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Abstract 
The topic of organised crime in relation to mass media is rather marginal in 
academic studies and this research is one of the first attempts to fill the gap. This thesis is 
based on Russian media coverage and many interviews with leading Russian experts, 
entrepreneurs and journalists. It analyses the relationship between the mass media and 
organised crime in post-Communist Russia. It aims to identify the place of these social 
institutions in the complex reality of this transitional country, to grasp some important 
features of their relationship, and to provide a framework for a further analysis. 
This thesis emphasises that the Russian news media have been increasingly 
involved in politics. It examines the media's role in relation to Russian power elites 
through the prism of the "symbolic method. " The symbolic method is defined as a means 
of exercising symbolic power that aims to impact the symbolic capital of parties involved. 
This research shows that organised crime reporting comprises significant part of the 
symbolic method and, as such, is an effective instrument of political confrontation. This 
makes the media attractive to organised crime groups, which are deeply embedded in 
Russian power networks, and results in the establishment of numerous ties between the 
mass media and the Mafia. 
This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the main features of 
the Russian media; Chapter 2 identifies the main types of Russian organised crime. 
Chapter 3 analyses weakness of the news media in the face of numerous methods of 
pressure from the power elites. This may explain the presence of ties between the Russian 
mass media and organised crime, which is illustrated in detail in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 
outlines numerous difficulties of organised crime reporting, and Chapter 6 offers an 
explanation of why these problems do not prevent the media from publishing 
investigative stories. The final chapter reviews the history of Russian investigative 
journalism and assesses its role as a watchdog of the public sphere. 
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Introduction 
This thesis examines the relationship between the mass media and organised 
crime. Crime stories have always been popular with audiences, which has led media 
organizations to satisfy demand with crime reports. There are numerous studies on the 
relationship between the mass media and crime. ' However, the relationship between the 
news media and organised crime in Russia has not been studied in detail yet. This topic is 
rather marginal in media research. This thesis is one of the first studies trying to fill the 
gap. 
It focuses on Russia and examines the period of last twenty years, since 1985. 
This country and this period are chosen not only because organised crime in Russia is 
very powerful and embedded in many social institutions, and not only because of the 
presence of numerous reports on organised crime and corruption in the Russian mass 
media. The main reason for this is the fact that it has been the time when two independent 
processes tarted in Russia, following the beginning of socio-economic reforms in Russia, 
pursued by M. Gorbachev and modified by B. Yeltsin. The first of these processes was 
the increase of the independency and power of the Russian news media. The second was 
the rise of organised crime that soon became very powerful force, threatening the Russian 
state, business people and politicians alike. 
It has been a period when the two growing powers tried to establish new relations 
between each other, relations that were based on their new roles and positions in 
transitional Russia. The role and status of the Russian mass media before this time were 
very different. The Soviet mass media was an ideological machine controlled by the 
Communist Party. Some sort of organised crime existed despite the ideological slogan 
that there was no organised crime in Soviet society. Nevertheless, organised crime had 
not been as multidimensional, widespread, visible and powerful as it became during 
Yeltsin's presidency. 
1 For example, Surette, 1- (1997) Media, Crime, and CriminalJustice Images andRealities. An International Thomson Publishing Company; Barak, G. (ed. ) Media, Progress, and the Social Construction 
of Crime, Studies in Newsmaking Criminology. New York & London: Garland Publishing, Inc; Hewitt K. D. 
and Osbom, R. (1995) Crime and the Media: The Post-Modern Spectacle. London. 
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This thesis examines various aspects of the newly established relationship 
between these two powers. First, it explains why the media has become attractive for 
criminal syndicates. Second, it assesses the arsenal of methods available to organised 
crime groups in order to put pressures on media organisations and compares it with the 
power of media's response. Third, it examines the connections of organised crime with 
the mass media. 
It should be noted that a full knowledge about the relationship between the 
Russian mass media and organised crime is unlikely to be achieved without a clear 
understanding of the place occupied by these two institutions in the complex reality of 
post-Soviet Russia. Consequently, one of the important objectives of this research is to 
embed the mass media, organised crime, and their relationship into a larger picture of 
Russian society on the verge of the third millenium. As a matter of fact, I regard this to be 
the most important asset of this research, because it gives us an opportunity to compare 
the developments of these two powers and to establish a solid base that can be used for 
further detailed studies of the relationship between organised crime and the media in 
post-Communist Russia. 
This thesis tests the following set of interconnected hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1. Russian organised crime is connected with economic and political 
elites in Russia; 
Hypothesis 2. The increased status of the Russian mass media is explained by its 
monopoly on the use of the "symbolic method", which is one of the major 
instruments in intense political competition between the power elites; 
Hypothesis 3. Crime coverage (especially reports on organised crime and 
corruption), which is an important part of the symbolic method, plays a very 
important role in the political campaigns; 
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Hypothesis 4. Because of that, organised crime (which is a significant component 
of the power elites) is interested in the news media, and it has established ties with 
some media companies. 
It is evident that quantitative methods are not especially useful for this research. 
Qualitative methods are more appropriate, but there is a problem of collecting 
information. At first glance, personal interviews are the most promising source, but they 
have several disadvantages, which are especially obvious in the study of the relationship 
between organised crime and the mass media. Drawbacks of personal interviews are not 
only problems of cost and time, which are frequently mentioned among major 
disadvantages of this method. 2 There are a number of other difficulties. 
The access to journalists is one of them. As it will be shown in this thesis, the 
status of the Russian mass media has significantly increased. Many journalists are 
regarded at least as important as politicians in Russia. In fact, many of the journalists 
have a higher esteem for themselves than for high-ranking officials and well-known 
politicians (including the Prime Minister and President). 3 Given that they are normally 
very busy, it is evident that to make an appointment for an interview with any of them is 
difficult. 
The major obstacle, however, is the problem of respondent's bias, which is 
strongly strengthened by the features of the research object. The topic of organised crime 
and corruption is dangerous to cover. Many examples show that respondents may risk 
their life. Furthermore, it is the topic that is not convenient to talk. The reputation of a 
media outlet can be negatively affected if this sort of information is disclosed. It means 
that we are unlikely to receive reliable answers from the respondents. 
In addition, the research should be based on clear and comprehensive information, 
for example, regarding the pressure on the mass media. Most people, including 
journalists, cannot remember everything, and, during interviews, are unable to give much 
needed details such as names and the time of some important events. Finally, if an 
2 Wimmer, R. and Dominick, J. (1994) Mass Media Research: An Introduction. Belmont: Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, p. 129. 3 For example, Tregubova, E.(2004) Bayki Kremlevskogo Diggera [A Kremlin Digger's Tales]. Moskva: Ad Marginem. 
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interview took place, the researcher is under invisible obligation not to reveal information 
that can hurt his source. In these circumstances, it is evident that personal interviews 
cannot be used as the main method for this study. 4 
Fortunately, there is no particular need for interviews. Very valuable data can be 
obtained from hard selective work of numerous printed sources. First, Russian journalists 
have recently published several books, in which they reveal much verified data about the 
5 
situation in the Russian mass media and their relationship with authorities. 
The second source is the media reports. From time to time j ournalists give 
interviews (to other prominent journalists) and reveal a lot of information that can be 
analysed and used for this research. In addition, there are reports in which the media 
disclose information about Russian media companies and journalists. This source is not 
particularly important in Western societies, where the media constitute an independent 
social institution. It is, however, an abundant source of data regarding the Russian news 
media. 
Third, a textual analysis of the media reports can give an insight into organised 
crime coverage in Russia. 6 It should be noted, though, that texts should be analysed in a 
broader framework. I adopt Fairclough's approach, which implies that text is the product 
of interaction between the processes of production and interpretation that are embedded 
into societal, institutional and situational context. 7 The knowledge of these contextual 
factors is important to understand the hidden mechanism of news production and 
relations within the mass media. 
These printed sources lack the drawbacks mentioned above. They are more easily 
verifiable. Furthermore, even if some media may sometimes twist their reports, this sort 
of data is generally more reliable than those obtained from personal interviews (the fact 
that it has been published shows that its authors are ready to be taken into court in order 
to defend their words). Finally, a researcher does not have direct or indirect obligations to 
the sources and is free to give his or her critical interpretation of the events. 
4 Interviews are important, of course, but they should be used only as a supplementary method. 5 For example, books by Borovik, Tokareva, Tregubova, Konstantinov, Vachnadze, and Vitaliev. 
'5 Some details can be found in Deacon, D., Pickering, M., Golding, P. and Murdock, G. (1999) 
Researching Communications. London: Arnold, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 132-161. 7 Fairclough, N. (1989) Language and Power. London and New York: Longman, p. 34. 
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Thus, the findings of this research is drawn from many sources, including an 
analysis of nearly one thousand publications on organised crime and corruption reported 
by the Russian and Western press, aired by the Russian nationwide TV channels, and 
published by leading investigative Internet news agencies. Although interviews have 
several drawbacks, they are still important for obtaining first hand data so I used 
information collected from twenty-five interviews with media researchers, Russian and 
British reporters, investigative j ournalists, representatives of Russian law enforcement 
agencies, politicians, and media managers. The interviews were conducted in London, 
Moscow and St. Petersburg, mainly from 2000 to 2003. The purpose of the interviews 
was to learn about respondents, reflections on Russian powerful elites and their relations 
with media organisations. Although the interviews were open-ended and depended on 
professions and positions of the individuals, I always tried to refer to their own 
experience in order to verify what they were saying. When I was not able to arrange a 
meeting with someone, I analysed the interviews given by him or her to other people. 
As I realised that any data associated with organised crime is based on many 
assumptions and indirect evidence, I used several sources so that I could triangulate. In 
addition to interviews, I have explored a great deal of survey material, Russian television 
programmes, the literature of political science, as well as media and organised crime 
studies. I also used my own observations on the work of journalists and their relations 
with power elites and the public. Most examples of this thesis are taken from the 
interviews that were confirmed by mass media publications. I used only the most reliable 
sources, such as the reports of the most respected Russian media companies and 
agencies! In some cases I have observed developments surrounding some personages of 
this thesis for several years. 
I used interviews as an opportunity to find out general opinions and estimates 
about what is going on in the Russian media community and to identify problems of 
journalistic work. When appropriate I always tried to move to facts and details such as 
names of people involved and timing. From my experience, it was difficult part for 
respondents, so I asked to indicate possible additional printed sources on any particular 
case. Then I searched for the recommended sources and studied them in detail. Such a 
8 For example, Newsru. com, Strana. ru, Inteifizx-ru 
- 
leading Russian news websites 
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procedure allowed me to collect primary data, which was accomplished, refined, and 
verified by secondary sources. 
The data collected has not been used randomly or uncritically. Even the 
information taken from interviews has not been taken for granted. Neither did I use data 
obtained from a source independently from the other information collected on the subject. 
Moreover, I tried to embed all facts into an institutional and societal context and to 
identify possible interests and incentives of parties involved. My ultimate goal was to 
combine all evidence into an internally non-controversial scheme that can be analysed 
from an academic perspective. 
This scheme is not a final academic verdict; it is rather a sort of report produced 
by a prosecutor, who has studied all evidence on a particular case and formed his vision 
of the event. It is known that prosecutor versions do not necessarily accurately reflect the 
reality and should be examined and verified by the court. Likewise, I propose my scheme, 
drawn from collected evidence, and expect its critical assessment and evaluation from 
Russian media experts and the world academic community. 
My key argument is that post-1 991, the Russian mass media became an important 
player in confrontation between powerful networks because of the increased role of the 
symbolic method due to a rise of democratic institutions and a decline of popularity of 
using coercive methods for economic and political benefits. This thesis defines the 
symbolic method as a means of confrontation aiming to downgrade the symbolic capital 
of the opponents. It should be noticed, though, that it would be a mistake to claim that the 
symbolic method completely overpowers the use of other available methods, which are 
also outlined in this study. It is more accurate to say that the symbolic method has 
occupied a very important place in the arsenals of confronting powerful networks, which 
made the mass media an attractive asset for organised crime and resulted in establishing 
ties between the media and the Mafia. 
The composition of this thesis is rather complex as it reflects the complexity of 
interdependence and interaction between Russian powerful elites, including the 
relationship between media companies and organised crime. Structurally, this thesis can 
hardly be broken into parts because all of its seven chapters are closely connected with 
each other, and, consequently, any separation is likely to undermine a number of 
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important ties between some of them. To demonstrate this and alleviate the task of getting 
through the text, I provide a scheme of ties between the chapters, shown in Figure 1.1. 
Chapter I and Chapter 2 introduce and describe in some detail the Russian mass 
media and organised crime, two main subjects of this thesis, which is vital for 
understanding the content of the entire thesis. The subsequent chapters explore various 
aspects of the relationship between media companies and organised crime. Chapter 3, 
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, while focusing on different features of the relationship, 
generally provide evidence on the ties, established between some Russian media 
organisations and criminal syndicates, and suggest an explanation of why the news media 
can hardly avoid being dominated by organised crime and other powerful elites. 
Chapter 6 explains why powerful actors are interested in ties with the media and 
provides a number of examples of how media organisations can be used for obtaining 
political benefits. The final chapter analyses the branch ofjoumalism that should aim to 
represent he right way of relations between the media and organised crime: Russian 
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Figure II Ties between Chapters in this Thesis. 
investigative journalism. However, it shows that Russian investigative j ournalism has not 
avoided deficiencies of other media networks and does not pay an adequate role in the 
reinstatement of the public sphere. 
The following sections of this introduction review the content of the chapters in 
more detail. Thus, Chapter I reviews the Russian mass media, its history, main 
developments, problems and actors. The first section of the chapter briefly reviews the 
period from 1917 to 1991 and shows that the development of the Russian news media at 
that period was greatly controlled by the political leadership of the Soviet Union. The 
relationship between the state and the media had been determined by Lenin's ideology of 
the dominance of the Communist Party over the political structure of the Soviet Republic. 
The media was seen as a tool that can be used by the leadership of Communist Party in 
order to explain its ideas and to dictate its will. Stalin, Khrushchev and Brezhnev slightly 
modified this approach so that it could help them to reach their own targets. 
The process of significant changes in the relationship between the mass media and 
the Russian government started during the Yeltsin era. Although Yeltsin tried to 
manipulate the media in first years of his presidency, progressively, the major Russian 
media organisations had been taken under control by the Russian oligarchs. The oligarchs 
is the group of richest men in Russia, who made their multi-billion pound fortunes during 
the privatisation of leading Russian state enterprises that was launched by Yeltsin. The 
oligarchs and their media companies helped Yeltsin to win the presidential election in 
1996. After that, however, the communication between the Russian state and the news 
media became greatly mediated by the oligarchs. 
After Yeltsin's resignation on 31 December 1999, Vladimir Putin, the new 
President of Russia, started reforms that have made a considerable impact on the Russian 
mass media. The last section of the chapter examines main trends of Putin's reforms and 
analyzes his policy towards the media. Although Putin always underlines his support for 
democracy and freedom of the press, some of his policies have been strongly criticised in 
the Western media. In particular, the Western media has condemned his position towards 
Gusinsky and Berezovsky, the two biggest former media moguls, who were forced to 
leave Russia after facing numerous charges ranging from fraud to tax evasion. 
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Chapter 2 explores Russian organised crime. It notes that the rise of organised 
crime was one the most serious problems of the Russian Federation in the mid- I 990s. 
The main purpose of the chapter is to review the structure and history of organised crime 
in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. The chapter suggests that it would be a mistake to view 
Russian organised crime as a lasting monolithic social phenomenon. On the contrary, it 
argues that Russian organised crime is a mix of different types of criminal networks, each 
of which has its own methods, structure, history, traditions and rituals. 
The first type is vori-v-zakone [thieves in law]. Thieves in law emerged during 
Stalin's rule and continue to be very powerful in Russia. The second type of organised 
crime is illegal entrepreneurs. This type encompasses entrepreneurs whose economic 
activities were illegal from the viewpoint of the Soviet Law. The administrative Mafia is 
another significant part of Russian organised crime. Finally, bandits, is a relatively new 
criminal type that has become one of the most dominant in Russia. 
The chapter describes each of these types and analyses their features, structure, 
significance and development. This structure is chosen because the history of organised 
crime in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia is an interaction of all above-mentioned types of 
the criminal underworld. The chapter shows that organised crime has embedded itself in 
almost all Russian institutions and is a considerable component of powerful elites. 
Why media companies are biased in their reporting organised crime is explained 
in Chapter 3. It argues that although there is an opinion that the media represents reality 
with little or no distortion, the content of media reports is influenced by a number of 
factors related to both the internal features of media industries and a diversified set of 
external pressures. The chapter analyses the range and power of these factors. 
The factors are broken into two big groups 
- 
internal and external factors. Internal 
factors are related to the media internal environment: the structure of mass media, the 
professionalism of media workers, missions of media organisations, their goals and 
ethical rules. Internal factors and their impact are described in the first section of the 
chapter. External factors are a set of coercive methods that can be used by external actors 
in order to force the news media to provide a required coverage of some events. I propose 
to include in the classification of external factors regulatory, administrative, economic 
(advertisement and other contracts), judicial, informative, symbolic, violent and law 
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enforcement methods. Their impact on media content is examined in the second section 
of the chapter. 
Although Russian media organisations are not as strong and independent as the 
mass media in some of the developed Western democracies, they have some resources 
that may allow them to resist external coercion. They are reviewed in the last section, in 
which I argue that the methods and resources of the media companies are not sufficient to 
resist effectively to the coercion of external powerful networks. 
Chapter 4 examines ties between the Russian mass media and organised crime. As 
it has been shown in the previous chapters, the Russian news media are very vulnerable 
to the pressures from powerful elites. No wonder that there are many examples of 
connections between the Russian media companies and criminal syndicates. 
The chapter argues that the owners of media companies is the social group that is 
most linked to the criminal underworld. It happens because criminal authorities are 
involved in legal business transactions and often try to hide their criminal background. 
The control of media organisations could allow them to diminish transaction costs for 
their commercial projects, improve their political status, and increase their chances of 
gaining political and economic advantages over the competitors. 
To a lesser extent, some executives of media companies are also involved in 
illegal transactions. The chapter shows that the complex reality of capitalist reforms 
encouraged some media executives to use their positions to seek opportunities for 
personal benefit. It is illustrated by several cases of corruption in St. Petersburg's 
Channel 5 and some dark transactions of Media-Most 
Numerous examples of the chapter attempt to prove the presence of various ties 
between organised crime and the mass media in Russia. Although any connections 
between organised crime and the media can hardly be appropriate for any normal society, 
the chapter points out that Russian media companies are involved in several forms of 
transactions with people or organisations that may be linked to organised crime. 
Chapter 5 examines the main problems encountered by Russian journalists, who 
report on organised crime 
-and corruption. It shows that reporting on organised crime is a 
dangerous activity. There is significant risk for journalists to be legally persecuted, to be 
injured or even killed during aj oumalistic investigation, after publishing the stories or 
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simply while convoying the people who might be linked with or tackle against organised 
crime. 
The chapter summarises the cases of threats, violence, and other criminal offences 
against journalists, including such serious crime as murder. Also, it shows the availability 
of legal action as a means of making life difficult for those who write and publish reports 
on organised crime and corruption. The chapter argues that Russian news media 
organisations and journalists should take into account many possible obstacles, 
difficulties and dangers before making a decision to start journalistic investigations or to 
publish stories on corruption and organised crime. In other words, the media should have 
very significant reasons to do so. 
Chapter 6 explains why the Russian mass media reports on organised crime and 
corruption in spite of encountering numerous problems. It argues that these reports reflect 
the changed role of the Russian media in the competition between powerful groups. The 
chapter refers to the extent of democratic values in Russia and points out that the negative 
media coverage of political opponents may give significant competitive advantage in a 
political campaign. The chapter shows that power elites use the negative media coverage 
frequently and organised crime reports have recurrently been a part of these political 
campaigns, influencing an erosion of the public sphere in Russia. 
The final chapter of this thesis focuses on the investigative jornalism in Russia, 
which is supposed to be a watchdog of the public sphere. The main task of investigative 
journalists is to alert the public when the boundaries between legal and illegal action were 
overstepped by some businessmen or politicians. Since many aspects of organised crime 
and corruption are on the boundary between legality and illegality, organised crime and 
corruption is the major concern of investigative journalism. 
The chapter not only examines the main trends of investigative journalism in 
Russia but also presents its major actors. It describes leading Russian investigative media 
organisations and journalists and reviews their biographies, methods and achievements. 
The first section focuses in a greater extent on investigative journalism in the press, the 
second section refers to the developments on television, while the final section reviews 
major investigative websites. 
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The chapter points out that connections with law enforcement agencies and 
organised crime is one of the features of investigative journalism in Russia. The chapter 
also shows that Russian investigative journalists are involved in political communication. 
Although managers of investigative media companies insist that their organisations are 
not politically motivated or financed, the reality of Russia does not allow them to stay 
away from power elites. 
In the conclusion, I summarise the main points of this thesis and make some 
recommendations to improve the situation. I suggest that the state media policy should be 
reconsidered so that news organisations become more independent and more protected 
from the pressures of power elites. I also suggest that the media system itself should be 
reformed and transferred to the larger control of the public. Otherwise, the media is at 
risk of continuing to be embroiled in the multifarious network of Russian organised 
crime. 
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Chapter 1 
The Russian Mass Media: Main Trends and Problems 
The role and the structure of Russian mass media have changed significantly over the last 
few decades. It has been quickly transformed from a vehicle of propaganda driven by the 
Communist Party into an independent force, which played a very important role in the 
fundamental restructuring of the political system of Russia. This chapter describes the 
main trends of this period of transition. 
The second aim of this chapter is to briefly present the structure of the Russian 
news media. It is not very different from the media structure in most countries: the press, 
radio, television and the Internet. However, because the Russian media system is weakly 
integrated in the world media system, a Western reader may face some difficulties in 
understanding the role and significance of one or another Russian media companies 
which are mentioned in this thesis. For this purpose, the chapter very briefly outlines the 
main developments of the components of the Russian media system and introduces the 
major actors in the Russian media market. 
First, this chapter briefly analyses the Soviet mass media. In the beginning it 
describes developments around the Soviet press under communist rule (before 1985). 
Then it shows the extent of Gorbachev's reforms and analyses their impact on the media. 
Main media developments during the Yeltsin era (1989-1999) are discussed in the second 
section. It was a very controversial and multidimensional period of Russian history, 
especially with regard to the news media. 
The relationship between the state and the media has considerably changed during 
Putin's presidency. The character of these changes and public response to those are 
summarised in Section 2.2. Finally, I refer to some analytic studies that tried to assess the 
role of the Soviet and post-Soviet mass media in the context of modernity. I shall argue 
that these studies have not succeeded in their evaluation because they failed to understand 
fundamentals of Soviet society. 
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1.1. The Soviet Mass Media (1917-1991) 
1.1.1. The Soviet Mass Media under the Communist Party 
-State Control (1917- 
1985) 
The mass media in Russia was under communist rule for more than 70 years. The 
ideology of communism made a significant impact on its structure and coverage. The 
Soviet model of media policy was developed by Vladimir Lenin and was not transformed 
significantly during the communist period (1917- 1985). It is based on the principle that 
the state under the control of the Communist Party must use the media to clarify and 
disseminate communist ideas. 
This section examines the main principles of the communist doctrine and their 
implementation in the practice of the Soviet mass media from Stalin to Gorbachev. First, 
it describes the model of relationship between the media and state and its transformation 
during this period. Then it shows developments of the main components of the Soviet 
media, which are the press, radio and television. 
1.1.1.1. Approach ofSoviet Leaders to the Mass Media 
Lenin was the most prominent of the Soviet leaders, whose ideas and actions had the 
strongest impact on the Soviet mass media. The underlining philosophy of Lenin's 
approach to the media was as follows: a world where the owners of plants and enterprises 
have all the power and wealth is not a just world. A revolution is necessary in order to 
destroy this injustice. The proletariat, that is workers, is the most revolutionary force. 
However, because of a lack of education, it needs guidance from the Communist Party, 
whose members include the most prominent workers, thinkers and experts. The mission 
of the Communist Party is to help the proletariat to seize power and to become the 
dominant social force. 
The state, although being an exploitative machine, can be employed by the 
Communist Party to ensure the victory of the proletariat. The media should be an 
important instrument to reinforce the state and the Communist Party to reach this 
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supreme goal. In other words, Lenin argued that the state under the control of the 
Communist Party should use the news media in order to clarify and disseminate 
communist ideas. 9 
Because the press was the main component of the mass media at that time, 
Lenin's theory focused on it. Lenin considered the newspaper as the centre of 
revolutionary action and thought. In his opinion, the newspaper was not only an 
institution but also a means of communication and persuasion. It was supposed to join 
people into a powerful social group. "The newspaper is not only a collective propagandist 
and collective agitator 
- 
it is also a collective organiser, " 
- 
was one of Lenin often quoted 
slogans. 10 Lenin's experience with Iskra [The Spark] helped him to realise the 
propagandistic potential of printed media, and he came to view newspapers as a vehicle 
for conveying the party line to members of the Bolshevik Party and to the masses. Lenin 
also highlighted the importance of control over personnel and supported the idea of 
censorship of newspaper content. " 
Although each successive Soviet leader had somewhat different views on 
socialism and communism in general, and on the role of the media in particular, each of 
their media policies remained based on Lenin's principles. Stalin did not considerably 
expand Lenin's theory of the press. In fact, he narrowed it. It could be said that his 
attitude towards the press resembled that of a battlefield commander's toward his 
subordinators. In Stalin's view, the press was a weapon of political confrontation: "The 
press is the most powerful instrument with which the party daily, hourly speaks with the 
labouring class in its own vital language. ,12 However, Stalin skilfully implemented some 
of Lenin's theories: it was he who built the Soviet mass media structure, incorporating 
purposefulness, dullness and conformity. 13 
Nikita Khrushchev, who was the Soviet leader from 1953 to 1964, did not 
contribute a lot to party's ideas on the Soviet media. However, in contrast to Stalin's 
9A good review of the Soviet model is presented by Brian McNair (McNair, B. (199 1) Glasnost, 
Perestroika and the Soviet Media, London: Routledge, Chapter 2 and Chapter 3). 10 Lenin, V. (1959) "S chego nachat" [How shall we start? ]. Polnoe Sobranie Sochineniy, Vol. 5, Moskva: 
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literaturi, p. 11. 11 Hollander, G. D. (1972) Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda 
Since Stalin. Praeger Publishers, p. 32. 12 Hopkins, W. M. (1970) Mass Media in the Soviet Union. New York: Pegasus, p. 74. 13 Ibid., p. 53. 
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intention of having a completely loyal media, Khrushchev expanded the range of the 
media's liberties, leading it to resemble a marketplace of ideas. Believing that a freedom 
of discussion could contribute to social development, Khrushchev allowed the media to 
be a relatively independent social force. In this sense, he turned the clock back to the 
1920's when the role and freedoms of the Soviet media were widely debated. However, 
this approach did not mean that the media became completely independent of the 
Communist Party. 14 
After Khrushchev had been ousted in 1964, the Party's grip on the media was 
restored. Brezhnev's team demolished even the very limited liberties which the Soviet 
news media had had during Khrushchev's time. It restored the party monopoly over the 
media and attempted to undermine dissemination of any views and ideas that were 
different from the official party doctrine. Gayle Hollander argues that the increased use of 
coercion, the cutback of foreign sources of information for the population, and the 
decreased access to information by foreign journalists concerning Soviet life indicated 
that the Soviet system continued the totalitarian model, which permitted some liberties in 
relatively unimportant matters but heavily relied on coercive means as far as its major 
values were concerned. 15 
1.1.1.2. The Soviet Media System 
The Soviet media system was large and multidimensional. Its main components were the 
press, radio and television. This section analyses them in depth. 
1.1.1.2.1. The Soviet Press from 1917 to 1985 
The day after the Bolshevik Party came to power on 7 November 1917, several Petrograd 
opposition newspapers were closed. According to Hopkins, 884 newspapers were 
published in Russia in 1918 (about 18 newspapers per 1,000 people). The average 
individual circulation was 3,100 copies with total output 2.7 million copies. There were 
14 Ibid., p. 54. 15 Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin, 
p. 195. 
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743 journals and magazines. By contrast, in 1913, there were 1,055 newspapers with a 
total circulation of 3.3 million issues (21 per 1,000) and 1,472 periodicals. 16 However, the 
party control over the press was relatively weak, especially outside main cities. 
In the 1920-30's the Communist Party tackled the disorganisation within the press 
and created a large network ofjournals and newspapers, which were available to almost 
all social groups in Russia. Stalin's main goal was to increase circulation and the number 
of newspapers and to extend the party dominance across the country, which he succeeded 
doing. The party made considerable investments into the Soviet mass media and stiffened 
its censorship and supervision. The number of newspapers increased from about 1,200 in 
1928 to 10,668 in 1934. Total circulation grew from 9.4 million to 34.7 million. These 
figures remained relatively stable until World War JI. 17 Table 1.1 represents the dynamics 
of the Soviet press during this period. 
Table 1.1 Soviet Newspaper Press: 1913 
- 
1953 
Year Number of newspapers Circulation (Millions) Average Circulation 
(Thousands) 
1913 1,005 3.3 3.3 
1918 889 1.7 3.1 
1922 803 20.5 3.2 
1923 528 2.2 2.6 
1928 1,197 9.4 7.9 
1932 7,536 35.5 4.7 
1933 8,319 35.7 4.3 
1934 10,668 34.7 3.3 
1935 9,990 35.7 3.6 
1937 8,521 36.2 4.2 
1939 8,780 38.0 4.3 
1940 8,806 38.4 4.4 
1945 6,455 23.2 3.6 
1947 7,163 31.1 4.3 
1950 7,831 36.0 4.6 
1952 8,299 41.7 5.0 
1953 7,754 44.2 5.7 
Source: Pechat SSSR za Sorok Let: 1917-195 7 [The Russian press duringAO years: 1917-1957), Moskva: 
Finansi i Statistika, p. 123; Pechat Rossff za 50 Let. - Statisticheskie Ocherki [The Russian press during 50 
years: statistical reports] (1967) Moskva: Finansi i Statistika, p. 132. 
'6 Ibid., p. 69. 17 Ibid., p. 92. 
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During World War II the numbers and circulation of newspapers and magazines 
dropped dramatically. For example, the circulation of Pravda decreased from 2 million in 
1940 to I million in 1944. By 1945 the total newspaper circulation decreased to 23 
million. After the war the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made an effort to revive 
the media and its structure was gradually restored. There were almost 8,000 different 
newspapers publishing a total of almost 170 million copies in the Soviet Union in 1970. 
Soviet newspapers were organised in strata. Nationwide newspapers, called the 
central press or All-Union newspapers, were at the top of the hierarchy. The second level 
included republic newspapers. Then there were the newspapers of provinces, cities and 
districts. The lowest level of the hierarchy was composed of the newspapers of individual 
factories and state agricultural firms. 18 
The main Soviet newspapers were: Pravda 
-a mouthpiece of the Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union; Izvestia 
- 
the organ of the government; Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 
-a mouthpiece of the youth organisation; and Trud - the organ of the trade 
unions. They had impressively large circulation figures: Pravda 
- 
circulation of over 10.5 
million copies annually; Izvestia 
- 
circulation of 8 million copies; Komsomolskaya 
Pravda 
- 
circulation of almost 10 million copies; Trud had a circulation of almost 8.5 
million copies. 19 
In a nationwide newspaper (such as Pravda) the first page normally contained an 
editorial, official news, as well as short domestic and foreign news stories. The second 
page was devoted to stories on the Communist Party. The next page published selected 
letters to the editor and domestic news. Page four presented foreign news, which 
normally focused on the situation in Communist countries. Reports from foreign 
capitalist countries were located on page five. All other stories such as humour, health 
advice and sports were placed on the back page. 20 
Most of the stories published were relatively outdated: only 15 per cent of 
newspapers reported events that occurred recently. 21 It was a direct outcome of the role of 
the media as an ideological instrument of the Communist Party which was supposed to 
18 Hollander, Soviet Political Indoctrination: Developments in Mass Media and Propaganda Since Stalin; 
Mickiewicz, E. P. (1981) Media and the Russian Public. New York: Praeger, p. 51. 19 Data for 1976. 
20 Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, p. 54. 21 Kaiser, R. G (1976) Russia: The People and the Power. Brattleboro, Vt.: Book Press, p. 236. 
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explain the party policy rather than entertain an audience. As the Soviet press was 
subsidised by the CPSU and the state, there was no advertising. The party believed that 
the mass media had enough finance and should not seek for additional financial support. 
The control of the CPSU forced the Soviet mass media to portray Marxism 
- 
Leninism. as the only one truly "scientific" theory and to dismiss oppositional views. 
Only a limited range of opinions was permitted. And the reports that expressed them were 
regarding relatively non-significant matters. Despite strong ideological control, some 
human interest stories were published in the Soviet press. However, even these stories 
highlighted communist values. 
Many usual topics for the Western media were not reported by the Soviet press. 
There was no information regarding celebrities and fashion in Soviet newspapers. Also, it 
was unlikely to find any advice on holiday travel. Astrology was seen as non-science and, 
consequently, no horoscope was published there. News of disasters and accidents were 
only slightly reported, crime and sensational stories went often unreported at all because 
they were on the list of the subjects prohibited from presentation in the Soviet 
newspapers. 
As Kaiser has correctly observed, the list of forbidden topics included 
"information about crime, drugs, accidents, natural disasters, occupational injuries, 
official organs of censorship, security intelligence, schedules of travelled for the political 
leadership, income and purchasing power structure at home and abroad, arms sales 
abroad, crime or morale problems in the armed forces, hostile actions against Soviet 
,, 
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citizens abroad, and special payment and education of athletes. 
1.1.1.2.2. Soviet Radio from 1917 to 1985 
Radio played a very important role in the early years of the Soviet era. Radio broadcast 
Lenin's first address to the citizen of Russia in October 1917. Regular radio broadcasting 
began in the 1920's. The first radio concert took place in 1922 and music became a 
considerable part of the content of radio programmes. Radio audiences constantly 
22 Ibid., pp. 243-44. 
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increased, especially after 1924, when several Soviet republics started regular radio 
transmissions. 
Although it remained relatively unexploited until after World War II, radio 
broadcasting made significant progress during this period. There were 60 operating radio 
stations with 1.3 million registered receivers in the Soviet Union at the end of 1933. By 
1940 these figures increased to 90 radio stations with about 7 million receivers. 23 
During World War Il radio broadcast was widely used in order to mobilise the 
Soviet population to fight against the German army. Radio was the main media channel 
to deliver the latest news of the war. Special radio programs were broadcast for people of 
occupied territories. 
After the war, radio continued to be an important propaganda tool and gained 
essential support from the Communist Party and the state. In October 1960, radio 
provided a 24-hours service with total coverage amounting to 78 hours. 24 However, at 
that time the importance of radio started to decline because of the progress made in the 
development of television. The main developments and the structure of Soviet television 
are reviewed in the next section. 
1.1.1.2.3. Soviet Television 
Soviet television had its origin at the beginning of the 1930s. Regular broadcasting was 
provided in 1939. At that time only one hundred television receivers were able to accept 
television programs, and those were located only in the Moscow oblast. 25 Further 
development of Soviet television was slowed by World War Il. Television gained a mass 
audience only in the 1960s. 
However, it expanded quickly after 1960. If there were only 4.8 million television 
sets in the Soviet Union in the 1960s, this number had climbed to over 55 million in 
1975.26 Colour transmissions started in 1967. In 1974, about 67 per cent of the families in 
the Soviet Union owned a television and 6 per cent of television sets were colour sets. 
23 Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union, p. 94. 24 Mehta, D. S. (1987) Mass Media in the USSR. Moscow- Progress Publishers, p. 59. 25 McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, p. 48. 26 Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, p. 18. 
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Broadcasts were transmitted through the network of television stations. There was 
the major television station in Moscow, and each of the 14 Soviet republics also had its 
television station. In addition, there were 109 television stations in large Russian cities 
and provincial capitals. 27 However, television programmes were not evenly accessible: 
while the European part was densely covered with central television networks, Siberia 
and the East had only local lines. 28 
The amount of broadcasting time grew steadily. For example, in the early days of 
Soviet television programmes were broadcast less than four hours a day. By 1975 the 
total air time of colour programmes on Channel I reached 60 hours a week 
. 
29 However, 
while the number of hours of programming increased, the Soviet government faced an 
unsuspected problem. Because communication lines could not provide equally wide 
dispersion of signals for several TV channels, some local television stations substituted 
central TV programmes (which they were unable to receive or amplify) by their own 
local programming. As a result, many Russian-language transmissions were replaced by 
programmes in local languages. In order to avoid the possibility of national tensions, the 
Union-Republic State Committee for radio and television under the Council of Ministers 
of the USSR was established in 1970.30 
In the 1980's there were four national TV channels in the Soviet Union. Channel 
I was the most important. It aired significant political and official programmes. Channel 
2 was devoted to local programmes. Channel 3 was educational. It carried lessons for 
schoolchildren and adult-education courses. Channel 4 broadcast shows, feature films, 
plays, and other entertainment programmes. 31 
The ideological potential of television was quickly recognized by leaders of the 
CPSU. Television broadcasting was supposed to support the Soviet ideological doctrine. 
Consequently, the content of television programmes was controlled and administered 
centrally. The chief executives of Soviet television were normally appointed by the 
27 Ibid., p. 19. 28 Gordon, L. A. and Gruzdeva, E. (1975) "Rasprostranenie i intensivnost chtenia v gorodskoy rabochei 
srede" [Extent and intensity of reading by workers in cities], Problemy Sotsiologii iPpsikhologii Chlenia. 
Moscow, p. 60. 29 Mickiewicz, Media and the Russian Public, p. 18. 30 Ibid., p. 19. 31 Ibid., p. 20. 
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Central Committee of the CPSU, and this fact alone shows how highly regarded was 
television in the Soviet Union. 
1.1.1.3. Summary of the State 
-Mass Media Relationship in 1917-1985 
The main element of relationship between the state and mass media was the dominance 
of the state. The media was regarded as an important instrument to help the Communist 
Party to reach its main goal 
- 
to help the proletariat to seize power and to become the 
dominant social force. This approach justified any use of coercive means against the 
media in the case if it disputed the truth of communist ideas or disagreed with the party 
policy towards the news media. 
The task of providing requested media coverage was sorted in several ways. Brian 
McNair has noted several methods that could be used for this purpose. The CPSU was 
empowered to grant licenses. It provided financial support and controlled the process of 
media policy-making. Furthermore, the Communist Party appointed chief editors of the 
Soviet mass media and supervised the training ofjournalists. Finally, if all these methods 
of influence were not sufficient, the party could use censorship, i. e., demanded to change 
or remove articles that did not satisfy the leadership of the CpSU. 32 
It should be noted that censorship did not play a very important role in the 
relationship between the media and the state. 33 For example, Antony Buzek correctly 
observed that although censorship was one of the major methods of control over the 
Soviet mass media, it was rather on the bottom of the hierarchy. 34 Lilita Dzirkals 
expressed a similar viewpoint by arguing that the Soviet news media was structured in 
such a way as to "necessitate limited direct intervention" of authorities. She pointed out 
that the censorship department played a relatively minor role in the process of regulating 
the content of media coverage in Russia. It was chief editors who worked out most of this 
job. 35 
32 McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, p. 49. 33 These comments are important to keep in mind while analysing the interrelation between the state and the 
mass media in Russia during all stages of its history. 34 Buzek, A. (1964) How the Communist Press Works. London: Pall Mall Press. 
35 Dzirkals, L. (1982) "Media Direction and Control in the USSR7, in J. Carry and J. Dasssin (1982) Press 
Control around the World. New York: Praeger, pp. 85-103; McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet 
Media, p. 50. 
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I. LZ Mikhail Gorbachev and the SovietMass Media 
This section analyses how the Soviet mass media and its relationship with public 
authorities were transformed during the Gorbachev era. Although the Communist Party 
continued to control the media during Gorbachev's leadership, there were very significant 
changes in the mass media coverage and policies. This section presents a brief outline of 
these changes. 
In April 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev claimed that many aspects of Soviet life should 
be modified. He wanted to change many social, political and economic realities of the 
Soviet Union and create a new, more democratic regime in the country. One of the major 
polices used by Gorbachev in order to revitalise Russia came to be known as Glasnost. 
The purpose of Glasnost was to make many previously hidden facts and data more 
transparent for the Soviet people. 
The news media was seen as the most important instrument for the 
implementation of this policy. The policy of Glasnost is thought to have been launched 
by an article published in Pravda, the major newspaper of the time, on 13 February 1986. 
The article included a letter from a reader, who expressed his view that "in discussing 
social justices, one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that the Communist Party, Trade 
Unions, [ 
... 
] and even Young Communist League officials intentionally deepen social 
inequality by taking advantage of all sorts of special refreshment bars and special 
,, 
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stores. In other words, the article disputed party privileges. It is worth mentioning, that 
it was published on the eve of the 27th Party Congress. According to Victor Afanasev, the 
chief editor of Pravda, it was this article that opened the era of Glasnost. 
As a result of the new policy, many topics became open for media coverage, 
including problems within the Soviet economy, dissidents, some historical events which 
previously had not been considered "desirable for discussioW', crime news, and disaster 
messages among others. It should be noticed that at the very beginning of the process a 
number of areas continued to be in the "forbidden zone", which included the direct 
criticism of communist ideology, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, and 
36 McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media, p. 54. 
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Lenin. However, little by little, the boundaries of permitted criticism expanded and even 
these major political figures became the legitimate target for a critical assessment. 
The changes in media policies demanded corrections of regulative norms. The 
new law regarding the mass media, the Law on Mass Information Media, was discussed 
during the 1 9th Party Conference and came into force on 12 July 1990. There were some 
changes in advertising policy. It should be noted that being financially supported by the 
Party-State, the Soviet media had not used advertisements to cover its expenditures. This 
changed during Gorbachev's leadership. Unfortunately, advertising in the Soviet mass 
media was less effective for covering expenditure than in the West because the Soviet 
media did not have adequate expertise. 
During Gorbachev's leadership, the popularity and power of the news media was 
speedily increasing. Many politicians, including Yeltsin, used the advantages of media 
coverage in order to accelerate their political careers. On the contrary, the failure of 
gaining positive media support is thought to have caused the collapse of Yanaev's putsch 
in 1991.37 The amplified power of mass media increased the popularity of the concept of 
the "fourth estate" among the Soviet journalists. This concept views the media as a strong 
and independent estate, along with the executive, judicial, and legislative. 38 Although 
Gorbachev had intended to use the news media in order to strengthen his own policies, in 
the end he was not able to control its independence and enormous power. 39 
To sum up the main principles of the transformation of the Russian mass media 
during this time, it should be noted that it obtained very significant rights. Although the 
media continued to be under significant guidance and financial support of the Communist 
Party, it continuously increased criticism of communist ideology and the policies of the 
Communist Party. This process was encouraged by the economic decline in Russia, the 
collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the growing split within the 
Communist Party, and the rise of legal private economic enterprises (cooperatives). This 
37 Zassoursky, 1. (2004) Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. Armonk, New York, London: 
M. E. Sharpe, p. 5. 3: Ibid., p. 11. 3 Ibid., p. 4 and p. 16. 
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triggered the growth of the independence of the mass media from the Central Committee 
of the CPSU and the state. 40 
1.2. Post-Soviet Mass Media (after 1991) 
LZ1. Russian Mass Media during Feltsin's Presidency 
1.1. Main Political and Economic Developments 
After being elected President of Russia in 1991, Boris Yeltsin encouraged further 
transformation of the mass media. Yeltsin, because of his dislike of commUniSM, 41 
initiated considerable socio-economic reforms that made an impact on the Russian media. 
The Russian government adopted a strategy of economic reforms that was recommended 
by the World Bank. One of the main principles of the programme was privatisation. 
Let us outline one of the cases of privatisation in Russia. Until 1993, the Russian 
telecommunications network had been entirely owned and controlled by the Russian Ministry 
of Communications. Local network operators were privatised in 1993. As a result of this 
privatisation, Rostelecom (the only nationwide network operator) and 85 regional 
telecommunications companies were established. In 1995, Svyazinvest was created as a 
company that consolidated governmental stakes in all of the 85 regional telecommunication 
companies. The Russian government held 51 per cent of Svyazinvest. The other shares were 
sold out to private investors. In July 1997, the Russian Government sold a part of its shares 
(25 per cent plus one share) of Svyazinvest for US$ 1.875 billion. 42 
As a result of privatisation, newspapers and broadcasting corporations changed 
their owners too. It is difficult to outline the common scenario of the privatisation of the 
mass media. In some cases, newspapers were privatised by their editors, managers and 
40 McNair, Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media; Mickiewicz, E. (1997) Changing Channels: 
Television and the Strugglefor Power in Russia, New York 
- 
Oxford: Oxford University Press; Gerol, I. 
and Molyneux, G. (19 8 8) 7he Manipulators, Stoddart: Gemol. 
41 It should be noted that Yeltsin was the former first secretary of the Moscow Unit of the CPSU for several 
years. 42 Koshkareva, T. and Narsikoulov, R. (2000) "Gazprom's Kokh on Gusinsky's Side", Gazeta. ru, 
12.01.2000, (URL http: //www. gazeta. ru/2000/12/01/GazpromsKokh. shtml, consulted in September 2003). 
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journalists. Nevertheless, the main trend did not differ significantly from the privatisation 
of the media in the majority of Eastern European countries. 
Colin Sparks has described this process and pointed out that there were several 
dissimilarities in the privatisation of television and the press. In particular, Sparks has 
noticed that newspapers were quickly and entirely privatised (maybe as a result of their 
relative insignificance) without any visible effect on readers. He has given an example of 
the privatisation of the press in Hungary: 
In early 1990, a unique method of depriving a publishing house of its newspapers and periodicals 
was invented in Hungary. All the journalists and editors of the single national sports daily, the 
single women's weekly, and all the satirical weeklies of the country abrogated their contracts of 
employment with the respected publishing houses on the same day and sign new ones with limited 
companies they had established collectively. They changed the names of the papers slightly and 
appeared on the market very soon. The papers of the new limited companies were delivered to 
subscribers without warning. 43 
The privatisation of the news media increased its independency to some extent. At 
least the media has become more independent from the Communist Party and the State. 
However, a question arises whether this allowed the Russian mass media to become 
completely independent. It could be argued that this did not happen because the mass 
media became dependent on finance. The reason for this is that the media was previously 
financed by the State. They had neither additional income from advertisements nor 
advertising expertise. When the Party-State suspended its subsidies to the news media, 
advertising revenue did not cover all media expenditure. 
Consequently, media organisations needed sponsors. Even though philanthropy 
was always popular in Russia, the financial support was normally given to media 
companies in the hope of making money from advertising. The second reason for an 
investment in the mass media was the intention to control media coverage of certain 
events. In other words, the political subordination of the media was replaced by a 
43 Sparks, C. (1998) Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media. London: Sage, p. 119, Galik and Denes (1992) From CommandMedia to Media Market: The Role offoreign Capital in the Transition ofthe 
Hungerian Media, Budapest University of Economics, p. 11. 
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politico-economic one. 44 This can be illustrated by Figure 1.1, which shows the 
difference between the Soviet and post-Soviet models of the relationship between the 
state and the media. 
Soviet Union (1917-1990) 
Party-State 
I 
Executives (Editors) of media companies 
I 
Reporters 6ournalists) 
Russia (1991-2000) 
President 
I 
Oligarchs (o 7 ers of media) 
Executives (Editors) of media 
I 
Reporters Ooumalists) 
Political Subordination Politico-Economic Subordination 
Figure 1.1 Comparative Structure ofState 
- 
Media Relations in the Soviet Union during 
Yeltsin's Presidency. 
It should be noted that together with the privatisation of existing newspapers a 
number of new private newspapers appeared, such as the dailies Nezavisimaia Gazeta and 
Segodnia. This does not mean that these newspapers were created from nothing. They 
employed correspondents from many respected dailies and used their publishing 
facilities. Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky became the owners of these 
newspapers. 
An important development during Yeltsin's presidency was the Law on the Mass 
Media. Adopted in 1991, it established many of the norms that appeared in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation two years later. The Law on Mass Media was very 
similar to Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In particular, it 
legislatively established the right for media companies to be privately owned. 
However, the law did not provide some essential definitions, including that of the 
ownership of a media organization, and this caused many commercial and political 
44 Nivat, A. (2000) "Russian presidential campaign coverage", The Harvard Journal ofPresslPolitics, Vol. 
5, No. 1, pp. 92-97. 
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disputes. Also, the absence of a law on broadcasting resulted in regulation of radio and 
television by governmental decrees and instructions, which impeded the free market 
development of the media and contradicted public interest. In addition, the Russian libel 
law was at odds with the practice of the majority of other countries. That is to say, it 
placed the burden of proof on the media 
- 
not on the plaintiff. Other laws guaranteeing 
the right to infonnation were not enforced. 
1.2.1.2 Media Structure in Yeltsin's Russia 
The media structure also changed significantly since the communist period. Russia was 
transformed from the "nation of readers" to the "nation of TV viewers. " This section 
briefly describes the main components and actors of the Russian mass media during 
Yeltsin's presidency. 
1.2.1.2.1. The Press in Yeltsin's Russia 
At the end of the Gorbachev era in 1990, the figures of the circulation of the major 
periodicals were as summarised in Table 1.2 and Table 1.3. 
Table 1.2 Circulation ofMajor Russian Newspapers in 1990 
Newspapers 
Argumenty i Fakti 31.5 million 
Komsomolskaya Pravda 20.3 million 
Trud 20.0 million 
Izvestia 9.4 million 
Pravda 6.4 million 
Selskaya Zhizn [Village Life] 5.7 n-0ion 
Semia [Family] 4.6 million 
Literatumaya Gazeta 4.2 million 
Sovetskaya Rossia 3.0 million 
Ychitelskaya Gazeta [Teacher's Newspaper] 1.2 million 
Krasnaya Zvezda [Red Star] 1.0 million 
Rabochaya Tribuna [Worker's Tribune] 800,000 
Ekonomika i Zhizn [Economics and Life] 600,000 
Sovetskaya Kultura [Soviet Culture] 500,000 
Source: Vachnadze, G. N. (1992) Secrets ofJournalism in Russia: Mass Media under Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin, Commack, N. Y.: Nova Science Publishers, p. 4. 
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Table 1.3 Circulation ofMajor Russian Magazines in 1990 
Magazines 
Ogonyok [Spark] 4.0 million 
Novy Mir [New Worldl 2.7 million 
Znamy [Banner] 900,000 
Molodaya Gvardia [Young Guard] 600,000 
Izvestia TsK KPSS [CPSU Central Committee News] 600,000 
Communist 500,000 
Zvezda [Star] 300,000 
Source: Vachnadze, G. N. (1992) Secrets ofJournalism in Russia: Mass Media under Gorbachev and 
Yeltsin, Commack, N. Y.: Nova Science Publishers, p. 4. 
It should be noted that although the number of nationwide newspapers increased 
significantly during Yeltsin's presidency, their circulation dropped remarkably, as shown 
in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 Russian Press in 1950-1998 
Year Number of 
peri dicals 
Total Circulation 
1950 23 9,423 
1970 28 62,364 
1990 43 110,810 
1998 245 32,914 
Source: Vartanova, E. (200 1) "Media in the post-Soviet Russia", Pro et Contra, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 66. 
Nonetheless, audience preferences did not change significantly. The data of 
VCIOM (All Russia Centre of Public Opinion Study), which is presented in Table 1.5, 
shows this. The respondents were asked to select the most interesting newspapers in their 
opinion. It is evident that there was little change in the popularity of the individual 
newspapers during Yeltsin's presidency. 
Table 1.5 Russian Favourite Newspapers 
Year Favourite Newspapers of Russia's Readership 
1991 AT, KP, Trud 
1992 AiF, KP, MK 
1997 AiF, KP, Speed-Info 
1998 AiF, KP, MK 
1999 AT, KP, MK 
Source: URL http: //www. polit. ru/documents/390969. htm], consulted in June, 2001. 
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In 1997 the main Russian newspapers were Centre Plus, Speed Info, Argumenti i 
Fakti (AiF), Extra M, Komsomolskaya Pravda (KP), Trud, Economika i Zhizn, and 
Moskovshy Komsomolets (MK). Their types and circulation are presented in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 Russian Press in 199 7 
Publication Type Circulation 
1. Centre Plus Shopper 5,000,000 
2. Speed Info Racy tabloid 3,820,000 
3. Argumenti i Fakti Weekly 3,390,000 
4. Extra M Shopper 2,900,000 
5. Komsomolskaya Pravda Daily 1,547,000 
6. Trud Daily 1,400,000 
7. Economika i Zhizn Business weekly 1,200,000 
8. Moskovsky Komsomolets Daily 1,000,000 
9. Sport Express S orts daily 850,000 
10. Izvestia Daily 630,000 
11.7 Days TV, personalities 450,000 
112. Segodnya Daily 100,000 
113. Nezavisimaia Gazeta Daily 50,000 
Source: Data of The Washington Post Company, 1997. 
1.2.1.2.2. Russian Television duriniz Yeltsin's Presidency 
Television played an increasingly important role during the Yeltsin era. There could be 
two reasons for this. First, access to television was enormously extended, which can be 
illustrated by the data that the population of the former Soviet Union had 93 million 
television sets. The second reason (which is largely dependent on the first) is that TV 
coverage became a very important political resource, helping to win elections. In 1992, 
television replaced the press as the main source of information (79 per cent of Russian 
45 population more relied on the press in 1979). 
Information about the main Russian TV channels during Yeltsin's presidency 
(and at present) is surnmarised in Table 1.7. 
45 Tolz, V. (1993) "The New Role of the Media and Public Opinion under Mikhail GorbacheV', The 
Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 192-209. 
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Table 1.7 Russian Nationwide TV Channels 
Network/ Audience Share 
National Number of Affiliates 
Distribution receiving Hours Owners 
Channel Method signal /day 
satellite, 51% state 49% ORT microwave, 94.7 49.5 20 private investors transmitter 
1 
satellite, 
RTR microwave, 93.6 14.0 20 100% state 
transmitter 
satellite, 100% private NTV NA microwave, 54.2 11.7 20 investors transmitter 
65 in 1996, though 
Petersburg 5 many affiliates did not microwave 60.2 2.4 100% state 
renew in 1997 
TV6 300 cities in CIS satellite, 6 61 6 1 
15 by I 100% private 
transmitter . . satellite investors 
8 hours/ 
REN- 62 in Russia also workday 
TV/NVS , other CIS states satellite 
29.0 1.3 9 Private investors 
hours/wee 
kend 
2x2/AST/MT 75 in CIS microwave, 23 0 0 4 16-18 Private investors, K satellite . . j Bank Moskva 
CTC/StoryFir 8 stations owned 76 
7 hours/ StoryFirst Corp. 
st (their 
figures Of affiliate stations 
in satellite 27.4 2.8 workday 9 hours/ with capital from 
3/97) Russia weekends Western investors 
All n& Co. Inc. 
TV3 Russia St. Petersburg and 10 satellite NA 10 
(USA), Botts and 
regional affiliates Co. (50%), Russian 
government 
Source: "A Survey of Russian Television", Internews. ru, 1998. 
ORT- the first Russian TV channel. According to various estimates, ORT 
had a potential audience from 141 to 200 million viewers. This biggest Russian 
television channel has had several names. During the Soviet period it was called 
the Central Television. Then it was renamed Channel 1. In 1991, the government 
of Russia gave it another name 
- 
Ostankino. Ostankino was under the control of 
the state television company Ostankino TV. 
In 1995, the privatisation of Russian television led to the establishment of 
the company ORT (Russian Public Television). The state continued to own 51 per 
cent of ORT. However, the other 49 per cent was distributed among Russia's 
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financial corporations and media companies. Ostankino, TV, ITAR-TASS 
Information Agency, the National Sport Fund, Gazprom, Logovaz, Mikrodin, 
Obedinenny Bank, Stolichny Bank, Menatep Bank, National Credit Bank and 
Alfa-Bank became its shareholders. The name of the channel was changed in 
accordance with the name of this company. 
Although the government was the largest shareholder of ORT, this channel 
had huge losses. It was interpreted as a result of the lack of financial support from 
the state. For example, in 1996, the State Duma refused to transfer any money 
from the state budget to ORT because the Duma believed that ORT was 
completely controlled by Yeltsin. 
ORT is one of the largest Russian corporations. Its annual budget from 
1995 to 1997 was nearly US$ 250,000,000. A third of the budget was spent for 
signal delivery and a third was used for programme purchases. ORT was 
supposed to maintain its nationwide infrastructure that included eight satellites, 
almost 9,000 transmitters, 7,000 receiving stations, and 220,000 km of terrestrial 
communications. 
As the government did not financially support ORT at that time, this TV 
channel began to rely on advertising revenue and investments from shareholders. 
The financial flow from its shareholders, who were Yeltsin's supporters, allowed 
ORT to exist without state subsidies and to be independent from the Russia's 
Duma. At the same time, some of the shareholders received huge political benefits 
from their investment. For example, Boris Berezovsky, who financially supported 
ORT and owned 16 per cent of the shares of this television company, helped 
Yeltsin to be re-elected in 1996. After the election, Berezovsky joined the Russian 
government. 
At the end of Yeltsin's presidency, although the financial situation in ORT 
improved because of private investment, advertising revenue (US$ 24,000-30,000 
per minute), and governmental subsidies, ORT continued to need additional 
finance. It was claimed that this television company was in risk of losing some of 
its personnel due to financial difficulties. In this situation, some managers called 
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for the complete privatisation of ORT and for its entire independence from the 
state. 
RTR 
- 
the second biggest nationwide channel in Russia. Soon before the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin insisted that Russia had to have its own 
television station that would be independent from Soviet television, which 
covered the whole territory of the former Soviet Union. After the 1991 coup, 
Channel 2 was replaced by Russian TV. Officially this channel was named as The 
All-Russian State TV and Radio Company (VGTRK, the Russian acronym), but it 
is commonly known as RTR. 
RTR was able to reach 98.7 per cent of the Russian population. It had five 
satellites and nearly 5,000 transmitters. Radio Rossii, one of the three major 
Russia's nationwide radio stations, also belonged to RTR. 
Although RTR was completely state owned, it was not entirely subsidized 
by the government. For example, RTR received only 30 per cent of its budget 
from governmental subsidies in 1996. The rest of the essential fanding was taken 
from commercial activities and advertising. 
Even though RTR was entirely owned by the state, many experts believed 
that this channel was one of the most independent in Russia. For example, Yassen 
Zasoursky thinks that VGTRK and RTR were in effect more independent than the 
private commercial channel NTV. 
St. Petersburg Channel 5- the only nationwide channel that was located 
outside Moscow. It had a potential audience of 90 million. It was separated from 
Gosteleradio in 1991, after the coup. Although Yeltsin attempted to transform this 
channel into a "presidential channel" in 1993, this project was not supported by 
the State Duma. 
NTV- the first Russian private TV company. It was established in October 1993 
by Igor Malashenko, Oleg Dobrodeev and Evgeniy Kiselyov, and financially supported 
by Gusinsky. NTV started its broadcast with own news programmes (Segodnia and Itogi) 
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on St. Petersburg Channel 5 and on Channel 4 (fon-nerly the Russian educational 
channel). In 1996, the presidential decree gave NTV the entire TV channel. It is believed 
that this was done because of NTV's support for the Yeltsin presidential campaign. 
NTV had over 15 transmitters and reached the 100 million audience in 
European Russia, Kazakstan, the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine. Largely because of 
its independent and high quality news programmes, NTV was especially popular 
in Moscow and in European Russia. However, NTV's reputation decreased after 
its support of Yeltsin's re-election presidential campaign. 
Many other small non-governmental television companies appeared during 
Yeltsin's presidency. According to various estimates, their number was between 
500 and 750. For example, according to the Federal Service of Radio and 
Television Broadcasting (FSTR), the broadcast licensing body, nearly 640 stations 
had licenses to broadcast. Eighty stations had licenses to operate cable 
television. 46 
LZZ The Russian Mass Media during Putin's Presidency 
After Yeltsin's resignation, Vladimir Putin, the new President of Russia, started reforms 
that made a considerable impact on the Russian mass media. Although Putin highlights 
his support for democracy and freedom of the press, some of his policies towards the 
media have been strongly criticized in the Western media. In particular, he was suspected 
of launching prosecution campaigns against Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky, 
the two biggest media moguls, who left Russia after facing charges of tax evasion and 
fraud. This section examines the relationship between the Putin government and the 
media. 
First, it briefly describes dimensions of Putin's reforms and assesses the impact of 
his policy on the Russian news media. Then, it addresses the issue whether the current 
Russian government aims to undermine the freedom of speech. In order to avoid personal 
46 "A Survey of Russian Television! ', Internews. ru, 199 8 
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judgments in this controversial dispute, I shall present only facts, figures, and views of 
politicians and journalists. As the structure of the Russian media has not changed 
significantly during Putin's presidency, it is not examined in detail. 
1.2.2.1. Putin's Career 
Yeltsin resigned on 31 December 1999. Vladimir Putin, Yeltsin's chosen successor, was 
elected the Russian President three months later. This section briefly describes his career. 
Putin worked for the KGB, the Soviet security service, and served as a spy in Germany 
for several years. After the collapse of communism in 1991 he was invited by St. 
Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, his university supervisor, to work in the 
Administration of St. Petersburg. Sobchak was not re-elected in 1996, and Putin decided 
to leave his post in the Administration of St. Petersburg. Being recommended by Anatoly 
Chubais, the former Vice-Premier of Russia, for a job in the presidential administration, 
Putin moved to Moscow and quickly became a member of the Yeltsin inner circle, known 
as the "family. " 
By March 1997 Putin was appointed the deputy head of the Presidential 
administration and in July 1998 the head of the FSB, the successor of the KGB. Even in 
this important post Putin was little known to the wide public. For the time being he 
preferred to stay a "grey cardinal", a man who wields power quietly, behind the scenes. 
Nevertheless, in August 1999, he was appointed the Prime-Minister of Russia and 
quickly showed himself as a man of action. His popularity soared during the new 
Chechen war. In response to terrorist actions by Chechen militants in Moscow and in 
Dagestan, Putin ordered the Russian army to invade Chechnya and defeat the rebels. 
After Putin was elected Russian president in 2000, the political stability in Russia 
was restored and the economy showed signs of revival. In addition, Putin was regarded 
by leading world leaders as a legitimate and competent ruler and Russia regained its 
status of a powerful state. Putin's achievements were so evident that had no real 
challenger in presidential election in 2004 and was re-elected. 
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1.2.2.2. Putin's Views and Reforms 
Putin's political credo was not clear for the majority of experts for a long time. Despite 
his image as a strong man, Putin is supported by many Russian liberals and reformers. He 
says that he is in favour of a market economy, but one that is adapted to Russian 
conditions. On the one hand, Putin criticises Soviet leaders because they failed to make 
the USSR a free or flourishing country. On the other hand, he does not approve many of 
the policies of post-Soviet reformers. He thinks that they made a number of avoidable 
mistakes. 
Nevertheless, Putin argues that the mistakes and controversies of the previous 
Russia's rulers might be forgiven because they are less important than the political 
stability in Russia. He is in favour of the establishment of a political consensus. For this 
purpose, Putin maintains close relations with many of liberal reformers, the communist 
majority of the State Duma, the previous president Yeltsin, and his predecessor 
Gorbachev. 
There are many contradictions in such a search for political compromises among 
so many different political groups. As a result of this, Putin's policy seems to stick 
together the incompatible. For example, although being devoted to democratic values, he 
insists that Russia should have a strong, paternalistic state. 47 To his mind, Russia is not 
yet ready for classical liberalism, and would not soon, if ever, come to resemble the USA 
or the UK. Putin believes that the strong state is a necessary basis for economic 
prosperity and democratic reforms. However, the state and officials should act on the 
basis of the law and there should be limits of the state intervention into socio-economic 
processes. 48 
It is evident that this definition of the state's rights and responsibilities, given here 
in a brief outline, can hardly avoid encountering serious contradictions. Some critics 
emphasise the difference between the Russian approach and the western understanding of 
47 "'Vmeste mi smozhern izmenit nashu zhizn': Rech Putina na tseremonii vstuplenia v dolzhnosf' (2000) [Together we will manage to change our life: Putin's inauguration speech], Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 
11.05.2000, p. 1. 49 Ibid. 
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the rule-of-law state. For example, Michael Thumann, a journalist for Die Zeit, claims 
that in Russia, dictatorship of the law is subordinated to political objectives. He argues, 
Putin has established in Russia an autocratic rule, skillfully camouflaging it by the idea of the rule- 
of-law. The Prosecutor's Office operates as if it was part of the Kremlin's legal department. It 
starts proceedings and it discontinues them subject to a political order. The Kremlin and its easily 
manageable the Council of Federation appoint the State Council, which, if necessary, can always 
be disbanded. As a result, the executive authorities, together with the law enforcement bodies, 
create the illusion of a rule-of-law state while browbeating that part of the Moscow elite, which is 
disloyal to the existing regime. 49 
1.2.2.3. Putin's Policy towards the Mass Media 
The contradictions in Putin's state doctrine are especially visible in his policy towards the 
mass media. 50 Putin always highlights the importance of freedom of the press. "Freedom 
of speech is a basic value of democracy in Russia, " he said in his inauguration speech, 
and pointed out that the Russian news media should play a very important role in the 
development of a civic society in Russia. He repeatedly underlined his support for a law 
that would prohibit censorship and any intervention into media activities in Russia. 
Despite this, some opponents blame him for the attempt to return to the 
communist dominance of the state over the mass media. An example of state pressure on 
the media could be seen in the establishment of a new "rapid response group", headed by 
Simon Kordonsky, formerly the chief of expertise in the Presidential Administration. 
According to the newspaper Segodnia, this group should control media coverage and 
discredit the oppositional media organisations. 51 
49 Thumann, M. (2001) Strana. ru, 17.11.2001, (URL 
http: //eng. strana. ru/state/Presidency/2000/11/17/974470547. html, consulted in November 200 1) 
Note: a lot of references of this section is based on stories published by the news server Strana. ru. This is 
because I regard its reports on those particular events as presenting viewpoints of all sides involved. It was 
not done deliberately, because I analysed reports by many other news servers, such as lenta. ru, deadline. ru, 
gazeta. ru, ntv. ru, polit. ru, grani. ru and some others. However, it happened that the most relevant materials 
for this section were published by Strana. ru. 50 See, for example, Lipman, M. and McFaul, M. (200 1) "'Managed democracy' in Russia: Putin and the 
p1rese', The Harvard Journal ofPressIPolitics, Vol. 6, No. 3, p. 12 1. 
Warshavchik, S. (2000) Deadline. ru, 22.09.2000. 
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The state effort to get back the dominance over the media could be seen in 
launching the major news website Rian. ru on I January 2001. It was supposed to be 
jointly produced by RTR, Radio Rossii, Mayk and Golos Rossii, all of which were under 
the state control. 52 There were frequent rumours regarding growing Kremlin's secret 
funding of selected news media organisations. 
At the beginning of Putin's first presidency, many his critics expected that the 
Kremlin would try regain control over all three nationwide television channels 
- 
RTR, 
ORT and NTV. Whether this was Putin's wish or not, all these TV channels became 
strongly controlled by the government by 2004. 
RTR has always been in the governmental property, and it took little effort to 
make RTR to be even more loyal to the new leadership of Russia. Two other channels 
were privately owned and it was more difficult to convert them to a state-run concern. 
Nevertheless, this has been done in a short period of time. 
As far as ORT is concerned, the presidential team succeeded in wresting it from 
the hands of Berezovsky. Berezovsky, the major owner of ORT, was forced to leave 
Russia after being charged with tax evasion and money laundering, and sold his 49 per 
cent stake to an unknown investor, allowing the state to restore its full control over this 
major TV company. 
Vladimir Gusinsky, the head of NTV and Media-Most, is believed to have 
encountered considerable pressure from the presidential administration. On 13 June 2000, 
the Russian Prosecutor's Office issued a sanction for his arrest. Gusinsky was accused of 
fraud, committed during his purchase of a state-owned TV channel, and of the withdrawal 
of the company's mortgaged assets. Having spent three days in custody, he was 
unexpectedly released after leaving a written undertaking not to leave the country. 
Soon the criminal case against Gusinsky was suspended and he was allowed to go 
abroad. In September 2000, it became known that this was caused by his agreement to 
sell his Media-Most along with NTV, to Gazprom, the richest Russian energy company. 
52 SmLru, 05.12.2000, (URL http: //www. smi. ni/2000/12/05/976028386. html, consulted in December 2000). 
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Thumann, Die Zeit analyst, claimed that Gusinsky was also required to "take care not to 
,, 
53 discredit Russia's leadership through the dissemination of unpleasant information. 
Although Putin often underlines his respect for freedom of the press, many media 
companies found it suspicious that the Russian Prosecutor's Office resumed the 
investigation into Media-Most after Gusinsky had breached the above-mentioned 
agreement with Gazprom, announced the deal void, and initiated new negotiations with 
the company. Even though Vyacheslav Soltaganov, the head of the Federal Tax Police 
Office, argued that the Prosecutor's Office had enough evidence to prove Gusinsky's 
crime, 54 it was not convincing for the Western audience. 
Gusinsky was repeatedly summoned for interrogation and he decided to leave 
Russia. After Russia's request Gusinsky was placed on the wanted list of Interpol and 
arrested by Spanish police on 12 December 2000. Russia asked to extradite Gusinsky, 
and the Russian Prosecutor's Office claimed that it provided the Court in Spain with all 
required evidence to prove his guilt. 
On the other hand, Gusinsky's lawyers and supporters claimed that his case had 
been politically motivated, and that the government of Russia attempted to take 
Gusinsky's media empire under control. Three month later, the Spanish Court decided 
that allegations against Gusinsky had political motives behind them, and he was finally 
freed on 17 March 2001.55 
Despite this verdict, the conflict between Gusinsky's Media-Most and Gazprom, 
Russian gas monopoly, in which the Russian state is the biggest shareholder, resulted in 
Gazprom's gain of the controlling stake in NTV. The former executives of NTV were 
replaced by the managers approved by Gazprom. 
The process of regaining the governmental control over Russia's major TV 
channels has been widely reported by the mass media both in Russia and abroad. Nikolay 
Ulyanov, an observer of Strana. ru, has described it in such a way: 
53 Thumann, M. (2000) Strana. ru, 17.11.2000. 54 "Glava FCHP: 'Spokoynie nochi dlia nashih kapitalistov konchilis... [Head of FTPO: '7he quiet nights 
for our capitalists are over"], (URL http: //Ienta. ra/russia/2000/11/14/soltaganov/, consulted in November 
2000). 
55 Nevertheless, Gusinsky is likely to be arrested if he returns to Russia. 
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Today Russia is witnessing a large-scale re-division of property in media space, mostly in its 
television sector. This is explained, on the one hand, by the Kremlin's desire to regain control over 
the production complex, which was publicly owned in the former USSR, but ended up, in the 
Yeltsin period, in the hands of several oligarchic groups, whose property rights were rather 
dubious from the legal perspective. 
The majority of the Russian population seems to look at media oligarchs with a bitter 
hostility. For example, it is hardly possible to expect from an average Russian to be well disposed 
to Gusinsky when his NTV run complementary interviews with Shamil Basayev, one of the 
Chechen terrorists, who had butchered thousands of Russian servicemen and civilians. Putin 
played on this sentiment during his presidential campaign, declaring that the oligarchs would be 
"equidistanf' from the authorities. 56 
The increasing interest of the Russian state in the media can be illustrated by the 
following. The Ministry of the Press and Information proposed to improve broadcasting 
in Russia. According to newspaper Segodnia, the Ministry planned to recreate the state 
broadcasting company Gosteleradio and then privatise a 49 per cent stake in this 
company. Gosteleradio was supposed to be managed by the Council, which would consist 
of the representatives of the president and municipal authorities. Another "public 
council", including members of the Duma, the Council of Federation, and prominent 
representatives of arts and sciences, would be the "watchdog" of this corporation. 
This project also suggested the establishment of the state company RTRC 
(Russian TeleRadio Communication) which would unite all television stations in Russia 
on the basis of Telecom Ostankino). Eighty-eight new regional broadcasting companies 
would be established in Russia, each under an initial 100 per cent state ownership. Then 
these companies would be privatised and 49 per cent would be sold out. In order to 
contribute to the state policy, the broadcasting corporation was expected to coordinate its 
programmes with higher executive authorities 
- 
i. e., the Ministry of the Press. It is not 
clear, how much of this project came to be true. However, at the beginning of December 
2000, Putin met Lesin, the Minister of the Press, and Leonid Reyman, the Minister of 
Informatics and Communications, discussed these proposals, and agreed with many of 
them. 
56 Ulyanov, N. (2001) "Media market shake-up to restore public control over televisiore', Strana. ru, 
11.01.2001, (URL http: //eng. strana. ru/stories/2001/01/11/979217054/97922653O. html, consulted in 
November2001). 
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Apparently, Putin tries to diminish controversies of his policy by strengthening 
the state control over national television and promoting entire independence of the private 
printed media and radio stations. However, even such a restricted dominance (if the 
Russian state will impose state control only over TV channels) would mean a threat to the 
freedom of speech. Ulyanov argues that the Soviet history showed that a state supervisor 
of a television company would act as a censor seeking to present news in a way most 
desirable for the authorities. 57 The next section aims to examine whether Putin's policy 
resulted in undermining the freedom of speech in Russia. 
1.2.2.4. Does Putin's Policy Abuse the Freedom ofSpeech? 
Television propaganda is increasingly regarded as the most valuable resource for political 
campaigns since television audiences are larger and the format of TV reports leaves a 
smaller chance for the public to probe their accuracy. No wonder that some Western 
politicians admit that "where voters are concerned 
... 
one TV picture is worth 10,000 
words. "58 Television coverage is even more important in Russia because newspapers 
become less affordable for a considerable part of the Russian population, while watching 
TV broadcasts is free. 59 As the value of television's propaganda is more significant than 
that in the press, Putin's policy caused growing fears of undermining freedom of speech 
in Russia. This problem is widely debated in Russian society and is examined in depth in 
this section. 
Let us start with the events relating to NTV. Kiselyov, Gusinsky, and some 
reporters of this TV company repeatedly emphasised that all action of Gazprorn towards 
NTV is an attempt by the Russian state to gain control over the independent TV channel 
which had different views in its coverage of some current state policies, in particular the 
Chechen war. Mikhail Berger, the editor of the daily Segodnia, said the conflict around 
NTV is "another phase of the war waged by the state and Gazprom, which have their own 
57 Ulyanov, N. (2001) "Media market shake-up to restore public control over television", Strana. ru, 
11.01.2001, (URL http: //eng. strana. ru/stories/2001/01/11/979217054/979226530. html, consulted in 
November 2001). 
58 Tiffen, R. (1989) News and Power. Sydney: Allien & Unwin, p. 90 
'9 Russians do not need to buy TV licenses in order to watch main nationwide channels. 
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interests here, against the TV company, which is not liked by the authorities and gets on 
their nerves by being audacious and informative. " In his opinion, the conflict was "a 
serious threat to the freedom of speech. 9960 
To some extent, such a viewpoint on the Gazprom-NTV conflict was supported 
by some Russian and Western media companies. For example, The Los Angeles Times 
wrote that the Russian State wanted to gain control of NTV in order to prevent the 
broadcast of its anti-Kremlin perspective on current events. 61 
Viktor Loshak, editor-in-chief of Moskovskiye Novosti, a popular Moscow 
newspaper, argues that the authorities do not want to hear different opinions. He has 
noted that there was no word regarding the media and the freedom of information in the 
message of president Putin to the Federal Assembly. "But the paradox is that NTV 
exactly repeated the statements made by the authorities 
- 
to listen and broadcast only 
what is necessary and pleasant for itself, " Loshak said. 62 
Some Russian politicians agree with this. Grigory Yavlinsky is one of them. The 
Central Committee of his party Yabloko claimed that it would consider events around 
NTV and other structures of Media-Most as a political action. According to the resolution 
of this party, signed by Yavlinsky, Media-Most had become "a suitable target for the 
state authorities to show their power, which helps to draw attention from the problem of 
the inability of Russian law enforcement to combat real criminals and corruption. " 
Yabloko accepted that NTV had financial difficulties. Nevertheless, Yabloko thought that 
"if the only independent national TV channel is to be controlled by the Kremlin, Russia 
will be thrown back to the era of the state TV monopoly.,, 63 In other words, the set of 
actions against NTV was regarded as a state attempt to undermine the freedom of the 
press in Russia. 
60 Strana. ru, 06.04.2001, (URL http: //russia. strana. ru/stories/2001/04/06/986548288/98655759O. html, 
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consulted in June 2001). 
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Sergey Markov, the director of the Institute for Political Studies, is to some extent 
of a similar opinion. He feels that the NTV situation stems from the differences between 
the political positions of the Kremlin and Gusinsky. Markov said: "NTVs ideology 
contains two basic components: a radical orientation toward the West (something the 
Kremlin might accept) and hatred for their own state (something the Kremlin will not put 
up with, considering that it has adopted the ideology of liberal patriotism). " According to 
Markov, until 1999 "Gusinsky's political views coincided with the Kremlin's political 
contract, and during that time the head of Media-Most was able to accumulate vast 
resources and built a highly professional TV channel. However, when the lines of the 
Kremlin and Gusinsky diverged, resources for a political contract were withheld from 
him and, naturally, he ran up a fairly large amount of debt. " 
However, the viewpoint that the NTV events in April 2001 have resulted from an 
attempt by the Russian State to undermine freedom of the press has a great number of 
opponents among many Russian officials, politicians and journalists (including even 
some journalists of NTV). Some of them believe that this is only a personal conflict 
between Gusinsky and Putin. For example, Igor Bunin, the director of the Centre of 
Political Technologies, pointed out that both have "made a mistake: on the one hand, by 
putting personal (interests) before state (interests), and on the other hand, by putting 
personal interests before the interests of the company. And it was only at a later stage 
when the conflict had already emerged that people, pursuing not quite immaterial 
objectives, joined the conflict. As a result of this, a political conflict turned into a 
,, 
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commercial conflict and a conflict of interests. 
Many of the opponents have argued that the wide public talks around the decision 
of NTV shareholder's meeting should be explained by Gusinsky's intention to sell his 
stake in bankrupting NTV to ensure his personal welfare in the future. Still others have 
emphasised that NTV rebel leaders were not afraid of crackdown of free speech. What 
they really feared was an audit of their financial activity. 
It is possible to note the comments of several chief editors of major Russian 
newspapers on the situation at NTV, published by the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets on 6 
64 Strana. ru, 5.04.200 1, (URL 
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April 2001. Vladimir Sungorkin, editor-in-chief of Komsomolskaya Pravda, regarded the 
protest actions and rallies as "a disgrace. " He said, "If the decision by the board of 
directors was legitimate, the NTV staff should act in the framework of that decision. 
Those who disagree have the right to get their discharge or appeal against that decision in 
court. ', 65 
Sungorkin did not assess the situation as an attempt to strangle the freedom of the 
press. "Our press is free. Many other media companies apart from NTV reported about 
the President's mistakes and about the Kursk tragedy. [ 
... 
]I think that behind the actions 
of the NTV staff is not a wish to 'remain free', but, on the contrary, a wish not to return 
the loans to the tune of many millions, which, as is known, had been granted to the 
journalists, " he said. 66 
Anatoly Chubais, the CEO of UES Russia, claimed that Gazprom had legally 
restored its owner's right on NTV. He pointed out that the decision of the Court was legal 
and final, and it should be accepted by the personnel of NTV. Chubais highlighted that 
after such a verdict Gazprom could have acted even more bravely. Instead, Alfread Kokh, 
the newly appointed head of Gazprom-Media, was rather accurate in assessment and 
subsequent actions. 67 
Gleb Pavlovsky, the head of the Foundation for Effective Politics, has expressed 
his view that the journalists of NTV staged an act of protest either "to shore up the 
positions of Vladimir Gusinsky or knock down the channel's price under an arrangement 
with its new owner. " He has not shared the view that the change of NTV's leadership 
poses a threat to the freedom of speech in Russia. All the talk is "simply a propaganda 
thesis because we do not see where the threat actually is, and none of the channel's new 
leaders is talking about it. " Pavlovsky regards the situation over NTV as "a mixture of 
business and politics since NTV is basically an institution for propaganda and agitation, 
and therein lays its value, including its commercial value. , 68 
65 Strana. ru, 6.04.2001, (URL 
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The State Duma also was not particularly worried about undermining the freedom 
of speech on NTV. Yavlinsky's suggestion to discuss the problem of freedom of speech 
was not approved. It was supported by 108 members of the Duma while 193 were against 
it. One of them, Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal-Democratic Party, was even more 
critical of NTV. He wanted to discuss an issue of "responsibility of TV channels, in 
particular of NTV, for the lie which this company has told to citizens. " Finally, 
Zhirinovsky demanded to "close and bury NTV as soon as possible. " Valeriy 
Komissarov, a presenter of RTR, described the viewpoint of the faction Edinstvo. He said 
,, 
69 that NTV "has never been independent.
Putin's approach to the media seems to be supported by the majority of the 
Russian people. It can be illustrated by the findings of the public opinion poll carried out 
by the ROMIR independent research centre on 26 March 2001. According to this poll, 
there had been no change in the attitude of most Russians. 59.6 per cent agreed to Putin's 
activities as Russia's president since 2001.9.9 per cent of respondents said that they had 
now taken a more negative view of the president. 56.5 per cent approved the president's 
action to promote law and order in Russia (individual security and the security of the state 
as a whole, the fight against corruption and crime, and the improvement of living 
standards) while 31.7 per cent said they held the opposite view. 70 
Another survey assessed public opinion regarding events with NTV. This survey 
was conducted by ROMIR among 509 Muscovites over the age of 18 in April 2001. 
According to this survey, a third of Moscow's residents (3 1.1 per cent) viewed the NTV 
events as a routine change of the company's owners, 28.4 per cent of Muscovites 
regarded these events as an attempt to undermine the freedom of speech in Russia, and 
12.7 per cent of respondents thought that at NTV the state authorities were waging a war 
against the journalist staff. In the opinion of 14.5 per cent, the events at NTV reflected a 
confrontation between the public authorities and oligarchs, 6.9 per cent of the 
respondents pointed out other reasons behind these events, and 6.4 per cent were 
undecided. 
69 Strana. ru, 4.04.200 1, (URL 
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The results of another poll conducted by the same agency indicated that 41.8 per 
cent of Muscovites believed that NTV journalists had launched their protest action 
because they wanted to uphold their own interests, 24.7 per cent of the respondents 
thought that the journalists had intended to defend the freedom of speech in Russia, and 
16 per cent pointed out that the protest had aimed to protect the interests of TV audience. 
6.4 per cent of the respondents argued that this action had been in favour of Gusinsky, the 
former owner of the TV channel, 4.6 per cent gave other answers, and 6.1 per cent were 
undecided. Every third Muscovite viewed the events at NTV as a routine change of the 
company's ownership. 71 
Does Putin's policy towards the media constitute state intervention or not? 
Despite evidence of the state pressure on the media, a point of view that the Russian mass 
media has become completely controlled by the state does not look accurate. The Russian 
media continues to be under control of various political and business groups. These 
political groups attempt to use the news media in order to form opposition to Putin's 
policy. It can be illustrated by many examples. 
One of the most remarkable examples is the publication of several articles 
criticising the policy of the president in almost all leading Russian newspapers on 28 
November 2000. Nezavisimaia Gazeta, Segodnia, Versia, Izvestia and NTV made public 
a programme of Putin's opposition, which involved several governors and a few members 
of the State Duma. These articles criticised the Presidential Administration, the Russian 
government, and the leadership of the political party Edinstvo. 72 
Also, it is evident that the Russian mass media is used as a means of political 
confrontation among politicians. In this confrontation the Russian news media reveals 
many unchecked and inaccurate information and rumours. The number of articles with 
rumours is so significant that special indices of rumours published in Moscow 
newspapers are being calculated. Index of Rumours estimates the rate of rumours 
published in Moscow newspapers, and Index of Corrections shows how many corrections 
to the rurnours published before have been made. 
71 Strana. ru, 5.04.200 1, (URL 
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For example, rumours on 14 March 2001 implied that Berezovsky gained the full 
control over TV-6 and the newspaper Kommersant, and that he was intended to sell his 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta [the Independent] for nearly US$ 10 million. Also, it was claimed 
that Berezovsky decided to establish a few welfare funds to provide aid for Russian- 
speakers in some of the countries of the CIS. There was a note that the Berezovsky's 
partner Badri Patarkatsishvili, who used to be a manager of ORT, had been appointed as 
the state secretary of Georgia. 73 
Does this mean that the Russian state does not intend to intervene into the mass 
media? Does this mean that the media in Russian are completely independent from the 
state? I shall argue that this is not true. Above-mentioned events relating to NTV, as well 
as many other strange events surrounding other subsidiaries of Media-Most, do not prove 
that there is a state intervention if they are considered separately. Nevertheless, if one 
takes a look at all the series of "strange" events surrounding Media-Most and some other 
media companies in Russia, he should conclude that there are too many of them to be 
incidental. 
Isn't it strange that the Spain's Court did not find the evidence presented by the 
Russian Prosecutor's Office sufficient enough to consider Gusinsky as a criminal and to 
extradite him to Russia? Isn't it strange that the United States and Greece have the same 
opinion on this issue? Savik Shuster, the chief of radio Svoboda in Moscow, stated that 
Putin has absolutely no idea what is the real freedom of speech. He argued that the 
Russian state attempted to control television, NTV being the last island of freedom of the 
press. "What will happen with the others 
- 
it is a question, " he said. 74 Shuster was soon 
fired from his post of the chief of the radio. 
It is reported that Marina Lelevyvi, a Channel 2 reporter, was assigned to 
interview Ludmila Putina, Putin's wife. Before the meeting the journalist submitted 
73 Mochenov, A., Nikulin, S. and Vorontsov, D. (2001) "Slukhi i Oproverzhenia" [Rumours and 
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questions, but she asked a couple of her own during the interview. Such an initiative was 
punished: the videotape was destroyed and barred from broadcast. 75 
Yhe Press Club, a popular TV talk show on Channel 2, is another example. It was 
one of the first live shows in which members of the Duma, politicians and journalists 
could discuss important weekly events. After the tragedy with the submarine Kursk, this 
show started to be taped before broadcasting and censored. Yevgenia Albats, who 
participated in that show, said she was stunned to see the final version: it was severely 
edited with respect to any critique of President Putin. The following shows were even 
more radically scrutinised. Albats claimed, 
Statements by participants were not just edited, but the whole course of the discussion 
- 
in pure 
Soviet style 
- 
was altered by changing the sequence. Viewers were unaware that they were seeing 
an edited version of a studio debate which had been taped a few days earlier: a running line of 
supposed pager and email messages from "viewers" aims to convince them that the show is going 
out live. 76 
Izvestia, the privately owned national daily, published several articles criticising 
Putin's move to reinstate the old Soviet anthem. The following week the Kremlin's 
Management Department filed a lawsuit disputing the legality of the dubious privatisation 
deal over the editorial office of this newspaper back in the mid-90s. 77 
During the conflict between NTV and Gazprom some programmes moved from 
NTV to TNT. The next day, TNT was accused of tax evasion. All of the events 
mentioned above were sufficient for Albats to draw a conclusion that freedom of the 
press in Russia is over and we are "watching its sunset with no hope of living long 
,, 
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enough to see that freedom return. In any case, the current relationship between the 
state and the media is different from compared to the later stages of Yeltsin's era. The 
mass media in Russia has become less independent from the state. 
It does not necessarily mean that officials force the media to do what they want. In 
fact, the government does not need to intervene into policies of the media. The case of 
75 Albats, Y. (200 1) "Cry for Russia's lost press liberty: Now 'managed democracy' is replacing freedom of 
cxpression", The Guardian, 11.05.2001 
76 Ibid. 
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Media-Most has been a good example for the other media organisations what could 
happen to them, if they "mistakenly" report some of the political events. The editors and 
staff of the Russian media companies are able to draw conclusions in order to avoid 
encountering similar problems. In other words, they are expected to understand what 
could fit the authorities' view. 
It should be noted that the Russian editors and other senior officials understand 
authorities' preferences well. Georgiy Vachnadze noted this while analysing the 
development of the Russian mass media from Gorbachev to Yeltsin. 79 Another case in 
point is provided by the launch and closure of the website Kogot, which published several 
negative stories regarding Russian leading politicians. Even before the call from law 
enforcement officers, the Internet provider FreeNet, which embodied the server 
People. weekend. ru, the host of the website, decided to suspend access to the server. 80 
This can also be illustrated by the above-mentioned example with the daily 
Izvestia. After the Kremlin's Management Department disputed the legality of Izvestia 
building's privatisation, the editors of this newspaper became very sensitive to political 
issues. An article which described teenagers' bitter resistance to the new anthem was 
eliminated. The lawsuit by the Kremlin was suspended, but not withdrawn 
- 
just in case if 
this newspaper would make another wrong move in the coverage of Kremlin policies. 
To sum up the discussion about the freedom of speech in Russia, let us refer to 
Putin's words at the beginning of his presidency regarding his policy towards the media. 
He said: 
Unfortunately, it has not been yet possible to develop the precise democratic rules that guarantee 
real independence of "the fourth estate". I want to emphasise the word real. Journalistic freedom 
has turned in an instrument used by politicians and the largest financial groups in confrontation 
between them [ 
... 
] Censorship and intervention in activity of the mass media are forbidden by law. 
We strictly adhere to this principle. However, censorship cannot be exclusively state censorship, 
and intervention 
- 
cannot be only administrative. The economic inefficiency of a considerable part 
of media companies makes them dependent on commercial and political interests of their owners 
and sponsors. This allows them to use the media for demolishing competitors, and even to 
79 Vachnadze, G. N. (1992) Secrets ofJournalism in Russia: Mass Media under Gorbachev and Yeltsin. 
Commack, N. Y.: Nova Science Publishers. 
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transform them into a means of mass disinformation, in a means of fight against the state. 
Therefore, we are obliged to guarantee journalists real, instead of ostentatious, freedom. We have 
to create legal and economic conditions for civilised information business in our country. 81 
It should be concluded, though, that if that really was Putin's aim, it has been reached 
neither in the issue of freedom of speech nor in providing legal and economic conditions 
for the independence of news media yet. 82 
1.3. Significance and the Role of the Russian Mass Media 
The final section of this chapter aims to examine the role of the Russian mass media over 
the last two decades. For this purpose it is essential to assess the nature of the later Soviet 
and post-Soviet society. In order to do so, I analyse some notes which was made in this 
respect by some Russian and Western scholars and explain my viewpoint. 
It was argued that the Soviet Union was a partly modernised country. Although it 
had some features of modem societies such as intense use of the media, they did not play 
a major role and were not able to promote further development. The pre-modem mode of 
economic relations continued to dominate all key processes. New modernization attempts 
failed because of the under-development of Russia. Instead, this failure strengthened the 
significance of the traditional mode of production. T'he mass media made a very 
significant impact on the collapse of the Soviet Union and its economic power. 83 
This approach looks very promising and it has its supporters. However, from my 
point of view, it is a simplistic viewpoint, which causes many problems in understanding 
many Russian processes and distorts an accurate assessment of the role of the media. I 
agree that Russia maintained a lot of its pre-modem features, but at the same time it had a 
great deal of post-modem characteristics. I argue that Russia during the late Soviet and 
U Putin, V. (2000) Gosudarstvo Rossia, Put k Effektivnomu Gosudarstvu [Russia's state: Towards an 
effective state], Putin's address to the Federal Council, 8.07.2000, (URL http: //www. nns. ru/Elect- 
99/chron99/2000/07/08. htm], consulted on September 2005). 92 More information about Putin and his policy towards the media can be found in Lipman, M. And 
McFaul, M. (2003) "Putin and the media", in Herspring, D. (ed. ) Putin's Russia: Past Imperfect, Future 
Uncertain. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, pp. 63-84. 23 Pietilainen, J. (2002) 77je Regional Newspaper in Post-Soviet Russia: Society, Press andJournalism in 
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post-Soviet period should be regarded as a society with pre-modem, modem, and post- 
modem features. The relevance of post-modem theories for Russia has already been 
discussed by several researchers. 84 1 intend to contribute to the discussion. 
Let us outline fundamentals of modernity and post-modemity. The development 
of modem societies began in European urban centres in the late Middle Ages. Modem 
societies are associated with capitalism as well as with developed political institutions, in 
which nation-state played the most important role. The nation states centralised the 
system of taxation and concentrated military power. Knowledge and information became 
very important and it encouraged the development of mass communications. The news 
media was a very important element of modem societies because it connected their 
members and serves as the most reliable source of information. 85 
Modernity encountered serious crisis at the end of 20th century. The role of 
nation-states was considerably undermined by the process of globalisation. Legitimacy 
and significance of political institutions and democratic values continue to decline. 86 'Me 
post-modem society regarded networks as a more efficient mode of socio-economic 
organisation. Mikko Lagerspets confirmed it by saying that in post-modem society 
loyalties are based on "particularism, fragmenting the society into potentially conflicting 
,, 
87 networks or post-modem tribes. 
It should be noted that the efficiency of networks was understood in Soviet Russia 
a long time ago. The late Soviet society was fragmented and resembled a system of 
networks. These networks consisted of representatives of different social, political and 
economic institutions and served as a very important medium, which to some extent 
diminished many deficiencies of the command economy and facilitated economic and 
84 Kirkow, P. (1998) Russia's Provinces: Authoritarian Transformation versus LocalAutonomy? 
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information exchange. 88 The importance of the networks even increased after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union. This is to say that Russia in the late Soviet and post-Soviet periods 
had some features of post-modemity. 
These post-modem features made an impact on the transformation of the Russian 
media system. Let us illustrate this by the history of Media-MoSt. 89 It is known that 
Gusinsky decided to be involved in the media business and established this largest private 
media syndicate. 90 The most important question arises as to how Gusinsky managed to 
find the money for this huge investment project. The Russian Prosecutor's Office argues 
that he used "dirty money. " According to the prosecutors, Gusinsky's Media-Most and 
some of its subsidiaries had many billions of losses and debts that far exceeded their 
assets. In these circumstances, Gusinsky, according to Russia's laws, had to take a 
decision on liquidating his companies. Instead, he, along with his colleagues, took a loan 
of over US$ 300 million on the security of non-existent assets, which is a criminal 
offence. 
Gusinsky borrowed US$ 300 million from Gazprom, the leading Russian gas 
company, to establish his media empire. The scheme loan 
- 
trade 
- 
return of credit is 
normal in market economies. However, it is unclear how Gusinsky managed to get a loan 
in Russia when there was a significant shortage of "hard" money in its economy. Second, 
it is unclear how he managed to take such a big loan? And only after this should it be 
asked: How did he manage to take the loan "on the security of non-existent assets"? 
In order to answer these questions, we have to return to Communist Russia. 
Although the Communist leadership underlined its strategy towards a classless society, 
there was a ruling class in the Soviet Russia. This group was called the nomenclature, and 
it could be viewed as the network connecting power elites in the Soviet Union. 
Researchers have not paid enough attention to the study of the force that kept 
members of the nomenclature together. However, it is important to outline the 
88 Ledencva, A. V. (1998) Russia's Economy offavours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
89 Lipman, McFaul, "'Managed democracy' in Russia: Putin and the press", p. 118. 90 Although Gusinsky now presents himself as a defender of the freedom of speech in Russia, it seems that 
he invested in the mass media only as one of many possible ways of making money. In 1992, Gusinsky was 
the president of Most Bank and tried to create a rather multidimensional corporation. He was interested in 
the construction industry and tried to establish ties with Luzhkov's son. Gusinsky seemed to realise the 
importance of advertising and hoped for long-term advantages for his business projects. 
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mechanism, without which this multi-selective machine would have been dead. This 
mechanism can be called benefit exchange (or bargain network). It involved officials and 
senior managers those who controlled the production of some valuable goods or services 
and exchanged a part of them between each other. This exchange was informal and not 
entirely equal since it was very difficult to compare goods and services in the non-market 
environment. 
This system penetrated all Soviet society 
- 
from the Ministers to the senior 
managers. The top of this network was often called the Soviet Mafia. On the level of 
senior managers and executives, this system was called Blat. 91 The system compensated a
shortage of necessary goods and resources in the "deficit" economy, the economy where 
there is a considerable misbalance of supply and demand. 
As the Soviet economy was extremely centralised and inefficient, the task of 
getting essential goods or equipment demanded considerable effort and time. However, 
there was a way to avoid the difficulties. Some enterprises could exchange part of their 
output for other goods or resources that were necessary for them. Executives of the 
enterprises (nomenclature) later used this mechanism in order to increase their standard 
of living. 
During Yeltsin's presidency, this mechanism remained popular amongst 
politicians and businessmen. Yeltsin, when he felt that he was missing popular support 
due to difficulties of the policy of "shock therapy", asked powerful moguls, or the 
oligarchs, for their financial support. In return, these people were regarded as Yeltsin's 
friends and might have counted on state resources in case they need financing for their 
business projects. And this was regarded as a normal deal (at least in this network). 
It was this organisation of the post-Soviet Russia that allowed Gusinsky to receive 
his loan from Gazprom and to establish the first private media syndicate in Russia. After 
that it took NTV only a couple of years to become one of the biggest Russian TV 
channels. This example illustrates that the current Russian media structure was recreated 
through the use of post-modem features and it itself has become an important element of 
the power network. 
91 Ledeneva, Russia's Economy ofFfavours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange. 
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1.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the history of the Soviet and Russian media since 1917. 
Transformation of relationships between the state and media organisations during 
different periods of Soviet and post-Soviet Russia has been examined, and the structure 
of the news media has been introduced. 
I have shown that the Russian mass media was controlled by public authorities 
and by the Communist Party for the most part of the Soviet period. After considerable 
political changes in the Soviet Union, the role and the impact of the media increased 
enormously. During the Yeltsin era many media organisations were privatised. Without 
state subsidies, however, many of them encountered severe financial difficulties and 
became dependent on powerful corporations and oligarchs. 
The trend of the growing independence of the media from the state was reversed 
when Putin came to power. Although events relating to major Russian TV channels NTV 
and TV-6 seem to have been caused by commercial conflicts, the whole series of the 
events shows that the time of the entire independence of the Russian mass media from the 
state is over. 
In this chapter I have argued that the role of news media in post-Soviet Russia 
could not be assessed properly without an understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between the state, business and the public in the Soviet and post-Soviet society. Business 
and political transactions in Russia are greatly mediated by power networks, which 
continue to play a more significant role than social institutions. This is explained in more 
detail in the next chapter, which examines Russian organised crime. 
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Chapter 2 
Russian Organised Crime: Towards a Definition 
The spread of organised crime is one of the most serious problems of the Russian 
Federation. Handelman, the author of a noteworthy book on Russian organised crime, has 
given the following description of the situation: "there seemed to be more gangsters in 
the country than policemen. One out of four crimes in 1992 was committed by criminal 
gangs in 1993.902 
The extent of Russian organised crime can be illustrated by the following 
statistics. In 1994 organised crime was reported to control about 40 per cent of the 
Russian gross domestic product. Overall it encompassed 41,000 economic entities, 
including 500 joint ventures, 550 banks, and 1,500 state enterprises. Criminal groups 
created nearly 700 legal financial and commercial firms for the purpose of money 
laundering. 93 The situation did not improve in 1997. It was estimated that 50 per cent of 
banks and 80 per cent of joint ventures had criminal connections. 94 
The problem of organised crime was in spotlight during various phases of Russian 
history. Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Gorbachev, Yeltsin and Putin drew 
attention to the task of tackling organised crime. Many of the western experts, politicians 
and economists also point out that Russian organised crime does not allow Russia to 
implement economic reforms successfully. 
What is Russian organised crime? This chapter attempts to answer this question. 
Its purpose is to describe the history of organised crime in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia. 
First, it is important to explain what is considered as "organised crime". It is essential 
because there are several definitions of organised crime. The first comprehensive 
definition of organised crime was given by the American Congress in 1968, which 
viewed organised crime as "the unlawful activities of the members of a highly organised, 
disciplined association engaged in supplying illegal goods and services, including, but not 
92 Handelman, S. (1995) Comrade Criminal. 
- 
Russia's New Mafia. New Heaven: Yale University Press. 
93 Ryan, P. and Rush, G. (1997) Understanding Organised Crime in Global Perspective. London: Sage, p. 
189. 
94 JZVeStia' 18.02.1997. 
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limited to, gambling, prostitution, loan sharking, narcotics, racketeering and other 
unlawful activities. , 95 
The definition of organised crime has been changed many times since then. Now 
the Columbia Encyclopedia defines organised crime as "criminal activities organised and 
co-ordinated on a national scale, often with international connections. [ 
... 
] Firmly rooted 
in the social structure, it [organised crime] is protected by corrupt politicians and law 
enforcement officers, and legal advice; it profits from such activities as gambling, 
,, 
96 
prostitution, and the illicit use of narcotics. 
It should be noticed that the definition of organised crime accepted by Russian 
Law differs from that in Western countries. The main point of contradiction is the 
concept "organised". While American criminologists use this term to describe the whole 
system of illegal ties, which may spread to national and international levels, the Russian 
police regard organised crime as a criminal action of two and more individuals. 
It could be argued that there is no significant difference between both approaches. 
Small crime groups are connected with larger and more powerful crime syndicates. Types 
and areas of criminal activities are controlled by higher criminal authorities. 
Consequently, it is possible to find a definition that to some extent combines both 
approaches. In my opinion, the best definition is given by Larry Siegel in his book 
Criminology Theories, Patterns, and Typologies. He has defined organised crime as "a 
conspiratorial actuate, involving the co-ordination of numerous persons in the planning 
and execution of illegal acts or in the pursuit of a legitimate objective by unlawful 
,, 
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means. This definition is used in this thesis. 
Second, it would be a mistake to view Russian organised crime as a lasting 
monolithic social phenomenon. I argue that it is rather a mixture of networks made of 
different types of criminal groups. Each of these types has its own methods, history and 
traditions. The first type is vori v zakone [thieves in law]. Thieves in law emerged during 
Stalin's era. This powerful criminal type has its structure, behaviour code, and rituals. I 
name the second type illegal entrepreneurs. This type encompasses entrepreneurs whose 
95 Lyman, D. M. and Potter, W. G. (1997) Organised Crime. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, p. 15. 96 Yhe Columbia Encyclopaedia, Edition 5, (1993) p. 27654, (URL http: //webl. infotrac- 
college. conVwadswortb/session/121/747/1043541/7! xm 2&bkm-7, consulted in March 2000). 
97 Siegel, L. (1998) Criminology Theories, Patterns, anj'ýYpologies, Sixth edition. West/Wadsworth 
Publishing Company, p. 362. 
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economic activity is illegal. The most known representatives of this type were called 
tshekhoviki. The administrative Mafia is another significant part of Russian organised 
crime that has existed in the one or another form during the considered period. Finally, 
bandits 
- 
it is a relatively new criminal phenomenon in Russian history. Nevertheless, 
they have quickly become one of the dominant powers in Russia. 
This chapter describes each of these four types of organised crime and analyses 
their features, structure, significance and development. The best alternative would be to 
represent the stages of the development of Russian organised crime in accordance with 
the changes of Soviet and Russian leadership. At first glance, this looks as a very 
reasonable choice because changes in Russian governmental policies significantly 
affected the features of Russian organised crime. However, the history of the organised 
crime in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia can be seen as an interaction of all mentioned 
above types of the criminal underworld: how these criminal cultures coexist, cooperate, 
and fight with each other. In other words, this case would include a similar description of 
relations among criminal groups, but such an explanation would have been less focused 
and more difficult for a reader without an essential knowledge of Russian professional 
crime. That is why this option has been rejected. The chosen structure lacks the above- 
mentioned problems and to some extent follows the main trend of major developments of 
Russian organised crime. 
2.1. Vori-v-Zakone [Thieves in Law] 
Russian scholars define a vor-v-zakone [thief in law] as "professional criminal, the 
recognized leader of the criminal world and an active ideologist of a criminal way of life 
08 
and morals, who has experience of anti-state activities. Thieves in law formed a society 
that resembles more known secret criminal cultures as the Sicilian Mafia, the Neapolitan 
Camorra, and Japanese Yakuza. 
98 Glazov, Y. (1985) "Thieves in the USSR as a social phenomenon", Yhe Russian Mind since Stalin's 
Death. Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidell Pub Co. 
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This thieves' organization was observed and described by some of the dissidents- 
convicts of the Soviet labour camps such as Dmitry Likhachev 99 and Alexander 
Solzhenitsin. 100 It seems to have been more durable than the Soviet system; the Soviet 
empire collapsed, but the society of Vori 
-v-Zakone continues to be one of the most 
powerful groups in contemporary Russia. This section examines the main features of this 
type of organised crime and bricfly describes its history. 
Thieves in Law originated in the labour camps at the beginning of the Stalin's era 
(the late 1920s). Like many other social groups that live in a closed space such as 
ordinary convicts or sailors, vori had their own signs that distinguished them from the 
others. They had their own dress code. 101 They also had their own language (fenia), 
which is thought to emerge out of nineteenth century criminal slang. 102 Thieves in law 
covered their bodies with various tattoos that allowed them to recognise one another. The 
most typical thief s tattoo was a heart pierced by a dagger. 103 Vori sought a monopoly of 
the usage of their tattoo design. If a non-vor wore a vorovskaia tattoo, he risked being 
punished by death. 104 
The key features that distinguished the thieves from the other groups and allowed 
them to form a society that headed the criminal underworld of Russia were their own 
code of behaviour, a special ritual for initiation of new members, and the vorovskie 
44courts. "105 During initiation a group of hardened criminals decided whether a particular 
person might be granted membership of this society. This permission could be granted 
only if they considered that the behaviour of the candidate was directly associated with 
the principles of the society of thieves in law. If so, the candidate became a member of 
the society. He was formally given a nickname (klichka) that was different from the 
previous one signifying that the criminal was starting a different life. 
" Likhavchev, D. S. (1935) "Chertypervobitnogo primitivizma vorovskoyrechi, lazyk i mishlenie" [Elements of primitivism in theves' speech], Proceedings ofthe USSR Academy ofScience, III-IV 00 Solnzhenitsin, A. (1978) GulagArchipelago 1918-1956:, 4n Experience ofLiterary Investigation, 
London: Collins & Harvill Press. 
101 Glazov, "Thieves in the USSR as a social phenomenon". 102 Chalidze, V. (1977) Criminal Russia: Essays on Crime in the Soviet Union. N. Y., p. 57. 103 Gamayunov (1995) "Thieves in Law: Devils dressed as Robin Hood", The Moscow Times, 11.01.1995. 104 Bronnikov, A. G. (1996) Tatuirovki u Prestypnikov v Rossii [Tatto of Criminals in Russia). Penn. 105 Varese, F. (1998) "The Society of Vory v Zakone", Cahiers du Monde Russe, p. 516,517. 
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There was a strict code of interaction of vori-v-zakone with each other. They 
were supposed to respect one another and avoid conflicts. It was prohibited for a thief to 
"raise his hand against another thief. "106 Violence without the sanction of a vorovskoy 
"court" was forbidden. 107 Thieves were required to support each other and to be honest 
with other members of the community. In addition, the thieves in law would have had to 
share all that they had with the other representatives of this society. 
The interaction of the thieves in law with the outside world was also regulated by 
this code of behaviour. In short, the thieves were supposed to restrict their external links, 
in particular their political activities. Consequently, any sort of activities that were 
recommended by the Soviet state, including serving in the army and being a member of 
Young Communist Unions (pioneer or comsomolets), was prohibited. 
Thieves'main responsibilities were as follows. A thief in law was supposed to: 
acquire a leading role in the camps; 
rule over criminals according to the vori rules; 
search for recruits; 108 
actively participate in the life of thieves' communities; 
live on money obtained only by criminal means (he should not work); 
promote "thieves"' traditions and rituals; 
be responsible to the criminal community; 
collect money for the communal fund (obshak)109 and supervise its spending; 
care for fellow thieves; 
follow instructions of thieves' meetings (shkodok); and, 
avoid any cooperation with the state agencies. 
There were a number of older rules. A thief in law could not have a family and 
come into any contact with law enforcement agencies. Also, he was supposed to live on 
only these monies which were obtained by him personally. 110 
106 Ibid. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Ibid., p. 520 109 Obshchak, the communal fund to support the activity of the society of thieves in law, bribe state officials 
and to aid the families of the other members of the community while they are in prison. Money of this fund 
were collected both by extortion from inmates and contributions from outside. 
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There was no direct leader in the group of thieves in law. Skhodka (a thieves' 
meeting) was the main authority, resolving all conflicts and problems of the society. Any 
thief in law could call for a new meeting. 111 
The society of "thieves in law"has a long history. It is reported that some 
organised groups of professional pickpockets emerged in the imperial (tsarist) Russia. 
They skilfully adapted to the Soviet reality. After developing a sophisticated and 
advanced scheme of criminal activities and rituals, they headed Russia's criminal world 
in the 1920s- 193 Os. Since that time they were referred to as to the "thieves in law. " 
The influence of thieves in law became so significant in the 1920s-1930s, that 
authorities of labour camps (Gulag) started to intensively involve thieves in law in 
suppressing the ideological opponents of the communists (Bolsheviks) in camps and 
prisons. This cooperation allowed the thieves to quickly leave the camps and to return to 
their criminal activities. In fact, the Gulag itself was considered as the crucial factor that 
determined the spread of the thieves' rituals and the elevation of thieves in law in 
society. 112 
In the 1940s-50s the thieves in law became so influential that the Russian state 
began to fight against the former ally. This period of time is known as suchya voina 
[bitches' war]. The intention of camp's authorities to undermine the power of thieves in 
law was strengthened by the rise of the power of anti-thieves groups in labour camps in 
the end of the 1950s. These groups consisted of the inmates that had essential military 
training and were well prepared for violence. Camps' authorities often cooperated with 
such criminal groups (which were called suki) and used them as an ally in the fight 
against thieves. 
Valeriy Shalamov has described one of the episodes of this war. Korol, the leader 
of suk, was chosen by the prison supervisors to undermine the influence of thieves. For 
this purpose, in one of the transit prisons in Vanino all inmates were lined up and forced 
to strip. It was not a problem to recognize thieves because of their tattoos. The thieves 
"ORazinkin, V. S. (1995) VorivZakone iPrestupnieKlani [Thieves in law and criminal syndicates]. 
Moskva, p. 26. 111 Gurov, A. I. (1995) Krasnaya Mafia [The Red Mafia]. Kommrcheskiy Vestnik, p. 115. 112 Varese, F. (1998) "The society of Vory v Zakone", Cahiers du Monde Russe, p. 526. 
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were required to choose between a rejection of their rituals or death. Many of the thieves 
decided to follow their traditions and were killed. ' 13 
Santerre noted another similar case in a camp of the Inta region. There were 50 
suk and 100 thieves in this camp. The camp's authorities did not directly intervene in the 
conflict between them. However they allowed only the suki to carry their weapons. It was 
the last day for the majority of the thieves. 114 
As a result of this anti-thieves strategy, the population of the thieves in law 
decreased ramatically at the beginning of the 1960s. If, according to Gurov, there were 
about 300 thieves in law in Soviet prisons by the mid-fifties, it is estimated that only 3 per 
cent of them remained by the end of the 1950s. The others either renounced the criminal 
profession or were isolated from the other prisoners. 
When Khrushchev was elected the General Secretary of the CPSU, the Soviet 
government took the position that any organised crime was a product of a capitalist 
system and could not exist in the Soviet Union. The slogan of the total eradication of 
criminality in the USSR and a victory over organised crime were declared. As a result, 
when the KGB and military personnel tried to report about such activities they often were 
told that there was no organised crime in the Soviet Union. 
Even the word thief in law almost disappeared from the departmental 
documentation. All types of organised crime were combined into a single article 
concerning banditism' 15 of the new Criminal Code in 1960. As a matter of practice, Local 
law enforcement agencies applied this article very rarely. If they intended to use it, they 
were supposed to inform the higher authorities by a special note. The central authorities 
investigated how the local law enforcement agencies allowed the organised crime groups 
to appear. As a result, the agencies themselves were frequently punished. To avoid such a 
situation they preferred to enforce laws against less serious crimes such as robbery. This 
encouraged a new rise of thieves in law. 
Therefore, the viewpoint that thieves in law were almost extinguished in those 
years is not accurate. On the contrary, it is possible to find some evidence that during a 
long period of Brezhnev's rule, thieves in law co-operated (if this word can be used for 
113 Shalamov, V. (1978) Kolimskie Rasskazy [Kolima Stories]. London: Overseas Publications Interchange. 
114 Varese, F. (1998) "The Society of Vory v Zakone", Cahiers du Monde Russe, p. 529. 115 Article 77 of the Criminal Code ofthe Russian Federation. 
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describing such a relationship) with black market entrepreneurs. 116 The entrepreneurs 
(tsekhoviki) were supposed to pay the thieves in law 10- 15 per cent of their profit for 
protection in order to avoid further intrusion into their activities. 117 
This form of cooperation between tcekhoviki and thieves in law was enhanced 
after Gorbachev's election as General Secretary of the CPSU. He allowed the legalisation 
of the majority of previously illegal economic activities. As a result of this, the number of 
private enterprises in the Soviet Union increased significantly. For the most part, they 
were notably defenceless against extortion by criminal groups, some of which were 
headed by thieves in law. Most entrepreneurs were forced to pay a tribute in order to 
avoid penalties such as arson or killings. For example, Georgian thieves in law controlled 
Tokobank, 118 and Shura Zakhar, a thief in law, owned shares of the commercial firm 
Interros. 119 Some thieves in law themselves became successful entrepreneurs. According 
to Handelman, "by the late 1980 some of the most successful wheelers and dealers of the 
perestroika era were former thieves, who had repudiated their origin, and thekhoviki, 
, 
420 
owners of underground factories. 
When Yeltsin was elected President of Russia in 1991, he launched a large 
programme of privatisation. As a result of this programme, some Russia's powerful or 
rich individuals and social groups instantly become the owners of valuable property and 
enterprises. Given that the above-mentioned activities provided considerable income for 
thieves in law, it is not surprising that many of them acquired a significant part of 
Russia's firms and property. After that, the social status of thieves in law notably 
increased. They have divided the territory of Russia in terms of controlling legal and 
illegal enterprises and are now regarded as the most influential persons in several Russian 
regions and in Moscow. 
1" This group is examined in depth in the second section and the ground of such a cooperation is analysed 
in the fourth section of this chapter. 117 Ulibin, K. A. (199 1) "Domisli i fakti o kooperatsii i tenevoy ekonomike" [Rumors and facts regarding 
the black economy], Tenevaia Ekonomika (The black economy], Moskva. 1 'a "Zemliaki zemliaka" [Neighbours of a neighbour], Rossiyskaia Gazeta, 22.03.94. 119 Izvestiya, 08.04.1994. 
120 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 42. 
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2.2. Illegal Entrepreneurs 
This section describes entrepreneurs who were involved in a set of economic activities 
that were considered by Soviet law as illegal. It is worth mentioning that most of such 
criminal activity was legitimate practice in the West. William Clark notes that: "the 
Soviet crime of speculation, a serious transgression punishable in extreme cases by death, 
involved in many cases little more than the everyday activity of retailers in the United 
States; the procurement and re-selling of goods and/or services with a view towards the 
acquisition of profit. "121 In fact, such activity represented a less formal and more 
traditional way of providing goods and services. 
However, this behaviour was not appropriate according to the communist 
ideology. Consequently the problem of what to do about such illegal economic activities 
arose immediately after the October Revolution. On 22 July 1918, Lenin signed a decree 
on combating speculation. This decree prescribed severe punishment (up to ten years of 
the work in labour camps and the confiscation of personal property) for such activities. 
Furthermore, such crimes were supposed to be persecuted by Chrezvychainaia 
Komissia, or CheKa (The All Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating 
Counter-revolution and Sabotage). This powerful organization, a predecessor of KGB, 
was created on 7 December 1917 in order to fight the political enemies of Bolsheviks. 
The CheKa was given permission to use various methods, some of which would not be 
accepted in a democratic society. It is known that a significant amount of Cheka work 
dealt with countering rampant speculation, i. e., private trading. This shows that such 
activities were a very serious infringement of Soviet law. 
The CheKa failed to overcome this problem although it worked hard to do so. It 
used several methods and arrested many private traders. The CheKa is thought to have 
arrested 26,692 individuals in charges of speculation between December 1918 and 
November 1920.122 In addition to the legal penalties, the CheKa is believed to have 
ministered its own penalties for these economic activities. It is reported that during this 
period the commission executed over 900 individuals. 
121 William, A. C. (1993) Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990. London: M. E. Sharpe, p. 9. 122 Leggett, G. (1981) The Cheka: Lenin's Political Police. Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 215. 
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However, private trading continued to flourish because the Soviet economy was 
unable to supply the population with the necessary economic goods. As Leggett, a 
leading expert on the CheKa, has noted: "The prevalence of profiteering was such as to 
defeat the combined efforts of the courts and the CheKa: it was not until the New 
Economic Policy (NEP) of 1921 removed its causes that the phenomenon of speculation 
virtually vanished, or rather was legalised. "123 
A permanent deficit of many goods was a consequence of central planning that 
was adopted as the basis of the Soviet economy. The State Plan was the main target, and 
the production of the amount of goods or services demanded by the State Plan was the 
most important goal of Russian enterprises. The salaries of the workers of the enterprises 
depended on whether this goal was reached. 
The State Plan, at least in the form in which it was adopted in the Soviet Union, 
turned out to be an inflexible and controversial. Enterprises were supposed to submit 
notes (zaiavki), which indicated their demand in amount of natural resources and goods 
they would need. However, it proved difficult to estimate the real demand of an 
enterprise in advance. Another problem was that the required amount and quality of 
essential materials were frequently difficult to obtain. 
Consequently, many enterprises faced a problem of getting essential materials in 
order to accomplish the targets of the Plan. This task was extremely difficult because of 
the above-mentioned unpredictability of supply and demand. Moreover, it was illegal to 
buy these materials from other firms without the official approval from the state 
authorities. As the process of getting this approval was very time-consuming and 
unpredictable, the executives of some enterprises sought alternatives. 
One of these alternatives was the assistance of the special procurement officers 
called tolkachi, or pushers. The range of activities of the latter was very wide and 
included legally questionable action. In the search for needed materials, tolkachi 
suggested various schemes of barter and bribed officials and managers. 124 It is worth 
mentioning that to some extent Soviet law enforcement agencies were disinclined to 
persecute violations that were primarily perpetrated in order to fulfil the Soviet state 
123 Ibid., p. 214,215. 124 Berliner, J. (1957) Factory and Manager in USSR. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
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interests. However, sometimes even such dealings were scrutinised by Soviet law 
enforcement agencies since the salaries were dependent on fulfilling the Plan's targets 
and it was possible to argue that the executives had been motivated by personal 
enrichment rather than by state interests. 125 
Stalin believed that the solution to the problem of illegal economic activities was 
a reinforcement of the coercive power of the Soviet State. In the 1930s the legal penalty 
for many crimes were raised to capital punishment. Stalin's theory of the intensification 
of the class struggle resulted in escalating the work of the Soviet coercive organs. OGPU 
(the Unified State Political Administration) received permission to execute those 
convicted of any anti-Soviet activities. Convictions in the Russian Republic are reported 
to have risen 44 per cent between 1928 and 1933.126 It seems that this policy was 
successful in dissuading many people from carrying out these activities since there is 
little evidence of an expansion of illegal economic activities and the existence of a black 
economy during Stalin's era. 
The black economy is thought to have emerged during Khrushchev's time. The 
black economy of that time consisted mostly of non-state firms. They produced ordinary 
goods and services. However, these firms were illegal because private business was 
prohibited in the Soviet Union. When Khrushchev was told about the existence of the 
black economy, he was very upset and ordered its eradication. Ironically, Khrushchev 
was soon dismissed from office, while the black economy continued to flourish for a long 
time afterwards. 
It seems that Khrushchev's reforms initiated the emergence of the black economy 
in Russia. First, there were a lot of difficult targets to reach. Second, Soviet law 
enforcement agencies diminished control of activities of enterprises. As a result, a 
specific kind of fraud, which is known as pripiski, became popular. In short pripiski 
meant misleading the higher authorities and controlling organs about the real 
performance and expenditures of the enterprises. 
12S William, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 
1965-1990, p. 53. 126 Treadgold, D. W. (1964) The Development ofthe USSR: An Exchange of Views. Seattle: University of 
Washington Press, p. 175. 
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The executives and senior administrators formed a main group that was able to 
profit from such fraud. 127 They received considerable sums of money and this capital 
subsidised the black economy. 128 Thieves in law were another dominant group of the 
black economy. This group also accumulated huge sums of money (partly obtained by 
extortion from the thekhovikov) and tried to invest it in profitable business projects. Since 
such illegal activity in the long run was impossible without the complicit agreement of 
state and party officials, they formed the third group of the black economy. 129 
The prolonged period of Brezhnev's rule allowed the black economy to strengthen 
and flourish. 130 Andropov's very short term of office from 1982 to 1984 was not 
sufficient to significantly undermine it. When he was elected General Secretary of the 
CPSU, Andropov, a former KGB chief, started a number of anti-corruption and anti- 
criminal initiatives. However, he was seriously ill and died before these campaigns could 
achieve any significant results. 
'Me Gorbachev era was the golden age of the black economy since he legalised its 
considerable part. The Law on Cooperative, adopted during Gorbachev's time, permitted 
most of the kind of economic activity that is legal in capitalist economies. Surprisingly, 
the legalisation of the black economy did not make it disappear. This did not happen 
because of the simultaneous decline of the Soviet state. During perestroika many firms 
did not report real profit figures in order to reduce tax payments. A large number of 
companies did not pay taxes at all. As the black economy is often defined as the one 
consisted of tax avoiding enterprises, it is possible to conclude that the black economy 
continued to exist in Gorbachev's and post-Gorbachev's Russia. Beside tax evasion, 
many entrepreneurs of Gorbachev's and Yeltsin's Russia were involved in many illegal 
economic activities, including traditional organised crime business 
- 
drug trafficking, 
pornography, and immigrant smuggling. 
127 Similar frauds are examined in depth in the section on the administrative mafia. 128 Ulibin, "Domisli i fakti o kooperatsii i tenevoy ekonomike". 129 It should be noticed that they often were the same people who composed the first of the groups 
mentioned above. 130 For example, see Vaksberg, A. (199 1) The Soviet Mafia: A Shocking Expose of Organised Crime in the 
USSR. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. 
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2.3. The Administrative Mafia 
The illegal economic activity described in the previous section was impossible without a 
hidden or open protection from state and party officials at various levels. This 
involvement, which can be viewed as corruption, was widespread, especially in late years 
of Brezhnev's rule. Let us call these corrupt state officials, managers and administrators 
the administrative Mafia. This section describes the causes and the extent of corruption in 
the former Soviet Union and reviews the structure and development of the administrative 
Mafi a. 
Let us start with the causes of corruption in Russia. Corruption was not a new 
social phenomenon produced by the Soviet way of life. It was deeply rooted in the 
Russian culture. Foreign visitors to Russia noted a significant involvement of Russian 
officials in corrupt practices. 
Even though all Soviet leaders declared programmes against corruption, they were 
not able to overcome it. Some of the factors which led to corrupt practices include: 
1. Infon-nal principles of the Soviet management 
2. Its organisational structure 
3. Command economy and central planning 
4. Institutional weaknesses 
5. The features of Soviet law 
Describing all of them in depth is not a task of this chapter. I shall draw attention only to 
the most relevant factors for this study. 
Informal principles of the Soviet management have been well described by 
Charles A. Schwartz: 
Party interests had supremacy over legal interests; 
Nothing succeeded like the success of the Plans; 
The state preferred its money to be spent carefully; 
"White" forms of corruption were acceptable. White corruption meant taking 
occasional illegal action in favour of state interests (for example, the success of 
the Plans); 
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* "Grey" forms of corruption would be evaluated with respect to a set of economic 
performance criteria. Grey corruption meant an action in favour of state interests 
that might have had a significant benefit for those personally involved; 
"Black" fonns of corruption were not tolerated. This was corruption for personal 
gains (e. g., wide variety of bribery). 131 
It is evident that these managerial principles encouraged corruption because they 
postulated that sometimes a violation of the rules was appropriate (provided this did not 
contravene the state interests). 
Centralplanning, another important factor, made administrative corruption 
almost inevitable. To reach the Plan's targets was the main goal of all Soviet enterprises. 
The salary and bonus of a Soviet firm's personnel depended on how well the firm coped 
with the Plan's targets. As a result, if managers were not able to reach the Plan's targets 
by legal means, they tried to produce at least an appearance of plan fulfilment by the 
falsification of reports regarding the real volume of production. 
Of course, such a practice, which was called pripiski, was a criminal offence. 
However, corrupt networks based on pripiski emerged because almost every level of the 
Soviet economy was interested in reaching the Plan's targets. These networks included 
economic ministers, Communist Party and state officials, supervisors and workers. 
As a consequence of central planning and the continuous deficit in the Soviet 
Union, executives tried to order more raw materials and spare parts than they actually 
needed. Such a safety net, which was called strakhova, sometimes resulted in a stock of 
materials and spare parts that managers preferred to hold for "a rainy day", because even 
if these materials were never needed, they could be bartered for other valuable goods. 
Another negative consequence of central planning (which has been noticed in the 
previous section) was an imbalance of supply and output. It was difficult to take into 
account everything beforehand, and it was almost impossible to receive ordered materials 
according to the specified terms and in the necessary volume. 
In order to survive in these circumstances, the enterprises tried to overcome this 
problem. Tolkachi (pushers), described in the previous section, were one solution. 
131 Schwartz, C. A. (1979) "Corruption and Political Development in the U. S. S. R. ", Comparative Politics, 
Vol. 11, No. 4. 
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However, it was extremely difficult for "pushers" to succeed unless they established 
informal links (znakomstva) with the executives of enterprises and with ministries. 132 
Thus, informal networks connecting power elites in the Soviet Union were created. 
As the number of people involved in these informal networks grew and the stock 
of additional products increased, the basis for the emergence of the Soviet administrative 
Mafia formed. Socialism in Russia did not provide many legal opportunities for citizens 
to improve their wealth. At the same time the Russians were aware of technological 
advances and the high standard of living in some Western countries. An aspiration to 
improve their wealth made many Russians search for illegal opportunities. The 
administrative corruption suited this purpose well. 
Because of a permanent deficit of many essential goods, it was possible to benefit 
from the redistribution of the goods or services that were under the managers' 
supervision. Although the control of law enforcement agencies was significant in Stalin's 
period, it was gradually diminished after his death. After the 1960s, an informal alliance 
of the state officials, the officers of law enforcement agencies, and the managers of 
enterprises was formed and this significantly increased the opportunities for profiting 
from such illegal activities. 
Thus, the Soviet administrative Mafia mostly consisted of upper classes of the 
Soviet society: executives, senior administrators, and the Communist Party and state 
officials. Joseph Serio notes that the Soviet administrative Mafia included the ministers in 
Moscow, controlling delivery of oil to other Soviet Republics, and their administrations, 
which controlled the trade with the assistance of criminals. 133 Some top-ranking leaders 
of the party, like the CPSU Secretaries in regions, used their posts for their personal 
enrichment. Although it would be wrong to say that every party official was corrupt in 
Russia, there were many examples of corruption during the Brezhnev era. 
Let us look at some examples at the top of this pyramid of corruption, which were 
investigated by Andropov's KGB. 134 Rytov, Deputy Fishing Industry Minister, was 
132 William, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Officialdom, Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 
1965-1990, p. 5 1. 133 Serio, J. (1983) "Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Only the Name is New", CJ 
International, Vol. 9, No. 4, July-August, p. 12. 134 It is believed that when Andropov was appointed the chief of KGB he focused his efforts on dismantling 
Brezhnev's elite. 
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dismissed for his key role in the so-called "fish case" or "caviar case" in 1978. This case 
involved several hundred suspects. Shibaev, the chairman of the All Union Central 
Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), was arrested in early 1982 on suspicion of being 
involved in a number of illegal activities, such as participation in sex orgies and the 
illegal construction of a private dacha. 135 
Another Brezhnev's prot6g6, Sergey Medunov, the chairman of the Krasnodar 
region, was expelled from the CPSU and some of his accomplices were arrested. In 1978, 
Dudnikov (director of the Polar Fisherman Resort Hotel), Magalentsev (an engineer at the 
Hotel), Cherkezia (the local construction administration's chairman), and Batalov 
(allegedly a carpenter attached to the local administration) were jailed for 15,12,10 and 
15 years respectively, and their property was confiscated. They were convicted in the 
"embezzlement of funds" in amount of 80,864 rubles (approximately US$ 70,000). 
Viacheslav Voronkov, the chairman of Gorispolkorn (City Executive Committee) 
of Sochi, a large city in the Krasnodar region, was charged with corruption in 1980. He 
was accused of accepting bribes of 3,000 rubles on each apartment rented in this main 
resort of the former Soviet Union. Voronkov was sentenced for thirteen years. Another 
Medunov's follower, Borodkina, the manager of the Gelenzhik Restaurant and Cafeteria 
Trust of the local municipal administration, was accused of receiving 561,834 rubles in 
bribes and executed. 136 
A very significant figure of the Brezhnev's political elite, Shchelokov, the 
Ministry of the Interior, was among the expelled together with Medunov. Shchelokov 
seemed to have used his post of the top police officer to enrich his family. His relatives 
are reported to have driven around Moscow in sixteen Mercedes and Volvo sedans, cars 
that were a rare and remarkable luxury of that time. 
Shchelokov frequently sent his deputies to raid Moscow Custom Office's 
storeroom of confiscated items for things he or his family wanted. After the death of 
Brezhnev, Shchelokov was ousted from this post and appointed the head of security at a 
Siberian gas pipeline construction site. Later he and his wife committed suicide. 137 
135 William, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Ojf1cialdom, Combating Corruption in the 
Political Elite, 1965-1990, p. 53. 136 Ibid., pp. 170,17 1. 137 Ibid., p. 174. 
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Uzbekskoe Delo [Uzbeck's Case] was the most scandalous corruption case of that 
time. Uzbekistan, a Soviet Republic of Central Asia, was a cotton-growing centre of the 
Soviet Union. For a number of years during Brezhnev's rule, the Uzbek executives and 
senior administrators systematically inflated reports on cotton production by incredible 
amounts of millions of tons. 
Because the producers' salary and bonus depended on reaching and exceeding 
Plan's quotas, the system ofpripisok significantly profited the so-called Uzbek Mafia. Its 
profit was enormous. When KGB officers searched the house of a low-rank criminal 
investigator who was caught in taking a bribe, they discovered a million rubles in cash, 
thousands of Swiss watches, and diamonds. 
The money obtained by the Uzbek Mafia "was injected into shadow black market 
dealings, including the purchase and sale of official positions, which fostered universal 
corruption in the republic. 438 It is estimated that more than 30,000 people were involved 
in this corrupt network, including Brezhnev's son-in-law Yury Churbanov, who was a 
deputy head of the Ministry of the Interior. Churbanov was convicted and sent to prison, 
Brezhnev died, and Andropov replaced Brezhnev as General Secretary of the CPSU. 
Andropov was very ill and did not succeed in the eradication of the Soviet 
administrative Mafia. The case of Eliseyevsky store was one of few cases finalised during 
this time. Yury Sokolov, the director of Eliseyevsky, the main store of the Soviet elite, 
and Nikolay Tregubov, his boss, were arrested. While searching Sokolov's premises, the 
police discovered the equivalent of US$ 4 million in a box hidden under his apartment 
floor. Sokolov and Tregubov were charged with accepting bribes in exchange for supply 
of foodstuffs. Sokolov was executed by a firing squad. 139 
When Gorbachev replaced Andropov as the General Secretary of the CPSU, the 
administrative Mafia gained even more opportunities to profit from corruption than 
before. Gurov, a leading expert on Russian organised crime, pointed out that "in 1985/86 
when the co-operative movement was starting up, 60 per cent of those co-operatives were 
138 Finckenauer, J. O. and Waring, E. J. (1998) Russian Mafia in America. Northeastern University Press, p. 
98. 
139 Serio, "Organised Crime in the Former Soviet Union: Only the Name is New", p. 12. 
139 It is believed that when Andropov was appointed the chief of KGB he focused his efforts on dismantling 
Brezhnev's elite. 139 William, Crime and Punishment in Soviet Qjficialdom, Combating Corruption in the Political Elite, 
1965-1990, p. 185. 
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run by former or active criminals [ 
... 
] These so-called entrepreneurs were people who 
stole from the rest of us. They cheated in their factories and their production lines and 
reserved the best stuff for their own private trade. I have estimated that 80 per cent of the 
chiefs of small criminal groups today are former deputy directors, former 
administrators. " 140 
During transition to the market this category is thought to have strengthened its 
power base. The administrative Mafia was able to trade the goods under their supervision 
for the private benefit and used this capital for profitable investments. The programme of 
privatisation adopted by the Russian government during the first years of Yeltsin's rule 
allowed some individuals of the administrative Maji'a to become owners of valuable 
Russian companies by paying significantly less than their real value. The devaluation of 
rouble, the Russian national currency, made Russian property and assets much cheaper in 
terms of hard currency (American dollar). In addition, the administrative Maji'a bought 
huge packages of privatisation vouchers from ordinary Russians, the majority of whom 
sold their vouchers almost for free as they did not know what to do with them. 141 
Groups of owners that were called oligarchs emerged at this time. To demonstrate 
that the process of privatisation was not entirely transparent and that the finance oligarchy 
acquired its wealth in a questionable way, let us quote President Putin who said: "The 
(Russian) law enforcement was very bad. [ 
... 
] Naturally, [ 
... 
] many people used this 
weakness of the state [ 
... 
]. Clans were created which became owners of multi billions of 
wealth. I am talking about the billions of dollars. Some groups became owners 
,, 
142 of billions within 2-3 years. 
Deficiencies of the Russian law, the economic instability, and the crisis in Russia 
have influenced the enormous number of frauds. There are many types of fraud, but it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss them. What is important is that the 
administrative Mafia has more opportunities to commit fraud and to avoid any 
punishment for it. 
140 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 56. 141 Castell, M. (2000) End ofMillennim. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, p. 188. 142 URL http: //www. strana. ru/state/kremlin/2001/06/19/99297198 I. html, consulted in June 200 1. 
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The majority of researchers have not paid attention to the fact that this Mafia 
continues to exist. 143 Of course, the methods of the administrative Mafia are much more 
"civilised". To force businessmen to act in an expected way, the administrative Mafia 
does not normally use violence and weapons. A number of legal ways are available for 
this purpose, for example tax inspection. 144 
There is much evidence to show that the administrations of many cities act like an 
administrative Mafia. For instance, the Moscow administrative elite around Luzhkov, the 
mayor of Moscow, seems to have become a society similar to the administrative Mafia of 
the Brezhnev era. 145 The number of officials of the Moscow Government charged with 
corruption has been rising from day to day. it is reported that thirty corruption cases have 
been filed against Moscow officials and reached a courtroom. 146 
The most striking cases have been the alleged theft of nearly US$ 8 billion during 
the construction of the Moscow circular highway 147 and the arrest of Dmitry Malishev, 
the deputy to the director of the former Moscow Property Department, because of the 
acceptance of a US$ 70,000 bribery. 148 The first Mayor of St. Petersburg, Sobchak and 
some representatives of his administration have also been investigated in corruption 
cases. 149 For example, Valeriy Malishev, the vice-governor of the Leningrad oblast, was 
accused of accepting bribes in 2001.150 
These cases are only the tip of the iceberg of administrative corruption. According 
to the report Economic Crime and the Security of Citizens, Society, and the State (1995), 
"In 1993 and 1994 federal officials took bribes and other forms of illegal income from 
143 For example, see Kulludon, V. (1998) "Kriminalizatsiya rossiyskoy politicheskoy eliti" 
[Kriminalisation of the Russian political elite], in Konstitutsionnoe Pravo: Vostochnoevropeyskoe 
Obozrenie, No. 1. 
144 Interview with V. Radaev, sholar and expert, Moscow, May, 1999. 145 Interview with Sergey, a researcher, St. Petersburg, 2001. 146 URL http: //russia. strana. ru/stories/2001/03/01/983451575/983454295. html, consulted in July 2002. 
147 Ibid. 
148 The Interior Ministry's Investigation Committee has started criminal proceedings on the basis of Article 
290 of the Criminal Code ("Acceptance of a Major Bribe by a Group of Persons"), which carries a prison 
term of up to 12 years and forfeiture of estate, (URL 
ttp: //www. strana. nL/incidents/criminal/2001/02/28/983373480. htnil, consulted in July 2002). 149 Konstantinov, A. (200 1) Corrumpirovanniy Peterburg [Corrupt Peterburg]. St. Petersburg: Neva. 
150 Lenta. ru, 10.07.2001, (URL http: //Ienta. ru/russia/2001/07/10/bribe/, consulted in July 2001). 
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inappropriate licensing export quotas and registration of commercial enterprises, the 
value of such fraud is liberally estimated at US$ 100 billion. "' 51 
To sum up, corrupt practices becwne necessary and possible because the formal 
system of the Soviet economy was less cfficicnt and fair than should have been the case. 
The Soviet administrative Ma/1a consisted of executives, administrators of firms, and 
party and state officials. Among the members of the administrative Ma/1a, money is not 
the main means of paying although transition to the market has increased the importance 
of this component. An exchange of goods or services that are often difficult or even 
impossible to compare in terms of money is the force that amalgamates the administrative 
Maji'a. 
The administrative Mafia is a serious competitor of thieves in law and bandits, a 
criminal type that is described in the next section. The administrative Mafia has very 
strong ties with the state and law enforcement agencies, and it is able to counteract any 
other Russian criminal group either by legal means (arrest of gangsters and lords of 
organised crime), or by encouraging conflicts between criminal groups in the saturated 
market of protection providers. 
2.4. Bandits 
Bandits is the last and most recent type of the representatives of organised crime in 
Russia. To some extent Russian bandits are similar to the Sicilian Mafia. This section 
analyses the origin of this type of organised crime, describes the main activities of 
bandits, examines their problems, and estimates their impact on the socio-economic 
situation in Russia. 
The conditions of the emergence of this type of organised crime are based on 
some principles that are well known in economic theory. The first principle is that any 
commodity cannot be successfully traded on a market unless there is demand for it. The 
second condition is that there should be a supply of this article of trade. In other words, 
for the emergence of the Mafia there should be a demand for the services that are 
15 1 Ryan, Rush, Understanding Organised Crime in Global Perspective, p. 189. 
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provided by the Mafia, and a sufficient number of people who wish to supply such 
services, i. e., to be mafioso. 
A situation when there is a demand for services of a Mafia can be illustrated by a 
number of historical examples. As Robert Putnam has noted in his book Making 
Democracy Work, the Mafia had a significant impact on the life in the southern areas of 
Italy. 152 Putnam has drawn attention to the fact that it was exactly in this area that public 
authorities were relatively powerless. In other words, following Putnam, it is possible to 
identify the weak state as a key factor that influences the genesis of the Mafia. 153 
To understand how the supreme guarantor of the law and one of its most 
malicious enemies became somehow related to each other, one should take a look at the 
nature of the state. Although there are a great number of proponents of the theory that 
considers the state to be a public contract, it makes sense to address to Max Weber's 
definition of the state. According to Weber, the state is a social institution that owns the 
monopoly of violence within a given territory. 154 
The state monopoly of violence was the key feature during the formation of states, 
and the state played a very important role in the development of the local economy. Let 
,, 
1 55 
us note F. Lane's paper "Consequences of Organised Violence. Lane has argued that 
the action of the state as an effective powerful guarantor has influenced the development 
of prosperous economies in some countries. On the contrary, if the state is weak, or starts 
to lose its monopoly of violence, and stops to be the guarantor of legal order, this causes 
social and economic crises. As impunity for crimes flourishes and crime increase in 
number, a need for an authority, which would be able to halt a spread of uncertainty and 
to enforce stability, emerges. In other words there is a call for the Mafia. 
The second condition of demand for services provided by the Mafia is closely 
connected with the first one. It is an insufficiency of the definition and enforcement of 
property rights. For example, Varese notes this condition in his three basic principles of a 
152 Putnam, R. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University 
Press, pp. 146-148. 153 Ibid., p. 146. 
154 Gerth, 11. and Wright, M. (eds) (1970) From Max Weber. - Essays in Sociology. London: Routledge, p. 
78. 
155 Lane, F. (1958) "Economic Consequences of Organised Violence", The Journal ofEconomic History, 
1958, XVII, 4, pp. 401417; North, D. and Thomas, R. (1973) The Rise ofthe Western World. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 1-18. 
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market economy, which comprise a clear definition of property rights, an opportunity for 
the extraction of income from available property, and the presence of the effective 
enforcement system of property rights that includes both an effective judicial system and 
a powerful police force. 156 
In a transition period there is a huge uncertainty concerning property rights. Such 
a situation existed in Sicily during its transition to the market economy. Russia did not 
avoid this problem when the government started market reforms. 157 As Marshall 
Goldman notes: "On top of everything else, there was no accepted code of business 
behaviour. Suddenly Russia found itself with the makings of a market but with no 
commercial code, no civil code, no effective banking system, no effective accounting 
system, and no procedures for declaring bankruptcy. "' 58 
Alexander Gurov, another researcher of Russian organised crime, also noted the 
significance of this factor when he discussed features and causes of the development of 
Russian organised crime. 159 He pointed out that laws regulating property rights in Soviet 
Russia differed considerably from those during the post-Communist period. As it has 
already been noted, a significant part of economic transactions with private property 
(which includes financial capital) was illegal according to the Soviet Criminal Code. 
The law enforcement system of Russia seemed to have been unsuitable for 
resolving many commercial conflicts. Arbitrary courts turned out to be very slow and 
relatively expensive (a court's fee was from 1.5 to 5 per cent of the sum of appeals). 
Nonetheless, there were no guarantees that a case would be resolved effectively and 
properly because of the presence of a significant number of "holes" in the Russian 
legislation. 
After describing the conditions of demand, let us examine another component of 
the emergence of the Mafia. Demand without supply is not sufficient for the success of a 
product or service. It has been argued that there are two main conditions for the 
emergence of the supply of mafioso services. First, there should be a significant number 
156 Varese, F. (1996) The Emergence ofthe Russian Mafia: Dispute Settlement and Protection in a New 
Market Economy. DPhil thesis. The Faculty of Social Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, Chapter 1. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Goldman, M. (1996) Lost Opportunity, fflat has made Economic Reform in Russia so Dijf1cult, New 
York: Norton, p. 42. 159 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 58. 
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of military trained individuals (who are able to use weapons). Second, these people 
should have sufficient reasons to prefer this dangerous occupation to other jobs. 
The importance of these two conditions for the emergence of the Mafia has been 
pointed out by several researchers. For example, Diego Gambetta notices that at the end 
of the nineteenth century, many professional soldiers, bravi, compagni, militi, former 
soldiers of the Bourbon's army lost their jobs. This forced them "to offer their skills and 
services to different social groups, and not only to aristocracy. " 160 
The situation in many Communist countries during transition to the market 
economy was similar. Many of the former employees of the coercive organs are thought 
to have been unable to find a good job in the new conditions. They are believed to have 
composed the core of criminal groups. Katherina Verdery suggested such a scenario for 
the people of the former secret police (Securitate) of Romania. 16 1 Russia is also in this 
list. It is known, that Alexander Solonik ("killer JV2 I"), a criminal of the Kurganskaia 
gang, was a policeman and a soldier of a special division of the Soviet Army in East 
Germany. 162 
What are the conditions that force the military professionals to choose this 
dangerous occupation? 163 First, this happens during considerable social changes, when 
the power and wealth of the state decreases with a consequent shrink of the employment 
rate and salaries in law enforcement agencies. The second important factor is the 
economic recession, i. e., a situation when opportunities to change one's occupation are 
very limited. Third, the risk of being mafioso should not be too high. To put it in another 
way, the counteraction of law enforcement agencies and other criminals groups should 
not be very strong. 
All the above-mentioned conditions for the emergence of the Mafia existed in 
post-Communist Russia. That made the emergence of bandits in Russia during its 
transition to the market economy inevitable. The bandits quickly became powerful 
160 Gambetta, D. (1993) Yhe Sicilian Mafia: Yhe Business ofPrivate Protection. Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, p. 80. 161 Verdery, K. (1996) "A Transition from socialism to feudalism? Thoughts on the postsocialist state", in 
K. Verdery (ed. ) "at Was Socialism, and "at Comes Next? Princeton University Press, p. 217. 
162 Maksimov, A. (1998) Rossiyskaia Prestupnost, Kto Est Kto [Russian crime, who is who]. Moskva: 
EKSM Press, p. 124. 163 It is very unsafe because criminal groups frequently fight against each other. 
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competitors of the thieves in law. Zhigalo noted: "In St. Petersburg, when avtoriteti (the 
leaders of bandits) sit down to talk with thieves, they are in equal terms. It is like two 
generals. " 164 
Finckenauer has described some of the features of this new Russian Mafia as 
being involved in "some of the traditional staples of Western organised crime (mostly 
unknown in the old Soviet Union) such as drug trafficking and prostitution). " 165 
However, the most distinguished feature is the "extortion of new companies, business, 
,, 
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and restaurants in Moscow and other former Soviet cities. In brief, the criminal 
groups forced the majority of Russian entrepreneurs to pay them for "protection. " These 
payments were from 10 to 20 per cent of capital turnover for these firins (the equivalent 
to over half of their profits). 167 
If the entrepreneurs did not pay, they were in serious risk of being beaten or 
killed. A senior investigator of the Ministry of the Interior confinned this fact by saying: 
"Every big town in Russia has dozens of powerful groups run by avtoriteti (respected 
people], some are divided among ethnic lines, and other just by their crime 
specialisation. " 168 
Whether or not the bandits helped Russian entrepreneurs to succeed is still a 
matter of question. On the one hand, Varese tries to defend the protection role of the 
Mafia and refers to a number of cases when the intervention of bandits was helpful for 
the entrepreneurs. 169 On the other hand, there is much evidence that the protection impact 
of some bandits groups (called in Russia as krisha [roofl) was very limited if it existed at 
all. 
Russian groups of bandits mostly consisted of robust youngsters who were trained 
and lead by mature criminals or professionals. Some former soldiers of special military 
164 Varese, F. (1996) The Emergence ofthe Russian Mafia: Dispute Settlement and Protection in a New 
Market Economy. D. Phil thesis, The Faculty of Social Studies, University of Oxford, Oxford, Ch. 1. 164 Goldman, Lost Opportunity, Tnat has made Economic Reform in Russia so Dijftcult, p. 42. 164 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 42. 165 "Russian organised crime in America", in R. Kelly, R. Schatzberg and K. Chin (eds) (1994) 
Handbook of Organised Crime in the United States. Westport, p. 249. 166 Ibid. 
167 Izvestiya, 26.01.1994. 
168 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 42. 169 Varese, F. Yhe Emergence ofthe Russian Mafia: Dispute Settlement and Protection in a New Market 
Economy. 
87 
units of the Russian Army also joined the gangs. For example, Sergey Butorin's gang 
(Orekhovskaia crime group) was composed of some former soldiers of special military 
units of the Ministry of the Interior. One of them, Alexander Pustovalov, who is thought 
to have committed nearly twenty murders, was a naval officer of a special elite division 
of the Russian Navy. 170 
The leaders of bandits, who are called avtoriteti, represent a new type of criminal 
lords. They have less respect for criminal traditions and are less susceptible to the 
morality of thieves in law. They are more involved into legal and illegal economic 
activities. Handelman notes that avtoriteti moved "into more risky spheres of criminal 
behaviour, such as bank fraud and drug trafficking, " and they "commanded wealth 
beyond the dreams and ambitions of the old vori. , 171 
In order to illustrate a multidimensional activity of avtoriteti let us take 
Kvantrishvili as an example. He was the coach of a popular wrestling team and a founder 
of a new political party Athletes of Russia. At the same time, Kvantrishvili was an 
"arbitrator" between criminal groups and the Russian officialdom. A few weeks before 
his murder, one of Kvantrishvili's enterprises, which exported aluminium, oil and 
titanium, was freed of taxes by a decree signed by Yeltsin. 
This example shows that many bandits invested their money in a profitable 
business. This business could be either illegal, such as drug trafficking or prostitution, or 
legal. There is some evidence that bandits have invested money taken from the 
entrepreneurs in personal shops and trade firms. For instance, the Tambovskaia crime 
group, one of the most influential crime groups in St. Petersburg, more resembles a 
society of businessmen than a gang. 172 Sergey Mikhailov (Mikhas), allegedly the leader 
of the Solntsevskaia criminal group, is a prosperous businessman. He supervises 
substantial investment projects in several countries, including Hungary and Austria. 
Although criminal groups try to prevent serious conflicts between each other, they 
are not able to avoid them. Large areas of Moscow cemeteries are filled with the graves 
170 "Lider orekhovskoy prestupnoy gruppirovki zaderzhan v ispanskom publichnom dome" [The ganglord 
of the Orekhovskaia crime group is arrested in a Spanish brothel], Lenta. ru, (URL 
http: //www. lenta. ru/world/2001/02/15/spain/, consulted in February 2001). 171 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia. 
172 Interview with Stanislav, a researcher on organised crime, St. Petersburg, December, 200 1. 
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of youngsters killed in banditskih razborkah [gangster wars]. The pressure especially 
escalates during the periods of redistribution of property or areas of control. 
This happened in Russia between 1992 and 1994. There was a gangster war in 
Moscow. Many avtoriteti and bandits were killed. As Moskovsky Komsomolets, one of 
the most popular Moscow newspapers, reported in 1992, "Almost everyday corpses are 
found in Moscow with bound hands and feet, sometimes even parts of bodies. "173 
One of the bloody fights was for control over a chain of car services. It was a 
conflict between Podolskaia and Balashinskaia organised crime groups. The fight was 
started by two ambitious leaders of the Balashinskaia crime group, nicknamed Gera and 
Sukhoy, who were upset by a lack of respect from the gangsters of the Podolskaia crime 
group. A series of skirmishes between the gangs ended with a pitched battle in a housing 
estate of a Moscow suburb. 
Three gangsters of Balashinskaia and two representatives of Podolskaia were 
killed. Police found 250 spent cartridges in the battlefield. Gera and Sukhoy managed to 
escape. However, Gera was gunned down in the Hotel Druzhba known as a headquarters 
of Georgian mobsters on Vernadsky Prospect [Vernadsky Road] in Moscow a few days 
later. Sukhoy was also fatally stabbed with his bodyguard on a beach in Istrinski 
district. 174 
One of the groups of bandits even specialised in killing members and leaders of 
other gangs. This group was called Kurganskaia. It was led by Audrey Koligov and is 
thought to have committed more than 40 contract killings during the criminal wars in the 
1990s. This group emerged in 1994 when Silvester, 175 a prominent Moscow avtoritet, 
invited some former soldiers of the decant army from other towns to Moscow. Silvester 
hired them in order to undermine his competitors 
- 
the Baumanskaia crime group. 
Kurganskie managed to solve this task 
- 
they killed Globus and Bobon, two leaders of the 
Baumanskaia crime group. 
Progressively, the Kurganskaia crime group demanded more independence. Its 
leaders wanted to have their own firms to extort money. Because the majority of Moscow 
enterprises had already been under a patronage of other crime groups, the Kurganskaia 
173 MoskovskyKomsomolets, 18.07.1992. 174 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 42. 
175 His real name was Sergey Timofeev. 
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group began killing the gangsters of those bandits groups. They focused on the north of 
Moscow, which was controlled by the Koptevskaia crime group. The gangsters of the 
Kurganskaia group killed 20 Koptevskaia's gangsters and businessmen, including 
Alexander and Vasiliy Naumov (Naum Starshiy, and Naum Mladshiy), the leaders of this 
crime group. 176 It is interesting to note that Vasiliy Naumov was killed next to the 
headquarters of the Moscow Department of the Interior Ministry. 
Almost all crime groups in Moscow suffered from the Kurganskaia group. 
Moscow law enforcement agencies were also annoyed by the activity of this group. Joint 
efforts against the Kurganskaia group led to the capturing of its leaders and gangsters. 
The trial over the Kurganskaia group started in February 2001. However, some of the 
most informed gangsters of this group, Andrey Zelenin (who killed Vasiliy Naumov) and 
Oleg Nelubin, had already been killed in custody. According to some data, the executors 
of these killings were paid US$ 120,000.177 
Bandits continue to put pressure on business until the present, although the 
government pledged to liquidate thern. Almost everyday Russians are told about new 
murders of businessmen in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other Russian cities. Some of the 
killed businessmen were the bandits themselves. 
2.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has described different types of organised crime in Russia. Each type played 
a somewhat useful role in overcoming some deficiencies in the Soviet economy. It has 
been argued that the presence of these types of organised crime was significantly 
influenced by the structure of the Russian economy and the features of Russian history. 
Although different types of organised crime use dissimilar methods and have 
different histories, it would be a mistake to consider them as completely independent of 
each other. It is important to note in this respect that these types of organised crime are 
often joined into networks that sometimes overlap. For example, it is very difficult to 
distinguish between the administrative Mafia and the illegal economic entrepreneurs 
176 Some experts believe that Kurgantkaia's gangsters also killed Silvester, their former "supervisor. " 
177 URL http: //www. cry. ru/text. shtml? 200002/2000021514483 Linc, consulted in January 2001. 
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because a significant part of the Soviet and post-Soviet administrative Mafia consisted of 
such illegal entrepreneurs. 
Recent activities of the thieves in law are very similar to those of bandits. Both 
criminal networks have been heavily involved in business and economic activities. They 
extort tribute from legal and illegal entrepreneurs. Almost all small private firms and 
nearly eighty per cent of larger private firms and commercial banks paid protection 
money to criminal groups in 1994.178 
It has been noted that bandits and thieves operate their own illegal and legal 
businesses. For example, the association Twenty-First Century was created by an 
organised crime group. In addition to extortion, kidnapping, prostitution, and other illegal 
activities, the Twenty-First Century is thought to have controlled a hundred companies 
including restaurants, hotels and casinos. It also offered insurance, investments, banking 
and pension services. 179 
Thieves in law and bandits have political links, i. e., they are connected with the 
administrative Mafia. As Handelman notes, "Mob money and Communist Party funds 
supported newspapers and certain right-wing political groups, and some provincial crime 
lords reputedly financed the political companies of anti-governmental candidates during 
the December 1993 elections. 9,180 Gurov also places organised crime at the centre of 
Russian politics: "Not a single organised crime group would exist today without these 
links. After 1985 the criminal syndicates began to resemble formal business 
organisations. As they grew, they increased their corrupt ties with officialS.,, 181 
There is some evidence that some of the Russian public authorities cooperate with 
criminal groups. In order to describe the situation in Yekaterinburg, the third biggest city 
in Russia, let us quote Handelman: 
Yekaterinburg political leaders periodically vowed to destroy the Mafia, "but that, " said Sergey 
Plotnikov, a reporter for newspaper Na Smenu whose critical articles had provoked that attack on 
178 Izvestiya, 26.01.1994. 
179 Finckenauer, Waring, Russian Mafia in America, p. 124. 180 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 55. 181 Ibid. 
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Tamara Lomakina, (the editor of this newspaper), 182 s, iS like someone saying he will stick a knife 
in his own throat. " 
The fusion of the gangs with the city's political establishment made a crackdown on 
organised crime even more unlikely due to the economic crisis in Russia. "The white criminals are 
putting literally millions of rubles into circulation, " Plotnikov said, "Senior municipal authorities 
have told me that since all this former criminal money is now subject to taxes, it would be silly to 
do anything to stop it especially since there is no money coming from the government. " The 
participation of officials in the frontiers plunder explained the tight-lipped atmosphere 
surrounding Ternyak's death. No one could avoid the conclusion that Yekaterinburg was run by, 
and operated for the benefit of, comrade criminals. 183 
Representatives of criminal groups lobby for their interests in the Duma (the 
Russian Parliament). 184 For example, Kobzon, a Russian singer and a member of the 
Russian Duma, has been suspected of links to organised crime and because of that has 
been repeatedly denied entry into the United States. Biyneger Baychorov, a member of 
Zakonodatelnogo Sobrania (mini-Parliament) in district Karachaevo-Cherkesiya, is also 
connected with criminal groups. He has been accused of extortion and placed on the 
wanted list of the Interior Ministry. 185 
To sum up, the ties of crime groups among one another and with the legal social 
institutions, business and politics in Russia are so tight that it is difficult to know where 
one begins and the others end. Many of the powerful actors in Russia are connected with 
all types of organised crime. This can be regarded as the key characteristic of Russian 
organised crime. Therefore, it is possible to agree with Solzhenitsyn's words that "the 
criminal revolutioný' in Russia is "an amalgam of former party functionaries, quasi 
- 
democrats, KGB officers, and black market wheeler-dealers, who are staying in power 
now (and have) represented a dirty hybrid unseen in world history. "186 
182 Another reference that the mass media are also in the sphere of interests of organised crime groups are 
given by Louise Shelley 
- 
"Russian criminal organisation intimidate journalists and scholars, acquire media 
outlets to circumscribe news coverage" (from Shelley, L. (1996) "Post-Soviet Organised Crime, A new 
form of Authoritarianism", Transnational Organised Crime, 2 (2-3). 
183 Handelman, Comrade Criminal: Russia's New Mafia, p. 89. 184 According to Vladimir MiIjutenko, a Russian journalist in Finckenauer, Waring, Russian Mafia in 
America, p. 12 1. 
1'5 "Razoblachena Deputatskaya mafia" [The MP Mafia is cought], Urro. ru, 28.06.2001, (URL 
http: //www. utro. ru/articles/2001062803084921903. shtml, consulted in July 2001). 186 Reported in Ryan, Rush, Understanding Organised Crime in Global Perspective, pp. 75,76. 
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Chapter 3 
Factors ofInfluence on Media Content in Russia 
One aspect of the relationship between the mass media and organised crime is organised 
crime reporting. Consequently, this chapter aims to explore factors that may have an 
impact on the media coverage of organised crime. Although there is an opinion that the 
news media represents reality with little or no distortion, some studies demonstrate that 
the content of media reports is determined by a number of factors related to both the 
internal features of media industries and a diversified set of external pressures. This 
chapter analyses the range and power of these factors. 
The factors are broken into two big groups 
- 
internal and external. Internal factors 
are related to the media environment, they include the structure of mass media, the 
professionalism of media workers, goals and ethical rules of media companies. Internal 
factors and their impact are described in the first section of this chapter. External factors 
are a set of coercive methods that can be used by non-media powerful actors in order to 
force the media to provide a required coverage of some events. The impact of external 
factors is examined in the second section of this chapter. 
Although Russian mass media organisations are not as strong and independent as 
media companies in some of the developed Western democracies, they have some 
resources that may allow them to resist external coercion. They are reviewed in the last 
section of this chapter in which I argue that the methods and resources of the Russian 
news media are not sufficient to resist effectively the pressure of external powerful 
actors. 
3.1. Internal Factors 
On the one hand, journalists claim that their reports are based on facts, the words of 
witnesses, or evidence. On the other hand, they work with sources and construct media 
messages by using specific techniques. One Russian journalist described this process in 
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such a way that aj ournalist should understand the goal of a report plainly and search for 
the data which supports this goal. It is not to say that this approach is bad. Media 
personnel have created a great number of techniques to present news laconically and 
remarkably. The problem is that in such a way, journalists construct reality rather than 
represent it. This section describes the range of factors that originated from inside the 
media industry. These factors are broken into three big groups, including: (1) inj7uence 
from media workers, (2) inj7uence ofmedia routines, and (3) organizational injluence. 
ILL Influenceftom Media Workers 
This group of factors includes beliefs and personal characteristics of media workers. It is 
not surprising that the beliefs ofjournalists can affect media reporting. Even if reporters 
honestly try to be unbiased, it is almost impossible to avoid the influence of those 
personal traits. As Herbert Gans points out, "journalists try hard to be objective, but 
neither they nor anyone else can in the end proceed without values. Furthermore, reality 
judgements are never altogether divorced from values. ( 
... 
] The values in the news are 
rarely explicit and must be found between the lines 
- 
in what actors and activities are 
reported or ignored and in how they are described. "' 87 
The impact of personal characteristics of reporters is equally difficult to avoid. 
Shoemaker shows that gender, cthnicity, sexual orientation, place in social hierarchy, 
careers targets, and reporters' professional background might also influence the content 
of media messages. 188 
Of course, professional roles and professional ethics should eliminate or alleviate 
the impact of beliefs and personal characteristics. These media workers' orientations arc 
shaped while learning the journalist profession in university or in job through the process 
of socialisation. Breed describes this process as follows: a new journalist "discovers and 
internalises the rights and obligations of his status and its norms and values. " 189 This 
"' Gans, H. J. (1979) Deciding What's News. New York: Pantheon, pp. 3940. 188 Shoemaker, J. P. and Reese D. S. (1996) Mediating the Message: Theories ofInfluence on Mass Media 
Content. White Plains, N. Y.: Longman Publishers, pp. 66-8 1. 189 Breed, W. (1960) "Social Control in the Newsroom: A Functional Analysis", in W. Shramm. (ed. ) Mass 
Communications. University of Illinois Press, p. 182. 
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socialization introduces "the context of shared values"190 within media organisations. To 
some extent, professional ethics eliminate personal characteristics and values. However, 
this framework ofjournalistic norms is the new constraint that distorts the content of 
news reporting. 
3.1. Z Influen ce of Media Ro utin es 
Media routines greatly affect the content of media reports. For the following analysis, it is 
useful to organise media routines into three subgroups, as shown in Figure 2. This Figure 
represents the main blocks of routines, which include routines related to the audience, 
routines related to media organisation, and routines related to sources. 
Process of production of symbolic content 
Media Organization 
(Producer) 
( 
Routines 
) 
Sources 
(Suppliers) 
Audience 
(Consumers) 
Figure 3.1 Media routines. 191 
3.1.2.1 Routines Related to the Audience 
Even if the mass media was able to report all events in the world, it would not be 
especially useful. The reason for this is that the media audience has limited attention and 
190 Sigal, L. V. (1973) Reporters and Officials, The Organisation and Politics ofNewsmaking. Lexington, p. 
3. 
191 Shoemaker, Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories ofInfluence on Mass Media Content, p. 109. 
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interest. Consequently, the audience would consume just the most valuable stories. 
Therefore, if media organisations find out the news preferences of the audience they are 
able to fulfil their mission more efficiently. 
Although mass media organisations want to know the interests of their audience, 
this data is not easily available. Many media outlets have solved this problem by 
inventing the system of craft norms that presumably reflect the audience's interests. As 
Schlesinger argues, "Production routines embody assumptions about audiences ( 
... 
] 
When it comes to thinking about the kind of news most relevant to 'the audience' 
newsmen exercise their news judgement rather than going out and seeking specific 
information about the composition, wants or tastes of those who are being addressed. "' 92 
The news media has created its perception of what the audience would find 
interesting and what encompasses the news values. Stephens points out the following set 
of news values: interest, importance, the unusual, controversy, proximity and 
timeliness. 193 The importance of a story is measured in how many lives it can impact. The 
range of human interests is far beyond what is directly affecting us and among others 
includes human dramas, scandals, and ftmny stories, etc. The unusual and controversial 
events are of a special interest for the public (audience) as well. Finally, the news should 
be reported at the right time and be primarily related to the events not far away from the 
offices of media organizations. 
Many Russian journalists also believe that they choose newsworthy events on the 
basis of the preferences of the audience, despite the absence of a direct dialog with it. 
One Russian journalist explained the abundance of crime stories reported by the Russian 
mass media by referring to Maslow's theory based on the hierarchy of needs. This theory 
suggests that basic human needs have to first be met. According to this journalist, as the 
need of safety is a basic need, reports about dangerous events, such as crimes and 
192 Schlesinger, P. (1978) Putting "Reality" Together., BBC News. London: Constable. 
193 Stephens, M. (1980) Broadcast News. New York: Holt, Rinehart& Winston; 
Baskette, F. K., Sissors, J. Z. and Brooks, B. S. (1982) The Art ofEdifing. New York: Macmillan; 
Dennis, E. E. and Ismach A. H. (1981) Reporting Processes and Practices. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
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catastrophes, are of primary interest to the audience. Therefore, the media should report 
such stories. 194 
Furthermore, in order to be competitive in the media market (at least in the free 
media market), media outlets should meet the audience's need for trustworthy 
information. A problem is that the verification of data is usually a difficult and time- 
consuming process. As the speed of reporting events is the most important media task, it 
was supposed to find practices that would allow it to report stories quickly and with 
sufficient credibility. Such practices of objectivity are attributing statements to sources, 
omitting seemingly harmless information, and avoiding mobilizing information. 195 
Finally, to meet the audience's needs, the media is supposed to present stories in a 
form convenient to the audience. Television news has to be visually appealing and 
interesting. Newspapers have to publish stories that are readable and well illustrated. The 
development and exploitation of these presentation formats are also a part of media 
routines. 196 
3.1.2.2. Routines Related to Media Organisation and Sources 
Ttrustworthiness and the format of stories may be equally related to the routines 
determined by media organization. A media organization can be defined as "the social, 
formal, usually economic entity that employs the media worker in order to produce media 
content. " 197 
As contemporary mass media companies have rather complex structures, they 
need to develop some routines that enable them to operate smoothly. A serious problem 
for the media is the fact that newsworthy events do not happen regularly, and they differ 
in importance and location. On the other hand, the space of media reports is fixed, media 
organizations should produce news reports on a regular basis regardless of the irregularity 
194 Koltsova, 0. (200 1) "Proizvodstvo novostey: tipy vlianiy na raboty journalistoV' [News Production: 
Types of Influence on the work of journalists], in V. Voronkov, 0. Pachenkov, and E. Chicadze (eds) (2001) Nevidimie GraniSotcialnoyRealnosti, Trudi TSNCI, Vip. 9, St. Petersburg, pp. 109-123. 
195 Lemert, J. B., Mitzman, B. N., Cook, R. H. and Hackett, R. (1978) "Journalists and mobilizing 
information", Journalism Quarterly, 54, pp. 721-726. 196 Shoemaker, Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories ofInfluence on Mass Media Content, p. 114. 
197 Ibid. 
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of real life, and the process of news production cannot avoid being regulated by certain 
deadlines. All this makes the mass media routinize the process of sorting available 
information and support the system of sources, so-called sources net. 198 
These routines, however useful they are for the work of media organizations, 
affect the content of media reports. For example, it has been noted that the occurrences 
that happen outside of regular working hours are less likely to be reported. The same is 
true regarding the events that take place outside the zone of reachability of media 
workers. Thus it is possible to say that through their routines the mass media constructs 
reality rather than reflects it. 
3.1.2.3 Organisational Influence 
Routines related to media organisation are only a small part of organisational influence 
on content of media reports. Although some researchers argue that technical and format 
restrictions are the most significant factor in the distortion of reality by the mass media, 199 
it is hardly the case in contemporary Russia where other organizational factors make a 
greater impact on media content. 
The first of them is related to the goals and mission of media groups. According 
to many researchers, the main goal of most media organizations is to make a profit. Other 
targets, such as producing a quality product, achieving professional recognition, and 
serving to public are built into this major objective. 
This is not always true in Russia. The Soviet mass media was subsidised by the 
state, and its main goal was to disseminate the ideological views of the Communist Party 
and to present events according to this ideological framework. In other words, the Soviet 
media was not supposed to make a profit. 
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the economic profit of a media outlet 
(at least in terms of income-expenditures of the media outlet) was not a priority for many 
Russian media organizations. One of the causes of this situation was the fact that the 
198 Tuchman, G. (1978) Making News: A Study in the Construction ofReality. New York: Free Press. 
199 For example, Pironkova, 0. (2000) "Zhivie novosti, ili o vremeni prostranstve v televizioonom efire" [Live news, or about the time-space in broadcasting], Sociologicheskie Issledovania, No. 8, pp. 65-74. 
98 
Russian media did not have the experience of advertising and was unable to effectively 
use the advertising resource, the main source of income in the Western media. This fact, 
along with the Russian economic crisis, caused most Russian media companies to 
become unprofitable after the state stopped subsidising them in 1991. Several media 
organisations decided to close their businesses. The others were supposed to look for any 
possible sources of income to survive. Because the media business made no profit, it was 
a rather difficult task. 
In order to reach a mutual compromise, some of the Russian media outlets started 
to consider as their main goal the following principle: the survival of the media outlet, the 
prosperity of its editorial personnel, along with economic or political advantages for the 
media owners or advertisers. In some cases, this formula worked perfectly. The success 
of Media-Most during 1996-1999 was a good example of this. 
Finally, the hierarchical structure of the media organisations also makes a great 
impact on the content of media messages. To reach their goals, media organizations have 
to develop an appropriate structure and to assign roles. Like other bureaucracies, media 
companies are a combination of hierarchy and division of labour. Their distinctive 
configuration has been aptly described as "middle-heavy hierarchy. , 200 
The typical structure of a media organisation reflects its divergent demands. On 
the one hand, media outlets widely interact with a diverse and unpredictable environment. 
On the other hand, their normal work is impossible without centralised coordination. 201 
That is why overall authority and decision-making in the mass media are concentrated in 
a relatively small group of editorial executives, below which is a large and diversified 
middle stratum of reporters and processors. 
The typical structure of Western media companies includes three levels. The 
lowest level is composed of reporters and journalists. The middle level consists of 
managers, producers and editors who coordinate the process of news production and 
mediate communication between the lower level and the top one. The latter encompasses 
corporate and news executives who are responsible for protection of commercial and 
200 Tunstall, J. (197 1) Journalists at Work. London: Constable, p. 1, p. 280. 201 Tiffen, News and Power, p. 16. 
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political interests of the media organization. They set budgets and make employment 
decisions. 202 
Although the structure of Russian media companies does not differ significantly 
from that of Western media corporations, a simpler model is to be used in the further 
analysis. The model views Russian mass media organisations as consisting of two layers - 
the management, including executives and top editorial staff, and the lower group, which 
consists of media workers, reporters and operators. Although the real structure is not as 
simple as that because of the considerable hierarchy of managerial posts within media 
organisations, this simplified yet reliable and convenient model can be used, as this thesis 
does not intend to explore all details of hierarchical relations within the Russian news 
media. 
The decisions of senior managers are compulsory for the staff placed lower in the 
organisational hierarchy. The majority of these decisions are about media routines, such 
as what is to be chosen for broadcasting and who should write a story about any 
particular event. According to Koltsova's experience of working in St. Petersburg office 
of a nationwide TV channel, there were nearly twenty telephone calls per day from the 
Moscow based management of the channel. 203 
Nevertheless, even in these minor matters it is almost impossible for managers of 
media companies to avoid personal views and beliefs. Media managers may explain their 
preferences to the journalistic staff either by referring to the interests of the audience or 
by not explaining their reasons at all. It should be noted that the managers use this 
possibility frequently because the ways of possible resistance of the media personnel to 
their decisions are very limited. 204 
For example, managers are capable of sacking media workers as happened with 
Shulekina, the anchor of show Mestnoe Vremia [Local Time] in August 1998. She was 
sacked by B. Maksimenko, the Director General of broadcasting company Vladivostok, 
after her live critical report regarding a policy of political censorship that had been 
introduced by the management of the company before the election of the mayor of 
202 Shoemaker, Reese, Mediating the Message: Theories ofInfluence on Mass Media Content, p. 15 1. 203 Koltsova, 0. (200 1) Institut SMK v Sovremennoy Rossii: Proiz-vodstvo Novostey kak Systema Wastnikh 
Bzaimootnosheniy [Institution of mass media in contemporary Russia: News production in the system of 
power]. Ph. D. Thesis, European Uiversity at St. Petersburg, p. 143. (04 It is examined in detail in the last section of this chapter. 
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Vladivostok. 205 This method is not used often because there is a wide range of other, less 
severe, ways of controlling the content of media reporting. The management is able to 
gradually push a reporter to resign by creating an unbearable working environment, or 
simply by closing the show. 
Another method of control over news coverage is the transfer of "bad" reporters 
from news programmes to less prestigious posts. For instance, Anna Kulikova, a 
presenter of the news on the TV channel of Leningrad Oblast, was replaced in September 
1998 as a result of her report regarding unpopularity of Valery Serdukov in the regional 
elite. 206 
Also, it is possible to eliminate some reports. Glasnost Defence Foundation 
reports several such cases. For example, it notes the decision of the state TV channel 
OKA to eliminate the report by journalists Maxim Andreev and Vladimir Tikhomirov 
about the restoration of a Lenin's monument on the central square of Riazan. This 
207 decision was made by Valentin Karpuskin, the Chairman of this channel. 
Therefore, the management of media companies is not only the actor that greatly 
influences the content of media reports, it is also an ideal tool for conducting the will or 
preferences of external actors. For example, it is reported that managers of media 
companies personally controls the production of zakaz stories (pre-paid stories). 208 
Following the pressures of external actors, the management is able to change the 
programme of broadcasting, or dismiss "bad" reporters. In fact, many of the above- 
mentioned examples have been influenced by some of the external actors. However, the 
range of possible external pressures on the mass media is significantly wider and is to be 
examined in the next section of this chapter. 
205 Monitoring of GDF, 28.08.1998, (URL http: //www. gdf. ni/monitor/I 998/august/russia-0898. html, 
consulted in July 2003). 
206 Monitoring of GDF, 23.09.1998, (URL http: //www. gdfru/, consulted in July 2003). 207 Monitoring of GDF, 10.04.1997. 208 Koltsova, "Proizvodstvo novostey- tipy vlianiy na rabotyjoumalistoV', pp. 109-123. 
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3.2. External Factors 
The internal factors that have been examined in the previous section do not encompass all 
possible methods of control over the mass media's coverage of events. This section 
analyses the impact of factors that originate from outside the media industry. Because of 
this they arc referred to as external factors of media news production. 
The impact of external factors has been noticed by several researchers. 209 A few 
interesting systems of classifications have been suggested. For example, Michael Parenti 
notes owners ofmedia, advertisers, editors and selr-regulatory practices ofjournalists 
among the forces which might influence the bias of media coverage. 210 Sparks has 
pointed out the existence of four groups of actors who can control the media coverage in 
Central Europe. These are entrepreneurs, politicians, the executives of the mass media 
. 
21 1 Koltsova adds a few new actors, including: state, criminals, sources, and their staff. 
owners ofmedia and advertisers (economic actors), audience and its representatives - 
media research groups. 212 
Although the classifications mentioned above have included many important 
external forces that might manipulate the media representation of reality, the choice of 
actors as the basis of an inclusive classification of external factors does not look 
appropriate. First, it is very difficult to distinguish between state and the owners of media, 
as well as between the latter and criminals. Secondly, sources can belong to each of the 
above-mentioned categories. Thirdly, different actors can employ the same way of media 
control. Finally, the same actor can use several ways to influence a desirable media 
response. Because of these contradictions Koltsova has noted that her classification is 
rather a set of analytic concepts. 
209 For example, Silviou Waisbord has summarised causes and coersive means of antipress violence in 
Latin America (Waisbord, S. (2003) "Antipress violence and the crisis of the state", The Harvard 
International Journal ofPresslPolitics, Vol. 7, No. 3, pp. 90-109). 210 Parenti, M. (1993) Inventing Reality: The Politics offews Media. New York: St. Martin's Press, pp. 
33-51. 
211 Sparks, C. and Reading, A. (1998) Communism, Capitalism and the Mass Media. London, Thousand 
Oaks, New Dehli: Sage, p. 137. 
212 Koltsova, 0. (200 1) "Kto i kak vliyet na proizvodstvo novostey v sovremennoy Rossii", in Pro et 
Contra, Vol. 5, No. 4, pp. 80-109, p. 85. 
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Many of these deficiencies can be avoided by applying the approach used by Jean 
Chalaby in his analysis of the development of the media in the successor states of the 
Soviet Union. Chalaby notes four types of coercive means against the media 
- 
legal, 
administrative, economic, and violent. 213 1 consider his approach, i. e., to classify the 
factors not by actors but by methods of media control, as the best basis of the 
classification of external factors. 
However, I would like to expand Chalaby's approach by taking into account a 
larger number of types of coercive means. My proposed classification of external factors 
of media production is a set of methods of putting pressures on the news media which 
includes regulatory, administrative, economic (advertisement and other contracts), 
judicial, informative, symbolic, violent, and law enforcement methods. They are 
explained in detail in sections 3.2.1 
- 
3.2.9. 
3. ZI. Regulation 
I shall define the regulatory method as an ability to make an impact on the legal 
framework of media activities (the Law on Media, governmental and local acts) and 
regulate the order of licensing and registration of media companies. It is the most 
powerful means of control of the media because the very existence of media outlets 
depends on this. Not many actors can have enough resources to be able to use the 
regulative method. For the most part it is a privilege of the government and local 
authorities. 
For example, the Yeltsin government seemed to be uninterested in the creation of 
a clear legal framework of media communications and slowed down the development and 
implementation of the Law on Broadcasting. The first draft of this law was developed as 
far back as 1993. However, the draft approved by the State Duma was rejected because of 
Yeltsin's veto. Even although the state Duma managed to overcome the veto, the Council 
of Federation did not approve this draft of the Law on Broadcasting in 1996.214 
213 Chalaby, J. (1998) "The Media and the Formation of the Public Sphere in the New Independent States", 
Innovation, Vol. 11, No 1, pp. 73-85. 214 Lange, Y. (1997) Media in the CIS. A Study ofthe Political, Legislative and Socio-Economic 
Framework. The European Institute of Media. Brussels: European Commission, pp. 157-158. 
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As a result of this, key aspects of the broadcasting industry 
- 
the issue of licences 
and distribution of broadcasting waves were regulated by the Presidential Decree N2 2255 
(December 1993) and the Governmental Act X2 1359 (December 1994). These vague 
regulatory acts allowed Federalnoy Sluzhbe po Televideniu i Radioveshaniu (the Federal 
Broadcasting Committee) to issue licences according to its own preferences. For a 
decision on these vital questions it was not even obligatory to organise tenders (although 
it was recommended). For example, Yeltsin himself decided to give NTV the whole 
channel 
. 
21 5 Needless to say, this channel did much for Yeltsin's presidential campaign. 216 
Until the mid-90s there were no rules which regulated the accreditation of media 
representatives in Russia. However, even after these rules were formulated, the state and 
Russian local authorities decided themselves to whom and for how long to give 
accreditation regardless of the appropriateness of their decision to law. For example, in 
August 1998, Alexander Lebed, the Governor of Krasnoyarsky Kray [Krasnoyarsk 
Borough], signed a decree which regulated the rules of accreditation ofjoumalists. 
Among compulsory conditions for journalists were mentioned: "the presence of the 
appropriate education and work experience, [ 
... 
] an ability to analyse data properly 
and so on. "2 17 It is evident that such a decree allowed the Administration of the 
Krasnoyarsky Kray to accredit or discredit any journalist in accordance with its 
preferences. 
IZZ Administrative Control 
The administrative method in this classification means the range of managerial activities 
by the media owners, the most important of which is a possibility of the appointment of 
media executives who influence the policies of media companies. As it has been noticed 
earlier in this chapter, the executive of a media organisation is its chief editor. He is 
responsible for almost all issues relating to the performance of the media company 
- 
215 NTV had only limited broadcasting time before this Yeltsin's decision. 2 '6 The transfer of the frequency of St. Petersburg Channel 5 channel to the channel Culture was also decided by Yeltsin without any consultation even with with Federalnoy Sluzhbe po Televideniu I 
Radioveshaniu. 
217 Monitoring of GDF, 17.08.1998, (URL http: //www. gdf ru). 
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content of reports, relations with the media personnel and those with many of the external 
partners 
- 
supplying firms, advertisers, and so on. In other words, the chief editor is the 
CEO of the Russian media syndicate who makes decisions on everyday activities of this 
company. 
However, the appointment of the chief editor is a privilege of the owners of the 
media organisation. Through the choice of the chief editor the owners are able to make a 
very significant impact on the policies and activities of the controlled media company. In 
other words, chief editors (or management) are a medium through which media owners 
control their media company. 
For example, chief editors can suspend any show. A number of cases have already 
been noted in this chapter. Another example is the closure of the show Sobitie [Evqnt] on 
Channel 11 of St. Petersburg in November 1998. According to Chemyadev, the 
anchorman of the show, his programme was closed because he rejected an offer made by 
a representative of Yabloko to agitate in favour of this political party. Chernyadev 
claimed that Yabloko's contacts with NTV, an owner of Channel 11, caused the decision 
of the management to terminate his show. 
This is not to say that the owners directly order the managers of media 
corporations. According to some journalists and editors, the owners do not control every 
aspect of media work but just determine the main targets and policies of the media 
companies. One editor said that he had to make many personal decisions because it would 
be impossible to contact the owners on every single occasion and, for the most part, he 
was not told what to do. Nevertheless, he admitted that he was sure what was supposed to 
be reported and who ought to have been mentioned. He even knew who was not allowed 
to be presented by his media organisation at all. 218 
An understanding of the preferences of the owners is often gained through 
informal contacts. The following words of a Russian editor illustrate how it may work. 
Who is this Dorenko? Yaa, he is a Berezovsky's boy, everybody knows this, in other words, they 
have informal contacts. He can phone him at any time and indicate what should be reported. 
The same is true regarding Svanidze. He is the best friend of Chubais. [ 
... 
] When some people 
drink together, for example, Berezovsky with Dorenko, or Svanidze with Chubais 
- 
can there be an 
218 Interview with a researcher on the Russian mass media, St. Petersburg, September, 2001. 
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order to say something? No, it might be informal talks. And naturally, after those informal talks 
people gain some understanding and make decisions, even if those talks were about somebody or 
something abstract. 219 
Nevertheless, it is not always easy to gain such an understanding of the owners' 
preferences, especially, when the preferences of several owners contradict one another. 
For instance, in 1997, two owners (Administration and a bank) of a St. Petersburg 
newspaper had a conflict between each other (because the Administration chose another 
bank as the main bank of its financial transactions). In this situation the chief editor of the 
newspaper was very uncertain how to report this conflict. Finally, the newspaper did not 
report this event at all. 
When the chief editor does not understand or does not want to understand the 
owners, the latter can, if necessary, dismiss the chief editor. It can be illustrated by the 
dismissal of Vitaly Tretyakov from the post of the chief editor of the newspaper 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta [the Independent Newspaper] in June 2001. The controlling stake of 
this newspaper was held by Boris Berezovsky, who absconded from Russia because of a 
prosecution against him. One day, Berezovsky decided that this newspaper should take a 
more critical stance against President Putin. Because Tretyakov refused to change the 
editorial policy of this newspaper, he was forced to resign. 220 The new chief editor of 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta made this newspaper cover events in the way that suited 
Berezovsky's preferences. For instance, on 4 December 2001, this newspaper published 
Berezovsky's open letter to leading Russian politicians and businessmen 
- 
Chubais 
(Chairman of RAO UES), Kasyanov (the Prime Minister of Russia) among others, in 
which Berezovsky encouraged them to create a strong liberal opposition to President 
Putin. 221 
Sometimes the intrusion of the owners can go further than the appointment of the 
management of the media concerns. It is reported that from time to time media owners 
(especially state officials) demand their preliminary approval of news, or dismissal of 
2 19 Koltsova, Institut SMK v Sovremennoy Rossii: Proizzvodstvo Novostey kak Systema Hastnikh 
Bzaimootnosheniy, p. I 10. 220 (2001) "Russian editor resigns", Financial Times; 7.06.2001. 
221 Berezovsky, B. (200 1) "Pismo is Londona" [A letter from London], Nezavisimaia Gazeta, 4.12.200 1. 
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some j ournalists. For example, let us quote a piece of Koltsova's interview with a 
reporter from TRK Petersburg (the major television company of St. Petersburg): 
In 1998 during the election for the St. Petersburg parliament [ 
... 
] glasnost on St. Petersburg 
television was eradicated. We do not know for sure whether the wife of the Mayor phoned the 
headquarters of the TV channel or not, but some people say that she did. Moreover, she also came 
there and took command. [ 
... 
] Before the election, some people from Smolny (the headquarters of 
St. Petersburg Administration) went to the television station and started putting pressure on the 
editors [ 
... 
] resulting in the broadcast of poor quality reports regarding how good everything was 
in Smolny and how wonderful things were in our City. 222 
3. Z3. Economic Means of Coercion 
The economic method in my classification encompasses two slightly different types of 
economic transactions. The first of them is the contracts (both formal and informal) of 
advertising. The financing of media outlets has become the vital problem since 1992, 
when price liberalisation started and the Russian state stopped sponsoring the mass 
media. 223 Although advertising revenue does not normally cover expenditures of the 
Russian news media, it is one of the important segments of media budgets. 224 
The Moscow advertising market is the most formalized and it resembles the 
western model. There arc three groups of advertising agencies in Moscow. The first 
group is the so-called media sellers which arc wholesale advertisement sellers, i. e., they 
buy huge time or space of any particular media group in order to secure their monopoly 
of this segment of the advertising market. Media sellers sell the portions of this time or 
space to less wealthy media buyers (advertisement retailers), which deal with the 
customers themselves (people or firms that are going to advertise their products or 
222 Koltsova, Institut SMI v Sovremennoy Rossii: ProLvodstvo Novostey kak Systema k7astnikh 
Bzaimootnosheniy. 
223 Zassoursky, Y. (1999) "Open society and access to information: To what degree the Russian media 
contribute to the openness of society", in Y. Zassoursky, E. Vartanova (cds) Media, Communications and 
the Open Society. Moscow: Faculty of Journalism / IKAR, pp. 30-3 1. 224 Other possible sources of income were state subsidies and private donations, investments which were 
secured by stocks in the media groups. 
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services) 
. 
225 The third group is composed of production agencies that produce 
advertisement. 
In regions the situation for advertising is more vague yet straightforward. On the 
one hand, there are fewer mediators between media outlets and advertisers. On the other 
hand, their relations are significantly more diversified in terms of the means of paying 
advertising fees. Because of a severe economic crisis in the last decade, many Russian 
enterprises, businessmen, state and political groups (especially outside Moscow) had a 
lack of liquidity. This is why Russian media organisations accepted health and transport 
services, or informational exchange as an advertising revenue. 226 
To a lesser extent this practice took place in Moscow in 1995-96. Sergey 
Dorenko, one of the leading reporters of one of the Russian TV channels, described this 
sort of relationship between the mass media and advertisers in the following way: 
Reports were paid by a repair of Zhiguli (major Russian car), or when a boss said, "Valia needs to 
replace fin-niture, that is why we are making this report. She will get two thousand dollars, take 
one thousand five hundred herself, and give five hundred to our fund. " There were deputies on 
corTuption [persons who were responsible for organising and controlling informal exchanges] in 
media outlets. I participated in a meeting at a TV channel, where the deputy on corruption reported 
how many TV reports had been made, how many visits of our children to children camps had been 
paid by the money earned from airing these reports, how many iron doors [in order to protect 
houses from burgling] had been provided for the personnel. 227 
It is important to note that formal advertising constitutes just a fraction of the 
Russian advertising market. Covert advertisement, that is stories paid by a business or 
political sources but presented as news, is a significantly more widespread variation of 
advertising in Russia. Advertisers prefer covert advertisements to the normal ones 
because they believe that a hidden advertisement is more efficient (many Russians have 
started to mistrust direct advertising, especially after a series of big fraud scandals with 
"financial pyramids"). 
225 Media buyers can also develop the advertisement plan for their clients. 226 This type of exchange (the informative method) is described later in this chapter. 227 Dorenko, S. (1998) "Dorenko v shkole Poznera. Stennograma uchebnogo zaniatia v shkole 
televizionnog masterstva pod rukovodstvom Vladimira Poznera" [Dorenko in Pozner's school. Notes of a 
Vladimir Pozner's lesson], in Sreda, No. 2-3, p. 10. 
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Let us take as an example the case of a new university in St. Petersburg, which 
was going to increase the awareness of the people of St. Petersburg about its existence. 
This university asked to broadcast a report about a presentation that took place in this 
university as a news item. However, a representative from the TV channel decided that 
this event was not newsworthy enough to be reported without an advertising fee. Finally, 
the television channel and the university agreed to broadcast this presentation and to 
acknowledge in the broadcast its sponsors. The university paid US$ 150 and was given 
permission to select people who would represent this university in a good light. 
Although many Russians might be surprised to learn that some of the media 
stories that they consider as an unbiased product of the media industry have actually been 
paid by advertisers, covert advertising is quite legitimate. Koltsova mentioned that there 
was a news schedule in a media outlet in Russia. In this schedule, hidden advertisements 
were labelled as zakaz [ordered story]. 228 Everybody was able to make his zakaz by 
paying advertising revenue to the media commercial department, in accordance with a 
relevant price list. Journalists might have been paid by a percentage of the revenue (up to 
twenty per cent if a journalist himself has found the advertisers) and/or little gifts from 
advertisers. 
Covert advertising goes primarily through media managerial involvement. 229 
However, a situation when journalists write prepaid stories independently from 
managerial control in hidden advertising is also possible. This independence from 
management may be with or without an agreement of the latter. The first situation 
(agreement) might take place in state TV channels on which their employees have low 
fixed salaries. There the management may be rather interested in keeping good personnel 
than in increasing the profitability of the company. The second situation (disagreement) 
happened with Nezavisimaia Gazeta [The Independent Newspaper] when its managers 
tried to avoid dependency on wholesale advertisers. Some of the disobedient journalists 
of the newspaper started writing paid zakaz stories on their own. 230 
228 Koltsova, "Proizvodstvo novostey: Tipy vlianiy na rabotyjoumalistov", pp. 109-123. 229 It will be illustrated later in this chapter. 230 Zassoursky, "Open society and access to information: To what degree the Russian media contribute to 
the openness of society", pp. 68-71. 
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Advertising is not the only type of economic transactions in which the Russian 
news media is involved. The normal work of media companies is impossible without 
interaction with numerous economic suppliers that provide the mass media with essential 
equipment, energy, telecommunications and paper. Like any economic enterprise, media 
companies also need to buy or hire offices for their personnel. Apparently dependence on 
the contractors provides them with a possibility of manipulating the content of media 
messages. The conditions of these contracts (for instance, the fees of goods or services 
provided) may well influence the media to cover selected issues in a way which fits the 
interests of the contractors. 
If some media reports do not satisfy the needs of economic actors involved, these 
contracts may be cancelled. For example, the Committee of the Municipal Property of the 
Administration of the town Dzerzhinsk in Nizhegordskaya Oblast terminated the contract 
of leasing with the television company OKA in March 1999. This decision was explained 
by the necessity of using OKA's headquarters for the needs of the Administration of 
Dzerzhinsk 
. 
23 1 Another frequently used method is the suspension of energy supply to 
selected TV channels. 
3. Z4. Information Control 
Another means of influence is information control. It refers to the fact that some actors 
from outside the media industry have information which is newsworthy from the mass 
media's point of view. The importance of the sources for news production has been 
pointed out by Tuchman, Shoemaker, and many other researchers. 232 However, the 
novelty of the proposed approach is that it enables us to analyse the impact of the 
informative factor outside the boundaries of a separate group. In fact, politicians, 
businessmen, and many other groups and people can have valuable information to report 
through the mass media. In other words, an analysis that distinguishes political and 
231 Monitoring of GDF, 18.03.1999, (URL http: //www. gdfru). 232 See, for example, Manning, P. (200 1) News and News Sources: A Critical Introduction, London: Sage 
Publications Ltd. 
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economic actors from sources has large overlapping areas. This problem is easily 
overcome in the proposed classification. It simply postulates that sometimes economic 
and political actors, as well as many other social groups, can serve as sources, and this 
allows them to use the informative factor to put pressure on the media. 
Why can this newsworthy information (or a possibility of providing it) be 
considered as a coercive means? The reason is that the mass media are in need of certain 
information to be presented as news. In other words, this information is a valuable 
resource. And by reporting or not reporting this information to the news media, the 
sources are able to have an impact on the content of media messages. To put it in a more 
practical sense, the sources may report some information to the media, provided the latter 
present this information in the format or with the content convenient to the sources. 
For example, one respondent noted the case when he was able to publish a few 
articles with a hidden advertisement of an organisation in one of the major newspapers in 
St. Petersburg. This respondent had neither enough money for advertising nor regulative 
or administrative power. However, he got access to the information which might be of 
interest for a large pad of the St. Petersburg audience. 233 
It is evident that state officials and politicians are especially skilful in using the 
informative factor. However, it is possible to presume that this mechanism is widely used 
by many other Russian social groups and their representatives in such areas as the arts 
and sports among others. 
Of course, an agreement between sources and the media is not always easy to 
reach. Koltsova noted an example when a reporter was trying to make a story about a 
famous craftsman who worked at a factory producing New Year decorations. The director 
of the factory was ready to permit it only if the whole enterprise was to be mentioned in 
this story. The media representative, in turn, demanded a fee for this report. The director 
refused and the story was aborted. 234 
233 Interview with Sergey, a public relation assistant, St. Petersburg, May, 2002. 234 Koltsova, 0. (200 1) "News production in contemporary Russia: Practices of power", European Journal 
of Communication, Vol. 16, No. 3, p. 324. 
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3. Z5. CourtAction 
The next coercive method is the judicial one. It includes a series of actions which involve 
court procedures. The judicial method has been widely used in recent disputes amongst 
Russian media companies. Let us mention just a few examples that happened during the 
conflict between Gazprom and Media-Most. After several legal battles, Gazprom, the 
Russian gas monopoly, acquired majority control of NTV, the country's most influential 
privately-held TV channel. 
Gazprom had owned 46 per cent of NTV by the 2001. When a Moscow Court 
froze the voting rights of a further 19 per cent of NTV held by Media-Most on 26 January 
2001 
'235 Gazprorn had secured a majority and gained a controlling stake in this television 
company. This allowed the gas monopoly to call the shareholders' meeting which 
changed the NTV's board in favour of Gazprom's representatives. 236 
Although Media-Most disputed the claim, another court ruling at the end of 
March 2001 in London dismissed a legal action brought by Vladimir Gusinsky, the head 
of NTV and Media-Most, against Gazprom. 237 The end of Media-Most was also caused 
by a court decision. This media syndicate was liquidated in line with a 29 May 2001 
resolution of the Moscow Court of Arbitration's Department of Appeals. 238 Following 
this resolution, the meeting of shareholders of Media-Most agreed to liquidate this media 
corporation on 10 September 2001. 
3.2.6. Law Enforcement 
Law enforcement is the next method of the proposed classification. There are numerous 
activities included in this category. However, it is not only the enforcement of court 
decisions. In Russia, like many other countries, there are many controlling organisations 
that check whether Russian enterprises pay their taxes properly and whether they follow 
235 That was possible because without those 19 per cent Media-Most owned only 30 per cent of NTV. 236 Jack, A. (200 1) "Gazprom claims victory in the battle for NTV", Financial Times, 26.01.200 1. 237 Jack, A. (200 1) "Control of NTV hangs in the balance", Financial Times, 2.04.200 1. 238 (2001) "Moskva prodolzhaet'triasti' Mcdia-Mosf' [Moskow continues to probe Media-Most, Lenta. ru, 10.08.2001, (URL http: //www. lenta. ru/most/2001/10/08/mediamost/, consulted on 12 July 2003). 
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fire and health regulations. If something is wrong, the controlling organisations are 
powerful enough to suspend the activity of the firms. 
Needless to say, law enforcement is being widely used against the Russian mass 
media as well as against other enterprises. For example, it was reported that twelve armed 
soldiers came to shut down a TV company in the Rostov oblast. The reason for this 
closure was a decision by health authorities (sanpedistantcia) that the temperature in the 
company office was 2-3 C below the norm. Another example is the decision of Russian 
state fire authorities (Glavnoe Upravlenie Gosudarstvennoy Protivopozhamoy Sluzhbi 
MVD RF) to suspend the activity of the newspaper Kommersant because of its failure to 
follow some of the fire regulations. 239 
Although it seems paradoxical, these checks are also able to impact the content of 
media reporting. In Russia the decision to close a media enterprise on the basis of its 
breaking some of the regulations mentioned above is often made due to its inappropriate 
coverage of certain events, or an improper policy of the media syndicate. Conversely, 
when the coverage and policy fit the interests of the powerful actors, these infringements 
are not taken into account. Let us note, as an example, the fact that Schetnaia Palata RF 
[the Audit Chamber of the Russian Federation] has regularly found many infringements 
in the finance of RTR during the last 10 years. However, nothing has been done yet to 
change the situation and this state TV channel continues to function normally. 240 
The method of law enforcement can be used not only by the actors that are able to 
have an impact (often regulative or administrative ones) on the work of law enforcement 
agencies and in such a way to reach their goals through assisting the agencies. In some 
cases, law enforcement agencies attain their own targets as well; often it is a mutually 
beneficial exchange. For instance, the management of a St. Petersburg newspaper is 
thought to have favoured the St. Petersburg FSB by the way it covered the Nikitin's 
case 241 in exchange for assistance with issuing an urgently needed passport to a journalist 
of this newspaper. 242 
239 Interview with Natalia, an expert on the Russian mass media, St. Petersburg, September, 200 1. 240 Rikovtseva, E. (199 8) "Iama: Pochemu VGTRK bessmislenno proveriat", in Sreda No. 2-3, pp. 13-17. 
241 Nikitin was accused of spying while he insisted that he aimed to assist in the protection of environment. 
This controversial case was widely reported by the Russian media. Nikitin was finally found guilty in 
pp s ng and sentenced. 2 Interview with Natalia, an expert on the Russian media, St. Petersburg, September, 2001. 
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3. Z7. Holence 
The next method of making an impact on the content of media reports is violence. 
This includes all sorts of criminal action against the people and property of media 
organizations. It is possible to break the violent means into three subgroups - (1) the most 
serious crime 
- 
murder, (2) grievous bodily harm of some representatives of the media 
syndicates, and (3) breakage or stealing of the property of media outlets. 
The murder of a journalist is an extraordinary event, even in Russia. Nevertheless, 
several killings ofjournalists have taken place during last decade. The most well known 
of them is the murder of Vlad Listev, the director of one of the nationwide TV channels 
who had been working on this post for only a few days before being assassinated. Other 
examples of assassinations are killings of editor Larisa Yudina and Dmitry Kholodov, a 
journalist of Moskovsky Komsomolets. 
Grievous bodily harm of media workers is a more widely used practice. For 
example, Ildar Zhandarev, a presenter and co-editor of the show Without Protocol [Bez 
Protokola] on TV-6, was severely punched and robbed on 30 November 2001. It was 
reported that Zhandarev had been hospitalised with serious concussion. 243 Glasnost 
Defence Foundation reported another case regarding the punching of an operator of the 
television company Dialog, his video camera destroyed, by the soldiers of a military unit 
in Nizhniy Novgorod in 1998.244 
Crime against the property of media organisations is also a widespread practice. It 
includes arson of the offices of media organisations and the destruction of their 
equipment. Used as a means of intimidation, it also helps in making an impact on media 
representatives and through them on the content of media reports. For example, during 
the funeral of Anton Malevsky, an alleged leader of a Moscow organised crime group 
who died in a parachute accident in November 2001, photo and video cameras of 
reporters were confiscated by the friends of Malevsky. 245 The explosion of the 
243 
"Televedushego Ildara Zhandareva izbili i ograbili" [Telereporter Ildar Zhandarev has been punched and 
robbed], Lenta. ru, 30.11.2001, (URL http: //www. lenta. ru/most/2001/11/30/zhandaryev/, consulted on 12 
July 2003). 
244 Monitoring of GDF, 16.01.1998. 24SNtvru. com, 10.11.2001, (URLhttp: //www. ntvru. com/russia/lONov2OOl/malevski_poh. html, consulted 
on 12 July 2003). 
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broadcasting equipment of radio Visavi in Vladikavkaz on 7 January 2002 is another 
example. 246 
3. Z8. Symbolic Pressure 
The final coercive means of this classification is called the symbolic method. It 
represents the transmission of negative information regarding any specific media 
company or its representatives by rival media corporations. This factor is to be examined 
in depth in Chapter 6. This chapter shows only one example of how this method is used. 
On 16 December 2001, Berezovsky accused the FSB of organising the Moscow 
apartment explosions in 1999 that triggered the second Chechen war and helped Putin 
win the presidential election. The following day after the Berezovsky's speech, some 
videoclips of a man "resembling" Kiselyov (the former Director General of NTV and 
TV-6)247 cavorting with prostitutes and making love with, reportedly, an assistant of his 
programme Itogi were released on the website Compromat. ru. 
Although leading Russian TV channels decided not to broadcast these videoclips, 
the information about this case was widely spread through Russian mass 
communications. Many experts believe that this was done on purpose to discredit 
Kiselyov and thus help state authorities return control over Berezovsky's TV channel. It 
should be noted that this affair resembled tactics successfully used to oust Yury Skuratov, 
Russia's Prosecutor General, in 1999.248 
3. Z9. Summary of the Proposed Classification 
The complete classification of external factors is presented in Table 3.1. In fact, the 
methods from the bottom half of this table (from legal to threat) are instrumental to those 
on the top. Nevertheless, in some cases they can be used independently. 
246 Newsru. com, 7.01.2002, (URL http: //www. ntvra. com/russia/07Jan2OO2/antenna_d. html, consulted on 12 
July 2003). 
247 TV-6 was owned by Berezovsky at that time. 248 Jack, A. (2001) "Fight for Russia's TV6 turns into soap opera", Financial Times; 18.12.2001. 
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Table 3.1 External Factors ofInfluence on Media Content 
Factors Description AgentS219 (with help of On which level 
which this sort of 
pressure can be 
delivered) 
Regulation Law, Regulative Government, Management and 
Documents, Licensing, Local authorities Editors 
Registration 
Administrative control Appointment of senior Owners Management 
management, Decisions And Editors 
on polic 
Economic coercion Paid direct or indirect Businessmen, Political Management and 
(Advertisement) advertising groups Editors 
Economic cohesion Loans, Contracts for Businessmen, Owners, 
(Other contracts) supply of materials Banks, Firms, Political Management and 
necessary for media groups Editors 
roduction 
Information control Desirable coverage in Political groups, Reporters 
exchange for Experts 
information Sources of information, 
culture, sport, 
Symbolic pressure Spread of negative Mass Media Whole media 
information organisations, 
including their 
managers and reporters 
Court action Legal solution of Courts Management and 
disputes Reporters 
Law enforcement Enforcement of court Police, Management 
decisions, Special forces, Tax and 
Control of conformity Fire Departments 
to technical regulations 
Violence Killings, Intimidation Protection companies, Reporters 
Criminals 
Threat Declared intention to Any of mentioned Management and 
use any means if the above agents or actors Reporters 
demanded media policy 
or coverage is not 
1 provided 
A few notes regarding the last row. The threat of applying any of the described 
above factors is also a means of influencing media coverage. It can be a threat of the 
arson of some media outlets, of assaulting or even killing their personnel, of destroying 
their property, of cancelling some contracts, of the closure of the media outlets, of 
suspension of the license, of a legal persecution, of using the power of law enforcement 
249 The difference between agents and actors is that the formers deliver the order of the latter. 
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agencies. It is the most widely used practice because it does not normally require a lot of 
efforts and money. In addition, it is not necessary to really possess the declared power to 
implement the threat, and it is possible to remain anonymous. Many threats are no more 
seriously considered by the media personnel than some of the widespread threats of 
explosions in public places. 250 
However, some threats are well grounded and should be taken very seriously. In 
fact, such threats are most often used as a preventive means, as a preliminary attempt to 
avoid using more costly, time-consuming and illegal means. Especially seriously taken by 
the media are the threats from some leaders of organised crime. For example, after a 
media story described an assumed leader of one of the St. Petersburg organised crime 
groups as an invalid, the author of this report preferred to give apologises to this gangster 
in order to avoid possible repercussions. 25 1 During the funeral of Malevsky, the 
journalists were told about very serious implications if any definite information regarding 
this event appeared in the mass media. This made the media limit their coverage of the 
funeral by only reporting that it had happened and that many VIP had participated in it. 252 
Actors are less important in my classification because any actor can use any of 
these means, provided he has sufficient resources. For example, the following powerful 
groups can be actors: 
Public authorities 
Business people 
Criminals 
Media groups (competitors) 
Other sources of information 
Table 3.2 surnmarises methods used by these actors and indicates how often they are 
nonnally used. 
250 Interview with Natalia, a media expert, St. Petersburg, September, 200 1. 
251 Ibid. 
252 NtVrU. COM, 10.11.2001, (URL http: //www. ntvru. com/russia/lONov2OOl/Malevski, 
_poh. 
html, consulted 
in July 2003). 
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Table 3.2 Actors and Yheir Methods 
Actors Methods Frequency Methods Frequency 
State Regulatory Often Judicial Rare 
(Government Administrative Often Law enforcement Often 
andLocal Economic Rare/No Violent Rare/No 
authorities) Information control Often Symbolic Often 
Otherpolitical Regulatory Rare Judicial Rare 
groups Administrative Often Law enforcement Rare 
Economic Often Violent Rare 
Information control Rare Symbolic Often 
Business Regulatory Rare Judicial Often 
people Administrative Often Law enforcement Often 
Economic Often Violent Rare 
Information control Rare Symbolic Often 
Criminals Regulatory No Judicial Rare 
Administrative Rare Law enforcement Rare 
Economic Rare Violent Often 
Information control Rare Symbolic Rare 
Other media Regulatory No Judicial Often 
groups Administrative No Law enforcement No 
(competitors) Economic Rare Violent No 
Information control Often Symbolic Often 
Other sources Regulatory Rare Judicial Often 
of information Administrative Rare Law enforcement Rare 
Economic Rare Violent Rare 
I Information control I Often I Symbolic Rare 
It is evident that powerful actors may use several coercive methods together. The 
events with NTV and TV-6 have shown this. Another example is the closure of the radio 
station Titan in Bashkirstan (one the autonomous republics of Russia) in May 
- 
June 
1998, just before the presidential election in this republic. Titan was the only media outlet 
that broadcast the interviews of candidates of the opposition. On 19 May 1998, the Mayor 
of Ufa (the capital city of Bashkirstan) requested to cancel Titan's rental contract. During 
the saine day, Gossviaznadzor [Controlling Committee of Russia's Telecommunications] 
began to investigate Titan's conformity to technical regulations. 
A similar investigation of Titan was launched by the Bashkirstan Sanpedistantiya 
[Health authorities] a few hours later. Then the state secretary of Bashkirstan rang A. 
Galeev, the President of Titan, and advised him: "not to criticise the Administration of 
Rakhimov" (the President of the republic). 
On the following day, Gossviaznadzor continued the investigation of Titan's other 
outlets. On 21 May 1998, Gosenergo started checking whether the personnel of Titan 
were permitted to work with technical equipment. The headquarters of radio Titian were 
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surrounded by the police (militciya). On 22 May, Russian Radio-Ufa, another mass media 
organisation, broadcast the show that portrayed the managers of the radio station Titan as 
drug abusers and mentally disturbed people. 
Despite this, the radio station Titan broadcast a show on corruption in the 
Administration of the President on 25 May. One and a half hours later, the transmitter of 
Titan was switched off. The Chairman of the Department of Social Services of 
Bashkirstan, in the offices of which the transmitter had been located, requested the 
management of Titan take it away. Five hours later, the water supply to Titan was 
interrupted. Three hours later, the electricity was stopped. 
On 26 May, the Chief Executive of Titan was going to take away the transmitter 
but discovered that it had already been confiscated by the MVD (the Ministry of the 
Interior) of Bashkirstan. In the evening of that day, the supply of energy to the estates 
around Titan was terminated and the police (MVD) restricted public access to these 
estates. 
On 27 May, Titan started to use its own power generator in order to broadcast its 
reports. Shortly afterwards, law enforcement units tried to break into the headquarters of 
Titan and arrested people who came to support the personnel of Titan. Galeev used his 
gun and shot upwards from the window of the office. After that, the employees of Titan 
were informed that a unit of MVD arrived and they were advised to stop their resistance. 
The personnel of Titan agreed to leave the office. They were taken into the offices of 
MVD and offered a cup of coffee. After drinking the coffee, the workers of Titan reacted 
in a way resembling the reaction to abusing drugs. They were requested to undertake a 
blood test without any regulations allowing this procedure. 
After three days of arrest, almost all workers of radio Titan were allowed to leave. 
However, Galeev was charged with illegal use of the gun and was imprisoned from 27 
May 1998 to 30 April 1999.253 In July 1998, the radio station Titan was officially closed 
by the rule of the Arbitrary Court of Bashkirstan because of "the infringements of 
253 Then he was released on bail. 
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technical and health regulations, the abuse of the freedom of speech, and conspiracy to 
breach of peace. , 254 
3.3. Possible Ways of Resistance towards Factors Affecting the 
Content of Media Reports 
The last section examines the methods that can be used by journalists in order to diminish 
the impact of internal and external factors on the content of media messages. This 
section focuses only on some of internal factors such as the relationship between 
managers and journalists. According to some researchers, conflicts between Russian 
journalists and editors are not frequent. It does not mean that managers and journalists are 
totally in agreement with the content of reports. Nevertheless, decisions of the 
management are not a matter for discussion. 
As it has been shown in the first section of this chapter, executives of media 
outlets have a set of methods to put pressure on workers. Many journalists do not insist 
on their views when they differ from the viewpoints of the editors because of the risk of 
being sacked. Most frequently they seek a consensus with editors' points of view. 
For example, one of the Russian journalists said that journalists sell out their 
professional skills like representatives of any other profession. Another Russian journalist 
said that "it is not a matter of big difference forjoumalists whom to support. There are 
some principal issues: for example, I will never support Zuganov, but on a more vague 
level, it does not matter for me whether I will write articles in favour of Gorbachev or 
Luzhkov. , 255 This position seems to be very motivated because there is considerable 
unemployment among journalists, which allows editors to replace the journalistic staff 
without problems. 
It is also true with regard to writing zakaz stories (articles-to-order). As it has been 
stated earlier in this chapter, the management of the news media supervises the 
production of prepaid stories. Although many journalists do not like writing such stories, 
254 Makarov, R. (1998) "Kak zastavili zamolchat radio 'Titan... [How radio Titin was forced to keep 
silence], in A. Simonov (ed. ) (1998) Zoni Bezkonfliknosti (Polozhenie SMI i Svoboda Slova v Nekotorikh 
"Blagopoluchnikh Subektakh Rossiyskoy FederatcH " [Zones without conflicts: mass media and the 
freedom of speech in some "secure" regions of the Russian Federation], M: Prava Chcloveka, pp. 49-55. 255 Koltsova, "News production in contemporary Russia: Practices of power", p. 329. 
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they consider this as a part of their responsibilities. The conflict between management 
and workers regarding writing zakaz stories rarely takes place. Koltsova noted only two 
cases when a journalist rejected an offer to write a prepaid story. Another journalist tried 
to persuade the editor that hidden advertisements mislead the audience. These cases of 
resistance happened during the earlier stages of the privatisation of the Russian mass 
media, and the journalists did not achieve good results. Gradually, they were forced to 
leave. 
The second method of possible resistance is the departure of media workers. For 
example, when the executives of NTV were replaced in 2001, many former NTV media 
workers, including Kiselyov, its Director General, left NTV and started working for TV- 
6. Another case happened in St. Petersburg in October 1999. When Chernyadev had been 
appointed the director of Channel 11 (one of the main TV channels in St. Petersburg), he 
argued in favour of a policy aimed to suppress the political opponents of the Mayor of St. 
Petersburg. After that, many media workers who were in disagreement with this policy 
left the channel. 256 
The personnel who continued working at this channel were encouraged to follow 
the new policy by several methods. One worker of this channel revealed that the director 
had offered extra payments in cash. Because of considerable financial needs, only a few 
of the most principled people rejected this offer. The journalist remembered that the 
director was persistently asking a reporter to take 100 dollars, but she said: "No, I will not 
work like that, " and left. 257 
Conflicts between the executives and owners of media companies are also rare. 
However, executives can resign if they strongly disagree with owners' policy. There have 
been several such cases, reported by Glasnost Defence Foundation and other sources. 258 
For example, in 1997, Rudnov, the director of the television company Peterburg-5 
Channel resigned and explained this by his disagreement with the plans to put the channel 
under the control of the Moscow management. 259 
256 Monitoring of GDF, 13.10.1999. 257 Interview with Natalia, a media expert, St. Petersburg, September, 200 1. 258 For example, Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Strugglefor Power in Russia 259 Monitoring of GDF, 15-16.07.1997, (URL http: //www. gdfru). 
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Although the influence of powerful external actors is usually difficult to resist, 
there are a number of ways of possible resistance. Perhaps the best example of how the 
media staff can try to overcome undesirable actions towards them is the response of 
NTV's personnel to the decision of Gazprom, the major shareholder, to replace some 
members on the directors board of NTV. 
As a result of this change, Vladimir Kulistikov, who had once been a NTV 
journalist but later worked for Vesti, the state-controlled RIA-Vesti news agency, was 
appointed as the chief editor. However, the most disputed decision was a significant 
reduction of the power of Yevgeny Kiselyov, the general director of NTV. Instead, Boris 
Jordan, an American banker, was appointed as the chief executive. Jordan, an American 
citizen of Russian ancestry, participated in the Russian government's controversial 
privatisation programme and ran the Sputnik Fund. This replacement encountered a 
negative response by managers and many of the workers of NTV. They used a set of 
methods to resist this decision. 
First, they appealed for public support. This was done several ways. NTV 
produced own television shows and news programmes that draw public attention to the 
conflict. In the evening following the replacement of the management, NTV broadcast its 
news with journalists standing behind the presenter. This was done in order to illustrate 
that something very dramatic was happening. In addition, NTV's logo in the comer of the 
screen was stamped by the word "protest" in red letters. 
In addition, Kiselyov in his weekly show Itogi presented the interviews with 
leading Russian politicians and prominent journalists who expressed their support for the 
former management of NTV. In this show NTV was presented as the channel persecuted 
for its intention to broadcast unbiased news. This conflict was presented as state 
intervention against press freedom. A speaker on this show exclaimed: "We have no 
doubt that Vladimir Putin is completely aware what is going on and is thus responsible 
for the consequences. 99260 
Another way of attracting public attention was a change in the normal schedule of 
media reports and shows. On 4 April 2001, as an act of protest against the decision of the 
26OZolotov, A. (200 1) "NTV managers ousted in Gazprom coup", The Moscow Times, 4.04.200 1. 
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meeting of NTV shareholders, all NTV's shows announced earlier were cancelled, 
broadcasting instead advertisements and news. 261 
In order to mobilize public support, outdoor conferences and public meetings 
were used. NTV organised the outdoor conference the day after the directors board 
decision. It was reported that about 70 supporters of NTV, expressing their support for 
NTV j ournalists and carrying a Russian flag draped with a black mourning band, 
gathered near the entrance to the NTV headquarters. In fact, the above-mentioned 
conference aimed not only to reach the audience but also to encourage political and 
international support. The majority of its participants were reporters from Russian and 
Western media organisations. 
A more effective form of public protest is public meetings. The former NTV 
management together with some prominent Russian politicians organised a few of them. 
Thousands of workers, pensioners and youngsters expressed their support for NTV in St 
Petersburg and Moscow, which is believed to have been the largest public appeal for the 
freedom of speech in Russia since 1990. Some experts estimated that more than 15,000 
people participated in this action. They shouted, "No TV without NTV" and "We won't 
give NTV to Putin. " 
In Moscow, at least 5,000 people attended a rally in front of NTV's offices to 
support the company's staff. Many attended other political rallies and concerts organised 
by the channel. NTV journalists made emotional appeals to turn public opinion against 
Gazprom, which was portrayed as an agent of the state attempting to suppress freedom of 
speech in Russia. In St. Petersburg, many prominent liberal politicians appealed to 
protestors from a truck standing close to the Aurora cruiser, a symbol of the 1917 
October revolution. Sergey Popov, a parliamentary deputy and member of the liberal 
party Yabloko, claimed: "What they are doing to NTV is the road to repression. But we 
will not go down that road. s1262 
The second way of resistance is the search forpolitical support. After the former 
NTV's management was replaced, some deputies of the Russian Duma were staying 
261 (2001) "Russia: NTV cancels scheduled programmes". BBC Monitoring Service 
-United Kingdom; 4.04.2001. 
262 An additional form of public support is telegrams and emails with the expression of support. NTV 
reported that it had received thousands such telegrams and e-mails. 
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together with NTV managers in the NTV headquarters in Ostankino throughout the night. 
One of them, Grigoriy Yavlinskiy, the leader of Yabloko bloc of the Russian parliament, 
declared that the situation around NTV would be debated at the State Duma next day. 263 
Political support can be found by appealing to the Duma (the Russian parliament). 
In fact, the Duma itself pays attention to important events amongst nationwide media 
organizations. For example, Gennadiy Seleznev, the Speaker of the Duma, criticized the 
NTV shareholders decision regarding the change of NTV's board of directors. "Honestly, 
I had not expected the NTV shareholders 
-I mean those representing Gazprom - to make 
such an inept decision and to appoint the roguish Jordan and Kokh. [ 
... 
] These people are 
not qualified to resolve the conflict and solve financial problems, " he told reporters. 
Seleznev underlined that the Duma "will not stand aside" in attempts to "settle the 
confliCt.,, 264 As a result, the State Duma tried to initiate the discussion on the laws about 
the restriction of state ownership in the Russian news media. Such a call was made by 
Yavlinsky's party, Yabloko. 265 
Some state departments and establishments have also assisted media companies in 
their disputes with shareholders. For example, during the conflict between Media-Most 
and Gazprom, the state Audit Chamber expressed its opinion that Gazprom was supposed 
to produce and sell gas, instead of dabbling in media. To some extent, this made 
Gazprom diminish its pressure on Media-Most. An appeal to the President is another 
possibility. The media workers of NTV asked Putin to intervene into this conflict. 
Although Putin did not reply immediately, his response showed that he regarded the 
conflict as an ordinary commercial dispute, which should be resolved via applying to the 
court. 
A court appeal is one of the most frequent ways of resolving conflicts amongst 
Russian media companies. It was used many times during the conflict between NTV and 
Gazprom. The lawyers of Media-Most 266 used this method even before the president 
suggested it. On 10 April 200 1, NTV lawyers filed a lawsuit with Moscow's arbitration 
court in which they asked the court to pronounce the 3 April Gazprom-initiated 
263 Ibid. 
264 (2001) "Russian Durna seaker attacks 'inept' decision to change NTV managernent", BBCMonitoring 
Service, 4.04.2001. 
265 Jack, A. (2001) "Durna to enter NTV battle", Financial Times, 10.04.2001. 266 NTV was a part of Media-Most, and Gusinsky was the President of Media-Most. 
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emergency meeting of NTV shareholders void. Unfortunately, the outcome of court 
applications is unpredictable and this method can hardly be used in conflicts with the 
Russian state as many experts believe that the rules of the Russian courts are very 
unlikely to contradict the interests of the state departments and officials. 267 
Media organisations can also appeal to the Prosecutor's Office to intervene in a 
conflict. For example, Alexander Gerasmov, the director of the state TV channel AMUR 
(and the chairmen of the Journalist Union of Amurskaya oblast), appealed to the 
Prosecutor of Russia. He argued that the human rights of the people of this oblast were 
being violated by the lack of access to information. This appeal was made after a decision 
268 by energy companies to terminate energy supplies to the channel. 
Essential support during a conflict can be found from other media organisations 
both in Russia and abroad. During the conflict between Media-Most and Gazprom, many 
Russian media companies supported NTV. For example, Obshaia Gazeta, along with one 
hundred fifty-nine national and local media outlets, published a special issue with an 
expression of support for NTV personnel. In this issue, the writer Alexander Volodin, the 
actor Igor Kvasha, and well-known Russian writer Boris Vasilev commented on the NTV 
events. 269 
The method of talks for resolving conflicts is also very popular. For example, 
some representatives of the former NTV management and its prominent reporters tried to 
resolve the conflict by negotiation with Jordan, the new Director General of NTV, and 
Alfred Kokh, the head of Gazprom-Media. Although these talks were not successful, it 
does not imply that such attempts are useless. 
Finally, mass media outlets can publish the stories negatively portraying their 
enemies. Thus, during the conflict between Gusinsky and the Russian Prosecutor's 
Office, NTV and the newspaper Segodnia, controlled by Media-Most, broadcast and 
published a number of scandalous news stories about officers of the Prosecutor's Office 
and their relatives in order to alleviate the pressure of the Russian law enforcement 
agencies on Gusinsky. One example is the ORT's filming (and intention to broadcast it) 
267 Interview ith Alexander, a former FSB officer, London, June, 2003. 268 (2001) "Amurskaia oblast ostalas bez televidenia" [Television i Amurskaya oblast is suspended], Lenta. ru, 7.12.200 1,(URL http: //lenta. ru/russia/2000/12/07/ýo-tv/, consulted in July 2003). 269 (200 1) "Vishel spetsvipusk 'Obshey Gazeti' v podderzhku NTV" [A special edition of Obshaia Gazeta 
released], Lenta. ru, 7.04.2001, (URL http: //lenta. ru/most/2001/04/07/gazeta/, consulted in July 2003). 
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the action of representatives of the Prosecutor's Office during a probe into the evasion by 
ORT from customs taxes. 270 
Another example in this respect is the publication of the story regarding the arrest 
of the daughter of Vasliy Kolmogorov, a deputy to Prosecutor General, at airport 
Sheremetevo-2. The newspaper Segodnia reported that Kolmogorova had attempted to fly 
to Geneva, having US$ 5,000 of undeclared currency. Such an offence could have been 
regarded as illegal currency laundering under article 88 of the Criminal Code of the 
Russian Federation, if her father had not had such a high status in law enforcement. The 
newspaper claimed that having received this information, the Air Transport Department 
of the Prosecutor's Office informed the Transport Department of the Prosecutor's Office, 
which picked up all the documents related to the case. Vladimir Ustinov, the Prosecutor 
General, was informed about this and he requested that all the documents be handed over 
to him. The documents were at the Prosecutor's Office until 10 January 200 1, and then 
were returned to the Air Department of the Prosecutor's Office reportedly with Ustinov's 
personal instruction not to open a criminal case against Kolmogorova. 271 
Although the Prosecutor's Office is powerful enough to overcome any negative 
media coverage, sometimes such a media policy has been successful. For example, 
Georgiy Tsabriya, a senior investigator of the Prosecutor's Office, who had used armed 
masked men during a search of the headquarters of ORT, was replaced. 272 Nevertheless, 
it is hardly possible to say that the media is able to achieve anything significant this way. 
Unfortunately, the above-mentioned methods of resistance do not allow the 
Russian mass media to effectively counteract the pressure of powerful external actors. 
NTV was forced to accept the new management, Media-Most. TV-6, another Russian 
nationwide television channel, bought by Berezovsky, was terminated soon afterwards. 
270 Sinitsina, 0. (2000) "Sotrudniki ORT obviniautsia v contrabande" [ORT's personnel is suspected of 
contraband], Strana. ru, 5.12.2000, (URL 
http: //www. strana. ru/incidents/criminal/2000/12/05/976014425. html, consulted in July 2003). 
271 (2001) "Delo docheri zamestitelia genprokurora RF" [The case of the daughter of the deputy to General 
Prosecutor of the Russian Federation], RosBisnessConsulting, (URL 
http: //top. rbc. ru/daythemes/index. shtml? /ýews/daythemes/2001/01/12/12101746_bod. shtml, consulted in 
July 2003). 
272 
"Priglasivshiy avtomatchikov na ORT sledovatel otstranen ot dela" [The detective who brought a gun 
squard into ORT is dismissed], Lenta. ru, 6.12.2000, (URL http: //www. lenta. ru/russia/2000/12/06/ort/, 
consulted in July 2003). 
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Many other examples can also be quoted, but it does not look essential since they have 
already been noted in previous section of this chapter. 
To sum up, although workers of Russian mass media have a set of methods to 
resist their managers, this resistance is not efficient due to the reality of a transition 
country 
- 
high unemployment rate in general, and in the media industry in particular. 
Similarly, the executives of media organisations do not have sufficiently effective 
methods to resist the pressure of powerful external actors. 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the factors that may influence the media content. It has 
shown that there are several internal and external factors that significantly affect the 
content of media messages. Although executives of media organisations are able to 
enforce their decisions on the content of media reports in disputes with the media staff, it 
has been argued that internal factors make a smaller impact on the media reports than the 
external factors. 
In this chapter I have proposed a new classification of external factors, which is 
based on methods rather then on actors. The administrative method of this classification 
has been regarded as the most powerful means of media control. The owners of media 
companies are able to use their power over their executives in order to secure required 
coverage of some events. 
This chapter has pointed out that the news media can use several methods to resist 
the pressure of external actors. However, Russian media companies are relatively weak 
and they are not able to resist external coercion effectively. This makes the Russian mass 
media serve as an instrument of powerful networks, many of which are linked to 
organised crime. 
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Chapter 4 
Ties between the Russian Mass Media and Organised Crime 
As it has been shown in the previous chapter, the Russian mass media is very vulnerable 
to the pressure of powerful groups, which are often linked to organised crime. Although 
information about those links is not easily available, it is possible to note a number of 
such cases, which were confirmed by a few sources. This is the main purpose of this 
chapter. 
It should be noticed that this chapter reviews ties between the mass media and 
different types of organised crime. It is hardly possible to place Vladimir Gusinsky, a 
businessman; Boris Berezovsky, who used to be the deputy to the secretary of the 
Security Council of the Russian Federation; and Mikhail Mirilashvili, a card player, on 
the same board. However, what is common in all these cases is the fact that they are (or 
were) the owners of major Russian news companies, and they might have been involved 
in dealings, which are considered illegal by Russian law enforcement agencies. 
Also, it is important to note that some of the cases reviewed in this chapter have 
not been finalised yet, and formally speaking it is premature to consider their participants 
as being involved in criminal business. Nevertheless, these cases are included in this 
chapter for two reasons. First, the prosecutor's office normally does not open cases 
without sufficient reasons. Second, the cases well illustrate the complex interaction 
between Russian powerful networks and the media. 
This chapter starts with a story illustrating the possible involvement of 
representatives of thieves in law in the media business of St. Petersburg. Then some facts 
about the ties between bandits and the Russian mass media are presented. A number of 
stories about fraud and economic misdoings with the media are to be reviewed in the 
third section. Finally, various forms of involvement of Russian politicians into the media 
business are examined and illustrated by several examples from the life of St. Petersburg 
elites and by the business and political career of such a controversial person as 
Berezovsky. 
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4.1. Ties between Russian Media Companies and Thieves in Law 
The facts of the previous chapter allow us to assume the existence of ties between thieves 
in law and the Russian mass media. Indeed, it is possible to find several examples that 
some thieves in law own or control some media organisations in Russia. One of them is 
given in this section. 
The Fund for the Development of Television is one of the organisations which 
aim to support television in St. Petersburg. There is something about this fund, which is 
worth mentioning in this study: this fund was headed by Konstantin Yakovlev, also 
known as Kostia Mogila [Grave], who allegedly was the chief coordinator of Moscow 
thieves in law in St. Petersburg. 
K. Yakovlev gained his nick name while he worked at a St. Petersburg cemetery. 
He really was very skilful in digging graves, which was his main occupation in the 1980s. 
It is reported that nobody has been able to do it faster than he used to do. At the 
beginning of the 1990s, Kostia Mogila became one of the leaders of the Tambovskaia 
crime group, which was the most organised and aggressive criminal syndicate in St. 
Petersburg. Mogila managed to become a good friend of some thieves in law from 
MOSCOW273 and they appointed him to be their chief representative in St. Petersburg. 274 
The post of President of the Fund for the Development of Television allowed 
Mogila to be involved in many important processes urrounding the mass media in St. 
Petersburg. He was seen as one of the most powerful media moguls in St. Petersburg. In 
addition to the Fund for the Development of Television and the Association of Mass 
Media Organisations, Mogila reportedly controlled cable television and was involved in 
advertising business. 275 For example, his firm Trend was the major advertising dealer for 
ORT in St. Petersburg. However, his involvement in media business was not restricted to 
this city. It is known that he was a business partner of Berezovsky, 276 one of the most 
273 In particular with Usoyan whose nick name is Ded Khasan [Grandfather Khasan]. 274 Stringer, 03.07.2001. 
275 
"Konstantin lakovlev: zhizn i smert 
-v zerkale SMI" [Konstantin Yakovlev-life and death in the mirrow 
of mass media], Rosbalt, 27.05.2003. 276 He was a Berezovsky's partner in oil business. 
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well-known, controversial and influential people of the Russian news media, who owned 
or controlled some nationwide Russian TV channels, newspapers and magazines. 277 
As a result of significant political changes in Russia and St. Petersburg, Mogila's 
status in St. Petersburg's hierarchy was significantly diminished. He lost influence in the 
Administration of St. Petersburg after the resignation of vice-governors Aleksashin and 
Malishev, who seemed to have been "his people" in the Administration. 278 Nevertheless, 
Mogila remained to be one of the most powerful and influential businessmen in St. 
Petersburg until the end of May 2003.279 
Unfortunately, even though Mogila became less active in his business projects 
and is reported to have left his post of "coordinator" of Moscow's thieves in law in St. 
Petersburg, this did not save his life. On 25 May 2003, when St. Petersburg celebrated its 
300-year Jubilee, two motorcyclists shot at Mo0a's car in Moscow. Konstantin 
280 Yakovlev, or Kostia Mogila, who had been inside this car, was killed. 
4.2. Ties between the Mass Media and Bandits (Avtoriteti) 
Another type of Russian organised crime is bandits. Bandits are also interested in the 
media business and ties with the mass media. It can be illustrated by numerous examples. 
Some of them are presented in this section. 
4. ZI. Mikhail Mirilashvili 
Mikhail Mirilashvili was the president of the media company Russian Video, and 
reportedly a close ally of Gusinsky, the former owner of the Russian largest media 
277 
"Berezovskogo ne vozmut v svetloe budushce" [Berezovsky is not to be taken in the prosperious future], 
MoskovskyKomsomolets, 13.04.2000. 
278 Malishev was accused of corruption and died in May 2002. 
279 "'Berezoviy' raskol v blizhayshem okruzhenii Kosti Mogili" [Berezov's split in Kostya Mogila's 
neighbourhood], Leningradskaia Pravda, 16.08.0 1. 280 "V Moskve ubit izvestniy peterburgskiy predprinimatel po klichke Kostia-Mogild" [Influential 
St. Pctersburg entrepreneur nicknamed Kostia-Mogila is assasinated in Moscow], Rosbalt, 25.05.2003. 
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syndicate Media-Most. He was sentenced because of his ties with Russian organised 
crime. 
Mirilashvili was bom on I May 1960 in the village of Kulashi in Georgia. His 
grandfather was the director of the Kulashi's fine silk fabrics factory where his father also 
worked as a senior engineer. Mirilashvili's parents placed great emphasis on education, 
encouraging him to take a good degree, although Michael liked sport and spent a lot of 
time to develop his significant athletic abilities. 
After secondary school Mikhail followed his parents' advice and passed exams to 
the Leningrad School of Paediatric Medicine in 1977, in order to receive medical 
education, which was considered especially prestigious in Georgia. His wife Laura was a 
pharmacist and worked as a pharmaceutical chemist. 
Mirilashvili's studies at the medical college and his active social life allowed him 
to develop managerial skills. He established numerous contacts with influential people, 
who still are a significant part of his social life and business projects. According to some 
of his friends, from this time Mirilashvili considered the principles of honesty and 
sincerity to be the basis of social order and business ethics. 
He graduated with a degree in medical science, specializing in paediatrics. After 
graduation, Mirilashvili did not return to his home village but became a businessman. His 
new acquaintances, very influential people in St. Petersburg, trusted him and invested 
some money in his commercial projects. Mirilashvili's business succeeded, and he was 
able to repay his debts. Moreover, he reinvested the profit into new business projects. He 
seemed to be able to adapt to the changing socio-econornic reality of Russia quite 
quickly. This allowed him to become a very rich and powerful man in St. Petersburg. 
Mirilashvili is reported to have been a very bright and charismatic man, very 
skilful in establishing business and social contacts. In addition, he was able to solve very 
difficult conflicts through negotiations, which was much appreciated among his friends 
and partners. One of his companions said: "What I realized about partnership at the age 
of thirty, Mirilashvili knew it when he was three. , 281 
281 Website Lichnosti Peterburga [Famous People of St. Petersburg], URL 
http: //www. ceu. spb. ru/rus/business/mirilashvili. m. m/index. shtml, consulted in June 2005. 
131 
Mirilashvili's reputation made him the president of numerous firms and 
associations in the 1990's. He was President of Conti, a large St. Petersburg 
entertainment corporation, and the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Petromir, 
which included over ten large St. Petersburg enterprises. Mirilashvili focused on the 
construction industry, pharmaceutics, food delivery, tourism, and the entertainment 
industry. Even during his college years, Mirilashvili was very interested in gambling 
games. He was never ashamed of this passion and became the first man in St. Petersburg 
to organise legal gambling business. Mirilashvili owned stakes in many of St. 
Petersburg's firms and is thought to have been one of the richest men in Russia. His 
daughter lives in Israel, and his son graduated from an American diplomatic school. 
Mirilashvili patronised St. Petersburg's large Jewish community. He provided aid 
to the city's synagogue, and was President of the Maccabi Association of Jewish 
Aesthetics and Physical Culture of the Commonwealth of Independent Countries and 
Baltic States. Also, he was President of the St. Petersburg office of Russian Jewish 
Congress. Mirilashvili voluntarily supported many charities. His Jewish charity 
organizations "Eve" and "Hesed Abraham" provided humanitarian aid to thousands 
elderly and disabled citizens of St. Petersburg. His enterprises invested in hospitals and 
schools. Mirilashvili's charitable activities allowed him to win the nomination "People of 
Our City" in 1999 and 2000.282 
Mirilashvili played tennis and was one of the strongest amateur players in St. 
Petersburg. He had a chance to play against world tennis stars Bjorn Borg and Andrei 
Chesnokov and is reported that he defeated Chesnokov and Lecomte in doubles. His 
companies sponsored the second largest series of tennis tournaments at St. Petersburg. 
Mirilashvili was acquainted with many of the prominent compositors and singers 
in St. Petersburg. Also, he had numerous connections with St. Petersburg well-known 
politicians, including Sobchak, the former mayor, Sobchak's wife Ludmila Narusova, and 
Galina Starovoytova, who was assassinated in 2001. Despite Mirilashvili's claims that he 
preferred not to be involved in politics, he allegedly sponsored Galina Starovoytova and 
the political party Democratic Russia. 
282 This pubic opinion survey was conducted by the Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg. 
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Mirilashvili was involved in the media business. He was President of the media 
company Russian Video, which released detective serials Streets with Shuttered Lanterns 
and Ment! (Menti is a rude word for the Russian police). The significance of this 
company can be illustrated by the fact that it produced the sound track of the Russian 
release of the soap opera Santa Barbara, which was very popular in Russia. 
In addition, Mirilashvili was connected with Gusinsky, the former president of the 
largest Russian media company Media-Most. They both were heads of the Russian 
Jewish Congress. Mirilashvili was the vice-president of this non-governmental 
organization, whilst Gusinsky was its president. Also, a good sign of close ties between 
Gusinsky and Mirilashvili was the acquisition of Russian Video by TNT, which was part 
of Gusinsky's Media-Most. 283 
Although the biography of Mirilashvili was published on the website of the most 
prominent people of St. Petersburg next to Putin's webpage, St. Petersburg law 
enforcement agencies suspected Mirilashvili in connection with the criminal underworld 
of St. Petersburg. According to law enforcement agencies, Mirilashvili had the nick name 
Misha Kutaissky. While being at college in St. Petersburg he became a professional card 
player and established contacts with card players of St. Petersburg. 284 (In fact, 
Mirilashvili himself never denied his passion for playing card games such as poker, and 
continued to play these games during his business career). 
Card players comprise still another branch of the criminal world of St. Petersburg, 
which is connected with both thieves in law and bandits. This makes it difficult to 
identify precisely which branch of organised crime he belongs to. Apparently, he is 
connected with many of them. It is reported that Mirilashvili was linked to Ivankov 
(Yaponchik), the boss of the Russian Mafia, who was sentenced in the US'285 and 
Feoktistov (Feka). According to some sources, Mirilashvili became a close ally of 
283 "Za 'delo Gusinskogo' budte gotovi" [Get ready for "Gusinsky's case"], RosBussinessConsult, 
24.01.2001. 
284 "MMM nachinal s kartezhnogo shulerstva" [MMM started his career with playing cards], Strana. Ru, 
24.01.2001. 
285 Ivankov's sentence was ended in July 2004, he was expatriated to Russia and charged by the Russian 
police with murder. 
133 
Feoktistov, a boss of the St. Petersburg Mafia, who was later arrested by St. Petersburg 
police. 286 
Mirilashvili's contacts with the criminal world, is not the only evidence of his 
involvement in criminal business. It is reported that he organised an illegal channel of the 
export of antiques and jewellery out of Russia at the beginning of his business career. 
Mirilashvili was also suspected by Interpol of smuggling diamonds and was denied entry 
into the European Union. 287 
Nevertheless, it was difficult for law enforcement to charge Mirilashvili with any 
crime. His first (and last) arrest happened only in 2001, when Mirilashvili arrived for one 
day to St. Petersburg from Israel in order to participate in the presentation of Social 
House, a non-governmental organisation which was sponsored by him and a Swedish 
charity. 288 He was expected to return to Israel, the second country of his citizenship and 
the main place of residency in recent years, together with a delegation of Israel's 
president. 289 However, St Petersburg law enforcement agencies tracked him, accused him 
of the murder of a few businessmen, and held him. 
Three of these businessmen were killed next to Astoria, one of the most 
fashionable St. Petersburg hotels, which is located just opposite to the St. Petersburg 
Legislative Assembly, on 8 September 2000. It was reported that they had left their car 
Jeep and were on their way to the hotel, when two men left their car V. 4Z 2106. One of 
these men killed the businessmen with machine gun Agran, while the second shot down 
the driver of their Jeep with a TT gun. Then, the gangsters left the place of the murder, 
and changed their car two blocks away. The V, 4Z 2106, with a fabricated number plate, a 
machine gun Agran and a TT gun, were discovered by the police, while the men managed 
to escape in a VAZ 21099. 
The killed businessmen were Gocha Tsakereshvili from Kutaisi, and Anguladze. 
Both of them had been previously sentenced. Law enforcement agencies linked this 
286 "MMM nachinal s kartezhnogo shulerstva" [MMM started his career with playing cards], Strana. Ru, 
24.01.01. 
287 URLhttp: //northwest. strana. ni/text/stories/2001/01/24/980347476/980344617. html, consulted in June 
2002. 
289 "FSB vziala avtoriteta i druga Gusinskogo" [IbeFSB arrestedaladoforgmisedcrfinevAD is a friend of&kkisky], 
Cir, eta. rz4 24.. 012001 289 "Za 'delo Gusinskogo' budte gotovi" [Get ready for "Gusinsky's case"], RosBussinessConsult, 
24.01.2001. 
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murder to the kidnapping of Mirilashvili's father, which occurred in the broad daylight at 
the end of August 2000, allegedly by a gang controlled by Moscow's thieves in law. 
Mirilashvili had been in Israel, but he returned to St. Petersburg and managed to 
sort out this incident quickly. The kidnappers agreed to let Mirilashvili's father go the day 
after negotiations, reportedly without any ransom. (According to the prosecutor's office, 
the ransom had been paid). Gocha Tsakereshvili and Anguladze, who were killed next to 
Astoria, seemed to have been involved in this kidnapping. 290 
Despite being suspected of having ordered Anguladze's murder, Mirilashvili was 
formally accused of creating an organised crime group, which kidnapped and killed two 
other Georgian businessmen with criminal backgrounds 
- 
Koba Kakushadze and Rostom 
Dvali. They also allegedly were linked to the kidnapping of Mirilashvili's father. As it 
happened, they disappeared at the same time and nobody has seen them since. 291 
The St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office declined the arguments of Mirilashvili's 
relatives (who claimed that this arrest was politically motivated and linked it to the 
political campaign against Gusinsky and his media company Media-Most) and charged 
Mirilashvili at the end of January 2001 with the kidnapping of the two businessmen. In 
addition, law enforcement agencies of St. Petersburg arrested seven other people from 
Mirilashvili's enterprises, including Sergey Kiselev, Mirilashvili's driver; Demyanenko, 
the vice-president of the corporation Conti; Viktor Petrov, the chief of the security team 
of this corporation; and a few bodyguards. 
Despite all efforts of Mirilashvili's lawyers to prove lawlessness of this arrest, 
Mirilashvili was remanded in custody from January 2001 to June 2003, and was finally 
jailed for twelve years. According to some reports, officers of the law enforcement 
agencies of St. Petersburg were personally motivated to hold Mirilashvili due to his 
numerous contacts with Western intelligence services, as well as with criminals, some 
officers of law enforcement agencies, and high-ranking politicians of St. Petersburg. 
Mirilashvili's cousin is allegedly an officer of Israel's intelligence service and he 
is on the board of a transnational corporation, which invested into Mirilashvili's business 
with diamonds of Yakutiya, a region of Russia. Ivanov, the former head of St. Petersburg 
290 RosMsConsult, 24.01.2001. 
291 "Mirilashvili zaderzhan po delu o pokhishenii cheloveka" [Mirilashvili is arrested because of being 
involved in kidnapping], Gazeta. ru, 24.01.200 1. 
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RUBOP (Regional Headquarters to Tackle Organised Crime) is allegedly Mirilashvili's 
close friend. Viktor Petrov, the head of Mirilashvili's bodyguards, arrested with 
Mirilashvili, used to be the deputy to the Head of the Ugolovnogo roziska GUVD of St. 
Petersburg. V. Yakovlev, the former mayor of St. Petersburg, was also among 
Mirilashvili's acquaintances. 
The prosecutor's office was aware of the strength of Mirilashvili's partners and 
expected to encounter many obstacles during the investigation of Mirilashvili's case. 
However, the detectives claimed that they had enough evidence to prove Mirilashvili's 
crimes and they were certain that Mirilashvili had to be in prison for many years. 292 
The arguments of the prosecutor's office were strengthened in June 2001, when a 
group of criminals was held in Odessa (a well-known city in Ukraine). The gangsters had 
kidnapped a businessman, and injured some police officers when they tried to rescue him. 
In spite of severe resistance, the kidnappers were arrested. The police were surprised to 
discover, that their fingerprints matched those discovered on the guns left in the car VAZ 
2106, which was involved in the assassination ear Astoria in St. Petersburg in August 
2000.293 
Ukraine agreed to extradite the gangsters to Russia. Fikret Alekperov, Rovshan 
Mamedov, and Ilgam Frendi, reportedly thieves in law from Azerbaydzhan, were 
convoyed to St. Petersburg at the beginning of July 2001. Interestingly, Mirilashvili was 
hospitalised because of a heart attack when these criminals arrived to St. Petersburg. 294 
The gangsters were questioned and pleaded guilty in their involvement in the 
murder of three businessmen near Astoria. They refused to name the man who ordered 
them to kill these people, though. However, they said that one of Mirilashvili's 
bodyguards had told them to secretly bury two corpses. The gangsters agreed to show the 
detectives the place, where they had buried parts of the bodies. At the beginning of July, 
the detectives dig up this place and found remains, which were identified as the corpses 
292 Lianov, Igor "Mirilashvili zarnechen v krovnom rodstve s Mossadonf ' [Mirilashvili has kinship ties with 
Mossad]. 
293 "Protiv Mirilashvili budut svidetelstvovat killeri" [Killers are to give evidence in Mirilashvili's inquest], 
Kommersant, and Lenta. ru, 07.06.0 1. 294 Ibid. 
136 
of Kakushadze and Dvali. This evidence allowed the prosecutor's office to charge 
Mirilashvili with the murder of five people. 295 
In spite of much evidence against Mirilashvili, his supporters claimed that the 
evidence gathered by the prosecutor's office did not prove anything, and blamed Ivan 
Sidoruk, the prosecutor, of corruption. 296 They argued that he had been paid by 
Moscow's thieves in law, who wanted to control Mirilashvili's business. They insisted 
that the prosecutors had to be replaced. 297 They organised, marches and speeches of 
298 influential people of St. Petersburg in the favour of Mirilashvili. Despite the huge 
support, Mirilashvili was sentenced for twelve years in the summer of 2003. 
4. ZZ Dmitry Rozhdestvensky 
Rozhdestvensky, another representative and founder of Russian Video, was also accused 
of the involvement in illegal business activities. 299 He was arrested on 10 September 1998 
and accused of corruption and stealing 324,127,400 rubles. 300 Rozhdestvensky could 
have been sentenced for up to ten years, if he had been found guilty. (Gusinsky, the 
owner of Media-Most, was also arrested because of his alleged involvement in this case). 
Rozhdestvensky always pleaded not guilty in this crime and argued that this 
accusation had been organised by his enemies. One of the competitors mentioned by 
Rozhdestvensky was Berezovsky. It is known, that Gusinsky, who was the major 
challenger of Berezovsky at that time, bought a significant part of Russian Video in 1997. 
295 'T dele Mikhaila Mirilashvili dobavilos trupov" (Tbe number of corpses in Mikhail Mirilashvili's case 
has increased], Kommersant, No. 131,26.07.2001. 
2% "U gendirektora, kholdinga 'Petromir' trebovali vziatku za prekrashenie dela Mirilashvili" [General 
Director of Petromir was asked to pay bribery if he wants Mirilashvili's inguest to be suspended], 
Lenpravda, 3.11.0 1. 
297 "Mikhail Mirilashvili silno postradaet" [Mikhael Mirilashvili is to be punished], Kommersant-SPb, 
12.11.2001. 
298 'T Peterburge prizvali ubrat 'ruki proch ot Mirilashvili... [Peterburg urges to leave Mirilashvili alone], 
Lenpravda. ru, 13.09.2001. 299 "Za 'delo Gusinskogo' budte gotovi" [Get ready for "Gusinsky's case"], RosBussinessConsult, 
24.01.2001. 
300 Article 160, part Il of the Criminal Code ofthe Russian Federation. 
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The investigation of Rozhdestvensky's case took five years. Rozhdestvensky was 
remanded in custody most of the time. He was released on bail due to his deteriorating 
health only in August 2000. 
The trial took place in January 2002. The court dismissed some of the accusations 
against Rozhdestvensky. For example, the court did not find Rozhdestvensky guilty of 
concealing advertising revenue taken from some Finnish firms for their advertisement on 
Channel II (Russian Video had the licence for this channel). Neither was charged 
Rozhdestvensky with taking (together with Alexander Sekretarev, the Director General of 
the Russian Video-Channel 11) a car as an advertising revenue from another finn. 
Nevertheless, Rozhdestvensky still had enough charges against him even without 
these accusations. According to the verdict of the Federal Court of St. Petersburg in 
January 2002, Rozhdestvensky was found guilty in corruption. The court sentenced him 
for three years and confiscated his property. Because of amnesty, this verdict was 
cancelled and Rozhdestvensky was freed. However, he did not live long after that and 
died on 6 June 2002.301 
4. Z3. Oleg Chervonuk's Murder 
The list of media firms allegedly involved in criminal business can be extended. The 
murder of brothers Chervonuk may be a good example of the complexity and 
multidimensionality of relations between the mass media and organised crime. Oleg 
Chervonuk was the owner of several press distribution firms and the chairman of the 
association Baltic Press, the leading St. Petersburg firm for distribution of newspapers 
and magazines. 
Chervonuk's reputation in the publishing business can be illustrated by the fact 
that the leading Russia's nationwide press distribution firm Rospechat offered him the 
post of the head of its branch in the North Western Region, one of the biggest regions in 
Russia, which includes St. Petersburg. Chervonuk was thought to have been independent 
from criminal influence. Moreover, he tried to create a legal market for the press 
distribution in St. Petersburg. 
301 Fontanka. ru, 06.06.2002. 
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Chervonuk, along with his brother, was killed on 28 October 1999. The killer 
waited for them in the entrance to their flat and escaped in his car. Fortunately, witnesses 
managed to remember the car and its number plate, and it was quickly found by 
detectives. Its owner, Vladimir Leyta, was immediately arrested and his flat searched. 
While searching, the detectives discovered several 9mm bullets, completely identical to 
those used for the killing of Chervonuks. Nevertheless, Leyta denied his involvement in 
this murder and insisted that somebody had left these bullets in his car and he brought 
them home. 
In addition to the bullets, the investigators found a notebook with telephone 
numbers. This notebook had the telephone numbers of two executives of The Union of 
Producers and Distributors, one of the leadings press distribution firms in St. Petersburg. 
These executives were Alexey Gorbenko, the owner of this firm, and Viktor Shubin, the 
Director General. 302 They both were acquainted with Chervonuk because he had worked 
for this firm first as a chief of the accounting department, and then as its director, before 
starting his own press distribution business. 
The investigators discovered that when Chervonuk was working for The Union of 
Producers and Distributors, this firm indirectly belonged to Alexander Sukhov. (He was 
not an official founder of this firm, but invested some money into it). It is interesting to 
note, that Sukhov had been sentenced for killing Sergey Roshektaev, a St. Petersburg 
businessman, in March 1995. 
Sukhov was also the owner of another press distribution firm Soglasie 
[Consensus]. This firm had been registered as a press distribution association. However, 
activities of this firm had raised suspicion of law enforcement agencies of St. Petersburg. 
Apparently, it was involved in a protection racket and was a "roof' for a number of press 
distribution firms in St. Petersburg. Like a normal "roof, Soglasie gathered money from 
the press traders and promised to protect them from bandits. The Union of Producers and 
Distributors also paid protection money to Soglasie. 
Chervonuk confirmed that Soglasie focused on the extortion of money from press 
distributors, when he had been questioned by detectives with regard to the Sukhov's case. 
He said: "In fact, Soglasie did not provide any services, save taking money from traders, 
302 Gorbenko was killed on 24 August 2005. 
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and it was a kind of 'roof. ' People employed by The Union of Producers and Distributors 
were told that they had to become members of Soglasie, which would protect them. , 303 
He said that the money gathered by Soglasie, allegedly nearly 30 million rubles per 
month, had been shared between Sukhov and Gorbenko. Chervonuk's talk might have 
caused serious problems for Sukhov. Although Chervonuk was trying to soften his words 
during the trial, Sukhov was sentenced for twelve years. This made the investigators 
suspect Sukhov of having ordered to kill Chervonuk. 
The current heads of The Union of Producers and Distributors (UPD), Shubin and 
Gorbenko, were also suspected of this murder, but for different reasons. They might have 
been interested in weakening his major challenger. Chervonuk had left The Union of 
Producers and Distributors (UPD) a long time before his death, and became a major 
shareholder of Metropress, the major competitor of UPD. 
Also, it became evident that some other people would benefit from Chervonuk's 
death. One month later his Metropress became controlled by two firms Nord and 
Stroycorporatciya "Souz", allegedly connected with the brothers Shevchenko. 304 (The 
brothers Shevchenko, members of the Legislative Assembly of St. Petersburg, were 
placed on the wanted list of the Russian Federation for their involvement in a series of 
crimes, which are described later in this thesis. ) 
Metropress had been owned by Oleg Chervonuk, the family of Bolotovi, and 
Andrey Shalisko. Chervonuk, who had owned 38 per cent of Metropress, intended to 
increase his shareholding up to 52 per cent. When he was killed, some people from a 
protection firm reportedly approached Shalisko and Bolotovi and convinced them to 
transfer Shalisko's and Bolotovi' shares to the firms Nord and Stroycorporatciya "Souz" 
almost for free. According to Bolotovi, these people threatened to kill them unless they 
would have agreed to do so. Whether Bolotovi revealed the whole truth or not, the 
outcome was that Nord and Union gained 50 per cent and 45 per cent stakes in 
Metropress. 305 
303 
"Ubiystvo Olega Chervonjuka: slishkom mnogo versiy" [Oleg Chervonuok's murder: there are too 
many explanations], Vash Tayniy Sovetnik, No. 11. 304 The corpses of Viacheslav Shevchnko and Zorin, the president of Nord, were discovered in Cyprus on 
25 March 2004. 
305 "Ubiystvo Olega Chervonjuka: slishkom mnogo versiy" [Oleg Chervonuok's murder: there are too 
many explanations], Vash Tayniy Sovetnik, No. 11. 
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4. Z4. riacheslav and Sergey Shevchenko and some Cases ofExtortion 
The Shevchenko themselves are a good example of complex interrelationship existing 
between the mass media and organised crime. They had acquired publishing rights for the 
magazine Televik. According to some reports, these rights were extorted from Maxim 
Kuzakmetov, the real owner of this magazine, since he had published some negative 
articles regarding the management of the club Nights of Hollywood, which was 
controlled by Shevchenko. In addition, Shevchenko seemed to have extorted ten of 
thousand dollars from Kuzakmetov and Vladimir Kuznetsov, the journalist who had 
written these articles. Following this incident, Kuznetsov left Russia in order to save his 
life. 
The prosecutor's office launched an investigation into this extortion in 1999. 
Vyacheslav Shevchenko, whose membership in the Legislative Assembly of St. 
Petersburg had expired, decided to hide. The other of the brothers, Sergey Shevchenko, 
remained in St. Petersburg. Although he was a member of the Legislative Assembly (who 
cannot be prosecuted), he was arrested and sentenced for seven and half years. 306 
Extortion has been used by some other representatives of the media staff. For 
example, in February 2002, Yury Gorbanev, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper the 
Soldier ofLuck, was sentenced for one year for money extortion from the director of a 
driving school in Nizhniy Novgorod. The journalist had written a scandalous story about 
this school, gone to its director, and said that he would not publish this article only if the 
director paid him one thousand dollars. The director told this to the Regional Unit of 
Tackling Organised Crime, and its officers arrested the editor of the newspaper when he 
was taking the requested money from the director. 307 
Nadezhda Kurbatova, the editor-in-chief of the leading regional newspaper 
Priokskaya Gazeta, was also accused of extortion in February 2002. Apparently, she 
asked politicians and businessmen to give her money for not publishing negative articles 
about theM. 308 
306 Samoylov, A. (2003) "Brat za brata" [Brother in behalf of the brother], Novaya Gazeta, 20.11.2003 307 
"Redaktor gazeti Soldat Udachi AWprigoveren k godu poseleniy za vimogatelstvo" [Editor of 
newspaper Soldat Udachi NN jailed for I year of labour camps for extortion], NLny. ru, 30.01.2002, (URL 
http: //www. nizhny. ru/report27856/, consulted in July 2003). 308 Vesti, 05.02.2002. 
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4. Z5. The Use of the Mass Media hy Organised Crime Groups 
The ties between the mass media and organised crime groups might be also confirmed by 
the words of an executive of an agency of investigative journalists about a St. Petersburg 
businessman, who was linked to bandits. The agency published an article that was 
considered by the businessman as inappropriately portraying him. He called to the agency 
and required an explanation why the article had been published. The businessman, who 
allegedly was one of the lords of organised crime, told the journalists that he himself was 
connected with the mass media and was able to order the publication of articles which 
would undermine the reputation of the agency. 309 
The ties of the criminal underworld of St. Petersburg with the news media are 
known to the people who are involved in the media business. These connections are so 
numerous that they allowed the criminal lords to fight with one another by means of 
publishing compromising articles about their criminal competitors. A good example in 
this regard is the information war, which took place after the murder of Gurevsky. 
Gurevsky, 33, was killed by a gun machine when he left his house. He was very 
influential in the Tambovskaia organised crime group, as well as one of the closest 
friends of Vladimir Kumarin and the godfather of Kumarin's daughter. According to 
some experts on organised crime in St. Petersburg, Gurevsky was responsible for killing 
people who preclude the development of the Tambovskaia organised crime group. 
Yan Gurevsky had grown up in a family without any criminal background. His 
father was involved in construction business and his mother was an economist. He was a 
bright person and won a few school awards in mathematics. Although Gurevsky 
graduated from a good university and served his term in the Red army, he was involved 
in one of the first cases launched to tackle organised crime in St. Petersburg in 1992. He 
was charged with extortion of 300 rubles (US$ 100) from a man who caused damages to 
Gurevsky's car, and was sentenced for two and half years conditionally. It is reported that 
309 Interview with Nikolay, an executive of an agency of investigative journalists, St. Petersburg, August, 
2002. 
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he continued to deny these charges and tried to convince law enforcement agencies that it 
had been a wrong accusation even after he was freed in 1994. 
There were several assumptions with regard to the Gurevsky's murder. Some of 
them underlined conflicts between Gurevsky and a few other influential people of this 
group, in particular Boris Ivanov (Bob Incassator), the owner of the hotel Sputnik and 
night club Relax. However, the most likely cause of this murder was the conflict between 
Mikhail Glushenko (reportedly, the second in the Tambovskalas hierarchy) and Vladimir 
Golubev (Barmaley), one of the shady owners of Adamant (and reportedly the boyfriend 
of Oksana Fedorova, the former Miss World from St. Petersburg, who used to work as a 
police officer). 
According to some sources, Barmaley decided to become completely independent 
from Tambovskie. However, he was told that his wealth had been created with the help of 
the criminal group. In order to gain independency Barmaley was asked to pay one million 
dollars, which is a huge sum of money even for a rich St. Petersburg businessman. 
Reportedly, Barmaley was very upset by this, and he tried to hit Glushenko. 
However, he was beaten himself, tied, and kept behind a moving ship. After this conflict, 
Barmaley preferred to leave St. Petersburg and temporarily lived in Israel. Some 
observers believe that the Tambovskie decided to take control over Barmaley's business 
in St. Petersburg. Gurevsky, along with Sergey Tarasov (Taras), was asked to coordinate 
this process. Some experts believe that they were behind a few bomb explosions in the 
restaurant Adamant and in a market place in Vasilevsky Island. 
Barmaley did not want to leave his business in St. Petersburg without a fight. He 
is thought to have helped the Unit of Tackling Organised Crime to arrest Tarasov and 
some of his gangsters. Gurevsky's fate was even worse. He was killed and his killers 
have never been found. 
The events that followed this murder were quite remarkable. A great number of 
articles about Gurevsky's killing and about organised crime were published in St. 
Petersburg. Media companies blamed different organised crime groups for breaking up a 
relatively peaceful consensus reached between the major criminal clans. Some reporters 
claimed that this was initiated by the thieves in law, others argued that this was done by 
St. Petersburg bandits. 
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For example, the Bureau of Journalistic Investigations published articles which 
argued that the Tambovskaia organised crime group financially supported the city and 
helped to solve many of its problems. At the same time, some other crime groups were 
blamed in an attempt to destabilise the situation in St. Petersburg. They were described as 
being linked to Moscow's thieves in law and Berezovsky. These publications clearly 
intended to put pressure on Kostia Mogila, who was accused of sponsorship of his own 
media companies, which reportedly included the Agency of Investigative Reporters and 
the editorial office of the magazine Your Secret Adviser. 310 
It was a remarkable moment in the history of the relationship between the mass 
media and organised crime. First, these events showed that the leaders of criminal 
underworlds started to try to defend their reputation as businessmen (not as criminals). 
Second, it showed that the crime lords started to rely on the mass media in order to reach 
this goal. For example, Vladimir Barsukov (Kumarin), the alleged gang lord of 
Tambovskaia crime group, even published an article in the St. Petersburg newspaper 
Smena, in which he denied any involvement of the gangsters-businessmen of his group in 
crimes. 
Third, these events signified that the news media became a very important 
instrument in competition between criminal syndicates. It is interesting to note that when 
the wave of articles with accusations of different criminal groups filled the St. Petersburg 
mass media, the head of Tambovskaia crime group and Kostia Mogila decided to meet 
each other to prevent irreversible damages to their images of "non-criminal" 
businessmen. This meeting took place in the hotel Astoria in the centre of St. Petersburg, 
311 
and apparently a new compromise had been reached. 
4.3. Illegal Entrepreneurs and the Russian Mass Media 
The management of news media was also known to be involved in some illegal or 
doubtful business enterprises and transactions. This allows us to review some of their 
310 Maksimov, M. (2000) "Kak khoteli possorit Vladimira Sergeevicha i Konstantina, Karlovicha" [Some 
details of an intention to force Vladimir Sergeevich and Konstantina Karlovich to argue with one another], 
Vash Tayniy Sovetnik, No. 10. 
311 Ibid. 
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deals in this section. These transactions are the most complicated from a legal viewpoint. 
That is why only the simplest cases are presented. The first is concerned with corruption 
of senior managers of St. Petersburg television. The second involves Gusinsky, one of the 
most powerful media moguls in Russia. 
4.3.1. Bella Kurkova 
Bella Kurkova, a member of the Russian Parliament and St. Petersburg Legislative 
Assembly, was appointed the director of Channel 5 in 1992. She had had a long career in 
journalism. She graduated from Leningrad University with a degree in journalism. Then 
she worked for the newspaper Sovetskaya Chukotka. After returning to St. Petersburg, she 
became the editor of the newspaper Leninskie Iskri. Kurkova started her career on 
television in 1965. Then she was the host of popular shows Na Politicheskom Olimpe and 
Piatoe Koleso [The Fifth Wheel]. She worked as an editor of television programmes and 
then she became the editor-in-chief. 
After Kurkova had become the director of Channel 5, she was accused of 
corruption. First, it became known that she had illegally got a very good apartment in the 
centre of St. Petersburg. The administration of Channel 5 had sent a letter to Sobchak, the 
former mayor of St. Petersburg. This letter asked Sobchak to give Kurkova a new 
accommodation in the centre of St. Petersburg, and he agreed to do so. Because the flats 
in some districts of St. Petersburg do not cost nearly as much as those in the centre, this 
decision upset many people in St. Petersburg. 
Furthermore, it was found that Kurkova had agreed to give a 35 per cent discount 
in advertising to an organisation, which was called Commercial Centre TV and Radio. At 
the same time, this organisation agreed to subsidisc another firm, which published the 
newspaper Nevsky Glashatay. In order to prove its sponsorship, the Commercial Centre 
paid 12 million rubles to Vadirn Tareev, the head of the firm. These contracts might not 
have caused any problems, if Tareev, had not been the husband of Kurkova. This led 
some members of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly to accuse Kurkova of bribery 
taking and to ask the prosecutor's office to launch an investigation. 
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The prosecutor's office managed to obtain the copies of the above-mentioned 
contracts as well as Tareev's confirmation that he had received the twelve million rubles. 
In fact, it was discovered that there were two similar confirmations. In the second of 
them, Tareev also confirmed that he had received twelve million rubles. However, these 
312 twelve million rubles had been paid to Tareev by another subsidiary of Channel 5. 
Even this bribery scandal had not been Kurkova's last accusation of corruption. 
The investigation of the project that aimed to build some houses for the personnel of the 
television company revealed that the largest part of the project money (which had been 
taken from the city budget) had dissolved and disappeared in the long chain of 
contractors. Only a fraction of the money had been spent for the construction of the 
houses themselves. 313 
Kurkova was also involved in the scandal about the transferring of US$ 2 million 
abroad to the firm TV and Radio St. Petersburg, registered in the United States. The 
details of this transaction are not clear yet. Kurkova claimed that this money had been 
stolen by one of her deputies Mikhail Siroezhkin. However, some experts believed that a 
part of the money transferred abroad returned to some Russian firms linked to Kurkova. 
In total, while being the director of Channel 5, Kurkova was accused of 
misspending 13.7 billion rubles. Although Kurkova always claimed that these accusations 
were politically motivated, she was sacked from her post in June 1995. 
4.3. Z TV Company Samara 
The situation with St. Petersburg television is not unique. Some executives of media 
organisations in other parts of Russia have also been accused of similar crimes. For 
example, on 15 February 2002, the prosecutor's office of Samara charged Alexander 
Kniazev, the director of TV company Samara, with fraud. Some business transactions of 
this company caught the attention of detectives in 1998. They discovered that this 
company transferred 3.6 million rubles (US$ 100,000), which it obtained from the local 
budget, to a few firms. 
312 Konstantinov, Corrumpirovanniy Peterburg, p. 367. 313 Ibid., p. 399. 
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Although the firms seemed to provide services to this company, it was claimed 
that the firms themselves used the personnel and equipment of Samara. However, the 
investigation in this respect was launched only after the beginning of the conflict between 
Kniazev and Konstantin Titov, the governor of Samara (the regional centre in the middle 
of Russia). This conflict followed by a series of articles, which were published by several 
local mass media companies, concerning financial misdoings in the TV company Samara. 
After these articles had been published, the prosecutor's office launched its 
investigation and arrested a few men. One of them was Sergey Ezhov, the Director 
General of the firm Video International Volga, who used to be the head of the firm Prime 
Time, which coordinated the transfer of the money from the bank account of the 
television company Samara to subsidiaries of Prime Time. After that the money was 
transferred to other companies and finally disappeared. 
Ezhov agreed with all accusations and said that he had wanted to inform the 
prosecutors about this, but Kniazev promised to kill him if he would go to the police. 
Ezhov's words made the prosecutors invite Kniazev for interrogation. He arrived to the 
prosecutor's office with his lawyers and bodyguards, but denied to answer any questions 
due to his right not to do so, written in the article 51 of the Constitution of the Russian 
Federation. Kniazev was arrested and released on bail. 314 
4.3.3. Hadimir GusinsAy and Media-Most 
The most well known case of fraud in the media business is the case of Gusinsky's 
Media-Most. Gusinsky, the founder of the group of companies Most, was the owner and 
the president of Media-Most, the largest of the Russian private media syndicates. Media- 
Most used to include a few Russian TV channels, several newspapers and magazines. 
Gusinsky's political views, in particular with regard to the Chechen war and the 
conflict in Kosovo, were different from the viewpoints of other Russian influential 
politicians and officials. In addition, the relationship between Media-Most and its main 
sponsor Gazprom changed for worse. As a result of this, the Russian prosecutor's office 
314 "Lesin zagovoril 
... 
o svobode slova" [Lesin starts talking about the freedom of speech], Novaia Gazeta, 
14.02.2002. 
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launched an investigation into the finance of Media-Most, and Gusinsky lost the 
controlling stake in this company. 
Nevertheless, even after this loss Gusinsky reportedly still owned 30 per cent of 
NTV, 42.5 per cent of satellite channel NTV+, 48.3 per cent of local television TNT, 25 
per cent minus one share of publishing group Sem Dney and 14.5 per cent of radio 
Moscow Echo. According to most recent reports, Gusinsky decided to sell his stake in 
NTV for allegedly 50 million dollars. 
As it has already been noted, Gusinsky has been suspected of several criminal 
offences. He was charged with alleged fraud associated with his purchase of a state- 
owned TV channel and the withdrawal of the company's mortgaged assets. On 13 June 
2000, Gusinsky was arrested. Having spent three days in prison, he was unexpectedly 
released on bail. Soon the criminal case against Gusinsky was suspended and he was 
allowed to go abroad. 
In September 2000, a possible reason for this decision was revealed. Gusinsky 
had sold his Media-Most along with NTV, to Gazprom. After Gusinsky had left Russia, 
he claimed that he had been forced to sell Media-Most for nothing under the pressure of 
law enforcement agencies. Gusinsky announced the deal void and initiated new 
negotiations with Gazprom. This move made the Prosecutor's Office launch a new 
investigation. Viacheslav Soltaganov, the head of Federal Tax Police Office, said that the 
prosecutor's office had very serious proof of Gusinsky's involvement in illegal 
business. 315 
Gusinsky was repeatedly summoned for interrogation, but he was outside the 
country, and decided not to attend these meetings. After Russia's request, Gusinsky was 
placed on the Interpol wanted list and was arrested by Spanish police on 12 December 
2000. Russian prosecutors asked to extradite Gusinsky and claimed that they have enough 
evidence to prove Gusinsky's guilt. On the other hand, Gusinsky's lawyers and 
supporters argued that his case was politically motivated, and that the Russian 
presidential team attempted to take Gusinsky's media empire under the state control. 
315 "Glava FCHP: Spokoynie nochi dlia nashih kapitalistov konchilis", [Head of FTPO: The quiet nights for 
our capitalists are over], Lenta. ru, 14.11.2000. 
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Three months later, the Spanish Court decided that allegations against Gusinsky were 
politically motivated, and Gusinsky was freed on 17 March 200 1. 
4.4. Ties between the Mass Media and the Administrative Mafia 
(Politicians) 
Apparently the type of organised crime that consists of politicians and state officials (so- 
called the Red Mafia)316 has most links to the Russian mass media and other criminal 
branches. It should be noted that it is difficult to verify whether scandalous tories 
regarding politicians are correct, or they are partly falsified in order to prove what the 
authors of these reports wanted to prove. Nevertheless, this section shows that some 
Russian leading politicians who are connected with the media might be involved in 
criminal business. 
4AL Fladimir Yakovlev 
Vladimir Yakovlev was the mayor of St. Petersburg until his resignation in July 2003. 
Information regarding his ties with the criminal world is taken not only from rumours 
published in the press. The facts support these rumours. Irina Yakovleva (his wife) was 
even invited to the headquarters of the FSB, the new KGB, and questioned with regard to 
a number of cases that involved several businessmen who were connected with the 
Yakovlevs and their relatives. 
Yakovleva used to work as a deputy to the director of one of the best-known 
cultural sights of St. Petersburg, the Russian Museum. She was responsible for 
construction and repairs. Then she was the manager of the firm Business Prosperity 
International, which organised large bank forums for top Russian and European 
managers. Her husband's position as the vice-mayor of St. Petersburg for construction 
and development was very useful for both of her jobs. The only reason he was not 
316 It is least considered as organised crime in the West. 
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accused of corruption is that it was such a fact of life that people did not recognise it as 
such. 
After Vladimir Yakovlev was elected the mayor of St. Petersburg, his wife 
established informal ties with some large construction firms. This was mutually 
beneficial. For example, Yakovleva is thought to have influenced the decision regarding 
the ownership of a site in the centre of St. Petersburg which used to belong to the 
Rozhdestvensky bank. This site was taken by the firm Nevsky Syndicate, which was one 
of the firms linked to Irina Yakovleva. 
The link from Yakovleva to Nevsky Syndicate can be extended to its subsidiary 
firm Severo-Zapadny Souz [North Western Union]. This firm had taken money from 
many residents of St. Petersburg and promised to pay good interest. However, this did not 
happen. North Western Union disappeared and its investors lost their money. 
Interestingly, no criminal investigation was launched concerning the disappearance of 
this firm. 3 17 
Another Turkish firm ATA, apparently connected with Yakovleva through the 
firm Start +T (one of its founders), was involved in several criminal scandals covered by 
several newspapers in St. Petersburg. Although the deputy to the prosecutor had made a 
speech at a press conference concerning this and said that there had been no criminal case 
launched against ATA, it became known later that a case had been opened, but it had 
been investigated secretly. 318 
Yakovleva was a patron of a few charities in St. Petersburg, such as Peterburgskie 
Traditsii [Traditions of Peterburg] and Fond Zashiti Materinstva i Detstva [Motherhood 
and Childhood Defence Foundation]. It took public money from the city budget for 
buying medical equipment and drugs for children. There were rumours that this 
equipment and drugs had been bought for half of the money reported. The difference 
between the declared and spent money had allegedly been spent for personal needs of the 
people involved in this project. Some officers of the Fond Zashiti Materinstva i Detstva 
were suspected of corruption in 1999.319 
317 Reported by Stolitsa in April 2000. 
318 Irina Yakovleva, is also linked to concessions that were given to the firm Lenzhilpromkomplex. Vladimir 
Yakovlev was the manager of this firm until 1996. 319 The Prosecutor Office decided not to launch any investigation in this respect. 
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YakovIev's family is connected with some shady businessmen through the 
contacts of Igor Yakovlev, 33, the son of the former mayor. He is a businessman who is 
involved in the energy business of St. Petersburg. According to some reports, he has 
acquired property in Spain and the source of this expensive purchase has not been known. 
The major supplier of energy to St. Petersburg used to be the company TEK St. 
Petersburg, which bought energy from main producers such as Lenenergo and sold it to 
residents of St. Petersburg. The equipment of TEK St. Peterburg became outdated, and it 
was decided to reform the whole energy distribution system of St. Petersburg. 
Although experts argued that privatisation and de-monopolization of TEK St. 
Petersburg was hardly necessary, Yakovlev decided to reform it in 2001. As a result of 
this reform, TEK St. Petersburg was supposed to be reorganised into several firms, which 
would eventually be privatised. It was suspected that Yakovlev or his friends would 
control these private firms. The reason for Yakovlev's opponents to argue that such a 
scenario was a real possibility was based on the previous privatisation of two subsidiaries 
of TEK St. Petersburg. These two companies were merged, privatised, and transformed 
into the new private firm Lenteplosnab, which was controlled by Igor Yakovlev, the son 
of the mayor. 320 
The family of Yakovlev might have been connected with criminal lords. Ludmila 
Narusova, the widow of Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg before Yakovlev, claimed 
that Yakovlev had established numerous contacts with bandits. Although the hate 
between the families of the two previous mayors is well known, it is possible to find 
some evidence that this may be true. 
For example, Alexander Cheluskin is thought to be a friend of theYakovlevs. 
However, since 1984, Cheluskin had been suspected of links to the organised crime group 
controlled by the brothers Vasilevi. Then he had been suspected of extortion and of being 
involved in other crimes committed by Malishevskaia criminal group. 
After a clash between the Malishevskaia and Tambovskaia groups in December 
1989, Malishev 321 and Cheluskin left Russia. They applied for asylum in Sweden, but 
their applications were rejected by the Swedish Home Office. Then Cheluskin was 
320 Kirillov, P. (2001)"Sem'Ya"' [Seven "Ya"], Versia, 26.06.2001. 
321 The ganglord of the Malishevskaia crime group. 
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allegedly involved in car trafficking from Poland and Germany to Russia. He was even 
accused of several contract murders and arrested, but was not charged with any of these 
offences. 
When Malishev and Kudryashov moved to Spain to avoid prosecution and 
possible revenge for their alleged involvement in the murder of Vladimir Kirpichev, an 
influential thief in law, 322 Cheluskin remained in St. Petersburg. He helped Yakovlev to 
win the mayor election in 1996. Cheluskin coordinated the activities of Yakovlev's 
supporters and searched for sponsors. After that he was seen as informal chief of 
Yakovlev's bodyguards. Cheluskin is believed to have helped the new elected mayor to 
overcome some conflicts with the representatives of Kazansky and Tambovskaia 
organised crime groups. 
Although Cheluskin had been suspected of many offences and links to organised 
crime, the deputy to the Head of the North Western Regional Unit for Tackling Organised 
Crime ordered to suspend Cheluskin's criminal investigations. It is reported that many his 
files were deleted. This made many people believe that Cheluskin was protected by 
someone who is linked to the political elite of St. Petersburg, maybe the mayor itself 323 
Yakovlev had other friends in the criminal underworld of St. Petersburg, such as 
Mustafin, Oleynik, Lashmanov and Ebralidze. Konstantin Yakovlev, who has been 
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, was also connected to the family of the mayor 
(he was not a relative of the mayor's family, though). All the evidence mentioned above 
allow us to regard Vladimir Yakovlev as a typical representative of the Red Mafia. 324 
YakovIev's family and their friends were well connected with the mass media. 
Konstantin Yakovlev, the President of the Fund for the Development of Television, 
reportedly controlled financial flows of the major St. Petersburg TV channel. Irina 
Prudnikova, the former Director General of TRK Peterburg, is thought to be the best 
friend to Irina Yakovleva, the mayor's wife. Some experts believe that Prudnikova got 
her post due to Yakovlev's support. In turn, Irina Yakovleva seemed to have become an 
informal manager of this major television company of St. Petersburg and controlled many 
of its activities. She even invited some managers from nationwide Moscow TV channels 
322 His nickname was Kirpich [Brick]. 323 Kirillov, "Sem'Ya"', 2001. 
324 Vladimir Yakoviev resigned from the post of the mayor of St. Petersburg in July 2003. 
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to work for this company. One of these managers, Maxim Yakovlev from ORT, was 
appointed the first deputy to the Director General of TRK Peterburg. 
4.4. Z Boris Berezovsky 
Although all people whose stories have been reviewed in this chapter are remarkable, 
Boris Berezovsky is a very special personage even among them. Berezovsky used to be 
one of the major Russian media moguls, and he continues to own shares of some 
nationwide newspapers and TV companies. In addition, Berezovsky used to be one of the 
most powerful Russian politicians: he was linked to the family of the previous Russian 
President and influenced many aspects of the Russian foreign and domestic policies. 
The status of a high-ranking politician did not prevent Berezovsky from being 
accused of connections with all types of organised crime. Because of these allegations he 
was placed on Russia's wanted list. The Russian prosecutor's office asked the British 
Home Office to extradite Berezovsky and his business partner Julian Dubov. London's 
Magistrates Court discussed the validity of these accusations but ruled out that they were 
politically motivated. Nevertheless, a new criminal investigation regarding Berezovsky 
was launched in Switzerland in December 2003. This section reviews the biography of 
this remarkable man and his ties with the Russian mass media and organised crime. 
Berezovsky was a representative of the Soviet elite. He was a doctor of 
mathematical science and worked for a rather important state organisation. However, 
after the launch ofperestroika, Berezovsky decided to change his life. He became a very 
successful businessman, and managed to secure a high post in the Russian goverment. 
Berezovsky started his business career by importing western computer software. 
However, his real business success was the establishment of the firm Logovaz that traded 
cars of Avtovaz, the leading Russian car plant in Toliati. Logovaz soon became the major 
Avtovaz's car dealer. However, it was by no means Berezovsky's main source of income. 
Berezovsky's success was a result of his business projects in banking, oil and aluminum 
business, as well as an involvement with the business of the state airline company 
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Aeroflot. In 1997, Forbes named him the ninth most powerful businessman in the world. 
Berezovsky fortune was rated at US$ 3 billion. 325 
Berezovsky is one of major owners of the Russian news media. Actually, his 
involvement into the media business started with large advertising campaigns for 
Logovaz. In this process, Berezovsky extensively used advertising campaign, which 
resulted in establishing and strengthening his links to the management of leading Russian 
mass media companies. Although Berezovsky did not own any media outlets at that time, 
he had established numerous contacts with the editors of the leading Moscow news 
organisations, which helped him gain a high political status. 
In particular, Berezovsky had a good relationship with Yumashev, the deputy to 
the editor of Ogonyok. Yumashev was the biographer of Yeltsin, the Russian President at 
that time, and a close friend of Yeltsin's family (later he married Yeltsin's daughter 
Tatyana Dyachenko). Yumashev recommended Berezovsky to Yeltsin as a possible 
major sponsor and publisher of Yeltsin's book Zapiski Prezidenta [Presidential Notes]. 
Berezovsky is believed to have used the payments to Yeltsin as a tool to strengthen his 
position in the Kremlin. 
In the 1990s Berezovsky became a senior adviser to Yeltsin and was appointed to 
the post of Deputy Secretary of the Security Council. He played a key role in 
implementing the 1996 Peace Agreement between Russia and Chechen separatists. Also, 
he played a leading role during talks between the Russian government and Chechen 
rebels concerning hostages taken by them. 326 
The informal ties with the Russian President allowed Berezovsky to promote his 
supporters into the top management of ORT, the leading Russian TV channel. Since then, 
Berezovsky's media empire continuously expanded. In 2000, Berezovsky owned 49 per 
cent of the largest Russian television channel ORT and a number of leading nationwide 
newspapers. 
This allowed Berezovsky to play a very important role in the 1996 presidential 
election, when he, along with other oligarchs, rescued President Yeltsin from well 
expected defeat. Berezovsky's media companies helped him in parliamentary elections in 
325 Gentleman, A. (2000) "Oligarch hits out at his Kremlin monster", The Guardian, 21.12.2000. 326 Reported by Transition on Line. 
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1999, when he won a seat in the Russian Parliament, which could have saved him from 
criminal prosecution. 
Paradoxically, Berezovsky's dominance in the media world seemed to have 
fastened his fall in 2000. It is well recognized that ORT news programmes effectively 
eliminated key rivals of Vladimir Putin during the presidential election in 2000, and it 
helped Putin to be elected. However, despite this support, Putin launched a campaign 
against some of the oligarchs who had flourished during Yeltsin's presidency. 
Berezovsky had the bad luck to be one of them. 
It is believed that the major conflict between Putin and Berezovsky happened 
when ORT covered the tragic events regarding the Russian submarine in 2000. In fact, 
one of the ORT reports accused the Russian government of using illegal (if not to say 
criminal) means to lessen the protest of the families of those who perished during the 
tragic accident. Berezovsky has claimed that Putin called him and said that if Berezovsky 
did not change his views (and his ORT 
- 
its coverage) it would cost him his TV company. 
Soon afterwards, the Russian courts stripped Berezovsky of some of his media 
outlets. In order to avoid charges, Berezovsky sold his shareholding in ORT. During this 
process, he also lost many of his people in leading positions in this major Russian TV 
company. In July 2000, Berezovsky resigned from his seat in the Russian Parliament 
because of his protest against what he saw as Putin's "authoritarian trends. " In turn, 
Russian prosecutors probed some of his business transactions, and Berezovsky decided to 
leave Russia as he did not want to be a "political prisoner. ', 327 
Berezovsky did not want to lose his influence over the Russian media even being 
outside the country. In order to compensate his loss, Berezovsky decided to buy the 
controlling stake in TV-6, which was the fourth major TV channel in Russia. He skilfully 
used the situation at NTV, and when the personnel of NTV was thinking about the 
possibility of working under the new management appointed by Gazprom, Berezovsky 
invited them to work for his channel TV-6. Some of NTV's staff, including its executive 
director Evgeniy Kiselyov, accepted this offer. However, the licence of TV-6 was soon 
327 URLhttp: //www. guardian. co. uklintemational/story/0,3604,414070,00. html, consulted in December 
2002. 
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cancelled by the Ministry of the Press and Television of the Russian Federation, and 
Berezovsky's company was banned from broadcasting. 
In addition to TV- 6, Berezovsky owned shares of STS, a Moscow TV channel, 
which can be considered as the fifth most important TV channel in Russia. Berezovsky 
still has a stake in the newspaper Kommersant, the leading Russian business daily, and 
the Independent Newspaper. Berezovsky controls Cityline and the news website 
Grani. ru. 328 There were non-confirmed reports that Berezovsky planned to create the 
biggest Russian Internet corporation that would join three telecommunication companies 
Cityline, Golden Telecom, and Sovintel. 329 
Berezovsky was allegedly involved in many illegal affairs. He was accused of 
money laundering, frauds, murders and corruption. These accusations were so serious 
that the Russian Prosecutor's Office launched a series of investigations regarding 
Berezovsky. After Berezovsky's escape from Russia, he was placed on the international 
wanted list and arrested by the British police. 
Surprisingly, the current prosecutor's investigation refers to the beginning of 
Berezovsky's business career, when he established close ties with the managers of 
Avtovaz, the leading Russia's car producing plant. In particular, Berezovsky became a 
good friend of Kadannikov, the director of this plant. 
Berezovsky used his ties with Kadannikov in order to launch a trade scheme that 
was considered later by the Russian prosecutors to be a large-scale fraud and money 
laundering scheme. It refers to the contract between Avtovaz and Berezovsky's firm 
Logova. z. According to that contract, Logovaz took several thousands of cars to sell and 
promised to pay for them after they would be sold. This trade scheme proved to be a 
success and Logovaz soon became the major trading dealer of Avtovaz. However, it has 
been revealed that the price that Logovaz paid for these cars was several times cheaper 
than their market value and even well below their production costs. 
To make the matter worse, the prosecutor's office claims that the money for 2033 
cars was not returned to Avtovaz and to the Administration of the Samara region at all. In 
other words, the local budget of the Administration was defrauded of 60 billion rubles 
328 "Berezovsky's plans to create Internet holding are 'an enemy invention"', Allnews. ru, 30.11.2001, (URL 
http: //allnews. nL/, consulted in May 2003). 329 Ibid. 
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(US$ 1.9 billion). 330 It is claimed that some of this sum (7.5 billion rubles) was spent for 
three villas in the Odintsovo district of the Moscow region. These villas are believed to 
have been bought for Logovaz's managers Krasneker and Ismailov. The third villa was 
left on the balance of Logovaz, apparently for Berezovsky himself. It used to be the villa 
of Tikhonov, the former chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. The 
villa cost more than one milliard rubles and it was later used by one of Berezovsky's 
daughters. 
In addition, 5.1 billion rubles were spent for Berezovsky's office on Morskaya 
Street in St. Petersburg. 331 Other money earned in this business project was reportedly 
used by Berezovsky for purchasing shares in leading Russian media companies. It is 
believed that nine billion rubles were paid for a stake in ORT (now Channel One). One 
and a half billion rubles were spent for acquiring shares of TV-6, and 3 billion rubles 
allegedly were used for buying Ogonyok, a popular Russian magazine. 332 
Another of Berezovsky's schemes, which can be seen as a large-scale fraud, was 
his project to produce a new Russian car that might have been affordable for most 
Russian citizens. The idea was not bad at all, as the market price of the produced cars had 
been higher than an average Russian could save in a decade. Evidently, such a big project 
was impossible without political support. Berezovsky had this support because he was a 
fiiend of Yeltsin's family, and the project was advertised as a state programme to support 
the domestic car industry. 
However, the project A VVA turned out to be a typicalfinancial pyramid. 
Financial pyramids were fraudulent financial schemes that were used in Russia by some 
firms in order to take money from citizens without paying promised dividends. In fact, 
these firms did not pay to their investors (vk1adchikam) at all, but spent the money of 
their investors for advertising campaigns that aimed to attract new investors. Then these 
firms disappeared and the investors were neither able to find the firms' founders nor to 
claim the return of their investments. 
The outcome of Berezovsky's campaign to collect investments for the A WA 
project was very much the same. Nationwide advertising campaigns encouraged many 
330 Gazeta. ru, 26.03.2003. 331 "Prosecutor's office accuses Berezovsky of stealing 2,000 zhigulw', Ntvru. com, 11.09.2002. 332 Gazeta. ru, 26.03.2003. 
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Russians to buy A VVA 's vouchers. However, the investors were later told that the 
investment required to launch the production of the new car had not been achieved. The 
new car has never been produced and most of the investors have never seen their money. 
Berezovsky's business projects with Avtovaz could not avoid being involved in 
conflicts or cooperation with organised crime groups. Car business was very profitable 
and, according to many reports, the output of Avtovaz was divided between several local 
organised crime groups. Conflicts between these groups often resulted in shooting and 
murders. The gangster wars around Avtovaz at the beginning of the 1990s have been 
described by local newspapers, and some episodes of the struggle between them has been 
recently filmed by one of the major Russian TV channels. 
Berezovsky traded cars in Moscow, which was divided between different criminal 
syndicates. Berezovsky was thought to have had good contacts with the Chechen gang. It 
does not necessarily mean that he wanted to establish those ties. Organised crime groups 
were very powerful in Moscow, and in order to defend their own business, many 
businessmen decided to pay one of them in a hope to avoid an intervention from the 
others. 
In any case, Berezovsky seemed to have good ties with one of the most powerful 
criminal syndicates in Moscow. Some conflicts with the representatives of other criminal 
groups finished in his favour. One of the bloodiest shooting of 1993 took place next to the 
main office of Berezovsky's Logovaz on Leninsky Prospect next to the cinema 
Kazakhstan in Moscow. Igor Ovchinnikov, one of the lords of the Solntsevskaia 
organised crime group, and his gangsters arrived at this place in three expensive cars and 
started gun shooting. Berezovsky's security officers shoot back. As a result of this armed 
conflict, three men, including Ovchinnikov himself, were killed and six other injured. 
Berezovsky's bodyguards, or Chechens, won this conflict. 333 
Berezovsky's ties with the Chechens allowed detectives to accuse him of being 
involved in several contract killings. One of them is the murder of Vladislav Listev, the 
Director General of ORT. When Berezovsky increased his political status, he tried to gain 
333 Klebnikov, P. (200 1) Krestniy Otets Kremlia Boris BerezovsA)4 ill Istoria Razgrablenia Rossii 
[Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the looting of Russia]. Moscow: Detective Press, p. 16. 
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control over ORT, the leading Russian TV channel with an 80 million audience. Some 
experts believed that this Berezovsky's target forced him to kill Listev on I March 1995. 
Listev was the anchorman of the most popular shows Vzgliad [Look], Pole 
Chudes [The Wonder Field], Tema [Topic], and Chas Pik [Rush Hour]. In February 1995, 
Listev was appointed the Director General of ORT. Immediately after his appointment 
Listev ordered to take away all advertising on this TV channel, and was found shot dead 
with US$ 800334 in his pocket in the entrance to his house only few days afterwards. 
Berezovsky was one of the people who were most suspected of this murder. Some 
witnesses remembered that Berezovsky had wanted to have Irena Lesnevskaia, one of his 
supporters, in Listev's post. It was a very lucrative position. The Director General could 
control all advertising revenue. At that time, the largest part of advertising money was so- 
called "cherny nal" [black cash]. In other words, this money was not formally paid or 
transferred through banks and, consequently, was tax-free. Many businessmen wanted to 
take up this money, including Berezovsky. 
Some of the witnesses revealed that Berezovsky had frequently argued with 
Listev, and one of the conflicts had happened a few days before the killing. Also, it was 
very suspicious that Berezovsky had flown to London just a few hours before Listev's 
murder. In addition, law enforcement agencies found the evidence that Berezovsky had 
paid a big sum of money to a thiefin law at that time. Berezovsky's explanation that this 
money was given in order to find the people who coordinated an attempt to kill him did 
not satisfy the detectives at all. 335 Since 1995, the Russian Prosecutor's Office has been 
repeating that Berezovsky might have ordered to kill Listev, and that they have gained 
some new evidence of his involvement. 336 
334 A two-Year salary of an average Russian at that time. 335 This attempted murder took place on 7 June, 1994. Berezovsky's car was exploded and his bodyguard 
was killed, but Berezovsky was just slightly injured. 336 
"Ustanovlcni ubiytsi zhurnalista Vlada Listeva" [Vlad Listev's killers are identified], Xovaia Gazeta, 21.02.2002, (URL http: //news. ng. nL/2002/02/21/1014284197. html). 
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4.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has examined relations between the Russian mass media and organised 
crime. As it had been shown in the previous chapter, the Russian media is very vulnerable 
to the pressure from various powerful groups. Not surprisingly, there is some evidence of 
connections between the Russian news media and criminal organisations. 
Some of the lords of organised crime became owners of media companies. A 
simple explanation might suggest that thieves in law and bandits are involved in legal 
businesses and often try to hide their criminal background. The ownership of media 
companies could help them improve their political and social statuses. In addition, it 
could allow these criminals/businessmen to reduce transaction costs for their commercial 
projects. In other words, the control of some media organisations increases their chances 
to gain political and economic advantages over their rivals. 
To some extent, the management of media companies is also involved in illegal 
transactions. It has been shown, that the complex reality of capitalist reforms in Russia 
encouraged some of the managers of the news media to seek economic profit from their 
positions and being either part of illegal entrepreneurs or the administrative Maji'a. 
The main objective of this chapter is to show the existence of different ties 
between organised crime and the mass media in Russia. Numerous examples of this 
chapter have proved this. Certainly, any connections between organised crime and the 
media can hardly be considered appropriate for any healthy society. However, regardless 
of whether it is good or bad, it has been the reality in Russia in the last few decades. 
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Chapter 5 
Difficulties of Reporting on Organised Crime in Russia 
Journalism has always been a dangerous profession. Many reporters and journalists have 
been beaten, kidnapped, or even killed. 337 One of the most recent examples in this respect 
is the murder of Daniel Pearl, a journalist for the Wall Street Journal. The dangers are 
especially true with regard to Russian journalists, particularly those who write stories on 
organised crime and corruption. "We leave under continuous pressure. We are 
prosecuted, threatened, and killed, " claimed one well-known Russian journalist during 
the interview. 338 
The previous chapter has shown the presence of ties between organised crime and 
the mass media. In addition, there is a wide range of methods that can be used in order to 
put pressure on the media, as it has been outlined in Chapter 3. Lastly, sometimes it is 
difficult to decide whether some economic action or actors are linked to organised crime 
or not. This makes the work ofjournalists reporting on organised crime and corruption 
very difficult. 
This chapter presents a summary of the main problems encountered by Russian 
journalists. In my opinion, they are mostly caused by the administrative Mafia and 
bandits. The administrative Mafia relies heavily on legal action (the use of the court and 
law enforcement agencies) while the bandits prefer to use violence. An additional 
problem forjournalists may be brought about by ethical issues. Many published stories 
can strongly affect the careers, health, and even lives of those in the report. As it is not 
always clear in each particular case whether the accusations of corruption or links to 
organised crime have been accurate, some journalists might feel themselves morose 
because of being a possible cause of such a tragic event. 
First, this chapter describes the problems while searching for data on organised 
crime. Then, it reviews the legal cases that involve Russian journalists and summariscs 
the cases of violence against them, including serious crimes such as murder. Finally, it 
337 Many criminal offences against journalists are reported by IFEX Communique. Data for 2004 can be 
found in (2005) Journalists and Media StaffKilled in 2004: An IFJReport on Media Casualties in the 
Field ofJournalism and Newsgatehring, The International Federation of Journalists. 338 Interview ith Elena, a newspaper journalist, London, August 2003. 
161 
gives an example of ethical problems faced by some media companies of St. Petersburg 
while reporting corruption and organised crime. 
5.1. Difficulties of Data Collection and Verification 
Journalists writing criminal stories encounter many problems. The first set are the 
difficulties the journalists face while seeking for data on organised crime and corruption. 
Because links with organised crime or involvement in corrupt practices are illegal, any 
information about them is hidden. To complicate matters even more, a lot of Russian 
media companies have financial difficulties and, consequently, limited capacities to use 
cash as a reward to their sources, which makes the task of finding sources for the 
information on organised crime and corruption difficult. 
Search for data might also be stopped by law enforcement agencies. For example, 
Alexey Malkov, along with some other reporters of NTV, was held by the police at 
Kazansky Vokzal [Kazan train station] on 15 March 2002 while they filmed an action of 
a unit of RUBOP (Regional Unit to Tackle Organised Crime). The police explained this 
arrest by claiming that the reporters did not have special permission to film at this place 
(according to the Russian Law, it is illegal to film at train stations without special 
permission). However, the management of NTV pointed out that their reporters filmed 
outside the Kazan train station and, consequently, the intervention of the police could not 
be justified. 339 
The verification of the data is another problem. Reliability of reports is essential 
for the mass media. This means that the data obtained should be checked and verified. 
Without such a test, there is a risk of airing some false reports. For example, on 30 
August 2001, Pavel Lisovsky, a technical director of the firm Pomon, phoned to the 
headquarters of NTV at St. Petersburg and said that he was a gangster. According to 
Lisovsky, his criminal group intended to organise some bomb attacks on train stations 
Moskovskaya-Sortirovochnaya and Kupchino. 
339 Reported by Lenta. Ru, 16.03.2002. 
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Lisovsky said that he wanted to reveal that information in order to prevent the 
attacks. However, when some officers of UFSB (Department of Federal Security), invited 
by NTV, checked out the Lisovsky's words, they discovered that it was completely 
untrue. Later Lisovsky admitted that the real reason for reporting the false story was that 
he had just liked to be in the Spotlight. 340 
This example not only demonstrates that any data has to be checked before it can 
be published or broadcast, but also that it is very unwise for respondents to present 
inaccurate information (Lisovsky was forced to pay 3 5,000 rouble ($ 1,000) compensation 
to NTV). However, the verification of information is an additional problem because there 
is considerable conspiracy around corruption and organised crime. Very few people 
would admit their involvement in illegal activities without very strong reasons. 
Although the problems of searching and verifying data for reports on illegal 
activities are very important for journalists, they are not explored in more detail because 
these issues are rather marginal to the goals of this thesis. Instead, this chapter focuses on 
the problems that journalists are likely to face after their stories on organised crime and 
corruption were published or broadcast. They are examined in the following sections. 
5.2. Difficulties Associated with Law Enforcement 
If the people mentioned in a report on corruption or organised crime feel offended, they 
can claim compensation through law. If the people in the reports consider that the facts 
which have been noted in these publications are false, they can sue the media 
organisation that has published or aired these reports. It forces Russian investigative 
agencies and media companies to employ well qualified lawyers in order to win these 
disputes. 341 This section presents several examples which show how often legal methods 
are used in Russia. 
340 "Telefonniy terrorist raskaialsia" [Telephone terrorrist changed his mind], Lenpravda. ru, 30.08.2001, (URLhttp: //lenpravda. ru/newsarch. phtml? cat--3&day=30&month=08&year--01#838, consulted in 
Septernber2001). 
341 Interview with Evgeniy, an investigative journalist, St. Petersburg, April, 1999. 
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Let us start with Berezovsky's claim that he was brought into disrepute by an 
article in Forbes. This article on the state of criminality in Russia during Yeltsin's 
presidency was written by Paul Klebnikov. It implied that Berezovsky was a gangster 
boss who had amassed his fortune by large-scale fraud and intimidation. The article also 
assumed that Berezovsky killed many of his political and business rivals. While this case 
was still on going, in July 2001, Forbes was forced to pay US$ 250,000 to Berezovsky. 342 
Finally, in 2003, Forbes admitted that it could not prove many points of the article, and 
published its apologies. 
In November 2001, Mezhregionalnaya Colegiya Advocatov 343 (MKA) Klishin 
and Partners sued Andrey Karaulov, the director and anchorman of the show Moment 
Istini [The moment of truth] and the TV company TVTC, one of Moscow's leading TV 
channels, which broadcast the show. MICA Klishin and Partners claimed that its 
reputation was significantly damaged by one of the clips of the show which portrayed 
Khimprom, a chemical enterprise in Chuvashiya (one of the autonomous republics in 
Russia), as a firm bought by MKA Klishin and Partners. 
According to Karaulov, the MKA Klishin and Partners had an agreement to 
manage a 26 per cent stake in Khimprom, which gave them 16 million rouble profit per 
month. On the contrary, MKA Klishin and Partners denied having any stake in 
Khimprom, and the registration department confirmed this. As a result, Karaulov, Nikolay 
Ivanov (a representative of Chuvashiya in the Council of Federations), and General- 
Lieutenant Sergey Voronov (an officer of the FSB, who also participated in the show) 
were accused of slander. 
In fact, it was not the first libel case won by MKA Klishin and Partners against a 
Russian media organisation. In the summer of 2001, the TV channel RTR was supposed 
to apologise and to correct its similar report regarding MKA Klishin and Partners, and so 
344 did the newspaper Novie Izvestia on 13 October 2001. 
Karaulov was also involved in other legal hearings. On 6 June 2002, Sergey 
Darkin, the governor of the Primorsky Kray, sued Karaulov and his show Moment Istini 
342 For example, URL http: //www. sem40. ru/politics/berez-15. shtml, consulted in June 2002. 343 Association of Solicitors. 344 Balutenko, M. (200 1) "Oshibka Karaulova: Na Moment istini podali v sud" [Karaulov's mistake: 
Moment Istini is sued], Vremia Novostey, 19.11.200 1, (URL http: //www. tvc. ru/anons/error. html, consulted 
in November 200 1). 
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over Karaulov's comments on a video clip that showed Darkin partying with his friends 
on the ship Lubov Orlova ten years ago. On the show, Karaulov said that the video clip 
had been filmed during a birthday party of one of Vladivostok's criminal lords. In 
addition, Karaulov told viewers that the ship of one of Darkin's advisors injured an 
eleven-year-old girl. The official representatives of the Administration of the Primorsky 
Kray claimed that Karaulov's report was inaccurate and pressed charges against him. 345 
The above case illustrates an aspect of the relationship between the news media 
and public authorities. Another example is the dispute between the Administration of St. 
Petersburg and the newspaper Kommersant-St. Petersburg. On 4 March 2002, Alexander 
Afanasev, the spokesman for the governor of St. Petersburg, brought Alexander 
Samoilov, a correspondent of the newspaper Kommersant-St. Petersburg, to the 
Frunzensky Federal Court. Afanasev claimed compensation from Samoilov and from the 
newspaper because he considered himself seriously offended by the report, published in 
the newspaper on 5 February 2002, regarding an incident with Ivan Korniev, the director 
of St. Petersburg Zoo, in which Korniev was severely injured. 
It was well known that Ivan Korniev was "an enemy" of Yakovlev, the mayor of 
St. Petersburg. The newspaper story implied that the incident was organised by people 
linked to Yakovlev. On the day the story was published, Afanasev paid a visit to the 
headquarters of Kommersant-St. Petersburg and asked its editors to explain their reasons 
for publishing the story. Two weeks after the incident, Afanasev published an open letter 
in the weekly Argumenti i Fakti-St. Petersburg and submitted his case to the Frunzensky 
Court, claiming a compensation of fifty thousand rubles (US$ 17,000) from the 
newspaper. 346 
Even people who are allegedly linked to organised crime can press charges 
against the mass media. For example, on 24 April 2002, Yury Shutov, a member of the 
St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and a crime lord, sued journalist Denis Terentev and 
the newspaper Vecherny Peterburg [Evening Petersburg]. Shutov claimed that the stories 
about his involvement in the business of organised crime, published by the newspaper, 
were false. 
345 Lenta. Ru, 7.06.2002. 
346 Vishnevsky, B. (2002) "Zhenskie istorii Vladimira, Yakovleva. [Women's stories of Vladimir 
Yakovlev]", Novaia Gazela, 21.02.2002. 
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It should be noted that Shutov has sued quite a few people and newspapers in this 
respect. He pressed charges against Ludmila Narusova, the wife of Sobchak (the former 
mayor of St. Petersburg and Shutov's adversary), the newspaper Argumenti i Fakti, and 
the Agency of Business News (ABN). On 16 May 2002, he sued the newspaper Novaia 
Gazeta [New Newspaper] because he believed that some of the stories in the newspaper 
portraying him as a gangster were untrue. 347 Also, Shutov sued the journal Vne Zakona 
[Outside the Law] because it published Terentev's story "Shutov's Case: A Publicly 
Elected Pakhan [Godfather]. 99348 
Due to Shutov's involvement in the media business 349 he was also sued on similar 
grounds. Grigory Yavlinsky, a prominent Russian politician, pressed charges against 
Shutov and the newspaper Noviy Peterburg [New Peterburg] with regards to the damage 
caused to his reputation by Shutov's words about him and his political party Yabloko 
350 [Apple] published in the newspaper on 17 December 1998. Yavlinsky considered those 
words to be offensive, distasteful, and incorrect. He demanded 100,000 rubles (US$ 
3,300) compensation from Shutov and 250,000 rubles (US$ 8,000) from the newspaper. 
As it has been shown, there are connections between organised crime, corrupt 
officialdom, and the mass media in Russia. As a result of this, sometimes media 
organisations sue one another. For example, on 28 May 2002, the information agency 
Rosbalt sued Alexander Afanasev, the spokesman for Yakovlev (the mayor of St. 
Petersburg), and the TV company Peterburg of slander. Rosbalt claimed that Ekaterina 
Dodzina, a reporter for the TV company Pcterburg, wrongly accused the information 
agency of discrediting some of the officials of the St. Petersburg Administration in the 
film The Unjinished Case of Valery Malishev shown in May 2002. Tatyana Chesnikova, 
the editor of Rosbalt, said that the television company Peterburg "practically accused our 
agency of an informational campaign against Malishev that might have caused his death. 
We consider this accusation to be false and it damages the reputation of our agency. 
Rosbalt insists that the TV company Peterburg must apologize and publicly correct their 
347 "Yury Shutov budet suditsia s Novoy Gazeloy" [Yury Shutov is going to sue Novala Gazeta], 
Fontanka. ru, 16.05.2002. 348 "Ocherednoy isk Yuriya Shutova k zhumalistam" [Yury Shutov sues journalists again], Fontanka. ru, 
22.05.2002. 
349 Yury Shutov published many his articles in the newspaper Noviy Petersburg [New Peterburg7. 350 Shutov, Y. (1998) "Kto takoy Grigoriy lavlinskiy, chto takoe Iabloko" [Who is Grigory lavlisnky, what 
is Yabloko], Noviy Peterburg, 17.12.199 8. 
166 
,, 
351 
previous statements. Chesnikova also said that Rosbalt was going to sue another 
media outlet, the website Flb. ru. 352 
Law enforcement agencies can intervene in the activities of the news media in 
several ways. For example, in 1999 the St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office launched an 
investigation into the brothers Shevchenko (Vyacheslav and Sergey), who were members 
of the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly and owners of a few media companies. They 
were accused of the extortion of US$ 10,000 and the publication rights of the magazine 
Televik (Televik is a combination of Russian and English words, meaning "television 
week") from the publisher Maxim Kuzakhmetov, and of the extortion of US$5,000 from 
Vladimir Kuznetsov, a correspondent of the newspaper Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti. 
As a result of this, Vyacheslav Shevchenko, who had already finished his term in office 
in the Legislative Assembly, preferred to leave St. Petersburg for an undisclosed location, 
while Sergey Shevchenko was arrested in spite of having immunity as a member of the 
Legislative Assembly. 
On 15 November 2001, the Kuybishevsky Federal Court of St. Petersburg 
conditionally jailed Sergey Shevchenko for seven-and-a-half years 
- 
due to his illness and 
the necessity to take care of his small child. On 19 February 2002, Shevchenko appealed 
against the court verdict. On the same day, the St. Petersburg Prosecutor's Office also 
appealed against this ruling, but because of its leniency. The Kuybishevsky Federal Court 
heard the arguments of both sides of the case and upheld the original verdict. 
Law enforcement agencies react quickly, especially when a media report criticizes 
their activities or performance. For example, on I March 2002, Alexey Andreev, the 
editor of the newspaper Noviy Peterburg, was accused of the dissemination of false 
information regarding the senior officers of the Prosecutor's Office, and of an 
intervention in the private life of its personnel. The Prosecutor's Office pressed charges 
against Andreev because of two anonymous reports published in the newspaper. These 
stories were interviews with the above-mentioned Shutov, in which he insisted that Ivan 
Sidoruk, the head of the Prosecutor's Office in St. Petersburg and his deputy Nikolay 
351 "Rosbalt budet suditsia s Alexandrom Afanasevirn i TRK Peterburg" [Rosbalt to be sued by Alexander 
Afanasev], Fontanka. ru, (URL 
http: //www. fontanka. ru/society. thtml? mday=29&mon--5&year--2002&id=75885293, consulted in 
September 2003). 
352 Kommersant-SPb, 30.05.2002. 
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Vinnichenko, along with investigators Vladimir Kirilenko, Natalia Litvinova, Alexey 
Dudkin and Sergey Tcutcuriak, were bribed by some criminal lords (avtoritetami) in 
order to force the Prosecutor's Office to press charges against their (gangsters') 
adversaries. The Prosecutor's Office had charged the newspaper with slander and 
Andreev received a two-year sentence. 353 
On 6 March 2002, the Prosecutor's Office in Samara, a large Russian industrial 
city, launched an investigation against Alexander Kniazev, the chairman of the local TV 
company VGTRK. He was accused of fraud and the intimidation of witnesses. Kniazev 
was temporarily dismissed for the time of the investigation. 354 
On 4 March 2002, Chernov, the Chairman of the Krasnodarsky Regional Court, 
pressed charges against Novaia Gazeta. Chernov said that the article "Lie Down, The 
Court is in Session! " caused damages to his reputation and he claimed US$ 10 million 
compensation from Novaia Gazeta. The Basmanniy Court of Moscow ruled that the 
newspaper had to pay the money, even though the fine would be the size of the annual 
budget of the newspaper. In other words, the newspaper was literally shut down as a 
result of its negative reporting on the court. 
This chapter does not describe the legal procedures against Media-Most in detail 
because they have already been reviewed in the previous chapters. However, it is possible 
to add that Anton Titov, the finance director of Media-Most was accused of a5 billion 
355 
rouble fraud, and was remanded in custody until he died. 
On I April 2002, Igor Zotov, the deputy to the editor-in-chief of the newspaper 
Nezavisimaia Gazeta [the Independent Newspaper] was accused of slander for publishing 
the story "One million dollar prohibition to leave" in November 2001. The story claimed 
that some of the court workers of the Moscow Meshansky Court were paid for helping 
Anatoly Bikov (reportedly the lord of organised crime in Krasnoyarsk) to be released on 
bail. Although the story was signed by Alena Tarasova, Zotov was the editor for the issue 
on that day and the Prosecutor's Office decided that he was mainly responsible for the 
353 The website of the party Zemlia Rossii [Soil of Russia], (URL http: //www. zr2 I. narod. ru, consulted in 
June 2003). 
354, 'Lesin zagovoril 
... 
o svobode slova" [Lesin starts talking about the freedom of speach], Novaia Gazeta, 
14.02.2002. 
355 Lenta. ni, 13.03.2002. 
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story, and could be tried in accordance with the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation 
for the dissemination of untrue information regarding law enforcement agencies. 356 
Law enforcement agencies accused the mass media of the infringement of quite a 
few laws. The data in Table 5.1 demonstrate this and shows the comparative frequency of 
the accusations. 
Table 5.1 Accusation ofthe Mass Media of the Infringement of lawfrom 1997 to 1999 
Infringements 1997 1998 1999 
Defamation, Damages to Reputation 255 72.9 406 64.7 417 49.6 
Intrusion in Private Life 37.0 10.5 14.0 2.2 16.0 1.9 
Infringements associated with political 
advertisement during election 
campaigns. 
14.0 4.0 55.0 8.9 101 12.0 
License and Registration 
Infringemen 
18.0 5.1 89.0 14.2 219 26.1 
Infringement of the Law on 
Advertising 
9.0 2.6 
I 
21.0 3.3 24.0 2.9 
The use of the media for criminal 
purposes 
9.0 2.6 22.0 
I 
3.5 58.0 
I 
6.9 
Other infringements 8.0 2.3 20.0 3.2 5.0 0.6 
Total 350 100 627 100 840 100 
Source: Glasnost Defence Foundation. 
Although it seems paradoxical, law enforcement agencies can and do interfere 
with journalistic investigations on organised crime. For example, on 30 November 2001, 
Evgeniy Vishenkov, a deputy to the director of St. Petersburg Agency of Investigative 
Reporters (AIR), was arrested for the kidnapping of a student of a St. Petersburg 
university. The Agency of Investigative Reporters defended Vishenkov by saying that he 
was involved in the investigation of several murders that took place in St. Petersburg in 
the autumn 2001. Vishenkov, along with other reporters of the agency, met the people 
who might have committed the killings. One of those suspected of the killings was the 
student, and he had agreed to come to their office and be interviewed (this agreement and 
the interview were audio-taped). During the talks the j ournalists concluded that he could 
be involved in the killings, and invited some of the officers of the Department of 
356 Lenla. ru, 02.04.2002. 
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Criminal Justice of the Ministry of Domestic Affairs to take part in the interview. After 
the interview, the officers charged the student with conspiracy to kill and arrested him. 357 
This case demonstrates that even when the interests of investigative journalists and 
detectives coincide, the former can be persecuted by another department of the law 
enforcement. 
Finally, it should be noticed that such law enforcement practices against the mass 
media are used not only in Russia but also in many countries of the former Soviet Union. 
For example, on 20 June 2002, Viktar Ivashkevich, the editor-in-chief of the weekly 
Rabochy [The Worker] was charged with libel against the president of Belarus as a result 
of Ivashkevich's article published in 2001. It was called "A Thief Must Go to Prison" and 
it accused Lukashenka of economic crimes. The police of Belarus confiscated all copies 
of that edition. 
On 24 June 2002, Mikola Markevich and Pavel Mazheika of Pahonia [Pursuit], a 
regional, privately owned newspaper, were charged with "defamation of character" of 
Alexander Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, and received a two-and-a-half year 
sentence, and two years of work in labour camps. According to the judge, the journalists 
got a relatively easy punishment just because one of them had two under-age children, 
and another journalist was only twenty-four years old. 
The j ournalists were held after Pahonia, edited by Markevich, published a 
Mazheika's article blaming Lukashenka for the unexplained disappearances of some of 
his political opponents. This edition never reached the public because it had been 
immediately seized by the police. After Lukashenka was re-elected as the President of 
Belarus, the newspaper Pahonia was shut down and an investigation against Markevich 
and Mazheika was launched. 358 
357 "Offitcialnoe zaiavlenie Agenstvajurnalistkikh rassledovaniy" [An official statement of the Agency of 
Investigative Reporters], Fontanka. ru, 30.11.2001, (URL 
http: //www. fontanka. ni/? map=incidents&mday=30&mon-- II &year--200 I &id=60269290, consulted in 
October 2003). 
358 Znatkevich, A. (2002)"Belarusian journalists jailed for libel", Transition on Line, 26.06.2002. 
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5.3. Serious Crimes against Journalists 
The previous section has reviewed various problems caused by the use of legal 
procedures against the Russian mass media. However, no matter how severe were the 
verdicts of law, they do not normally impose a threat to the lives of the journalists, 
reporters and the management of the media. Unfortunately, there are organisations and 
people who find it possible to cause even more serious damages to the media staff. 
Many reporters, journalists, and managers of the media have been assaulted or 
even killed. According to the data of the organisation Reporters without Boundaries, over 
500 journalists who had been covering corruption, money laundering and organised crime 
have been murdered or kidnapped over the decade. It means that nearly 50 reporters have 
become the victims of serious crimes every year. From fifteen to twenty of these cases 
happen in Russia alone. This section summarises the cases involving serious crimes 
against the personnel of the Russian media organisations. 
5.3-1. Serious Crimes in which the Mass Media Personnel did not Lose their Lives. 
Threat is the most common and least serious crime against reporters. On 18 February 
2002, Viktor Merezhko, a reporter, and Sergey Moskvin, the General Director of the TV 
channel M-1, revealed that some people had threatened them. Merezhko and Moskvin 
said that these people ordered them not to take part in the tender for the broadcasting 
license on the frequency of the channel TV-6. Otherwise, these people promised to cause 
serious problems to Merezhko and Moskvin. According to Merezhko, he received these 
calls on his mobile phone and at home. He said, "They have threatened me, my son and 
059 daughters, and I think it makes sense to hire bodyguards. 
As has been noted in the previous section, on 15 November 2001, the 
Kuybishevsky Federal Court of St. Petersburg found Sergey Shevchenko, a member of 
the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly, guilty in the extortion of large sums of money 
from Kuzakhmetov and Kuznctsov. They published some stories about a few illegal 
359 Pressing. spb, (URL http: //www. pressing. spb. ni/). 
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dealings by the managers of the club Golivudskie Nochi [Nights of Hollywood) owned 
by the brothers Shevchenko. 
These publications are believed to have made the brothers claim the above- 
mentioned "compensation". As the brothers Shevchenko had the reputation of being very 
serious and powerful people, Kuzakhmetov preferred to pay US$ 10,000, and transferred 
the publishing rights of the magazine Televik to Shevchenko, while Kuznetsov chose to 
secure his life by living outside Russia for several years. 360 
In July 2000, the former personal cameraman of the President of Belarus, Dmitry 
Zavadski, a reporter for ORT at that time, disappeared. Although two men were charged 
with his kidnapping and were sentenced to life imprisonment on 14 March 2002, the trial 
failed to explain what happened to the journalist after he was abducted 
'361 and 
Zavadsky's relatives were very disappointed by the verdict of the court. 
The brutal beating of Ildar Zhandarev, an anchorman for the shows Interesnoe 
Kino [Interesting movie] and Bez Protokola [Without Protocol], has already been 
mentioned in Chapter 3. He believed that this was an action against the policy of the TV 
channel. He said, "During the attack I heard: 'You have annoyed some people by your 
show and they "ordered" you. t11362 
The following examples refer to more serious crime against journalists such as 
conspiracy to kill. On 6 December 2000, Maya Shekina, the General Director of the 
publishing company Dalpress in Vladivostok, was assaulted. Two unknown gangsters 
shot her when she and her bodyguard were leaving a lift on their way to office. Shekina 
and her bodyguard were seriously wounded. The gangsters managed to escape. 
Shekina had been appointed the General Director of Dalpress, 363 eventhough 
Nazdratenko, the governor of the Primorsky Kray, would have preferred to have his 
representative in the post instead of her. The promotion of Shekina was forced by 
Pulikovsky, the Representative of the Russian President. 
360 Asamov, A. (2003) "Brat za brata" [A brother backs a brother], Rosbalt, 17.11.2003. 361 Znatkevich, A. (2002) "Belarusian Journalists Jailed for Libel", Transition on Line, 26.06.2002. 362 "Telehumalist Ildar Zhandarev uveren chto ego 'zakazali... (Television reporter Ildar Zhandarev is sure 
that he was "ordered"], Strana. ru, 30.11.200 1, (URL 
http: //www. strana. ru/news/88987. html, consulted in October 2003). 363 It publishes 90 percent of the periodicals of the region. 
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It was reported that before her new appointment, while being the deputy to the 
General Director of the company, Shekina had been repeatedly threatened by unknown 
people. They wanted her to quit the job. One year before, someone had put an explosive 
devise by the door of her apartment. A few days before the assault, she once more had 
been asked to resign from the top post of Dalpressa. Some local reporters linked her 
assassination to the fact that the publishing company published some of the newspapers 
and journals that opposed the policy of the Administration of the region. 364 
Furthermore, there were a few assaults on the employees of Independent Media 365 
in Moscow. On 24 January 2001, Vladislav Maximov, a deputy editor of Vedomosti, a 
daily published by this company in cooperation with The Wall Street Journal and the 
Financial Times, was stabbed and seriously wounded next to the tube station Dinamo. 
Another man, Maxim Maslakov, the editor of the Russian edition of Playboy, was shot 
and injured by an unknown attacker in the parking area in front of the magazine's 
headquarters in the middle of March. Fortunately, Maslakov was shot with buckshot and 
no vital organs were damaged. It was unclear what had caused the assault. A witness said 
that the assailant had said nothing before firing. 366 
On 6 February 2002, Sergey Leybgrad, the editor-in-chief of the radio Ekho 
Moskvi v Samare [Moscow's Echo in Samara] and an anchorman of a show on a local 
television channel, was attacked and beaten by two criminals. On 28 February 2002, in 
broad daylight in the view of many witnesses, Marina Popova, a local correspondent of 
the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets, was attacked and seriously wounded by two men in 
Vladivostok. She believed that this was caused by her stories on illegal business and 
prostitution. 367 
364 "Kto 'zakazal' izdatelia? " [Who "ordered" a publisher? ], Utro. ru, 6.12.2000, (URL 
http: //www. utro. ru/articles/accidents/2000/12/06/200012060036105157. shtml? 2000/12/06, consulted in 
December 2000). 
365 Independent Media is the parent company of The Moscow Times. In addition to Playboy, Independent 
Media publishes the Russian editions of glossy magazines such as Cosmopolitan, Men's Health, Good 
Housekeeping, and some others. 366 "Russian Playboy Editor Shof', The Moscow Times, (URL 
http: //www. themoscowtimes. com/stories/2001/03/15/017. html, consulted in March 2001). 367 "Vo Vladivostoke izbili korrespondenta Moskovskogo Komsomoltsa" [A correspondent of Moskovsky 
Komsomolets is beaten in Vladivostok], Pravda. ru, 3.01.2002, (URL 
http: //pravda. ni/moscow/2002/03/01/37706. html, consulted in April 2002). 
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On II March 2002, Sergey Zolovkin, a journalist for the newspaper Novaia 
Gazeta, was assaulted in Adler. A man shot Zolovkin twice but did not hurt him. 
Zolovkin had a gun and managed to hold the attacker and to bring him to a police station. 
In Novaia Gazeta, Zolovkin published his journalistic investigations on corruption in 
Krasnodar, including the case of Ruben Grigoryan, who was charged with the attack on 
Elu Kondratjuk, "Miss Sochi", a beauty from the major Russian resort Sochi. 
It should be noticed that it was not the first violence against Zolovkin and the 
members of his family. Some unknown gangsters had badly beaten the brother of 
Zolovkin's wife during his trip from Sochi to Adler, that caused his hospitalisation with a 
diagnosis of a possible fracture of spinal bones. Zolovkin himself had been repeatedly 
threatened by telephone calls and advised to stop publishing his investigative stories. 368 
On 18 March 2002, Vladimir Kuznetsov, a St. Petersburg journalist, was severely 
beaten. As a result of the attack, he was hospitalised with serious injuries. It should be 
noted that Kuznetsov was one of the major witnesses in Shevchenko's case on extortion 
and his statement allowed the court to convict Shevchenko. 369 
On 30 March 2002, a group of youngsters beat Sergey Topchiy, the chief editor of 
the newspaper Sertovolo and Okrestnostl [Sertovolo and neighborhood). The gangsters 
had asked him to come out of his house and when he did so they beat him with sticks. As 
a result of this beating, Topchiy was hospitalised with brain concussion. 370 
On 17 April 2002, Anatoly Ezhelev, the editor-in-chief of the magazine Terra 
Incognita, was attacked, injured, and robbed by unknown people. Ezhelev is one of the 
most well-known journalists in St. Petersburg. He was the head of the Union of St. 
Petersburg Journalists and one of the founders of the leading St. Petersburg newspaper 
Chas Pik [Rush Hour]. 371 
368 "Jurnalist Novoy Gazed dostavil svoego killera v militsiW' [A journalist for Novaia Gazeta brough his 
killer to the police station], Russian Courier, 13.03.2002, (URL 
http: //www. russiancourier. com/news/2002/03/13/4919/, consulted in October 2003). 369 Lenpravda. ru, 19.03.2002. 370 
"Jurnalist iz doma. vishel, na. nego napala 'krisha... [A journalist left his house and was attacked by a 
.. roof'], The Court ofthe Russian Federation, Obzor deyatelnosti arbitrazhnikh sudov v SMI, 25.04.2002, 
(URLhttp: //www. garweb. ru/project/vas/news/smi/02/04/20020425/2247268. htm, consulted in September 
2003). 
371 Reported by Pressing. spb. ru. 
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On 14 June 2002, German Galkin, the deputy to the editor-in-chief of the 
newspaper Vecherny Chelyabinsk (and a correspondent of the newspaper Kommersant) 
was badly beaten. In his articles, Galkin criticized the administration of the Chelyabinsk 
Oblast (a big Russian borough) and Peter Sumin, its governor. According to Oleg 
Grachev, the editor-in-chief of the Vecherny Chelyabinsk, Chelyabinsk's major 
newspaper, the last story investigated by Galkin was about the holidays taken by some 
VIP of the Chelyabinsk oblast. For example, he obtained a letter sent by Konstantin 
Bochkarev, the CEO of governor Sumin, to the American Consulate in Yekaterinburg. 
This letter was on behalf of seven of Chelyabinsk's residents who were awarded with 
holidays to the USA paid from the budget of the Chelyabinsk Oblast because of their 
"good work achievements. " Galkin discovered that these people worked for a protection 
company and were Sumin's bodyguards. 
Galkin's wife, Ekaterina, revealed some details of the attack. She said that while 
Galkin was opening the door of their house, a robust man punched him in the face 
silently. Then another man joined the first one in the beating. When the neighbours heard 
Galkin's cries and turned up, the gangsters run away. As a result of this incident, Galkin 
was hospitalised with heavy bruises and brain concussion, his face badly injured, his eye 
bleeding. 
The Prosecutor's Office opened an investigation into that incident and questioned 
its witnesses, including Galkin himself. Galkin said afterwards: 
I was questioned who might have been interested in beating me and I replied that it maybe Andrey 
Kosilov, the first vice-governor of the oblast. Vecherny Chelyabinsk, where I am coordinating the 
work of economic and political departments, have recently published many stories which might 
have encouraged someone to make me silent: I have written much on misuses of the billions of 
rubles from the budget, and about other cases of corruption in the administration. A couple of 
weeks ago, Kosilov publicly demanded me to stop publishing unfavourable stories about some 
people of the administration. 372 
372 4. V Chelyabinske zhestoko izbit izvestniyjournalist German Galkin" [German Galkin, a well-known joumalist, is severely beaten in Chelyabinsk], UralPolit. ru, 17.06.02. 
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An attempt to kill Maksim Tkachev, the chairman of the Directors Board of the 
advertising agency News Outdoor, 373 took place on 4 June 2002. Fortunately, he was just 
slightly injured. According to media reports, Tkachev was approaching one of the offices 
of that firm when a gangster appeared behind him and let off two shots. Fortunately, the 
wounds caused by that shooting happened to be not all that serious, Tkachev managed to 
take up his mobile phone and to call the police. He was immediately hospitalised. 
Investigators believed that the incident was connected with a new split within the 
advertising market in Moscow. It was widely known about a tender on all advertising in 
the Moscow Metro, which was scheduled for the middle of June. The annual profit of the 
winner of the tender was expected to reach US$ 20 million and many companies would 
have been interested in taking out one of the strongest competitors. 
There is another version of that assault. Reportedly, there had been a conflict with 
an advertising firm, which had bought the licence for placing standard advertising stands 
(3x6 m) but chose to place larger advertising stands (4x8 m) there. Tkachev had been 
very annoyed by such an action of that firm and even posted a complaint to Yury 
Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, a few days before the incident. Also, Tkachev had 
continuously arguing with Kanevsky, the director of the advertising agency Aton, who 
was assassinated in the February 2002. This case is examined in detail in the next section, 
which reviews killings of journalists. 374 
5.3. Z Murders ofjournalists 
Beating is not the most serious crime committed against journalists: many of them have 
been killed. According to the data of the Glasnost Defence Foundation, nineteen Russian 
journalists were murdered in 1996 and another fifteen in 1997. Other sources report that 
373 The company News Outdoor is the second biggest advertising company in Moscow which specialised on 
outdoor advertising and hold 12 per cent of the market. Annual turnover of the company was about $30 
million. 
374 Mediaallas, 06.06.2002. 
176 
fourteen journalists were killed during Putin's presidency. 375 This section aims to present 
some cases concerning the murder ofjoumalists that have happened over the last decade. 
Let us start with the killing of Dmitry Kholodov, the correspondent of the daily 
Moskovsky Komsomolets. 376 Dmitry Kholodov, 27, wrote a number of stories on the 
corruption within the Russian Army. He was acknowledged as a leading expert in this 
respect and invited to talk at the Parliament hearings on the corruption within the western 
group of the Soviet troops. However, he never managed to do so because he was killed by 
a bomb explosion. 
On 17 October 1994, Kholodov arrived at the editorial office with a case, which 
he had taken from a luggage locker in the Kazan train station. He had been told that there 
were some evidences on corruption. In the afternoon he went to the office of the deputy 
to the editor-in-chief, took a seat, opened the case, and was critically injured by the 
explosion caused by the bomb that was hidden in it. According to medical reports, 
Kholodov was terribly shocked, lost a huge amount of blood, and died one hour later. 
Kholodov's last words were: "This should not have happened. " 
The Prosecutor's Office had investigated the murder of Kholodov for six years. 
Six officers of the Soviet army were charged with conspiracy to kill, including Pavel 
Popovsky, a colonel of MIA, Vladimir Morozov, the mayor, Alexander Soroka and 
Konstantin Mirzayants, Morozov's deputies, Alexander Kapuntsov, a security officer of a 
protection agency, and Konstantin Barkovsky, a businessman. The prosecutors claimed 
that this group was involved in the killing after Pavel Grachov, the defence Minister of 
Russia, had told them to "work out the things with Kholodov. ', 377 
Another nationwide known case was the killing of Vladislav Listev, the Director 
General of ORT, on I March 1995, which has been reviewed in detail in the previous 
chapter. Listev was appointed the Director General of ORT, the leading Russian TV 
channel and ordered to drop all advertising on the channel. A few days after, he was 
found shot dead in the doorway of his house. 
375 "Smertjournalista oslozhniaetpopitku opravdatperegibi Putina" [The death of the journalist 
complicates a justification of Putin's policy] Inopressa. ru, 20.07.2004, (A translation of Shmaman's article 
from New York Times, 13.07.2004). 
376 The end of June 2002. 
377 URL http: //www. strana. ru/stories/00/1 1/14/149/134238. html, consulted in December 2000. 
177 
There were several assumptions on why and who might have killed him. The first 
explanation linked this murder to the lords of the Russian advertising market. Most 
people believed that Listev's decision to take away advertising from his channel was a 
move to enforce a better contract. However, it caused huge business losses for Lisovsky, 
the president of the company which was the monopoly wholesaler of advertising and had 
many contracts with advertisers. 
Berezovsky was among the people who might have been involved in the murder. 
Some witnesses revealed that Berezovsky had wanted to have Lesnevskaya, a supporter 
of his, in Listev's post and frequently had an argument with Listev. Also, it was 
suspicious that Berezovsky had left Moscow a few hours before the incident. 378 In turn, 
Berezovsky expressed his views on who might have murdered Listev. Berezovsky argued 
that Listev's killers were Korzhakov, the head of presidential bodyguards, and the 
Russian secret police. Berezovsky even asked President Yeltsin to intervene and sack 
Gennady Ponomarev, the Prosecutor of Moscow, and his deputy who investigated 
Listev's murder. 
Other killings ofjournalists have been less known but more numerous. For 
example, on 25 January 1996, Oleg Slabynko, who used to be the director of television at 
Ostankino, and the producer of the programme Moment Istini, 379 was assassinated. 
According to some reports, this killing was caused by the programme's plans to report on 
corruption in the Russian government. 380 
On 15 January 1999, Nikolay Lapin, the editor-in-chief of the local newspaper 
Obo Fsem [About everything], was murdered in Toliati, the city mostly known due to its 
car producing plant Avtovaz. It has been reported that a gangster approached Lapin, shot 
him, run to his car, and escaped. Lapin was hospitalised but lately lost his fight for life. 
On the same day, Alexey Eldashov, a correspondent of the newspaper Khabarovsky 
Express, was found dead in Khabarovsk. Investigators discovered that Eldashov had been 
suffocated and then stabbed. 
379 "Ustanovleni ubiytsi jurnalista Vlada Litseva" [Vlad Listev's killers are identified], Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta, 21.02.2002, (URL http: //news. ng. ru/2002/02/21/1014284197. html, consulted in February 2002). 379 Karaulov's program, to be reviewed in detail in Chapter 7. 380 McNair, B. (1996) "relevision in Post-Soviet Russia: From Monolith to Mafia", in Media, Culture & 
Society, Vol. 18, pp. 489499, p. 496. 
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On I February 1999, Yury Baldin, the cditor-in-chief of the television company 
Focus TV in Chelyabinsk was hospitalised with severe head injuries. He had parked his 
car and was on his way home when he was attacked. Baldin was in a coma for three days 
and never managed to recover. A similar incident happened in Kursk on 12 February 
1999. Vyacheslav Zvonarev, an editor of the independent elevision company Tact, was 
attacked, beaten, robbed, and strangled. He was found the following morning and the 
doctors were unable to save him. 
On 24 February 1999, Vadim Birukov, a deputy to the Director General of the 
publishing company Izdatelstvo Press Contact, one of the founders of the magazine 
Delovie Ludi [Business people] and a former reporter for the leading Russian news 
agency ITAR TASS, was assassinated in Moscow. His strangled corpse was found next 
day with extensive head injures, the mouth sealed by tape. Detectives reported that 
Birukov had been tortured before being murdered. 
On 4 March 1999, Antonina Lukina, the director of the TV channel Don, was run 
over by two cars while crossing a street in Voronezh, a city in the central part of Russia. 
The drivers of both cars escaped. Lukina was hospitalised but died soon afterwards. 
Vladimir Aliev, a correspondent of the Radio of the Republic of Cabardino- 
Balcaria, was attacked, robbed and killed by unknown gangsters in Nalchik, the capital 
city of the republic, at the end of March. He was found unconscious, his head severely 
wounded. Although Aliev was hospitalised, he never managed to recover. According to 
Aliev's co-workers, some people threatened him before his death. 
In March 1999, Nikolay Mozolin, a freelance journalist for the newspaper Noviy 
Peterburg [New Petersburg], was attacked in Kirovsk, a suburb of St. Petersburg. 
Although Mozolin had been a former police officer, he was badly injured, and died. The 
detectives believed that his murder had been caused by his stories on illegal child trade. 
Alexander Korkin, a publisher, was murdered by some unknown gangsters in 
Pereslavl-Zalesk (Yaroslav oblast) on 10 May 1999. Korkin was reportedly tortured 
before his death, the attackers broke his tooth and cut away his ear. 
At the end of June 1999, Munjuk Zhazhoyan, a reporter for the newspaper 
Russkaya Misl [Russian Mind], was knocked over by a car on Ncvsky Prospect in St. 
Petersburg and died in the hospital. The driver of the car has never been found. In his 
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newspaper, Zhazhoyan had monitored the development of Nikitin's case, in which the 
former Russian officer had been charged with spying. 
Valery Krivosheev, a correspondent of the daily Komsomolskaya Pravda, was 
killed in Lipetsk on 5 September 2002. On that day he had gone to an important meeting 
for his investigative stories and never come back. His co-workers believed that his 
murder was the result of his investigative reports on conflicts between several major 
enterprises in Lipetsk. 
Lidia Lazarenko, an editor of the newspaper Birzha Plus Svoy Dom [Stock 
Exchange Plus your House], was found dead in the waste area in Dzerzhinsk 
(Nizhegorodskaya Oblast) on 19 October 1999. The Prosecutor's Office of Dzerzhinsk 
launched a criminal investigation into her murder. 
On 12 May 2000, Igor Domnikov, a journalist for the newspaper Novaia Gazeta 
[The New Newspaper], was assassinated in Moscow. The gangsters hammered his head. 
Domnikov received medical treatment but died on 16 July. Dmitry Muratov, the chief 
editor of Novaia Gazeta, told the radio Ekho Moscow that it was a contract murder, but 
the gangsters most likely aimed to assassinate Oleg Sultanov, the executive of the 
investigative department of the newspaper, living in the same house, after the 
investigative department had published several stories about organised crime in 
Moscow. 391 
Sergey Novikov, the president of the independent radio Vesna [Spring], was 
assassinated in Smolensk on 26 July 2000. Although Novikov might have been killed 
because he ruled the board of the Pervomaysky Glass Plant, almost everyone was certain 
that his murder was caused by the radio show The Globes of the Smolensky Oblast which 
was aired on that day. On the show, Novikov and other j ournalists talked about a vice- 
governor of the Smolensky Oblast, who allegedly was the most corrupt official in the 
region. 382 
In October 1999, Oleg Chervonuk, a chairman of the firm The Baltic Press, and 
his brother were assassinated. Chervonuk was a prosperous businessman, a leader of 
media distribution market in St. Petersburg, and he tried to create a "civilised" market of 
381 Interview with Elena, a journalist for Novay Gazeta, London, August, 2003. 392 Reported by the Center for Journalism in Extreme Situations, (URL 
http: //www. cjes. ru/lib/prof 2000/4. shtml, consulted in June 2001). 
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periodicals, which would be free from criminal influences. After Chervonuk's death, the 
press distribution market in St. Petersburg was reshaped. 383 
Toliati, the current capital of the Russia's car industry, proved to be one of the 
most dangerous places to live for investigative journalists. Five journalists were killed 
there between 2000 and 2002. None of the killers have been found. On 3 October 2000, 
Sergey Ivanov, the Director General of the channel Lada-TV was assassinated. A 
gangster shot him several times and escaped. 
Three weeks after, on 28 October 2000, Sergey Loginov, the editor-in-chief of the 
same channel, was found severely injured and unconscious at his dacha in a suburb of 
Toliati. According to the witnesses of the incident, Loginov, along with his wife and 
mother-in-law, arrived to the dacha and went to park his car in the garage. He drove his 
car inside, and was opening the gate when another car hit them and drove away quickly. 
Loginov fell into the garage hole and seriously injured his head. Relatives found Sergey a 
few minutes after the incident and he was hospitalised. 
The circumstances of the accident were unclear. A criminal investigation was not 
launched because the police did not believe that Loginov was hit. Nevertheless, the mass 
media in Toliati received a letter from an unknown the Council of Toliati's Editors. The 
letter recommended the media companies "to consider Loginov's traumas as a sad 
accident, to believe in doctor skills, and not to make quick assumptions. " 
Valeriy Ivanov, the editor of Tolyatinskoye Obozreniye and a member of the 
local Legislative Assembly, was assassinated next to his house on 30 April 2002. A 
gangster shot Ivanov eight times while he was boarding his car. Several people witnessed 
the murder, but the gangster managed to escape. The Prosecutor Office opened a criminal 
investigation into Ivanov's death. 384 Ivanov's colleagues and the prosecutor's office were 
certain that Ivanov's death had been caused by his reports on local organised crime, 
official corruption and drug trafficking. 
Valery Ivanov was the first journalist in the region who investigated organised 
crime in Toliati. He established the newspaper Toliatinskoe Obozrenie [Toliati's Review] 
in 1996. That newspaper published stories on the local elite and on gangster wars around 
383 "Ubiystvo Olega Chervonuoka: slishkom mnogo versiy" [Oleg Chervonuok's murder: there are too 
many explanations], Vash Tayniy Sovetnik, No. 11. 384 "Russia: Newspaper editor killed", IFFX Communique, II- 19,14.05.2002, (URL http: //www. cpj. org). 
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Avtovaz. The newspaper had connections with law enforcement agencies and even 
presented awards for several police officers. One of the most well-known corruption 
stories written by Ivanov was his report on some illegal financial transactions of Sergey 
385 Zhitkin, the former mayor of Toliati. 
Vladimir Suprun, the head of UVD (the Department of the Interior) claimed that 
Ivanov was targeted because of his investigative stories. Evgeniy Novozhilov, the 
prosecutor of Toliati said: "There have been published many stories about Toliati's 
organised crime in the Toliati Obozrenie over last three months. Also, there have been 
reports that might offend one influential man. I will not tell you his name right now, he is 
not a criminal character, but he is very wealthy. 086 
It was possible to assume who was this anonymous rich man because Nikolay 
Utkin, the mayor of Toliati, did not attend Ivanov's funeral. He did not even send a 
telegram of condolences. He and his friend Nikolay Abramov were making a holiday 
abroad at that time. According to Alexey Sidorov, Ivanov's deputy, Abramov phoned to 
the editorial office of the newspaper and intimidate them after Toliati's Obozrenie had 
published stories on money laundering by the municipal enterprise headed by Oleg 
Abramov, the son of Nikolay Abrainov. 
However, that was not the only possible explanation. Zhilkin, the fortner mayor of 
Toliati, might have been linked to the murder because of Ivanov's earlier investigation. 
Also, some time before his death, Ivanov had been threatened by local criminal avtoriteti 
Igor Sirotenko (nickname Sirota) and Suleyman Akhmadov (Suleyman-Chechen, BeBe), 
the lords of the Chechen gang. Sidorov said, "Many people knew about Ivanov's conflict 
with the Chechens and Sirota. They were aware that Ivanov would never compromise 
with them, and might have decided to kill him 
.,, 
387 Nevertheless, Ivanov's co-workers 
doubted that the prosecutor's office would manage to find the killers of Ivanov. 388 
Chechens and Sirota were not imprisoned and their business continued. 
385 'T Samarskoy oblasti zastrelen glavniy redactor gazetia Toliatinskoe obozrenie" [The editor-in-chief of 
Toliatinskoe Obozrenie is shot dead in Samarskaia Oblast], Ntvruxom, 30.04.2002, (URL 
http: //www. ntvru. com/crime/3OApr2OO2/killing. html, consulted in May 2002). 
386 Kommersant-Daily, 6.05.2002. 
397 Kommersant-Daily, 6.05.2002. 
388 It is interesting to note that Ivanov himself had been charged with defamation by the prosecutor's office 
one year before this event. 
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Many killings ofjournalists took place in other Russian regions. Oleg Polukeev, 
the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Moskovsky Predprinimatel [Moscow Entrepreneur] 
was attacked and robbed next to the tube station Altufevskaya in Moscow on 12 April 
2000. According to the Independent Newspaper, Polukeev was also a correspondent of 
Stroitelnaya Gazeta [Construction Newspaper], of the newspaper Business and Banks, of 
the magazine Moya Moskva [My Moscow], and the editor of the department on the 
economic issues in Nezavisimaia Gazeta [Independent Newspaper]. Although Polukeev 
was hospitalised, he died on 17 April. 
The body of Nikolay Kolesov, a journalist for the local newspaper Revdinsky 
Rabochiy [The Worker of Revdin], was found in his flat on 19 July 2000. It was a rather 
curious murder. Although it was evident that he had been stabbed, the door and windows 
of his flat were locked from inside. The detectives did not find any evidence that anything 
had been stolen from the house. 
Oleg Goryansky, 32, the reporter for the local TV channel Provintcia [The 
Countryside], disappeared in Cherepovets in September 2000. At the beginning of 
September, the channel Provintcia asked Goryanksy to write a story regarding drug trade 
in Cherepovets. Nobody has seen him in the editorial office since then. 
At the beginning of October, Goryansky's landlord phoned to the editorial office 
and asked to pick up Goryansky's belongings. That phone call made the editors of the 
channel inform the police about Goryansky's disappearance. In the middle of October, 
the police finally identified a severely beaten and unconscious man brought to a hospital 
in Cherepovets as Goryansky. However, the doctors were unable to save him and he died 
on 20 October. 
Georgiy Garibian, 3 9, the anchorman of the show Actualniy Reportazh [Urgent 
Talk] of the television Park, was murdered on 18 October 2000 in Rostov-na-Dony. In his 
show he reported about extraordinary events in the city. The ultimate reason of the 
murder has not been found. 
The body of Pavel Asaulchenko, an operator of state company Austria Radio and 
Television, was discovered on the stairs of his home in Moscow on 20 November. The 
medical examination showed that he was knifed. In this case, the detectives managed to 
identify who ordered and committed this killing. They accused Mikhail Shuvmun, 42, 
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from town Chekhov, of this murder and arrested him. He latter admitted that an unknown 
person had ordered him and Alexey Chupin, 19, from Serphukhovo district of Moscow, 
to kill Asaulchenko, and paid US$ 5,000. 
Valeriy Kondakov, a photojournalist, was murdered in Armavir, a town in the 
Krasnodar Kray. He participated in an election campaign and made several photos of the 
houses of the local political elite. They were published in an Annavir newspaper just 
before the election. The magnificent homes of some of the pretendents could divert poor 
people (a considerable part of the electorate) from voting for them. Apparently, the 
publication of these pictures displeased some powerful actors, and they ordered to punish 
Kondakov. 
According to reports, some gangsters attacked Kondakov next to the dormitory 
where he lived. Nobody was brave enough to stop the beating and to help Kondakov. 
Bleeding, he managed to phone to the police from the front desk of the dormitory. 
However, the gangsters entered the dormitory and killed him. Although this case caused 
serious protests in the town, the administration and law enforcement agencies of the town 
apparently were not especially interested in finding the criminals who committed the 
murder. The killers of Kondakov have never been found. 389 
Sergey Kalinovsky, the editor-in-chief of the daily Moskovsky Komsomolets and 
the radio MK- Smolensk, disappeared in Smolensk on 14 December 2001. Kalinovsky 
was the anchorman of the show Bodry Vecher [Fresh Evening] at the radio ST and the 
news programme Smolensky Nedelka [Smolensky's week] on the TV channel SCS. The 
most important of all, Kalinovsky was the anchorman of the show Kriminarium [Criminal 
News] on the channel TV-30. This show presented criminal news, covered conflicts 
between law enforcement agencies and bandits, and reported on contract killings. Some 
Kalinovsky's stories about crime and corruption in Smolensk had been published in the 
daily Moskovsky Komsomolets. Kalinovsky's colleagues were certain that he was targeted 
because of his reports. 390 
Kalinovsky had already been involved in an accident. At the end of March 200 1, 
his flat caught fire. Although many people believed that it could have been the result of 
3'9 Reported by the Centre ofJournalism in Extreme Situations, 03.02.200 1, (URL 
http: //www. cjes. ru/lib/Prof 2000/4. shtrffl, consulted in March 2001). 
390 IFFXCommunique, 11 19,14.05.2002. 
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his reports, the police did not find any evidence of arson. 39 1 The outcome of 'the following 
incident was much worse. On 14 December 2001, Kalinovsky and a guest, who turned in 
Kalinovsky's house, went to a shop Okean [Ocean]. Even though this shop was not far 
away from Kalinovsky's house, nobody saw Kalinovsky since that time. The 
investigation launched in this regard had not yielded any result until his body was 
discovered outside Smolensk on I April 2002. Detectives found numerous wounds on the 
corpse and confirmed that he was killed. 
Furthermore, in March 2002, Natalia Skryl, a reporter for the newspaper Nashe 
Vremia [Our Time], was murdered near her home in Rostov-na-Don. Nashe Vremia's 
editor-in-chief said that her killing most likely was caused by her investigations into the 
business of several large local companies. 392 
Alexander Plotnikov, one of the owners of the biggest advertising newspaper 
Gostiny Dvor [The Guests' Yard], was assassinated on 21 May 2002. His corpse was 
found by the police at his dacha in Tumen. His death was caused by a shot in the head. 
He was apparently killed by the other owners of the newspaper in an attempt to push him 
away from the business. It was known that they had transferred all assets of the 
newspaper Gostiny Dvor to the firms beyond of Plotnikov's control and launched the 
bankruptcy procedure. Plotnikov brought his partners to the court and won the case, but 
when he was trying to return to his office with the court officers on 17 May, he was not 
allowed to go in. Plotnikov planned to repeat his attempt at the end of May but was 
murdered. 393 
On 25 June 2002, Oleg Sedinko, an owner of the TV company Novaia Volna [A 
New Wave], was assassinated in Vladivostok. His death was caused by the explosion of a 
bomb hidden in the entrance of his home. The bomb had been so skillfully concealed that 
Sedinko's bodyguard did not find it during checking out the entrance before the arrival of 
his patron. When Sedinko, along with the bodyguard, came in, he was shattered in pieces 
391 "Propavshiy bez vesti redactor 'MK v Smolenske' nayden mertvirn" [The missing editor of MK in 
Smolensk is found dead], Ntvru. com, 1.04.2002, (URL 
http: //www. ntvru. com/crime/0 I Apr2OO2/kalin_sky. html, consulted in June, 2003). 392 IFFXCommunique, 11-19,14.05.2002. 
393 Newsletter of the Mediaadds, 22.05.2002. 
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by the explosion. According to reports, it was even impossible to officially identify the 
corpse. 394 
Even foreign journalists can become an object of assassination in Russia. 
For example, Hartmut Shults, a photo reporter from Germany, was allegedly killed on 14 
March 2000. He had arrived in Kaliningrad a few days before his death and rented a long- 
term accommodation. The landlord founded his strangled corpse on 16 March. 
Apparently, it was not a result of a robbery because his car was still parked nearby and 
nothing had been stolen from the house. Five months later, on 21 September 2000, 
Iskandar Khatlony, the reporter for the radio BBC and the radio Svoboda in Tadzhikistan, 
was found seriously injured nearby the underground station Rechnoy Vokzal in Moscow. 
He died in hospital soon afterwards. 
Murders of journalists take place not only in Russia but also in many other 
countries of the former Soviet Union. The killing of Geogre Gongadze, publisher of the 
Internet journal Ukrainska Pravda (www. pravda. com. ua) in Ukraine, is an example. 
Gongadze had disappeared on 16 September 2000 and his corpse was later found 
headless in a suburb of Kiev. 395 
It was known that Gongadze investigated corruption in the Ukraine's government. 
In September 1999, a few days before Ukraine's presidential elections, he asked 
President Leonid Kuchma in a television show why the Ukrainian Ministry of the Interior 
never caught former prime minister Pavlo Lazarenko, who had been involved in multi- 
million dollar corruption scandals on gas trading in 1995-97 and was waiting a trial in an 
American custody, charged with money-laundering. 396 
394 "Pri vzrive bombi vo Vladivostoke pogib uchreditel telekompanie' [A founder of a TV company was 
killed by a bomb explosion], Ntvru. com, 25.06.2002, (URL 
http: //ntviu-coni/crime/25Jun2OO2/sedinko. html, consulted in June, 2002). 395 For example, URL http: //media. gn. apc. org/gongadze/, consulted in June 2001. 396 The energy sector, particularly the gas industry, remains the biggest feeding-trough for corrupt business. 
The biggest gas scandal of all began with an industrial slump in the early and mid- I 990s as Ukraine 
plunged into a vicious cycle of debt and barter payments. In 1995, when Western advisers were feeding a 
mania for privatisation in the Soviet republics, the business of importing, trading and distributing Russian 
gas was handed to traders, who needed licences and import quotas from the state. The state granted larger 
import quotas to gas traders it liked, assigning them solvent customers. Traders made money by paying 
producers, mostly Gazprorn of Russia, far less than they themselves collected. 
Three trading companies dominated the market: United Energy Systems of Ukraine (UESU), 
Interhaz, and Itera-Ukraina, the Ukrainian subsidiary of a much larger Russian gas trader. 
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Gongadze wanted to find out why Kuchma gave awards to some heads officers of 
the Ministry shortly after Lazarenko's had left Ukraine, if they had failed to discover his 
crimes? Or, if the Ministry had known about this, why did not it arrest Lazarenko? 
Gongadze asked Kuchma: "Your [security] ministers messed up. Millions of dollars went 
abroad. And now you're giving them medals? " The president reportedly scowled with the 
answer and asked Gongadze's name. 
Two months after Gongadze's murder, Mykola Melnychenko, a former Kuchma's 
bodyguard, left the country and revealed audio tapes, recorded from a microphone hidden 
in the president's couch. On these tapes, it was possible to hear that two people were 
discussing the need to sort out the case with Gongadze. As their voices were similar to 
those of the president and his interior minister, it triggered a political scandal. Although 
Kuchma remained in office, most Ukrainians believed that Gongadze was murdered 
because of his questions. 
The killing of Gongadze was not the only crime against j ournalists in Ukraine. 
Jean-Christophe Menet, a Reporters Sans Fronti6res representative, noted that, in fact, 
Gongadze was the thirteenth of the Ukrainian journalists killed in five years 
. 
397 This list 
includes Igor Alexandrov, the Director General of the television station TOR, who was 
attacked and beaten to death on 3 July 2000. He published stories on corrupt links 
between politicians, police officers and businessmen in eastern Ukraine. Oleg Breus, a 
founder of the newspaper XY Vek, was assassinated on the same day. One week after, 
Oleg Velychko, the head of a Ukraine media group, was attacked and seriously 
wounded. 398 
Pavlo Lazarenko, who was energy minister in the early 1990s and prime minister in 1996-97, helped these 
companies get rich. The most successful gas trader, UESU, was given exclusive contracts to supply gas to 
most of Ukraine's eastern industrial heartland and grew rapidly to notch up a$ 10 billion annual turnover. 
In December 1998, Lazarenko 
- 
who was heading a movement against Kuchma 
- 
fled to Switzerland after 
Ukrainian officials accused him of siphoning millions of dollars of public money into Swiss bank accounts. 
Swiss authorities arrested him but he posted bail and skipped the country, resurfacing in the US three 
months later. 
He has since been arrested and is in jail awaiting trial on money-laundering charges in the US. He 
has been convicted in absentia by a Geneva court for money laundering in Switzerland and faces 
extradition proceedings to return him to Ukraine (reported by Simon Pirani). 397 "Don't forget murdered journalists", Freelance, November, 2001, (URL 
http: //mcdia. gn. apc. org/fl/O III gong. html, consulted in July 2003). 398 pirani, S. (2001) "Practising journalism is lethal in the Ukraine, Gas, guns & Gongadze", Gemini News 
Servic, (URL http: //mcdia. gn. apc. org/gongadze/pirani. html, cosultcd in September 2003). 
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5.4. Other Difficulties 
5.4. L The Dangers of Following PowerfulActors 
Sometimes reporters can perish during routine trips and meetings. It was shown in the 
previous chapters that the boundary between businessmen, criminals and politicians in 
Russia is very vague, and the powerful groups in the country continue to use many illegal 
methods to fight one another. It means that the reporters interested in working with 
politicians are in risk of being injured or killed even while interviewing or convoying 
them. The death of General Alexander Lebed in a helicopter crash is an unfortunate 
example in this respect. 
General Lebed was a very remarkable and popular person in Russia. His farther, a 
factory worker, was sentenced to 12 years in the prison camps for showing up late at 
work twice. When he was a twelve-year-boy, Lebed became nearly a victim of the 
crushing of a strike in Novocherkassk, when over twenty people were shot dead. 
Later Lebed graduated with distinction from an elite military academy and fought 
during the war in Afghanistan. He proved a good soldier and was eventually appointed 
the commander of the Tula paratroop division, the elite division of the Red Army, which 
participated in the bloody suppression nationalistic protests in Baku and in Tbilisi before 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Lebed showed by his refuse to fire on the 
defenders of the Russian Parliament (the White House) in 1991 that he was not a blindly 
obedient soldier. 
Lebed began his political career by brokering an end to a separatist conflict in 
Transnistria, a breakaway region of Moldova. In 1995, when he was dismissed from the 
army because of his sharp criticisms of the Defence Minister of Russia, Lebed's 
reputation of being a hard man helps him to gather considerable political support among 
Russians who were fed up with the widespread corruption and violence in Russia. He 
claimed that the diversity of political parties in Russia did not help much to its 
development and looked to Chile as his ideal political model, arguing that General 
Pinochet had been able to revive Chile by "putting the army first" and "preserving the 
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anny as the basis for preserving the government. " He was, Lebed said proudly, a General, 
not a liberal. 
In 1996 presidential election, Lebed was third with 15 per cent of the vote. To 
increase his own chances to be re-elected, Yeltsin made Lebed the secretary of the 
Security Council. During a short time being in the office, Lebed managed to end the first 
Chechen War. However, soon Yeltsin accused Lebed of plotting a coup and sacked him. 
In 1998, Lebed was elected the Governor of Krasnoyarsky Kray, a region of 
Siberia four times the size of France. 399 Although this rich Russian region was known as 
being the Mecca of organised crime, Lebed seemed to have managed to establish himself 
as the leading powerful actor of the region. However, he died in a helicopter crash on 28 
April 2002. His helicopter is believed to have hit an electric pylon while trying to land at 
a large Siberian ski resort. Lebed was found alive at the scene of the crash, but died soon 
afterwards while being transported to the hospital. 400 
There have been a number of suggestions that enemies of the general might be 
behind the accident. It is known that Lebed had some conflicts with Bikov, reportedly a 
lord of organised crime in Krasnoyarsk. Alexei Arbatov, a member of the faction 
Yabloko in the Russian Duma, told the correspondents of ORT that "malicious intent" 
might have played a role, and that "Lebed had long been at the epicentre of a battle 
between various groups and interests in Krasnoyarsk, among them economic, 
administrative, criminal, and political. " Consequently, he had many rivals who might 
have wanted to get rid of Lebed before the coming governor elections. 401 
Berezovsky said that Lebed's enemies were most likely to be involved in the 
incident and he personally believed that Putin might have ordered to kill the general. 
According to Berezovsky, Lebed was a bright figure. Unfortunately, "In the dispute 
between the grey president-colonel and the bright general-govemor, the grey always 
399 Gardner, A. (2002) "Lebed", Transition On Line, 29.04-2002. 
400 "Kransoyartsi prostilis s Alexandrom Lebedený' [Citizens of Krasnoyarsk said the last "forgive us" to 
Alexander Lebed], Ntvru. com, 29.04.2002, (URL http: //www. ntvru. com/russia/29Apr2OO2/lebed. html, 
consulted in October 2003). 
401 Ntvru. com, 29.04.2002. 
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celebrates a victory. That is the essence of Russian history: the grey always wins by one 
or another way, " said Berezovsky. 402 
Let us note that there were quite a few people in the general's helicopter during 
that crash 
- 
Lebed's bodyguards, Nadezhda Kolba, his deputy on social issues, and 
Gennadiy Tonachev, the chairman of Committee on Tourism and Sport in the 
Krasnoyarsky Kray. Gennady Klimik, Lebed's press officer, also was on the board of the 
helicopter as well as several journalists. In this collusion seven out of nineteen people on 
board died while the others were seriously injured. Igor Gareev, a television reporter, 
journalists Natalya Pivovarova, Konstantin Stepanov and Emma Mamutova died in the 
crash while correspondent Stanislav and the deputy to the chief editor of the newspaper 
Krasnoyarsky Rabochiy [The Krasnoyarsky Worker]403 were seriously wounded 
. 
404 
5.4.2. EthicalIssues 
After this extended analysis of the dangers of being a journalist in Russia, another matter 
that can cause some problems for journalists writing on corruption and organised crime 
should be mentioned. This problem refers to ethical issues. Sometimes it is very difficult 
to assess the real involvement of a person in organised crime or corruption. Consequently, 
the correspondents are in continuous risk of blaming innocent people who might be 
deeply offended by the stories. Some of the authors of such stories might hold themselves 
responsible for causing such a sad outcome. The case of the St. Petersburg vice-governor 
Valery Malishev is an example among many. 
Almost all vice-governors of St. Petersburg have been charged with corruption 
since Putin became the President or Russia, and Malishev was one of them. In October 
402 "Chto sgubilo Alexandra Lebedia: tuman samonadeyanosti ili kozni serogo polkovnika" [What caused 
Alexander Lebed'death: the fog of self-confidence or the intrigues of a grey colonel], Lenta. ru, 
29.04.2002. 
403 "V Moskve nachalas tseremonia proshania s Alexandrom Lebedem" [Memorial service for Alexander 
Lebed has started in Moscow], Lenta. ru, 30.04.2002, (URL http: //www. lenta. ru/russia/2002/04/30/body/, 
consulted in March 2003). 
404 Another example is the death of Adam Khasanov, a Reuters camerman, in the accident, when Chechen 
Presiden Akhmad Kadyrov was assasinated in Grozny in May 2004 (Journalists and Media StaffKilled in 
2004: An IFJ Report on Media Casualties in the Field ofJournalism and Newsgatehring, p. 19). 
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2001 he was accused of corruption and tax evasion. After that, Malishev was temporarily 
dismissed, although he and his lawyers argued that this accusation was ridiculous. 405 
Malishev held high posts in the Soviet state and in the Communist Party. 
However, Sobchak, a democratically elected leader, invited Malishev (along with Putin) 
to work for his administration in 1993. Malishev worked in the St. Petersburg 
Administration for nine years. He was responsible for sport, tourism and transport. 
Malishev continued to work in the Administration even after Sobchak lost the mayoral 
election. Despite swearing to collectively resign if Sobchak did not win the election, 
Malishev (in contrast to Putin) accepted the invitation of Yakovlev, the new mayor, to 
continue working for the Administration of St. Petersburg. 
Malishev supervised the distribution of a huge amount of money (billions of 
American dollars) and was repeatedly accused of misdoing while financing the Good 
Will Games in 1994 and while organising a Party congress of Edinaia Rossia in May 
1999. Although Malishev was also suspected of being involved in several other criminal 
offences, nobody had been able to find anything compromising about him personally 
until he was charged by the Prosecutor's Office in October 2001. 
Because Malishcv was formally accused of only taking a low interest bank loan to 
build his dacha (a house outside the city) and of accepting a mobile phone Nokia as a gift, 
the charges surprised not only Malishev and his lawyers but also many other people. 
Although this could be regarded as corruption, it was such a common misdoing, that it 
was unclear why all the other members of the St. Petersburg Administration and the 
Russian government had not been charged together with Malishev. 406 
Several journalists decided to investigate Malishev's case and visited Malishev's 
dacha. They were surprised to find that this house was relatively modest for a "new 
Russian. " They estimated its cost as US$ 50,000 at most. Although this is a huge amount 
of money for the average Russian, there were plenty of houses ten times more expensive 
than Malishev's dacha in elite regions of St. Petersburg. According to neighbours, 
Malishev and his brother visited the house only in the evenings. For the rest of the time, 
403 "Vitse-gubemator bral, z1oupotreblial i ne platil nalogi" [Vice-govemor took bribes and did not pay tax], 
Kommersanf-SPb, 09.01.2002, (URL 
http: //www. lenpravda. ru/readingl. phtml? id=1592, consulted in January 2002). 406 "Posledniy vitse" (The last vice (-governor)], Novaia gazeta 
- 
SPb, 14.05.2002, (URL 
http: //www. lenpravda. ru/reading I. phtml? id=279 1, consulted in May 2002). 
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the house was inhabited only by their mother. The neighbours said they had respect for 
Malishev because he helped them a lot. 407 
After charging him, Malishev was soon hospitalised in the Cancer Research 
Institute in Pesochnoe (a suburb of St. Petersburg). He died on 7 May 2002, when he was 
only fifty-two years old. His funeral service took place in the Tavrichesky Palace. Similar 
respect had previously been given only to Sobchak, Dmitry Likhachev (a well-known 
Russian scholar), and Lev Zaykov (a member of the Soviet Government). The 
Tavrichesky Palace is thought to have been chosen in order to highlight the similarity 
between Malishev and Sobchak, who had also been persecuted and died. 
Let us make a long quote from a witnesses' report on Malishev's funeral: 
All the elite of St. Petersburg attended the memorial service in the Tavrichesky Palace. Although 
no ordinary people attended it [ 
... 
], it was the most sombre funeral service of all. In the dead 
silence Malishev's mother cried out through her tears: "Look what you have done! Why?! I am 
asking you, people! Why have you done this to him?! Has he stolen something from anybody? 
God, we lived as everyone else, and no richer! Then, why?! " The elite kept silence. The pale 
mayor of St. Petersburg, along with Antonov, Krotov, Kagan, Potekhina and Potekhin, stayed by 
the coffin. It was evident that he was very disappointed. 
The memorial ceremonial started. Yakovlev said just a few words. The main point of his 
speech was that "evil tongues are more dangerous than guns. " This idea was repeated by almost 
all of the speakers. One of them, lawyer Semen Kheyfetc, extended it by saying: "We are burying 
an innocent man. The detectives do not have any evidence to prove Malishev's guilt. He died an 
honest man. " 
After these words, both Irina Potekhina, a vice-deputy of St. Petersburg, and Varvara 
Vasilevna Malisheva cried. Everybody waited for what the deputy representative of the President 
of Russia in St. Petersburg would say. He said almost nothing, which perhaps was the best option 
in the situation. Yudin, who replaced Malishev in the Russian Duma, was the most laconic of all. 
He came to the microphone and said: "Forgive USr 408 
This media report demonstrates the attitude of partial guilt on the part of the 
media for Malishev's death. In fact, this case allowed some of the media companies in St. 
407 Zasorin, 0. (2002) "Sekretnaia vziatka Valeria Malisheva" [A secret Malishev's bribe], Vash Tayniy 
Sovetnik, No. 22. 
408 "Chto imeem-to khoronini" [We bury what we have], Izvesliya-SPb, 14.05.2002, Lenpravda. ru, (URL 
http: //www. lenpravda. ru/readingl. phtml? id=2792, consulted in August 2002). 
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Petersburg to blame others in speeding up Malishev's death. As it has been noted at the 
beginning of this chapter, one large St. Petersburg news agency even took another media 
organization to court for reporting stories about a possible involvement of the agency in 
Malishev's case. This example shows the importance of ethical issues amongst the 
difficulties faced by the media while reporting on corruption and organised crime. 
5.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has described dangers and difficulties of reporting on organised crime in 
Russia. I have reviewed the cases of threats, violence and crimes against journalists, 
including such serious crime as murder. In addition, the availability of legal action as a 
means of making life difficult for those who write and publish reports on organised crime 
and corruption has been shown. 
It has been pointed out that Russia continues to be one of the most dangerous 
regions for journalistic work. The third of the all murdered journalists have been killed in 
Russia. Russian law enforcement is not able or does not want to secure the safety of 
journalists. In average, only one out of twenty murders of reporters has been conclusively 
investigated. 409 
It has been proved that talks about difficulties and dangers of working for the 
mass media in Russia are based on evidence, especially with regards to the people writing 
on corruption and organised crime. There is significant risk for the people to be legally 
persecuted, to be injured or even killed during a journalistic investigation, after 
broadcasting (publishing) the stories, or simply while convoying the people who might be 
linked to or tackle against organised crime. 
In this chapter I argued that the Russian news media should take into account 
many possible obstacles, difficulties and dangers before making a decision to start its 
journalistic investigations and to publish stories on corruption and organised crime. Or, to 
put it in another way, the media should have very significant reasons to do so. 
409 Mass Media v Rossii Zakoni, Konflikti, Pravonarusheniya (Po Dannim Monitoringa Fonda Zashiti 
Glasnosti) [Mass media in Russia: Laws, conflicts, infringments (According to data by Glasnost Defense 
Fund)]. 
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Chapter 6 
Why the Russian Mass Media Reports on Organised Crime and 
Corruption 
The previous chapter has shown that organised crime stories may cause a lot of problems 
for the news media organisations which report them. The powerful actors can use various 
coercive methods in order to penalize journalists for negative stories about them. In spite 
of the above-mentioned difficulties, there are numerous reports on organised crime and 
corruption in the Russian media. The question arises why they take risk to report on 
organised crime and corruption. This chapter offers an explanation and argues that reports 
on organised crime and corruption reflect the changed role of the Russian mass media in 
the competition between power elites. It shows that the news media have become an 
important tool in a strategy of powerful actors. 
This chapter refers to the extent of democratic values in Russia and shows that 
democratic elections have become an essential part of the Russia's political system. All 
the governmental posts in Russia are now being filled through democratic elections. 
However, it is often very difficult for the electorate to distinguish between the candidates 
for any particular post because of significant similarity in their political slogans, and 
powerful groups need to use various practices in order to succeed in their political 
campaigns. 
This chapter points out that negative media coverage of political opponents is 
frequently regarded as a very efficient instrument of the pre-election campaign, which 
may give significant competitive advantages. Media reports about connections between 
the opponents and organised crime, or their involvement in corrupt practices, normally 
diminish the chances of the rivals. The belief of some politicians in the effectiveness and 
efficiency of this method make them use the mass media for this purpose, and many 
organised crime reports have been a part of these political campaigns. 
The first section attempts to prove the increased importance of the Russian mass 
media in intense political competition. Section 6.2. will review some examples of the use 
of the media in "information wars" (wars where information is used as a weapon). The 
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final section focuses on the use of organised crime and corruption stories in the 
information wars. 
Chapter 5 has shown that reporting on organised crime may cause a lot of 
problems for the media organisations. The lack of a clear definition of organised crime 
and corruption makes it difficult to prove links of any particular people or firms to 
organised crime. Investigative journalism is often very expensive. Also, it can be very 
dangerous because powerful actors can use numerous coercive practices and put 
pressures on the media organisations that publish or broadcast negative stories about 
them. Finally, inaccurate accusations of being involved in corrupt practices or to be 
linked to organised crime can heavily hurt the health of those in reports and even cause 
their death. 
Nevertheless, Russian TV channels, newspapers and news websites publish many 
stories about organised crime and corruption. No systematic research has been done so 
far, but to some extent the popularity of criminal stories in the media can be illustrated by 
a study of the content of stories aired by a St. Petersburg television channel in 1998-1999, 
results of which are summarised in Table 6.1. 
Table6.1 Topics and Reports of a St. Petersburg TV Channelfrom July 1998 to January 
1999 
X! Topics Frequency Per cent 
1 Criminal stories: Any criminal offences including political 
killings 
52 23.3 
2 Social issues: protest marches, strikes, crises, everything 
related to the social sphere 
39 17.5 
3 Issues related to national identity (55 Jubilee of the end of 
Leningrad's blockade, other national bank holidays, and so 
on) 
31 13.9 
4 Cultural events: Exhibitions, cultural festivals 30 13.5 
5 Holidays and festivals 18 8.1 
6 Technical achievements and catastrophes 15 6.7 
7 Politics: visits, speeches and appointments of prominent 
politicians, elections, governmental policies, political 
murders, and so on 
9 4.0 
8 Economic and financial issues 8 3.6 
9 Nature: Natural catastrophes 7 ý. i 
10 Entertai=ent 5 2.2 
11 Othe 9 4.0 
Total 223 100.0 
Source: Koltsova, Proizvodstvo Novostey: Tipi Vliyaniy na Rabotu Jurnalislov [News production: Types of 
influence on journalistic work]. 
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This table shows that criminal reports were the prevalent topic on this TV channel. 
Almost quarter of all reports referred to criminal topics. Although this table does not 
distinguish between crime and organised crime stories, a significant part of these reports 
were about organised crime and corruption. 
Why the Russian mass media reports organised crime and corruption? Why 
journalists forget about dangers of violence and expensive trials? The first possible 
answer is that the media seek to satisfy interests of the public, who like to read about 
organised crime and corruption. It probably is a valid hypothesis because the Russia's 
audience likes criminal topics. 4 10 Almost all leading Russian television channels 
broadcast crime serials such as Ulitci Razbitikh Fonarey [The Streets with Shattered 
Lanterns], Banditsky Peterburg4, Banditsky Peterburg-2, Banditsky Peterburg-3, Menti 
[Cops], Dalnoboyshiki, Mesto Vstrechi lzmenit Nelzia [The place of meeting cannot be 
changed] and a number of others. The film Brat [Brother], which has been widely 
acclaimed as the best Russian film of the last five years, is also about organised crime. 
However, even the popularity of crime series can hardly explain why media 
organisations are ready to take serious risks. The major income of the media is not taken 
from subscription fees and, consequently, there is no direct need to satisfy the interest of 
consumers (audience). Furthermore, it is possible to find numerous examples that the 
management of some Russian media organisations did not try to meet audience's needs, 
but focused on their own. In other words, the argument about the needs of audience does 
not sound convincing enough. Why do some of the mass media companies gamble their 
money, reputation, the health and life of their personnel? This chapter suggests an answer 
to this question. 
6.1. The Involvement of the Russian Mass Media in the Space of 
Politics 
I shall argue that a possible explanation of the large number of reports about connections 
with organised crime could be found in the changed role of the Russian mass media. As it 
410 The reason of such popularity is not entirely clear, but it is not the task of this thesis to explore it. This 
may be a result of Stalin's policies that sentenced many citizens to prisons and labour camps, or the 
mentality of the Russian people. 
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has been pointed out in Chapter 1, the Soviet media was controlled by the Communist 
Party and the Soviet State. 41 1 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, independent media 
organisations encountered numerous problems. Little by little, they lost their 
independence and became an important mediator in the competition between power 
elites. In other words, they began playing a very important role in Russian politics. 
The dominance of the mass media in the space of politics in many other countries 
has already been noticed by researchers. 412 For example, Manuel Castells has noted that 
contemporary democracies rely heavily on the ability of political parties to mobilise the 
majority of votes. 413 In the informational age, the media, or at least the most credible of 
its outlets, is a very powerful instrument in election campaigns, which allows politicians 
to inform the public about their political programmes and persuade the citizens to vote for 
them. 
As a result, the role of the news media in many democracies is crucial and has 
forced political actors to organise political action around the media. Nowadays, political 
parties carefully plan their media campaigns and develop informational leakings in order 
to advance their competitive political advantages. In other words, the mass media is 
becoming the battleground where political groups try to undermine one another. 
Castells shows that the growing dominance of the media in the space of politics 
does not mean that the other methods of political competition have become of no 
importance. Demonstrations, mass gatherings and town meetings are essential for 
political campaigns in some countries. However, he has to admit that "without an active 
presence in the media, political proposal or candidates do not stand a chance of gathering 
,, 
414 broad support. 
The mass media play a very important role in European and American politics in 
spite of differences between the political structures of these countries. As far as the 
United States is concerned, it should be noted that there have been a number of changes 
in the political system and the media since the 1960s. The role of political parties has 
411 There are many interesting notes on the role of the media during the Soviet time in Dzirkals, L. (1982) 
The Media and Intra-Elite Communication in the USSR, Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation. 
412 For example, McNair, B. (2003) An Introduction to Political Communications. London: Routledge; 
Franklin, B. and Murphy, D. (1990) What News? The Market, Politics, and the Local Press. London, New 
York: Routledge. 
413 Castells, M. (1997) 7he Power of1dentity. Blackwell Publishers, p. 313. 414 Castells, Yhe Power of1dentity, p. 317. 
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decreased while political marketing has been becoming increasingly popular. Similarly, 
the role of the mass media has been changed both in terms of organisation and 
technology. Currently, the American mass media is a set of interconnected media 
organisations, components of which are functionally different. While newspapers are 
normally responsible for gathering news and elaborating on it, television disperses 
selected news to a broader audience. 415 
The new pattern of relations between the mass media and politics was rooted after 
John Kennedy won the presidential campaign because of his victory in televised debate 
with Nixon. 416 Current politics relies heavily on television and huge political advertising. 
In other words, debates around an event have become more important than the event 
itself. The reflection of politics in the media is more important than politics itself, and this 
increases the status of the mass media. 
Technology has only strengthened the role of the media in American politics by 
linking up in real time the mass media with political marketing. 417 The technology has 
increased the speed, spread and comprehensiveness of informational flows. Cable 
television allowed the media to focus on segrnents of the audience by decentralising and 
diversifying its services. 
Europe differs from the USA in many respects. Europe has a different political 
system, and European interrelation between the mass media and politics has its own 
features. European culture and tradition create a number of ethical barriers, which make 
an impact on the contents of European mass media and restrict the range of stories 
available for publishing and airing. 418 However, in terms of making an impact on the 
result of political bids, the mass media in Europeý19 are as important as in the USA. 420 
The growth of political importance of the mass media in Russia took place later 
than in the United State and Europe. During the Soviet period the Russian media was 
4 15 Friedland, L. (1996) "Electronic democracy and the new citizenship", Media, Culture, and Society, Vol. 
18, pp. 185-211. 
416 Jacobs, L. and Shapiro, R. (1995) "The rise of presidential polling: the Nixon White House in historical 
perspective"I Public Opinion Quarterly, No. 59, pp. 163-95. 
417 West, D. (1993) Air Wars: Television Advertising in Election Campaigns, 1952-1992. Washington 
DC: CQ Press. 
419 Castells, Yhe Power of1dentity, p. 324. 419 Semetko, H. and Schoenbach, K. (2003) "News and Election! ', Press lPolitics 8 (3) Summer, pp. 54-69. 420 Kaid, L. L, Holtz 
-Bacha, C. (eds) (1995) Political Advertising in Western Democracies. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
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controlled by the Communist Party. The growing political status of the mass media in 
Russia became visible only during Gorbachev's perestroika. 
The increased status of the mass media can be illustrated by the effect of 
Nevzorov's video report about the events in Riga, the capital city of Lithuania, in 1991. 
When supporters of Lithuanian independence went to the streets, the Soviet government 
decided to use the army in order to end the uprising. At the beginning of the events, the 
official Soviet Press did not report what happened in Riga. However, radio Echo Moskvi, 
which was the least dependent on the government, almost immediately aired news about 
these events. 
It should be noted that the government did not put pressure on the radio station 
Echo Moskvi. Instead, Alexander Nevzorov, who was a very popular journalist at that 
time, 421 moved to Riga and produced a video report, which was seen by many 
representatives of opposition as a pro-governmental attempt to hide the truth. 
While almost all of the independent media companies reported this event as the 
invasion of the Soviet troops into an independent Republic, Nevzorov showed it from a 
completely different point of view. His video report showed young Soviet soldiers who 
were left almost defenceless against wild crowds of Lithuanian rebels. Nevzorov 
portrayed the soldiers of Russian special troops (SOBR) as the heroes who choose to die 
from the bullets of enemies in their attempt to uphold the honour of their Fatherhood. 422 
Nevzorov's report was shown by Soviet television and welcomed by patriotic and 
nationalistic parties of the Soviet Union as well as by many common people. In any case, 
this report significantly diminished criticism towards the action of the Soviet government 
among a significant part of the population of Russia. Although the Soviet army left Riga 
soon afterwards, this example shows the awareness of the importance of media reports 
and their clever use by power elites (in this case, by pro-governmental forces). 
The further involvement of mass media in politics took place very rapidly and got 
closer to the western model. Russia first adopted the Western style political campaigns 
421 Nevzorov's career is reviewed in the last chapter of this thesis. 422 A very interesting description of the impression created by Nevzorov's video report is presented in the 
book by Dubov, Y. (2003) Bolshay Payka (Large share]. Moskva, Vagrius; Androunas, E. (1993) Soviet 
Media in Transition: Structural and Economic Alternatives. London: Praeger, p. 84. 
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based on the mass media in 1993. Three years later the mass media is believed to have 
played a crucial role in helping Yeltsin to be re-clected. 
Almost all elements of the western political model were used in Ycltsin's 
presidential campaign, including segmented propaganda and direct mailing. Russia's 
private and state TV channels launched a strong anti-Communist propaganda, which 
effectively undermined the chances of Ycltsin's major opponent Zuganov, the leader of 
the Communist Party, to end Yeltsin's presidency. 423 Yeltsin's advertising campaign was 
carefully planned by a foreign political consultant company. Yeltsin did not appear on 
television very often because it might have bored the Russian audience. Instead, political 
advertisements portrayed common people who revealed why they were Yeltsin's 
supporters. All advertisements ended with the words "I believe, I love, I hope", followed 
by Yeltsin's signature. 424 
The growing importance of the media in post-Soviet Russia can be indirectly 
illustrated by graduate employment records of the School of Journalism at St. Petersburg 
State University in the mid- I 990s. It should be noted that there was a very high 
unemployment rate in Russia. Graduates were one of the least secure groups in this 
respect. For example, only a fraction of the graduates of St. Petersburg State University 
(SPbSU) were able to find a job soon after graduation. 
In fact, those who were lucky in employment were the graduates of three schools: 
the School of Law (Putin's Alma Mater), the School of Economics (Kudrin, the current 
Russian Finance Minister, graduated from this school), and the School of Journalism. 
According to an administrator of the School of Journalism, not only were all of its 
graduates employed during the last year of study but also the number of vacancies 
exceeded the number of the graduates. 425 
The importance of the media became evident when Russian oligarchs started to 
form alliances in order to control nationwide TV channels. For example, in 1993, the 
Most-Bank, the bank Stolichniy-SBS and the bank National Credit established the first 
423 Oates, S. and Roselle, L. (2000) "Russian elections and TV news: Comparison of campaign news on 
tate-controlled and commercial television channels, The Harvard International Journal ofPresslPolitics, 
Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 30-5 1. 424 Observation, also reported in Castells, The Power ofIdentity, p. 326. 425 Interview with Shishkina, an Adminstrator of the School of Journalism, St. Petersburg, 1994. 
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Russian private TV company NTV 
. 
426 Another alliance, Consortium of Banks-ORT, was 
created in order to finance the nationwide TV channel ORT (Obshestvennoe Rossiyskoe 
Televidenie). Fifty-four per cent of ORT belonged to the Russian state, and 46 per cent 
was given to the alliance consisted of a group of influential bankers and businessmen, 
including Boris Berezovsky. 427 
The importance of the mass media in political communications can be proved by 
other kinds of evidence. 428 1 would like to show how significant the mass media is in 
Russia by a number of examples taken from the trial on Zakaev's extradition to Russia, 
which took place in London in 2003. Akhmed Zakaev, who used to be a commander of 
the Chechen rebels, was arrested by British authorities after Russia had charged him with 
a number of criminal offences, including the kidnapping of two Russian priests, one of 
whom was apparently killed, and the other was held for six months. Zakacv had also been 
charged with the torture of innocent people. 429 Zakaev's defence was sponsored by the 
Fund of Civil Liberties, which is financially supported by Berezovsky. 
Defence and prosecution invited numerous witnesses. As a matter of fact, the 
prosecutors, lawyers and witnesses repeatedly referred to media reports in order to prove 
Zakaev's guilt or innocence. 430 For example, while questioning priest Sergey, the lawyers 
pointed out several of priest Sergey's interviews to the Russian mass media. Priest Sergey 
was in the Chechen Republic in order to find one man who had disappeared. Sergey 
talked with Zakaev in this respect and stayed in his house. After Sergey left Zakaev's 
house, he was arrested by Chechen rebels, and he spotted one of Zakaev's bodyguards 
among the people who arrested him. Priest Sergey was held by rebels for almost six 
months before being released by the Russian army. He met Zakaev once after that, and 
426 Mukhin, A. (200 1) Bizness-Elita 1 Gosudarstvennaia Wast: Kto Hadeet Rossiey na Rubezhe Vek-ov [The 
bisiness elite and state power: Who owns Russia between the last centures]. Moskva: Izdatelstvo GNOM & 
D, p. 7. 
427 In a little while, the private stake was increased to 49 per cent, which was entirely bought by 
Berezovsky. 
428 For example, see Gerol, 1. and Molyneux, G. (1988) The Manipulators. Stoddart: Gemol Publications 
Ltd; Mickiewicz, Changing Channels: Television and the Strugglefor Power in Russia; McNair, Glasnost, 
perestroika and the Soviet media. 429 For example, he was accused of shooting out two fingers of Solovev, who worked as a driver for 
Russian military forces in Grozny. 430 Personal observation (here and in the following references it means that I was an eyewitness), also 
confirmed by publication on www. granLru (consulted in August 2003). 
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Zakaev seemed to be very surprised to see him and told Sergey that it was not his 
(Zakaev's) fault. 
Zakaev's lawyers tried to show that priest Sergey changed his words in the last 
interviews in order to satisfy the Russian Prosecutor's Office, which decided to arrest 
Zakaev after the hostage crisis in Moscow in November 2002. The lawyers argued that in 
the earlier interviews the priest apparently did not link Zakaev to his kidnapping. Then 
the lawyers referred to priest Sergey's last interview and his press conference, in which 
he claimed that Zakaev had been involved in his capture. 
Priest Sergey replied that he had never claimed whether Zakaev was involved in 
his kidnapping or not. He just presented facts, but the reporters modified his words in 
such a way as to satisfy their own understanding of what had happened. Priest Sergcy 
said that he spoke to the journalists very briefly, and they did not show him what they 
intended to publish. On the contrary, after he read these interviews, he even tried to 
persuade the media companies to announce that what they had published was incorrect. 431 
Solovev, another witness invited by the prosecution, was also asked about his 
exchange with the mass media. He claimed that he had been arrested by Chechen rebels 
because he worked as a driver for a military unit in Grozny, the capital city of the 
Chechen Republic, and Zakaev shoot out two of his fingers during interrogation. Lawyers 
tried to persuade the judge that Solovev just wanted to be portrayed by the media. The 
reason for this was the fact that video report in which Solovev accused Zakaev was 
broadcast by NTV. 
The lawyers argued that the Russian prosecutor's office in the Chechen Republic 
deliberately invited reporters from NTV in order to create a video report that would 
satisfy the Russian government. Solovev replied that the video report was filmed rather 
occasionally, because the reporters of NTV happened to be next to the Prosecutor's 
Office in the Chechen Republic, when he told the detectives about the incident. The 
reporters became interested in Solovev's evidence and decided to broadcast it. Solovev 
432 himself was not shown in the video report; only his speech was recorded 
. 
431 Interview with priest Sergey and his answers during the trial. 432 Personal observation during the trail, also confmned by publication on www. grani. ru (consulted in 
August 2003). 
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The questioning of another witness revealed another interesting fact of the 
involvement of the Russian mass media in political communications. The witness told the 
jury a story that had happened several months before Zakaev's trial. According to him, 
the Russian prosecutors forced him to give false evidence against Zakaev and invited 
reporters from NTV's programme Sovershenno Sekretno so that they filmed his evidence, 
which he gave because of an imminent threat to his life. 433 Although the witness was held 
in prison at that time, this video report was broadcast in order to mobilise negative public 
opinion towards Zakaev. 
It should be noted that many of the trial's other witnesses referred to media 
reports. For example, Kovalev, who used to be the head of the Department of Human 
Rights in the State Duma, indirectly illustrated the importance of mass media reports 
during his questioning. When he was asked whether he personally knew people who were 
mercilessly treated in Russian prisons, he noted several cases that had been reported by 
one or another news media organisation, rather than remembering any case from his own 
experience. 434 Another witness, Ribkin, the former chairman of the State Duma, also 
referred to reports by the media while being asked about his personal experience. 435 
In addition, almost all the witnesses of the trial were asked to comment on their 
interviews with the media about any particular events during the Chechen war. If any of 
the witnesses had not given any interview, they were asked why they had not expressed 
their opinion publicly. 436 
In conclusion of this section, it is worth mentioning that the boundary between 
political parties and the mass media in Russia sometimes disappears. For example, 
German Galkin, the deputy to the editor of the newspaper Vecherny Chelyabinsk, 437 is the 
head of the regional branch of the party Liberalnaya Rossia [Liberal Russia]. 438 The 
owner of this newspaper is Mikhail Yourcvich, a member of the Russian Duma, who is 
well-known due to his critics of the policies of President Putin. Galkin used to work for 
the newspaper Rabochaia Gazeta, which was controlled by another member of the 
433 Observation. 
434 Observation. 
43S Observation. 
436 Observation. 
437 One of the major newspapers of Chelyabinsk, a big industrial city in the centre of Russia. 438 Gurevich, A. (2003) Dela Deputatskie 
... 
Ugolovnie [Issues of the MP 
... 
Criminal Issues], Vozrozhdenie 
Urala, No. 22 (252), August, p. 1. 
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Russian Parliament, Berezovsky's supporter Golovlev, who co-ordinated privatisation in 
the Chelyabinsk Oblast and was killed in 2002. 
To sum up, the mass media has become an important instrument in political 
confrontation between Russian power elites. In the next section we shall discuss why the 
Russian mass media has become so important in the space of politics. 
6.2. Symbolic Power as the Major Asset of the Mass Media 
6. Z1. The Symbolic Method. An Introduction 
Vyacheslav Kuznetsov, a counsellor to the chairman of Gazprom, 439 when asked why 
Gazprorn invested or subsidised 29 television stations and newspapers in 1997, explained 
that the Russian mass media was involved in a fight between Russian financial moguls, 
similar to the struggle for power by such American magnates as John D. Rockefeller and 
J. P. Morgan. He said: "Gazprorn must be very careful about its image. That is why we 
have to work with the mass media. Not just work. We have to invest in them 
., 
440, MiS 
section explains why the image created by the mass media is very important, and why the 
most powerful Russian actors are ready to invest enormous sums of money in it. 
I shall argue that the power of the mass media is in its monopoly of the use of 
symbolic power. The symbolic method, which is based on symbolic power, has been 
introduced in Chapter 3. This describes different methods of influence on the content of 
media reports. The symbolic method was associated with the transmission of negative 
information regarding rival media corporations. However, it can be used not only against 
the mass media but also by the media itself against industrial, financial and political 
groups. 
The enormous importance and significance of the symbolic method is explained 
by the dominance of informational technologies in the contemporary world. The news 
media is a considerable part of the informational field and the symbolic method is the 
439 Rem Vyakhirev, a Russian oligarch. 
440 Hoffman, D. (1997) "Powerful Few Rule Russian Mass Media", Washington Post, Foreign Service, 
31.03.1997, p. AO I. 
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main weapon of the mass media. It can be explained in more detail by referring to the 
Manuel Castells's concept of informational society. 441 
Castells argues that a new mode of production is becoming dominant. He calls 
this mode of production informational. The informational mode of production is based on 
the production of knowledge, informational technologies and symbolic 
communication. 442 The major feature of this mode of production is the impact of 
knowledge on the process of the production of knowledge. Castells points out that the 
difference is based on "the eventual realisation of the productivity potential contained in 
the mature industrial economy because of the shift toward a technological paradigm 
,, 
443 based on information technologies. 
According to Castells, the sectors of national economies that deal with 
informational technologies are gradually becoming dominant. These sectors are finance, 
telecommunications and the media. It should be noticed that these sectors are important 
not only for national economies. They are also vital for the global economy. Castells 
argues that the contemporary world economy is not only the informational economy but 
also a global one. In his opinion, the global economy is "an economy with the capacity to 
work as a unit in real time on a planetary scale. ', 444 
However, the informational, global economy is not totally symmetric and 
integrated. There are numerous national industries that are not connected with the world 
economy. At present, there are only a few sectors that have international links, and, they 
are again finance, telecommunication and the mass media. Thus, these sectors are not 
only enormously important for national economies but also they join the parts of the 
world economy into the global system. 
In other words, the mass media is one of the main components of the 
informational economy, and this explains the increased status of the mass media in the 
contemporary world. There are a number of other factors that make an impact on the 
dominance of the mass media. The first of the factors has been indirectly noted by 
441 Kastels, M. (2000) Informatsionnaia Epokha, Economika, Obshestvo i Kultura [The Informational Age: 
Economy, Society and Culture]. Moskva: GU VShE. 442 Ibid., p. 39 
443 Castells, M. (1996) Yhe Informational Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Vol. 1, Yhe Rise of the 
Network Society, Blackwell Publishers, p. 9 1. 444 Ibid., p. 92 
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Castells when he points out that the informational economy is not only an information 
based one, but an economy which is embedded into cultural and social systems. 445 It is 
clear that the mass media is the major bridge between the informational economy and 
national socio-cultural institutions. 
In my opinion, another factor explaining the special position of the mass media in 
some countries is connected with the fact that any information (or media message) can be 
broken into two principal components. One of the components is an unbiased description 
of an event. Ideally, it describes what has happened without any subjective comments. 
That is the main component of any media report, especially of the Anglo-American mass 
media that aims to present events as objectively as possible. 446 
The second component is a remarkably less visible yet apparently unavoidable 
part of any media message. Any media message can hardly avoid assessing events in 
terms of goodness or badness. Negative or positive attitudes towards a particular event 
reflect its author's viewpoint or the preferences of the editors of the media company, 
which publishes or broadcasts it. Which component (informational or symbolic) is more 
presented in the content of media messages, and how the symbolic component is used in 
the media reports depend on many factors, especially on cultural, social, economic and 
political ones. The more a particular media company is biased in its political preferences, 
the more symbolically engaged are its reports. Some factors that may twist the objectivity 
of media messages have been noted in Chapter 3. 
This thesis refers to the informational component that directly or indirectly 
reflects opinions, ideas and viewpoints as to the symbolic component. The skilful use of 
the symbolic component is a very powerful instrument in showing events in a particular 
light. Although the symbolic component is not frequently used in the contemporary 
Anglo-American mass media, it played an important role during the early period of 
Western democracies. Its importance was well understood by many politicians, and some 
of them acquired mass media companies in order to support their political campaigns. 447 
445 Ibid., p. 9 1. 
446 Chalaby, J. (1998)An Invention ofJournalism. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press. 447 Chalaby, J. (1997) "No ordinary press owners 
- 
press barons as a Weberian ideal type". in Media, 
Culture and Society, Vol. 19, pp. 621-64 1. 
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The symbolic component is one of the main constituents of the "symbolic 
method", a new theoretical construct, which I shall try to describe in some detail in the 
final part of this section. Although it is a new concept, it is closely related to a number of 
important elements of political theory. Thus, the symbolic method is closely associated 
with the concepts of symbolic power, which have been suggested by John Thompson and 
Pierre Bourdieu. Thompson uses the term symbolicpower in order to describe "the 
capacity to influence actions and beliefs of others by means of the production and 
,, 
448 transmission of symbolic forms. Symbolic power is very important for political groups 
(especially in democratic societies), since their political success depends on their ability 
to persuade others and control events. 
Any power, however, needs agents and methods of exercising it. In my view, this 
important dimension has not been adequately developed, yet. Although Bourdieu used the 
notion of symbolic systems, which may be regarded as main vehicles of symbolic 
power, 449 he did not pay much attention to the methods. I am attempting to address this 
important issue by stating that the symbolic method, introduced in this chapter, is a 
means of exercising symbolic power. 
In order to define the symbolic method in more precise terms, the concept of 
symbolic capital, another very important construct of political communications, 
introduced by Bourdieu, 450 needs to be taken into account. Symbolic capital is "any type 
of capital (economic, cultural, and so on) that happened to be legitimised or prestigious in 
a particular field. "451 Although it may be associated with any field, symbolic capital is an 
essential asset of political success because it reflects the accumulated reputation, prestige 
and respect of political groups or individuals. 
As symbolic capital is important, anything that impacts the symbolic capital of a 
politician is naturally of particular importance for him. 452 Any blow to the reputation of a 
448 Thompson, J. (2000) Political Scandal, Power and Visibility in the Media Age, Polity, p. 98. 449 Bourdieu, P. (1990) Language and Symbolic Power. Cambridge: Polity Press, Chapter 7; Couldry, N. (2004) "Media meta-capital: Extending the range of Bourdieu's field theory", in D. Swartz and V. Zolberg (eds) After Bourdieu: Influence, Critique, Elaboration. London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, p. 177. 450 Bourdieu, P. (1984) Distinction: A Social Critique ofthe Judgement of Taste. Harvard University Press. 451 Bourdieu, P. (1986) "The Production of Belief. contribution to an economy of symbolic goods", in R. 
Collins at al. (eds) Media, Culture and Society: A Critical Reader. London: Sage, pp. 132,133, Bourdieu, 
P. Language and Symboic Power, p. 230. 452 Thompson, Political Scandal, Power and Visibility in the Media Age, p. 102. 
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politician affects his political career and even the prosperity of the political group to 
which he belongs, since it is likely to diminish his ability to gain wide public support, 
which is very important in democratic societies. 453 This is the ultimate purpose of the 
symbolic method. Consequently, the relationship between symbolic capital, symbolic 
power and symbolic method can be outlined by this definition: the symbolic method is a 
means of exercising symbolic power that aims to impact the symbolic capital of parties 
involved. 
The importance of symbolic capital for politicians has been realised for a long 
time. The entire industry, called public relations, has been developed with the purpose of 
managing social capital and mediating relations between politicians and the media. 454 
Public relations strategies aim to affect social capital by means of image engineering 
techniques and by manipulating media content. Public relations departments provide 
media organisations with symbolically engaged information that can be reported as news. 
Rodney Tiffen has outlined some characteristics and patterns of news through which 
press secretaries can influence news agenda, including fresh supply, completeness, brief 
formats, and drama content among others. 455 
Although communication between publicity strategists and the media are far from 
being straightforward and explicit, it is possible to identify two main principles of this 
relationship: 
1. a low proportion of PR material given to news organisations appears in the news 
and even less appears exactly as its promoters wanted; 
2. a large proportion of news is predominantly or partially the product of PR 
456 
efforts. 
The relationship between sources and journalists can be compared to a dance, in which, 
however, more often than not, the sources do the leading. 457 
453 This may explain why political scandals have been so widespread and effictively used by political 
o 
4pponents 
in recent years. 4 4 Public relations 
- 
media and information management tactics designed to ensure that a party receives 
maximum favorable publicity, and the minimum of negative (B. McNair's definition, from McNair, An 
Introduction to Political Communications, p. 7). 
455 Tiffen, News and Power, pp. 75,76 456 Tiffen, News and Power, p. 74 457 Gans, Deciding nat's News, p. 116. 
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It should be noted, that sometimes sources remain concealed. The unauthorised 
release of confidential information provided by concealed sources is frequently defined as 
a leak. Leaks are a very frequent form of supplying information to the media and they 
play an important role in contemporary politics. Another form of revealing discrete 
information is briefing. Background briefings differ from leaks by their semi-institutional 
nature, as they are normally given to a group ofjournalists rather than an individual 
reporter. 458 
Various pubic relations strategies, leaks and briefings can be used in numerous 
forms and varieties. Thus, the symbolic method includes not only the use of the symbolic 
component, which has been analysed earlier in this section. Damage to a political 
reputation can also be caused by political scandals, large media campaigns, and by a 
series of relatively minor blows, which step by step demolish the symbolic capital of the 
politician or politicians who are under media attack. The symbolic method encompasses 
all forms of disseminating information that targets the reputation of politicians, and some 
of its most popular forms are discussed in the next section. 
6. ZZ Political Scandal, Information Wars and other Forms of the Symbolic Method 
Let us start this section with an analysis of scandals. There are several definitions of 
scandal in academic studies. Thompson points out that "scandal" refers to "action or 
events involving certain kind of transgressions which become known to others and are 
sufficiently serious to elicit a public response. "459 Little by little, scandals become more 
closely associated with the mass media. In simple terms, political scandal is a media 
campaign which publicly criticises something that has been done by a politician which is 
considered to be unacceptable for a man involved in politics. 
Scandals as a mediated event have been happening in democratic societies since 
the eighteen century. Several factors why democratic societies are prone to scandal have 
been noticed by social researchers. First, democratic societies consist of many political 
458 Tiffen, News and Power, p. 97 
459 Ibid., p. 13. 
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parties that compete with each other in order to gain political power. Competition is the 
norm in this society, which makes the parties search for strategies and techniques that 
may effectively undermine their opponents. 
The second factor refers to the fact that political election is an essential part of 
democracy. Consequently, politicians' reputation is a very important asset, and since 
scandals can affect the politicians' reputation, they are regarded as a powerful weapon. 
Thompson explains this as follows: "Scandal can destroy a vital resource upon which 
politicians must to some extent rely 
- 
namely, their reputation and good name 
- 
destroy 
, 
A60 ability to persuade others. 
The third factor is a relative autonomy of the media in most democratic countries. 
Although the mass media is not entirely independent from political actors, it is more self- 
regulating than the mass media in authoritarian regimes. The fourth factor is the 
commercial nature of Western media companies. This forces them to attract public 
attention by publishing high profile stories. The final factor is the dominance of the rule 
of law. It makes the space of politics more open for criticism than in authoritarian 
countries because powerful actors have less power to put pressures on the mass media. 461 
Political scandals can be broken into several groups: sexual-political scandals, 
financial-political scandals and power scandals. Sex scandals reveal activities of 
politicians which transgress prevailing norms of sexual relations. Financial-political 
scandals disclosure illegal practises of acquisition and relocation of economic resources. 
Power scandals target events and political groups which transgress norms of acquisition 
and exercising political power. 462 
Although political scandals are widespread in democratic countries, this form of 
the symbolic method is less common in Russia because the Russian mass media are 
significantly less independent from powerfiil actors than the media in Western 
democracies. In the West, a political scandal is a rather unanimous involvement of mass 
media companies into the blaming of a politician, in which the mass media acts as an 
independent watchdog of moral norms. 
460 Thompson, The Media and Modernity: A Social Theory ofthe Media. 461 Thompson, Political Scandal, Power and Visibility in the Media Age, p. 97. 462 Ibid., p. 12 1. 
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Russian media organisations are more dependent on powerful actors and are more 
likely to promote their political will. Because of that many researchers call this phase of 
the development of the Russian mass media instrumental. 463 There is much evidence of 
this created by politicians, researchers and journalists themselves. For example, Ludmila 
Telen, the deputy editor of Moscow News, said, "Freedom of speech and the independent 
attitude of the mass media were the first gains ofperestroika. Today, disappointment and 
disillusionment in the mass media are becoming disappointment in democracy itself. "464 
Some other examples are to be noted later in this section. In the meantime, this 
can be illustrated by the words of Litvinenko, the former lieutenant-colonel of the FSB, 
who worked closely with the Russian mass media. In an interview, he said he believed 
that nearly 90 per cent of the stories in the Russian mass media were paid for. 465 
Since the dependency of the mass media on powerful actors results in it being 
broken into groups, another form of the symbolic method is more prevalent in Russia. As 
far as a large-scale symbolic competition is concerned, powerful Russian political 
syndicates are involved in so-called information wars. Information wars have become 
increasingly popular in Russia since the end of the 1990s. It is believed that the first 
information war between Lukoil and Oneksimbank, two powerful Russian syndicates, 
began in 1997. The first episode of the war was the competition for the shares of the 
newspaper Izvestia. Oneksimbank succeeded by taking more then fifty per cent, while 
Lukoil managed to buy 49 per cent. Finally, the sides reached an agreement that Lukoil's 
loss would be compensated by taking control over other large firms. 
The second episode of the war took place in 1997 and regarded the privatisation 
of Sibneft, a major Russian oil company, which was later entirely controlled by Roman 
Abramovich. Oneksimbank decided to bid although this was seen by many as a break of 
an informal agreement between these powerful groups. 
Another episode of the war between the two international consortiums happened 
in the summer of the same year. They competed for a 25 per cent stake in Sviazinvcst, the 
biggest Russian telecommunication company, which included 76 regional telephone 
463 For example, Zassoursky, 1. (1999) Mass media vtoroy respubliki [The mass media of the second 
rgublic). Moscow State University. 4 4 Hoffman, "Powerful Few Rule Russian Mass Media", p. AO I. 
465 Interview with Litvinenko. 
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firms. The first attempt of selling this company had taken place in 1995. However, the 
talks with STET, an Italian company that was interested in this acquisition, were finally 
cancelled without any acceptable agreement. 
The second bid took place in 1997. One consortium consisted of Soros's Fund 
Quantum, Deutche Bank and Oneksimbank. Another group included Gusinsky's Most- 
Bank and Alfa-Bank, controlled by Berezovsky. Finally, Sviazinvest was bought by 
Oneksimbank. As compensation for this defeat, Alfa-Bank obtained a controlling stake in 
TNK, one of the biggest Russian oil companies. Because the result of the auction was 
disappointing for some parties, they started an information war. The scenario of this war 
has been described by Ivan Zassoursky in his book The Mass Media of the Second 
Repubjjc466 and is outlined below. 
The day after the auction, Dorenko, 467 a reporter for news programme Vremia, 
claimed that Oneksimbank had stolen several million dollars from the plant Azot in 
Cherepovets, an industrial city in the North Western region of Russia. The daily Segodnia 
published an article that doubted the legitimacy of the auction because the shares had 
been very cheap, and the procedure of the competition had not been transparent 
enough. 468 On 27 July 1997, Moscow News published a few articles that repeated the 
accusations of Oneksimbank in dirty transactions and showed the scheme how the money 
of the plant Azot had been transferred abroad. 469 
On 28 July 1998, the newspaper Segodnia published an article that claimed that 
Oneksimbank was involved in the trial on illegal transactions with the money from the 
state budget. In addition, the article drew attention to suspicious ftiendly ties between 
Potanin, the President of Oneksimbank and Alfred Kokh, a member of the Russian 
government. The author argued that Oneksimbank had problems with the law and, 
consequently, the result of the auction was illegal. 470 
Another article of this newspaper claimed that some powerful groups in the 
Russian government were linked to Oneksimbank, and they intended to shut down 
466 Zassoursky, Mass media vtoroy respubliki. 467 A Berezovsky's supporter. 468 Soldatov, A. (1997) "Konverti vskrivali tseliy chas" [It took almost an hour to open envolopes], 
Segodnia, 26.07.1997. 
469 Denisov, A. (1997)'Tlokhie Dengi? "[Dirty money? ], Moskovkie Novosti, 27.07.1997. 470 Zviagilsky (1997) "Dengi Zapakhli" [Money starts smelling], Segodnia, 28.07.1997. 
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oppositional mass media companies, such as TV channel ORT. This was allegedly done 
in order to make the media forget the involvement of Oneksimbank in illegal 
transactions. 471 
On 29 July 1997, Kommersant Daily, the newspaper controlled by Berezovsky, 
published a Dorenko's interview in which he argued that the vice-premier Nemtsov tried 
to put pressures on the mass media. Novaia Gazeta, another newspaper linked to 
Berezovsky, assumed that Oneksimbank had compromising materials regarding 
Nemtsov, and this explained why Nemtsov tried to defend Oneksimbank. 472 
Another article in this newspaper assumed that Potanin planned to become the 
President of Russia. The article claimed that Potanin intended to use his media companies 
and to close all other mass media organisations. 473 The editors of the newspaper were 
aware of the fact that Yeltsin did not like to hear about possible opponents in the election 
campaign and attemptcd to encouragc him to takc action against Potanin. 
The information war continued the following day with a few publications in 
Novaia Gazeta, which claimed that a few Western companies owned a part of 
Oneksimbank and, consequently, this could undermine the national security of Russia. 474 
Zvigilsky's articles in Segodnia repeated this argument and claimed that Oneksimbank 
used the mass media in order to manipulate public opinion. In addition, Zvigilsky argued 
that Chubais and Nemtsov should take the main responsibility for establishing bandit 
capitalism in Russia. 475 
The news programme Vremia announced that Oneksimbank might have been 
involved in the killings of two senior managers of the St. Petersburg port. Also, it 
revealed that the flat of Patarkathishvili, the deputy to Director General of ORT at that 
time, had been burgled and a number of very important documents had been stolen. 
471 Trofimova, E. (1997) "Viydet li zavtra v efir ORT? Perviy kanal riskuet razdelit uchast Izvestiy" [Is 
CRT to broadcast tomorrow? Channel I risks to repeat the fate of Izvestiya], Segodnia, 28.07.1997. 472 Mulin, S. (1997) "Programa 'Vremia' otrkrito atakovala Vladimira Potanina" [Programme Vremia 
0 enly attacked Vladimir Potanin], Novaia Gazela, 29.07.1997. 
4T3 Koshkareva, T. and Narzikulov, R. (1997) "Stanet li Potanin presidentom Rossii? " [Is Potanin to became 
Russian president? ], Novaia Gazeta, 29.07.1997. 
474 Babich, D. (1997) "Dengi Sorosa pomogli Oneksimbanku" [Soros's money helped Oneksimbank], 
Xovaia Gazeta, 30.07.1997. 
475 Zvigilsky, A. (1997) "Boris Nemtsov progovorilsia. Zhertvam 'banditskogo' capitalsima posvishaetsia", 
Segodnia, 30.07.1997. 
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The next day, the newspapers of the group Most continued to accuse Soros of 
involvement in dirty business transactions. Potanin was accused of not saying the truth, 
and Yeltsin was blamed of not being able to defeat the growing political ambitions of 
some politicians led by Nemtsov. 476 The newspapers controlled by Berezovsky also 
published a few articles that disputed the legitimacy of the acquisition of SviazinveSt, 477 
and assumed that Oneksimbank was cheating during the privatisation of Norilsky Nickel, 
the major nickel plant of Russia. 478 
On I August 1997, Oneksimbank was accused of using different money 
laundering schemes for paying its winning bid for Sviazinvest. In particular, Segodnia 
argued that Oneksimbank illegally transferred huge sums of money to CypruS. 479 Also, 
the newspaper accused Nemtsov of corruption. 480 
The next day, news prograrmne Vremia repeatedly accused Oneksimbank of 
illegal transactions with Norilsky Nickel and revealed that the flat of the journalist who 
was investigating some details of Oneksimbank had been searched. 
On 4 August 1997, Novaia Gazeta published the text of talks between Nerntsov 
and Lisovsky, an influential man of the Russian advertisement market. This article 
assumed that Nemtsov had deliberately tried to suspend the law on tax declaration by 
state officials. 48 1 The same newspaper published Dorenko's interview in which he argued 
that Oneksimbank was rather a bandit "roof' than a normal bank. The newspaper 
Segodnia supported this idea and claimed that the Prosecutor's Office should probe 
Oneksimbank because of the presence of numerous examples of evidence that this bank 
had been involved in illegal economic activities. 482 
Segodnia continued publishing negative stories about Oneksimbank the next day. 
It published a diagram that showed how Oneksimbank made profit from its illegal 
476 Lobachev, T. (1997) "Pechalnie posledstvia malaziyskoko Sviazinvesta" [Sad consecuences of 
Malaisian. Sviazinvest], Segodnia, 31.07.1997. 
477 Babich, D. (1997) "Chubais vse raziasnil presidentu" [Chubais has explained everyting to the president], 
Novaia Gazeta, 31.07.1997. 
478 Ivanov, N. (1997) "Seryznie pretenzii nakamme auktionaP [Serious allegations on the eve of auction], 
Novaia Gazeta, 31.07.1997. 
479 Zviagilsky, A. (1997) "Otkuda dengi? Iz tumbochkf' [Where the money from? ], Segodnia, 1.08.1997. 480 Voropaev, V. (1997) "Gusinsky nameren podat v sud na. Potanina" (Gusinsky intends to sue Potanin], 
Novaia Gazeta, 1.08.1997. 
481 Minkin (1997) "Ia lublu kogda tarelki ochen bolshie" [I like large plates], Novaia Gazeta, 4.08.1997. 482 Trofimov, E. (1997) "Desiat dney, kotorie nas potriasli" [Ten days that hit us], Segodnia, 4.08.1997. 
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483 
activities. Also, the newspaper worried about the increasing embededdness of 
Oneksimbank in Russia's political, executive and financial networks, and it expressed its 
concerns regarding the growing monopoly of Oneksimbank. 484 
However, the campaign against Oneksimbank did not succeed. Oneksimbank won 
the second bid on Norilsky nickel on 5 August 1997. The next day, the newspapers of the 
group Most and media organisations controlled by Berezovsky published several very 
critical articles which argued that the government was not able to stop Oneksimbank from 
its illegal expansion. They claimed that all Oneksimbank's dealings should be cancelled. 
The informational campaign continued the next day. Segodnia published a few 
stories that repeatedly accused Oneksimbank of illegal consumption of public money for 
its profit. 485 Moskovsky Komsomolets published data that said that the Russian state kept 
10 per cent of its money in Oneksimbank, and claimed that the Russian population 
suffered from the illegal dealings of Oneksimbank due to a delay in payments of salaries 
and pensions caused by the fact that Oneksimbank used the money in order to increase its 
own profit. 486 
The information war was so visible that Yeltsin tried to stop it. On 15 September 
1997, he invited Khodorovsky, Gusinsky, Fridman, Vinogradov, Smolensky and Potanin 
in the Kremlin in an attempt to reach an agreement between conflicting powerful groups. 
However, this attempt failed. 487 
The fact that Russian political parties and economic actors increasingly often use 
various forms of the symbolic method in conflicts with each other can be illustrated by 
the symbolic confrontation between Baltiysky Zavod and Severnaya Verf, two large St. 
Petersburg enterprises, during the competition for the construction of two destroyers that 
had been ordered by the government of China. 
483 Yabova, E. and Kislyarsky, A. (1997) "Konkurs po Norilskomy nickelu priostanovIen" [Bid on Norilsky 
nickel is suspended], Segodnia, 5.08.1997. 
484 Radzikhovsky, L. (1997) "Chemy peredel" [Black redistribution], Segodnia, 5.08.1997. 
485 Rogachev, N. (1997) "Samiy upolnomochenniy iz upolnomochennikh bankov. Za proshliy god cherez 
Oneksimbank proshlo 45 trillionov rubley tamozhennikh deneg", Segodnia, 7.08.1997. 486 Vasilev, K. (1997) "Piat trillionov dlia Potanina. Pochemu gosudarstvo derzhit v kommercheskom 
banke desiatuu chast svoego dolga pered naseleniem? " [Five trillions for Potanin. Why does the state keep 
one tenth of its debt to the population in a comersial bank? ], Moskovsky Komsomolets, 7.08.1997. 487 Mukhin, Bliness-Elita i Gosudarstvennaia Wast: Kto Hadeet Rossiey na Rubezhe Vekov, p. 12. 
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Severnaya Verf has already built two destroyers for the Chinese Arrny. The 
Chinese government was very satisfied by the previous destroyers and wanted another 
two destroyers to be built by the same firm. However, Baltiysky Zavod was supported by 
some very influential politicians such as Ilia Klebanov, a vice-premier, and Vladimir 
Potekhin, the leader of Edinstvo (a group in the State Duma). Their support was so 
powerful that it had almost been decided to give this profitable contract (US$ 1,4 billion) 
to Baltiysky Zavod. Nevertheless, the support from Kasyanov, the Prime Minister of 
Russia at that time, finally resulted in transferring the contract to Severnaya Verf. 
According to the contract, all parts of equipment of the destroyers should be new. 
Unfortunately, it became evident that Severnaya Verf was not able find the necessary 
new equipment for destroyers because its subcontractors did not manage to supply all 
essential parts. Baltiysky Zavod was one of the subcontractors and it cancelled its supply 
of an essential piece of equipment. It was irreplaceable since Baltiysky Zavod was the 
only producer of this ship equipment in Russia. 
As executives of Severnaya Verf were unable to find the essential new equipment 
for the destroyers, they decided to use second hand equipment from other ships. In order 
to cover the replacement, the workers of Severnaya Verf secretly changed numbers on the 
parts of equipment so that they could be presented as new. Baltiysky Zavod told 
journalists about this fraud during a press conference. In return Severnaya Verf revealed 
many commercial secrets of Baltiysky Zavod. 488 
Berezovsky and his team also realise the importance of the symbolic method in 
their confrontation with the Russian president. In any case, Berezovsky gives numerous 
interviews to the Russian and Western mass media, in which he uses any opportunity to 
damage Putin's political reputation. Moreover, he spends enormous sums of money on 
publishing reports that target the political image of the Russian president. For example, in 
September 2003, Berezovsky paid almost one million American dollars to a number of 
influential world newspapers for publishing a request of his political team to the President 
of the United States. This letter asked Bush to reconsider his opinion regarding Putin and 
his policy because this policy undermines the main principles of democracy. 
488 Kalinin, V. (2002) "Tak ne dostavaysia zhe ti nikomu" [Okay. Nobody is to own it], Grani. ru, 
25.07.2003. 
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It should be noted that information wars are rather large media campaigns 
arranged and controlled by powerful parties behind the media. It is evident that only very 
powerful networks are rich enough to be able to use this form of exercising symbolic 
power. That is why less expensive forms of the symbolic method are used in Russia more 
frequently. Certainly, the above-mentioned examples do not cover all forms and 
techniques of the symbolic method, but it is not aim of this research to describe all of 
them in detail. 489 Instead, the next section analyses the place of organised crime reporting 
among other forms and techniques used in the space of politics. 
6.3. Reports on Organised Crime and Corruption: an Important Part of 
the Symbolic Method. 
There are many techniques used by the mass media for political coverage. Personalization 
of events, dominance of political advertising and simplified reports, targeted mailing, and 
the focus on images rather than on events are main features of media reporting in many 
countries, in particular in the U. K. and the U. S. 490 (For example, the format of 
personalization was used by the British media during political campaigns of Margaret 
Thatcher, Neil Kinnocks and John Major). 491 
Some techniques are of special importance for this study. Those are negativism 
and relying on leaking of damaging information. For example, in Britain, negative 
advertising was especially effective in the Tories political campaign in 1992 and helped 
them win the election. 492 Negativism in media coverage is even more widespread and 
efficient in Russia. There are many elections in Russia and it is rather difficult for 
common people to distinguish between candidates on any particular post because of 
significant similarity of their political programmes. However, the choice may be easier if 
the voters are informed about negative features of some candidates. 
489 More information on these tecniques can be found in Cherepanova, 1.(2003) "Angelskdy Ogon 
Krasnie PR Rossi! ["Angel's Fire": Russia's red PR]. Moskva: KSP Plus. 490 Castclls, The Power ofIdentity, p. 324. 491 Berry, S. (1992) "Party strategy and the media: the failure of Labour's 1991 election campaign", 
Parliamentar 
492 Ibid. 
y Affairs, 45, (4), pp. 565-8 1. 
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Negativism can have many forms, 493 and this thesis emphasises that stories on 
organised crime and corruption are one of the forms of negativism, which is used by the 
mass media controlled by power elites in their competition with opponents. For example, 
it is easy to see that many stories in the information war described in the previous section 
referred to illegal economic activities, corruption, and ties with organised crime. 
Another interesting example is given by Andrey Konstantinov, a leading 
investigative j ournalist from St. Petersburg, 494 regarding Gongadze's murder. It is well 
known that Gongadze published several articles which accused Kuchma, the President of 
Ukraine, of corruption. After Gongadze was murdered, many politicians, journalists and 
people believed that Kuchma was involved in this killing. 
After an analysis of evidence, Konstantinov and his investigative team concluded 
that it was unlikely that Gongadze had been killed by Kuchma's people. Konstantinov 
came to conclusion that Gongadze had been murdered because of his negative stories 
against some political opponents of his boss. Konstantinov drew attention to the fact that 
the leading Ukrainian party Sobomost aimed to take as many seats on the Parliament of 
Ukraine as possible. For this purpose, the leaders of the party decided to use the symbolic 
method and employed several journalists, who published numerous negative stories 
regarding political opponents, including the leading governmental officials. Gongadze 
was the editor of one of the newspapers that published these reports. 495 
The special place of organised crime reporting (which is normally associated with 
investigative journalism) in political communications in contemporary Russia is 
confirmed by many sources. It is possible to give an example that indirectly illustrates 
this. The Mass Media Centre at St. Petersburg State University regularly organises 
summer schools on various aspects of the news media in Russia. It is interesting to notice 
that two last summer schools were on investigative journalism and on the role of the 
media in political elections. Although these two themes are rather different from the 
viewpoint of Western democracies, the programmes of the two last summer schools of 
493 Some detail can be found in Lukashov, A. and Ponidelko, A. (2002) Cherniy PR Kak Sposob 
OvIadeniya Wastiu [Black PR as a method to capture power]. St. Petersburg: Business Press. 494 To be reviewed in the next chapter of this thesis. 495 URL http: //www. comprice. ru/set/2001-27_2. phtml, consulted in July 2003. 
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the Mass Media Centre did not differ significantly. The same lecturers gave similar 
presentations and seminars. 
Another example which illustrates the use of reports on organised crime is the 
media campaign against Alexander Litvinenko, the former lieutenant-colonel of the FSB. 
Litvinenko used to work for the Unit of Tackling Organised Crime and was well 
informed about ties between law enforcement and criminal organisations. In 1999, 
Litvinenko and a few of his partners organised a press conference. They told the 
journalists that the leadership of the FSB ordered them to kill Berezovsky and a few other 
businessmen. They argued that the FSB used illegal methods and resembled an organised 
crime group itself. 
This case was clearly related to the confrontation between Russian powerful 
actors. It is interesting to note what happened after the press conference. Litvinenko 
claimed that some newspapers accused him of numerous killings and portrayed him as a 
criminal, despite the lack of evidence of his involvement in any crime. For example, the 
newspaper Segodnia published an article which claimed that Litvinenko was involved in 
fifteen murders and ten other criminal offences. Another article was published in 
Komsomolskaya Pravda. In this article, the director of the FSB revealed that Litvinenko 
was suspected of taking bribes and this caused the FSB to secretly record his telephone 
talks. 496 
Litvinenko, has always denied his involvement in any murder and insisted that 
everything in these articles was false. 497 He said that he asked general Zdanovich, his 
commander, why he had not corrected these false reports publicly. Zdanovich replied that 
he did not intend to do so. Then, Litvinenko himself decided to publicly deny these false 
accusations and organised another TV presentation. In this TV presentation he repeatedly 
accused the FSB of having committed many crimes, including political murders. 
Litvinenko claimed that the FSB arrested him after the presentation. He was 
charged with several criminal offences and sentenced. He pleaded not guilty and insisted 
that his case was politically motivated. 498 The court verdict regarding Litvinenko was 
496 Litvinenko, A. (2002) Lubianskaya Prestupnaia Gruppirovka [Lubianka organised crime group], New 
York: Grani, Grani. ru, and from Litvinenko's interview, London, July, 2003. 497 Ibid. 
499 Interview with Litvinenko, London, 2003. 
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later changed and he was released on bail. He managed to leave Russia and was granted 
asylum in Britain. He is co-author of the book and co-editor of the film Vzorvannaya 
Rossia, which attempted to prove the involvement of the FSB in the explosion of two 
apartment buildings in Moscow that killed nearly three hundred Russian citizens and led 
to a new war with Chechen rebels. 
In an interview, Litvinenko revealed that law enforcement agencies recruit 
journalists in order to be able to publish in the media the information which can help 
them put pressure on their opponents. For example, he argued that Alexander Khinshtein, 
a leading Russian investigative j ournalist who worked for the newspaper Moskovsky 
Komsomolets, had been recruited by a department within the FSB. 499 
It should be noted that journalists writing stories on corruption and organised 
crime as a part of political competition might be negatively portrayed and accused of 
similar crimes by other media companies. For example, the newspaper Vozrozhdenie 
Urala, a Chelyabinsk newspaper, published some negative reports about Galkin after he 
had been sued for libel because of his articles accusing Peter Sumin, the Governor of 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, of corruption. 
In turn, Galkin sued the newspaper Vozrozhdenie Urala for libel against him. 
Galkin argued that the articles damaged his reputation by portraying him as a man who 
hates people and is Putin's uncompromising opponent. The response of Vozrozhdenie 
Urala was to publish a new negative story about Galkin-500 The article criticised Galkin's 
arguments and reminded its readers that Galkin was not only linked to people who might 
be connected with the lords of organised crime but also was charged with a number of 
criminal offences. 
Berezovsky also uses crime and corruption stories in his political battle against 
the Russian President. In August 2003, two months before the scheduled launch of 
Berezovsky's extradition trial, Berezovsky published an open letter in the newspaper 
Kommersant. 501 Berezovsky asked all people and parties that disagree with Putin's policy 
to form a strong political opposition and elect another president. Berezovsky referred to 
499 Ibid. 
500 Gurevich, A. (2003) "Dela Deputatskie 
... 
Ugolovnie" [Issues of the MP 
... 
Criminal Issues] (the title 
implies that some MI's are involved in committing crimes), Vozrozhdenie Urala, No. 22 (252) August, p. 1. 501 The editors of the newspaper noted that it was an advertising article and it was published because of the 
personal request of the owner of their newspaper. 
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the events relating to one of the biggest Russian oil companies Yukos and claimed that 
this proved that Putin intended to redistribute ownership in Russia. Berezovsky warned 
Putin that such a policy would cause a civil war in Russia. 
Berezovsky named several elites that could and should resist Putin's policy. The 
first of them was represented by regional leaders (governors), who lost a great deal of 
their power after Putin strengthened the Russian state. Berezovsky argued that oligarchs 
are another elite, which dislikes Putin because he threatens to undermine their wealth. 
The army should also be dissatisfied with Putin's policy because he did allow the army to 
win a single military battle and it lost its influence in the CIS, Middle East, Vietnam and 
Cuba. According to Berezovsky, the mass media is one of the elites. The power of the 
mass media has also significantly decreased uring Putin's presidency. 
Berezovsky pointed out that Putin is supported only by two elites: state 
bureaucracy and law enforcement agencies. He argued that bureaucrats want to regain 
control over ownership of Russia. However, law enforcement agencies, which are 
successors of the KGB, may be disappointed by Putin because he has been too soft. 
Berezovsky underlined that Putin's background is not law enforcement (CheKa) but 
bureaucracy. 
It is interesting to notice that Berezovsky referred to Putin's links to organised 
crime in order to show the real danger of Putin's policy. Berezovsky reminded a number 
of cases that might have indicated ties between Putin and the Russian Mafia. Some of 
them are outlined below. 
On 13 May 2000, the police arrested Ritter, the brother of the Minister of 
Lichtenstein. He was accused of links to drug dealers in Columbia and Russia. In 1992- 
96, when Putin was responsible for external contacts of the St. Petersburg administration, 
Ritter's company SPAG (St. Petersburg Immobilien und Beteiligungs AG) invested the 
laundered money from drug trade in its St. Petersburg business, and it was reported that 
Putin provided political protection for this firm. According to some documents, Putin was 
a consultant of this company until 23 May 2000. 
In the middle of the 1990s, a group of members of Lensovet (Council of 
Leningrad), headed by Maria Salye and Yury Gladkov, launched an investigation into 
trade licences and accused Putin of corruption. The group recommended that Sobchak 
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sack Putin from his post. 
Berezovsky noted that Putin was involved in the privatisation of the plant 
Saintrest, together with Mikhail Mirilashvili, who is thought to be linked to organised 
crime. In addition, Putin was involved in the privatisation of Baltiysky Sea Terminal 
(BMP). Berezovsky claimed that the control of BMP allowed some businessmen to 
illegally trade Russian ships abroad. All transactions were mediated by Treber, an 
influential criminal avthoritet. 
Berezovsky drew attention to the fact that when Putin was a vice-governor of St. 
Petersburg, he coordinated the illegal trade of military submarines abroad through 
Leningrad Admiralteyskoe Obedinenie. A deputy to the Director General of this 
enterprise was killed in 1994, reportedly because he tried to stop this illegal trade. 
Also, Berezovsky pointed out that the corporation XX Trest, which had been 
created by Putin together with Nizheshin and Goldman (members of the St. Petersburg 
Legislative Assembly), transferred some public money given for the construction of 
several buildings in St. Petersburg (the business centre Peter Great is one of them) to 
Spain. Putin reportedly used this money in order to buy a villa in Benidorm and a hotel in 
another Spanish town. 502 
Finally, it should be noted that the use of negative stories, including information 
regarding links to organised crime, in political campaigns has been recognized by all 
political actors in Russia. Confirmation of this can be taken the announcement by 
Alexander Vishniakov, the Chairman of the Election Committee of the Russian 
Federation, that all leading Russian political parties have formed a committee which is 
supposed to control the use of the mass media coverage (in other words, control the use 
of the symbolic method) in the election to the State Duma in 2003. This committee was 
created because political parties were disappointed by the way the mass media was used 
in the previous elections. 
The role of the new committee was to analyse any particular conflict (for 
example, publishing compromat, or negative stories about candidates). This committee 
consisted of the representatives of all leading political parties, it assessed how serious the 
502 Berezovsky, B. (2003) "Noviy peredel, Chto delat? " [New redistribution, what is to be done? ] A letter to 
the newspaper Kommersant, Kommersant, No. 129 (2732), 24.07.03, (URL 
http: //www. korrunersant. ru/archive/archive-material. html? docId=398799, consulted on 25.07.2003). 
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conflict was and determined who was in the right. If necessary, the Committee was given 
the power to inform the Central Election Committee of the Russian Federation (TsIK) 
and law enforcement agencies about the conflict, and to ask them to get involved in 
resolving the situation. 503 
Time is needed in order to estimate how this means of control would impact 
organised crime reporting. In the meantime, it should be noted that while this chapter was 
written, the leading oppositional website Grani. ru informed its visitors about the alleged 
links of the Russian President to the Mafia. 
6.4. Conclusion 
This chapter has suggested an explanation of why, in spite of numerous difficulties and 
obstacles, the Russian mass media reports on organised crime and corruption. This 
explanation is based on social and political changes that have happened in Russia since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
This chapter has elaborated the argument that the widespread use of democratic 
values in Russia has resulted in making democratic elections an essential part of the 
Russian political system. Almost all governmental posts in Russia from local government 
to the presidency are now being filled through democratic elections. 
This chapter has pointed out that the news media has become an important 
weapon in the political confrontation between power elites in Russia. Negative media 
coverage of political opponents can provide a very significant competitive advantage by 
effective undermining the reputation of rivals. This makes the symbolic method a very 
efficient political weapon. 
It has been argued that reports on organised crime and corruption are one of the 
forms of the symbolic method. Reports by the mass media about ties between some 
politicians and gangsters normally diminish chances of those in report being elected to 
important positions. This encourages the inclusion of organised crime and corruption 
503 News Programme Vremia, 23.07.2003. 
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stories in political campaigns of powerful actors, and explains why reporting on 
organised crime flourishes in Russia. 
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Chapter 7 
Investigative Journalism in SovietlPost-Soviet Russia 
The previous chapter has explored the role of the mass media in political 
communications. It has been shown that Russian media companies frequently use 
hidden techniques of pubic relations in order to provide a symbolic support for 
politicians. It should be noted, though, that the recurrent use of the symbolic method 
erodes the borders of the public sphere in Russia. This chapter, therefore, reviews the 
definition of the public sphere and examines its relationship with investigative 
journalism. I shall argue that investigative journalism is supposed to be a watchdog of the 
public sphere since the main task of investigative journalists is to alert the public when 
the boundaries between legal and illegal action are overstepped by some businessmen or 
politicians. 
This chapter, furthermore, will review the history of Russian investigative 
journalism and assess its guarding role in post-Soviet Russia. It should be noted that the 
nature and ma or features of investigative journalism in many other countries have been 
essentially studied by researchers. For example, Clark Mollenhoff reviewed investigative 
reporting in the United States, 504 Burgh focused on the United Kingdom505 and Sophie 
Gerbaud summarised the main developments of investigative journalism in France. 506 
Even though investigative reporting plays a very important role in contemporary Russia, 
Russian investigative journalism has not been sufficiently explored in academic literature. 
This chapter is a pioneering study in this respect. 
The purpose of this chapter is not only to present the major trends of investigative 
journalism in post-Russia but also to introduce its major actors. It describes some leading 
investigative media organisations and journalists and reviews their biographies, methods 
and achievements. Although it is difficult to distinguish the major media affiliation of 
504Mollenhoff, C. R. (198 1) Investigative Reporting, From Courthouse to nite House. New York: 
Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc., London: Collier Macmillan Publishers. 
505 Burgh, Investigative Journalism: Context and Practice. 506 Gerbaud, S. (1993) Le Journalisme Dinvestigation en France de 1945 a Nos Jours. Universitete de 
Paris X, Nanterre. 
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investigative journalists due to their contributions to all types of the media from the press 
to the Internet, section 2 of this chapter in a greater extent focuses on Russian 
investigative journalism in the press, section 3 refers to the developments on television, 
while the final section reviews the achievements of Russian investigative websites. 
7.1. Investigative Journalism and the Public Sphere 
It is difficult to over-estimate the significance of the public sphere in democratic 
societies. People have the right to know about controversial issues and events of public 
interest in order to make competent decisions about ftirther social development. 507 In 
other words, citizens need to have information about certain social, political and 
economic events and be able to express their critical evaluation. The purpose of the 
public sphere is to provide room for this important dialog. Thus, the public sphere can be 
viewed as an arena in which the democratic exchange of information takes place. 508 
The concept of the public sphere is important for social theory. For example, 
Jurgen Habermas has conducted his comprehensive analysis of the public sphere in an 
attempt to identify conditions for a rational debate among various social groups-509 He 
has argued in favour of balances communication among equal people and pointed out that 
public communication can only benefit from the absence of pressures from the 
government or powerful business groups. 
Nevertheless, Habermas admits that the golden age of the public sphere in 
Western societies ended in the eighteen century. The ideal model of balanced 
510 
communication was lost as a result of the rising intervention of commercial interests. 
Capitalistic monopolisation increasingly transformed the media into profit-oriented 
commercial enterprises, and constrained public access to critical debate. This resulted in 
the erosion and decline of the public sphere. 511 
507 Harnelink, C. (1999) "International communications: global market and morality", in A. Mohammadi 
(ed. ) International Communications and Globalisation. London: Sage, pp. 106-107. 
508 Chambers, D. (2000) "Globalasing Media Agendas: The Production of Journalism, " in Burgh, H. (ed. ) 
Investigative Journalism: Context and Practice, London: Routledge, p. 109 
509 Habermas, J. (1999) The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
510 Chambers, "Globlasing Media Agendas: The Production of Journalism, " p. 110 
511 Habermas, Yhe Structural Transformation ofthe Public Sphere, p. 4 
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The Russian public sphere experienced a similar scenario of development, but 
passed through all stages very quickly. At the end of the 1990s, the Russian public sphere 
was considerably eroded via the promotion of business interests in the media. The recent 
effort of the new Russian government to limit business intervention has not yet 
completely restored the essential balance. Investigative journalism could have an 
important role in the revival of the public sphere protected from state or commercial 
interference. 
Investigative journalism is a branch of journalism that requires especially many 
investigative skills. A good definition is given by Hugo De Burgh: 
An investigative journalist is a man or woman whose profession it is to discover the truth and to 
identify lapses from it in whatever media may be available. The act of doing this generally is 
called investigative journalism and is distinct from apparently similar work done by police, 
lawyers, auditors and regulatory bodies in that it is not limited as to target, not legally founded and 
closely connected to publicity. 512 
Thus, publicity is an essential component of investigative j ournalism, and this makes it an 
important actor in the pubic sphere. Since the government and business frequently 
attempt to hide part of their activities, the professional investigative skills of this branch 
ofjournalism should secure its role as a watchdog of the public sphere. 
Investigative journalists believe that there are some standards in business and 
politics that cannot be violated. These standards are held by most people and their 
violation should trigger public disapproval. The main task of investigative journalists is to 
alert the public, when the boundaries between legal and illegal action are overstepped by 
some business people or politicians. As many aspects of organised crime and corruption 
are on the boundary between legality and illegality, organised crime and corruption are a 
major concern for investigative journalism in Russia. This explains why this chapter 
reviews Russian investigative journalism and assess its role as a watchdog of the public 
sphere. 
512 Burgh, H. (ed. ) (2000) Investigative Journalism: Context and Practice. London: Routledge, p. 9. 
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7.2. Investigative Journalism in the Press 
The press is the major host of the Russian investigative journalism. It is caused not only 
by the fact that printed press emerged significantly earlier than television but also by the 
features of the Soviet political system. The Soviet leadership controlled television to a far 
greater extent than the press, allowing only the most refined stories to be aired and only 
the most loyal people to be employed in television. 
The Soviet newspapers were relatively more independent. Although Soviet 
newspapers also were under censorship, their editors were allowed to criticise selected 
aspects of Soviet life. It was always a risky business but, as far it was supported by some 
authorities, the newspapers could draw public attention to some of the deficiencies in the 
social and economic organisation of the Soviet Union. 
There was the specific genre that was useful to expose negative phenomena, 
beginning in 1970s. This genre was called satire. Most of the earlier investigative stories 
in the Russian press were written in this form. Some newspapers published more satirical 
reports than others. Such newspapers as Krokodil [Crocodile] and Literaturnaya Gazeta 
[The Newspaper about Literature] were most known for their investigative stories. 
7. ZL Fitaly Fitaliev (1980-1990) 
Some methods, themes and features of investigative journalism in Russia between 1980 
and 1990 can be presented by reviewing the journalistic career of Vitaly Vitaliev. He was 
born in Kharkov (Ukraine) but later moved to Moscow. Due to his proficiency in English, 
he worked as an interpreter for the Ministry of Culture until 1979, when the war in 
Afghanistan started. 
He started his journalistic career by publishing some satirical stories in the section 
Twelve Chairs of the Literaturnaya Gazeta. His debut was successful and he was 
awarded the Golden Calf literary prize, which was the most coveted award for a satirist in 
the Soviet Union. After that Vitaliev was offered a job of literature consultant in this 
newspaper. Some of his stories were also published in the magazine Krokodil, and the 
newspapers Gudok and Trud. 
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The letters from the readers of the newspaper were Vitaliev's best source of new 
stories. According to him, he received a huge amount of letters. He could choose the most 
interesting out of them and check the facts. If the editors of the newspaper thought that 
the new story was within allowed boundaries, they pennitted it to be published in the 
newspaper. 
It is an interesting point to note how the range of permitted topics changed during 
that period. At the beginning, only small misdoings of some senior officers of local 
enterprises were exposed in critical stories. For example, Vitaliev wrote stories about the 
terrible situation in a student dormitory at Blagoveshenchensk agricultural institute and 
about inappropriate treatment of animals in a zoo. 
Then, Vitaliev moved to the taboo topics of bribery and corruption. Bribe and 
bribe taking were very common crimes in Brezhnev's era. Sometimes, corrupt practices 
exceeded what was considered appropriate for that period and it drew attention of 
satirists. For example, Vitaliev wrote a story about the case when one of the Soviet 
deputy ministers demanded a tractor to cultivate his own piece of land from the director 
of a subordinate plant. 513 Although this action hardly can be considered as corruption 
from the point of view of many in the West or would be not be noteworthy from the 
viewpoint of the editors of current Russian newspapers, it was a serious offence during 
the Soviet period. 
The range of permitted topics expanded significantly after Gorbachev was 
appointed the Secretary General of the Communist Party. It became possible to explore 
and publish stories about serious social phenomena. In 1986, Vitaliev wrote a story about 
prostitution in Russia. It was a difficult topic because in theory prostitution did not exist 
in the Soviet Union. In practice, prostitution in the major Russian cities, especially in the 
cities which were frequently visited by foreign tourists, was widespread. 
Vitaliev's first intention was to focus on Moscow and Leningrad, two Russian 
capital cities. However, his bosses were not certain whether it was allowed so Vitaliev 
started with Sochi and Tuapse, two resort towns near Black Sea. What he discovered far 
exceeded his expectations. Vitaliev noted that the second secretary of the Sochi party 
committee, the major authority of the city, told him: "We cannot go on living like this. 
513 Vitaliev, V. (1990) Special Correspondent: Investigating in the Soviet Union. London: Hutchinson. 
229 
The town is being swamped by prostitutes from all over country. "S 14 His words were 
confirmed by the local police chief who said, "the foreigners come to us asking to be 
protected from the prostitutes. But what can we do? " In fact, the police were practically 
helpless, because there were no laws against prostitution due to its ideological non- 
existence in the Soviet Union. 
Vitaliev conducted some interviews with prostitutes and published the story "The 
Plague of Love", which triggered thousands of letters and opened this formerly forbidden 
topic for further research. Manyjournalists started to write about prostitution. For 
example, the daily MoskovsAy Komsomolets published an article on famous Moscow 
prostitutes Blokha (the Flea) and Yaponka (the Japanese girl). 
However, Vitaliev admitted that it caused two unexpected results. First, this topic 
became tiresome to readers because of numerous publications. Secondly, many of the 
published stories described advantages of the life of prostitutes - restaurants, good cars 
and earnings far beyond of the reach of the common Soviet people. As a result, some 
women wrote to editorial offices of newspapers and asked to tell them more how to 
become prostitutes. A group of girls asked the Literaturnaya Gazeta to publish their call 
to the public authorities in order to allow their group to open a prostitutes' cooperative. 
(Cooperatives were a form of legal private economic activity in Gorbachev's Russia). 
These unexpected consequences forced Vitaliev to publish a story in The Journalist (the 
major magazine of Soviet journalists) in which he asked journalists to focus on negative 
aspects of the life of prostitutes. 
7. ZZ Alexander Khinshtein 
Alexander Evseevich Khinshtein is another prominent Russian investigative journalist. 
Khinshtein started his career in 1993 as a free licence j ournalist for the daily Moskovsky 
Komsomolets when he was seventeen years old. Although he did not have a degree in 
journalism at that time, he was included in the staff of the newspaper and became the 
editor of the section Incidents. Eventually, Khinshtein graduated from Moscow State 
University with a degree in journalism. At present, Khinshtein is an advisor to the editor- 
514 Ibid. 
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in-chief of this newspaper 
515 
and the anchorman of the popular television show Secret 
Materials, the joint project of the TVTS (Moscow television channel) and the daily 
516 Moskovsky Komsomolets. 
Khinshtein focuses on corruption in the Russian officialdom and criminal 
activities of Russian oligarchs. Khinshtein is well known because many of his stories 
triggered political scandals and resulted in launching criminal investigations. Some 
officials such as General A. Starovoytov (Director General of FAPSI) and V. Serov, a 
vice-premier of the Russian goverment, were dismissed after his publications. 
Khinshtein's most well-known story included some pieces of the recorded 
telephone conversation between Chubais and Ilushin concerning the situation when the 
security men guarding the White House (the House of the Russian Government) held 
several officers of the presidential team after they attempted to smuggle out a box holding 
US$ 500,000. It was the first publication of talks between high-ranking members of 
Russian officialdom and it had a huge impact on the following widespread use of 
compromising stories for obtaining political dividends. 517 
Another noteworthy Khinshtein investigation was on corruption in the Federal 
Department of Governmental Telecommunication (FAPSI). This department was 
responsible for all telecommunication in the Russian government, including recording, 
coding and decoding incoming messages. Khinshtcin discovered a lot of evidence 
pointing to corruption in this department and published an article about it in his 
ncwspaper. 518 As a result of this publication, General Starovoytov, one of the heads of 
FAPSI, was dismissed. 
Khinshtein revealed illegal methods of the protection company Atoll and 
described how some high-ranking officials got richer from the illegal dealings with State 
Short-Loan Deposits, which ended with the rouble collapse on 17 August 1998. Also, 
515 Brezhnev, A. (1997) "Alexander Khinshtein Politicheskie Rassledovania Vsegda Strashniy Risk" 
I Political Investigation are always risky], Pressa, No. 3. 16 This show is about political scandals and criminal investigations. Also, it has demonstrated some 
achievements of law enforcement agencies in Russia and Belarus. 
Programs oftelevision company YV Centre, (URL http: //www. tvc. nL/programs/sccret. html, (consulted on 
10.07.2003). 
517 Khinshtein, A. (1996) "Golosuy ili... Anatoly Chubais: 'No mi zhe ikh tuda poslali eti korobki nosit s 
millionami... [Vote or... Anatoly Chyabais: "After all, we ordered them to carry these boxes with money"], 
MoskovskyKomsomolets, 15.11.1996. 
518 Brezhnev, "Alexander Khinshtein: Politicheskie rassledovania vsegda strashniy risk". 
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Khinshtein wrote about Berezovsky's illegal business transactions which involved the 
firms Aeroflot and Andava, as well as about Berezovsky's alleged links to Chechen 
criminal syndicates. 
One of Khinshtein's stories "A bomb for the governor"was about the alleged plot 
of the enemies of Boris Gromov, the governor of Moscow Oblast, to replace him. In this 
story he published several audio recordings made by a Russian special unit. According to 
these records, Nasima Stolyarova, a member of the Commission for Electoral Practices 
Studies (one of the commissions of the State Duma), apparently have agreed to modify 
the results of the governor's election for some districts of the Moscow oblast in favour of 
the Gromov's adversary, who seemed to have promised to pay this dirty business. 519 
When Khinshtein was asked about his journalistic job, he said that moral values 
are important to him and that he is proud of his work, not because of the money, but 
because he is contributing to the betterness of society. Otherwise he would be "digging 
up rubbish bins. " Khinshtein revealed that he starts a new investigation by finding out 
who might benefit from the results of this research. He checks out whether other people 
are involved in a similar investigation and estimates whether he will remain independent 
from any powerful actors. According to Khinshtein, he does not take money for 
publishing his stories because it is against his moral values and he is afraid of losing 
independence. 
Khinshtein pointed out that he prefers to carry out his investigations 
independently during all its stages. For example, he started his investigation on 
corruption in the Russian White House (the House of the Russian government) 520 when 
he discovered a memo written by the security department of the Presidential 
administration about an involvement of a high-ranking official of the White House with 
the business of a German firm. Although this memo alone would have been sufficient for 
many journalists to write a story, Khinshtein decided to explore the facts. He found the 
man in Germany who negotiated with this Russian official, met with him, and obtained 
written evidence that the Russian official had taken a huge sum of money for his service. 
519 Lustritsky, D. (2002) "Sensatsia po moskovsky" [Sensation a la Moscow], Voslochno-Sibirsk-aya 
Pravda, 20 (24154), 31.01.2002. 
520 Khinshtein, A. (1999) "Skelet iz Belogo Domaý' [A skeleton from the White House], Mosk-ovsky 
Komsomolefs. 
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In addition, Khinshtein obtained other evidence, including some records of the official's 
telephone conversations. This allowed Khinshtein to write and publish in the daily 
Moskovsky Komsomolets a huge scandalous tory "A Skeleton from the White House. 021 
In July 2005, Khinshtein published the story "An ascetic with a look at the 
522 Kremlin" accusing Kasyanov, the former Russian Prime-Minister, of corruption. The 
investigative journalist claimed that Kasyanov purchased a luxury accommodation in 
Troitsa-Likovo, an elite Moscow district, almost for nothing. Khinshtein insisted that 
Kasyanov paid 11 million rubles (E230,000) for the property occupying 11,5 hectares 
while only one hectare of the district had market value of E1,67 million. He published 
two documents and identified the scheme showing how the former Prime Minister had 
become the owner of the valuable piece of land. On the basis of the story, the Russian 
Prosecutor Office started a probe into the privatisation of the property. 523 
It is evident that such an activity might cause serious problems for a journalist. 
Khinshtein noted that FAPSI tried to prove that he had been working for the Russian FSB 
(the Federal Security Service) and attempted to gather any information regarding 
Khinshtein's bank accounts in Western banks, but they did not succeed in their search. 
Also, Khinshtein was sued over his stories. For example, after his article "General 
Kuptsov's Brotherhood" was published in the newspaper Versia [A Look], Kuptsov sued 
Khinshtein for US$ 20,000. 
The Investigative Committee of MVD (The Ministry of the Interior) launched an 
inquiry into Khinshtein's illegal possession and use of fabricated documents. On 18 May 
1999, Khinshtein was stopped by traffic police officers for a routine check. According to 
the officers' report, Khinshtein showed them a document N 03726, which was issued for 
Alexander Matveyev, an officer of the Administration of Criminal Department of GUVD, 
with Khinshtein's photo. In addition, they discovered that he had an ID of the Press 
Secretary of Moscow Custom Department (with a licence which allows him to carry 
guns), an ID of a consultant of the Secretariat of the State Duma (the Russian Parliament) 
and an ID of an advisor to the deputy to the Chairman of Moscow Oblast Duma (the 
52 1 Brezhnev, "Alexander Khinshtein: Politicheskie rassledovania vsegda strashniy risk". 
522 Khinshtein, A. (2005) "Asket s vidom na Kreml" [An ascetic with a look at the Kremlin], Mosk-ovsky 
Komsomolets, No. 28,6-13.07.2005, pp. 4,5. 523 Khinshtein, A. (2005) "Premyemiy fars" [Prime-Minister' farse], Moskovsky Komsomolets, 20- 
27.07.2005, No. 29, pp. 4,5. 
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Legislative Assembly of Moscow Borough). If Khinshtein was found guilty, he could 
have been jailed for 2 years. 524 
Some Russian mass media organisations published compromising stories 
regarding Khinshtein. For example, Khinshtein had some problems after he had published 
the story about the plot against the Governor of Moscow oblast. In this article he implied 
that the results of the governor's election were modified by the committee which made 
final decisions on all aspects of election in Russia. Khinshtein's findings were criticised 
by journalists from Vostochnaya Pravda, who interviewed Vikor Ignatenko, the 
Chairmen of the Electoral Commission in Irkutsk (which was mentioned in the records 
published by Khinshtein). In the interview, Ignatenko denied that there were any 
misdoings during the election in Irkutsk and said that although some of the members of 
the above-mentioned commission visited Irkutsk during the governor's election, they did 
not intervene in the election. Consequently, Vostochnaya Pravda argued that the results 
of the election were accurate and Khinshtein's allegation was founded on faulty 
information. 525 
Another example is concerned with the documents regarding Khinshtein which 
were delivered to Mikhail Lesin, the head of the Russian Press Ministry, and the Agency 
of the Press and News (APN) on 25 November 1999. According to these documents, 
Khinshtein was a mental patient. Lesin forwarded these documents to the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Ministry of Health. The Agency ofthe Press 
and News decided not to reveal these documents because they thought that even if the 
documents were accurate, they were irrelevant. 526 
Khinshtein understands that his profession is very dangerous. However, he said 
that he forgets about the fear when he realises that the people who threaten him preclude 
the development of Russia. He said: "These people do not deserve to be feared. " 
Although he did not need any support and had neither gun nor protection suit, he had a lot 
of ftiends who could protect hiM. 527 
524 "Khinshtein skrivaetsia ot sledstviya" [Khinshtein is hiding from prosecution], Lenta. ru, 31.12.1999, (URL http: //www. lenta. ru/russia/1999/12/31/hinshtein/, consulted on 10 July, 2002). $25 Lustritsky, "Sensatsia po moskovsky". 526 (1999) "Moskovskyjournalist Alexander Khinshtein 
- 
shizofrennik" [Moscow's journalist Alexander 
Khinshtein is a mental patient], Agency ofPress and News, 25.11.1999. 527 Brezhnev, "Alexander Khinshtein: Politicheskie rassledovania vsegda strashniy risk". 
234 
There are rumours that Khinshtein has strong links to the special units of Russian 
law enforcement agencies (MUR, RUBOP and the FSB), and that his stories are based on 
materials gathered by them. 528 Some people believe that it might be true. For example, 
during a discussion on the question whether an official has to resign after being charged 
with corruption, 529 Khinshtein replied that Russian corrupt officials do not resign. On the 
contrary, they organise what special law enforcement agencies call "an active 
involvement. " This reply made Evgenia Alabats, an active opponent of the KGB and the 
FSB, conclude that Khinshtein himself belonged to this camp (otherwise, how did he 
know this specific term? ) There is no evidence whether it is true or not, but it is a fact that 
many Khinshtein's stories are based on materials possessed by special law enforcement 
units. 
On the contrary, Khinshtein insists on his independency and argues that 
journalists should not be the tool of politicians or criminal businessmen, who have 
managed to capture the power in Russia. He considers his newspaper, the daily 
Moskovsky Komsomolets, to be the most independent because it does not belong to any of 
the Russian financial or industrial groups. 530 Khinshtein is certain that a common 
taxpayer should know how state officials spend his money and the mass media should 
infonn him about this. And Khinshtein believes that this will help Russia to become a 
democratic state with a strong economy and efficient law enforcement agencies. 
It should be noted after reviewing biographies and investigative practices of the 
two of the Russian investigative journalists that investigative journalism can be more 
plausible when investigations are carried out by a team ofjournalists. The next section of 
this chapter reviews one of the teams of investigative journalists which is called the 
Agency of Investigative Reporters. 
528 Lustritsky, "Sensatsia po moskovsk-/'. 
"9 This show was aired next day after Khinshtein had published his story about US$ 500,000 taken from 
the White House. 
530 Brezhnev, "Alexander Khinshtein: Politicheskie rassleclovania vsegda strashniy risle'. 
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7.23. The AIR 
-Agency of Investigative Reporters andAndrey Konstantinov 
The Agency of Investigative Reporters (AIR) was created in May 1996 by St. Petersburg 
journalist and writer Andrey Konstantinov. It was a new type of media organisation 
specifically focused on finding and reporting news on crime, political scandals, organised 
crime and corruption. Nowadays almost fiftyjournalists work for this agency. 
The structure of the agency reflects its mission: it consists of several departments. 
The investigative department analyses political and socio economic events in St. 
Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast. This department has produced a number of studies 
on the regional economy, as well as on big financial and industrial groups, including 
criminal syndicates. The complicated criminal cases and corruption scandals are of 
special interest to the department. Its staff consists of former law enforcement officers 
who are able to investigate very sophisticated crimes. 
The efficient work of the investigative department could have been hardly 
possible without support from the information department. The information department 
maintains a data base with information regarding leading St. Petersburg politicians and 
businessmen. The responsibility of the information department is to gather important data 
and to input it into the data base. 
This data is collected from both primary and secondary sources. While the 
information department relays on stories published or aired by the other Russian mass 
media organisations, all efforts are made to verify the data reported in these stories. For 
this purpose the Agency has recruited a crew of reporters. 
The reporters are the vital force for gathering information from primary sources as 
well. They have links to both influential people and common citizens of St. Petersburg. In 
addition, AIR uses the latest communicational and technological innovations. For 
example, its personnel used pagers and mobile phones significantly earlier than it became 
common in St. Petersburg. This allows the AIR to have first hand information about the 
key events in St. Petersburg and the leading Russian mass media increasingly often 
rebroadcast the news from St. Petersburg reported by the Agency. 
The agency provides legal, political and socio-economic consulting for its clients 
and for the mass media. It has consulted many foreign media organisations such as 
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Focus, Newsweek, Vanity Fair, Figaro, Stern, Hokaydo Simbun, Kiodo Tzucin. The 
assistance of the US State Department helped the AIR to open the Consulting Centre for 
Foreign Journalists in St. Petersburg. 
The AIR is also involved in many academic activities. Its staff has given 
presentations about Russian organised crime at international conferences in the UK, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Norway. Also, the agency participated in special workshops in 
Istanbul, Yerevan, Tallinn, Kiev and Stockholm. 
The AIR assists to educate investigative journalists in many Russian regions. Its 
personnel is often invited to deliver lectures and seminars for students and journalists 
nationwide. Tberc are especially strong links between the AIR and the school of 
journalism at St. Petersburg State University. AIR's personnel gave its first course on 
investigative journalism for the students of this school in 1999 and this course is still an 
essential part of its academic programme. 
In 2000 the agency was awarded a grant by the Soros Fund to coordinate 4 
workshops for journalists on the methods ofjoumalistic investigations. This grant 
included internships and the publication of the first Russian textbook on the techniques of 
journalistic investigation. That helped the AIR to provide training for investigative 
journalists from other Russia's regions. Another grant was given to conduct workshops 
on investigative journalism in St. Petersburg, Rostov and Nizniy Novgorod. 
The AIR has a good reputation in the informational and publishing market of St. 
Petersburg and the North-Western region of Russia. It daily produces and sends to its 
clients a summary of major St. Petersburg events with focus on accidents and crimes 
committed in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad oblast. Every week its Department of 
Reporters sends its subscribers nearly 100 new reports. 
The Agency of Investigative Reporters has been publishing the monthly criminal 
review Your Secret Adviser since October 1999. This newspaper is based on the stories 
provided by departments of the agency and includes reports on assassinations committed 
in St. Petersburg, analytical reviews of St. Petersburg criminal syndicates, and chapters 
from books Gangsters'Petersburg, Corrupt Petersburg, and Knavish Petersburg. 
The agency has published several books. Most of them are written by Andrey 
Konstantinov, the head of the agency. Konstantinov and Swedish journalist Malcolm 
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Dixelius wrote the book Russia's Gangland, which was published twice in Sweden. Also, 
he is the author of Gangsters'Petersburg, Advocate, Advocate-2, Journalist, Journalist- 
2, Inventor and Inventor-2. 
Konstantinov together with Alexander Novikov published novels Specialist, 
Ultimatum to Petersburg's Governor, Prisoner and Cop. The estimated edition of 
Konstantinov's books is more than 10 million copies. The other personnel of the agency 
have also contributed to the publications of some books such as Corrupt Petersburg and 
Gangsters'Russia, Corrupt Petersburg-2 and Knavish Petersburg. They are based on the 
evidence collected by the AIR. In 2000, the agency published the book Agency "A 
Golden bullet. " This book consists of detective stories written by investigative journalists 
of an imaginary agency 
- 
the prototype of the AIR. 
The Agency of Investigative Reporters tries to follow the latest developments in 
communication technologies in order to publish its stories. For example, in 2001 the 
agency created its own news website which represents the viewpoint of the agency on 
noteworthy events taking place in St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia. The content 
of this website includes crime stories and reports about political, economic and cultural 
events. Diversity and the quality of the stories published on this website have made this 
news server popular among St. Petersburg residents. 
The agency has gained access to Russian television. The leading Russian 
television channels have become interested in some stories published by the AIR. NTV 
offered Konstantinov the chance to write the script for the serial Gangster's Petersburg. 
This serial, which was based on Konstantinov's books, was broadcast by NTV in 2001. 
The serial was popular and many of its episodes were video-taped and sold throughout 
Russia and abroad. 53 1 The book The Agency of "Golden Bullet" was also screened and 
broadcast by Russian national channels and NTV International in 2002. 
The Agency has received a number of rewards. In 1999, its news service was 
awarded with the Golden pen 
- 
98, the major annual St. Petersburg's journalistic 
competition. The weekly Your Secret Adviser gained the first prize in the same category 
in April 2000. Three AIR's officers, including its director, were given awards by the 
Russian government for finding Alexander Malish, who was allegedly involved in the 
531 Interview with Pavel, a Latvian entrepreneur, London, October, 2000. 
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assassination of Viktor Novoselov, a member of the St. Petersburg Legislative 
Assembly. 532 
Let us review this investigation in depth. This story is worth mentioning due to 
two reasons. First, it refers to the killing of one of the most influential and high-ranking 
St. Petersburg politicians. The second reason is the fact that journalists of the agency 
found the suspect who committed this murder while law enforcement agencies (and 
gangsters) did not manage to do so. 
Viktor Novoselov was killed on 20 October 2000 at about 9 am. After the news 
became known, three AIR's officers arrived at the scene of the murder by 11 am. They 
immediately found out from the people who stayed there that Novoselov, a member of St. 
Petersburg Legislative Assembly, left his house on Moskovsky Prospect [Moscow Road] 
and was placed on the front seat of his Volvo-940 (Novoselov was not able to walk and 
had to use a trolley for disabled people). This trolley was placed into the luggage 
compartment of the car. Novoselov's bodyguard and servant also boarded the car. The car 
slowly moved along Frunze Street and stopped in front of traffic lights next to 
Moskovsky Prospect. 
At that moment, a young man appeared nearby, threw a package onto the top of 
the car, and ran away. The package proved to be an explosive. It blew apart the car, 
killing Novoselov and severely injuring his driver. The bodyguard managed to get out of 
the car and shoot the man in the neck. The injured man was quickly caught. Witnesses of 
this incident reported that the arrested youngster seemed to signal another man. The 
police checked the second man, discovered a strange wire devise, and arrested him. 
The Press Unit of GUVD (the St. Petersburg Headquarters of the Russian Interior 
Ministry) and St. Petersburg radio stations reported that the injured arrested man died 
soon afterwards. However, the officers of the AIR doubted that it was the case. They 
knew the description of the wound and suspected that the information reported by the 
Press Unit of GUVD was false. AIR's journalists decided to verify whether it was true or 
not and moved towards the closest infirmary. 
532 This section is based on interviews, AIR's analytical documents, and publications in Vash Tayniy 
Sovetnik [(2002) "Mi iskali Malisha dva mesiatsa i nashli" [We hunted Malish for two months and found 
him], Vash Tayniy Sovetnik [Your secret adviser], No. 2,3,4]. 
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Although the personnel of the infirmary rejected to confirm the hospitalisation of 
any shot man, the AIR's officers decided to continue their search. They managed to enter 
the infirmary and heard a story told in a smoking room regarding a man who had been 
delivered to the hospital by law enforcement officers. It was evident from the talk that the 
man either had been transported to another place or would quite soon be. However his 
future destination was unclear. 
AIR's investigators assumed that if the man was still alive he would be delivered 
to the special military hospital and they immediately headed for it. They stopped next to 
the military hospital's entrance and saw that a man was being taken inside the hospital by 
law enforcement officers a short time afterwards. 
The next day, the further verification that the man delivered to the hospital was a 
criminal suspect was obtained, when some AIR officers visited a special hospital for 
prisoners. After talking with personnel, AIR officers managed to find out that the man 
had been transported from a military hospital to the prison hospital the previous evening. 
This allowed them to assume that the man who had killed Novoselov was alive in spite of 
reports about his death. 533 
On 20 October 2000 at 4 pin, another AIR team started gathering data about the 
second arrested man. It took about two hours to find out the name of this suspect 
- 
Nikolay Petrov. This information allowed the investigators to quickly find his address in 
St. Petersburg. They immediately went to his place. 
Before going to Petrov's flat, the investigators decided to talk to his neighbours. 
They did not reveal the real purpose of their visit and told an old woman who lived 
nearby that they were journalists interested in finding out some details about a fraudulent 
firm controlled by a Nikolay Petrov. They said they wanted to find him and consequently 
needed to check whether this Nikolay Petrov was the person they were looking for. The 
woman confirmed that a person with the surname Petrov and his mother were registered 
at this address but only the mother was living there. 
The investigators rang the bell. A robust man opened the door and asked them 
who they wanted to talk to. Investigative reporters said that they would like to talk to 
533 (2002) "Mi iskali Malisha dva mesiatsa i nashli" [We hunted Malish for two months and found him], 
Vash Tayniy Sovetnik [Your secret adviser], No. 2. 
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Nikolay Petrov and the man invited them inside and asked their identities. In turn, the 
journalists asked the man who he was. He replied: "The FSB" (the Russian FBI). There 
were a lot of people inside the flat 
- 
four FSB agents, a detective, and some other 
persons. They did not tell anything to the journalists, did not allow them to interview 
Petrov's mother, and politely ushered them out. 
On 20 October 2000 at 9 pm, the investigative reporters made an attempt to 
identify the first (hospitalised) man. They gained some reports that his surname might be 
Gusinsky. Then they were informed that his name was Artur and his surname was either 
Buzkov or Guzkov. According to official data, nobody with this surname was living in St. 
Petersburg. However, because the name Artur is not common in Russia, the reporters 
decided to continue their search for name by trying similar surnames 
- 
Kuzkov, 
Guskov... and succeeded to find Artur Gudkov, who was born in Belarus in 1966, and 
registered living in a dormitory in Sosnovy Bor, a St. Petersburg suburb. 
On 21 October at 10 am, the investigative journalists discovered a new piece of 
information about Gudkov. Gudkov had been working as a security man for the 
protection company Ycsaul since 1995. He had been involved in a criminal inquiry for 
grievous bodily harm but was cleared in 1997. In 1998, Gudkov was placed on the federal 
wanted list over the extortion and murder of the director of the plant Severnaia Zvezda 
[The Northern Star]. The journalists managed to find some details of the incident and 
learnt that it happened after the traffic accident involving Gudkov's and the director's 
cars. At the end of the dispute regarding this accident, Gudkov took his gun and shot dead 
the director. 534 
On 21 October at 2 pm, the agency discovered that Petrov had been charged with 
robbery, and its reporters immediately moved to the court to learn the details of the case 
before it would be taken by the FSB. The agency printed official request and the judge 
allowed the reporters to read the details of this case. It followed from the document that it 
was not an especially serious crime: Petrov, along with his friend, extorted a cheap watch 
from an old man in 1995 and was sentenced to 4 years but later allowed to leave the 
prison in 1997. Some youngsters from Petrov's class in school were witnesses in the trial. 
534 Konstantinov, A. (2004) Zhurnalistkoe Rrassledovanie: Istoriya Methoda i Sovremennaya Prakika 
[Investigative journalism: the history of the method and current practice]. St. Petersburg: Olma-Press, p. 
396. 
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While the reporters were reading this document there was a call from FSB agents who 
said that they were going to pick up Petrov's file. 
On 21 October at 6 pm, the team of investigators found the witnesses involved in 
Petrov's trial and interviewed them. In addition the experts of the agency checked all 
available information from special data bases regarding Petrov's biography and law 
infiringements. There was nothing of special interest 
- 
once he had been held by the 
underground security because of smoking in the Metro and another day he had been 
stopped by traffic police because of erratic driving. Since 1999, Petrov had been working 
for the car repair firm All-Motors, which was situated very close to the place of the 
murder. 
On 22 October at 10 am, the journalists visited the firm All-Motors and talked to 
its managers. The managers described Petrov as an expert and claimed that it was very 
unlikely that he was able to use the equipment of the firm to produce an explosive device. 
Petrov always worked together with other people and it seemed that he did not keep any 
secrets from them. In addition, none of the managers and workers of the firm saw Petrov 
with people looking like bandits. 
The managers were aware of what Petrov did the day before and in the morning of 
Novoselov's murder. On 19 October Petrov finished his work very late and then moved 
to the home of his parents. In the morning he went to the work as usual at 9.30. He 
carried a package with a telephone which he had promised somebody to repair. Petrov's 
partners believed that he might have been at the place of the murder by chance and was 
rather a witness than a killer. They assumed that when he had heard shooting, he would 
only instinctively have increased his pace and it was enough for the police to arrest him. 
On 22 October at 5 pm, AIR investigators talked to Petrov's girlfriend. She 
insisted that Petrov could not be involved in this killing. She told them that he was 
satisfied with his life and loved his job. Although Petrov was not very rich, he always had 
enough money to live. His only real fear was being sentenced again. 
The journalists reviewed all of this evidence and concluded Petrov could not be 
charged with the murder and might be free in ten days when his preliminary term in 
custody expired. This conclusion was correct and Petrov was soon a free man. 
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Investigative reporters gathered data about the second man involved in the 
Novoselov killing. They discovered that he had registered two vehicles 
-a lorry Ural - 
3 75 (1982) and a car Mazda 
- 
323 (1994). The journalists asked an inspector of the 
GIBBD (State Inspection of Safety of the Highways) to check the history of the Mazda 
and found that this car had been involved in a series of accidents between 1996 and 1998. 
The most interesting point of these accidents was that they happened when this car was 
driven by Tumentsev Vasily. The investigators had already come across this name, as 
they had data of law enforcement agencies that he was the leader of Tumentsevsky 
criminal syndicate in Sosnovy Bor, a suburb of St. Petersburg. 
On 22 October at 6 pm, the journalists found a friend of Novoselov. This friend, 
an influential St. Petersburg businessman, was connected to some lords of organised 
crime. The j oumalists arranged a meeting with him and asked him whether he was aware 
of the fact that Tumentsev drove the car of the man who had thrown the bomb at 
Novoselov's car. He was extremely surprised and phoned to Tumentsev. In addition, he 
agreed to give Tumentsev's telephone number to the journalists. 
On 22 October at 7 pm, the journalists phoned to Tumentsev and arranged a 
meeting in Sosnovy Bor. The journalists were in a hurry to interview Tumentsev, because 
they knew that law enforcement agencies could find and arrest him quite soon. 
On 22 October at 9 pm, the investigative reporters met Tumentsev, a short robust 
man wearing a sport jacket. 535 They told Tumentsev that they knew that he had used 
Gudkov's car. He confirmed that he and his wife used this car. Tumentsev also said that 
he had been asked about this a year before, when Gudkov had killed another man. 
However, he insisted that he had a license to use the car and that he did not have any 
links to Gudkov. 
The journalists were very surprised and told him so. He replied that he was 
acquainted with Gudkov because Gudkov worked there as a karate and boxing coach, 
training young people in Sosnovy Bor almost for free. He said that they provided him 
with sport facilities and were very satisfied with what Gudkov did for youngsters of 
Sosnovy Bor. In addition, Gudkov helped to organise the aviation festivals for the local 
people. 
535 Tumentsev used to be a boxer. 
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To his knowledge, Gudkov worked as a bodyguard for the company Yesayl, the 
major protection provider of Sosnovy Bor, and tried to avoid conflicts with anybody. 
Nevertheless, the involvement of Gudkov in the murders caused many problems for 
Turnentsev and he did not want anyone linking him to Gudkov again. If the journalists 
wanted to find out more information regarding Gudkov, Tumentsev recommend them to 
talk to Marina, Gudkov's wife. 
On 22 October at 10 pm, the investigative reporters moved into the dormitory 
where Gudkov and his wife were registered and found out that it had already been 
searched and sealed by law enforcement agencies. The journalists learnt that the officers 
of law enforcement agencies had discovered a few radio transmitters. However, it was 
evident that Gudkov had not lived in the dormitory for a long time. 
The journalists decided to talk to Gudkov's neighbours. The neighbours liked 
Gudkov because he was entertaining at parties, playing guitar and accordion. He left the 
dormitory after his first murder one year ago and nobody had seen him since. The 
journalists asked for Gudkov's wife telephone number, phoned to her, and arranged a 
meeting. 
Marina told journalists that she had not seen Artur Gudkov for a long time, but 
she did not think that he could have killed anyone. The j ournalists asked for Gudkov's 
photos and she agreed to bring them to the St. Petersburg office of the AIPL 
The reporters found a videotape that showed Gudkov jumping with a parachute. 
Gudkov's voice on the sound track of the videotape revealed that he had been interested 
in skydiving since he was fifteen, and he dreamt to be enlisted in the paratroops army (the 
Russian elite army). Instead, he had been sent to the military headquarters in Sosnovy 
Bor. Later, he obtained access to his file and discovered a medical record which stated 
that he had been eligible to join any other branch except the paratroopers. 
Gudkov, on the sound track, assumed that somebody in the medical military 
commission had deliberately decided to destroy his life. However, Gudkov decided to 
keep skydiving. In 1997, Gudkov was the runner up in the competition Slabo [Can You 
Do This? ] of the show Sam SebeRezhisser [An Editor for Himselfl. 
On 25 October, the investigative reporters went to the voenkomat (the military 
recruitment centre) and checked whether the medical military commission could 
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officially assess anybody to be eligible to join any other army except the paratroopers. 
They were told that it was a normal practice of military doctors. If a man was not strong 
enough (for example, if he was short and weighed less than 50 kg) he would not be 
allowed to join the paratroopers. Consequently, Gudkov's complaint was not entirely 
justified. 
On 26 October, the j ournalists learnt that Marina Gudkova had changed her mind 
and decided not to give Gudkov's photos due to her uncertainty about whether or not the 
reporters were not criminals. 
On 28 October, the investigative reporters decided to ask Gudkov's photos from 
Gudkov's neighbours. The neighbours had many of them. The most interesting point of 
these photos was that Gudkov was pictured among different cars in some of them. There 
were about ten different cars. The journalists wrote down the number plates of those cars. 
However, the neighbours said that Gudkov drove only two of the cars 
- 
grey VAZ 2109 
and red VAZ 2108. 
On 29 October, the reporters decided to check histories of Gudkov's cars. The 
records of the grey VAZ 2109 did not lead anywhere. However, the red VAZ 2108 was a 
very remarkable car. It was driven by Malish [The Little Man], a man who often 
accompanied Gudkov. Malish was not the owner of the car but drove it on the basis of an 
agreement, which allowed him to do so. Another interesting detail was that Malish had 
sold the red VAZ 2108 just a few days before Novoselov's murder. The new owner of the 
car (Malish's acquaintance) immediately moved to Ukraine. 
On 31 October, the investigative reporters found out that Alexander Malish was 
born in 1963 and registered in Sosnovy Bor. Apparently he used to be a paratrooper and 
worked as a skydiving instructor in Sosnovy Bor. Then Malish worked for the firm 
Kaskad in Petergoff. In 1994, Malish and companions established NAB-TID Ltd, a trade 
and transport firm. 
The most interesting finding was that Malish had been on the wanted list due to 
his involvement in the murder of Lev Toper, the general director of Ltd Europe. Toper 
was an owner of TOO Topmix, Ltd Toper Firma, and Regional Advertising Agency, 
which placed outdoor advertising in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad Oblast. Regional 
Advertising Agency signed a large contract for the advertising campaign of the beer Vena 
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in St. Petersburg. Toper's corpse was discovered next to his home in Griboedov's 
Embankment on 26 May 1999. The detectives determined that he was killed. In other 
words, the same red VAZ 2108 was used by two men who both were on the wanted list 
due to their involvement in different killings. 
On I November, law enforcement agencies admitted that Nikolay Petrov was not 
guilty and released him. On the other hand, Gudkov was charged with Novoselov's 
murder. In other words, the law enforcement agents confirmed that Gudkov was still 
alive. However, they did not confirm the possible involvement of Malish in Novoselov's 
murder. 
On 5 November, the sources in Moscow helped the investigative reporters solve 
the existing dilemma of how the criminals had managed to run the red traffic light when 
Novoselov crossed the intersection. In fact, Malish and Gudkov waited at that 
intersection for several days. During this time, there was always a green light when 
Novoselov's car approached the intersection, and the car crossed without any problems. 
On 20 October, however, there was a red light and Novoselov's car was forced to stop, 
whereby Gudkov placed the bomb on the top of the car. 
On 8 November, the journalists found out what Gudkov told the investigators of 
law enforcement agencies. He admitted his involvement in this murder as well as in a 
number of other killings. However, Gudkov did not know whom he had killed and was 
not able to identify his victims. He claimed that he had been driven to the intersection and 
was told to murder a man in the Volvo. 
On 9 November at 3 pm, the investigative reporters realised that Malish was a 
very important person and increased their efforts to find him. They contacted Malish's 
acquaintances, requesting to talk to Malish regarding a very important matter, and 
arranged a meeting with the acquaintances. 
On 9 November at 7 pm, the journalists arrived to the flat and discovered that 
during their phone call Malish had been staying there but left immediately after this call 
because he was afraid of being arrested by the police. The acquaintances did not know 
about Malish's involvement in Novoselov's murder. They said that Malish arrived at the 
end of October (after the murder) and asked them to accommodate him. 
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On 10 November, the investigative reporters discovered that law enforcement 
agencies were also searching for Malish. In addition, they found data that Malish was 
linked to organised crime syndicates. He was a soldier of Lomonosovskay organised 
crime group, which was headed by German Misailov. Misailov was an influential man in 
the St. Petersburg underworld, not least because he married a relative of Alexander 
Malishev, the lord of one of the most powerful crime syndicates. 
However, Malish encountered serious problems when Andrey Borovikov, his 
brigadir (commanding officer), was gunned down on 21 October 1994. He was not 
accepted by the major criminal clans and was not able to earn enough money to live. 
Malish's acquaintance said that Malish had no more than US $ 3,000, half of which was 
the money which he gained from selling his car. 536 
The journalists started to investigate contacts between Gudkov and Malish and 
discovered that they had frequently communicated since the autumn of 1998. The 
journalists found the number of Gudkov's pager and examined incoming messages. It 
was a digital pager and many messages consisted of a set of numbers. For example, there 
were the following messages 
On 30 July at 16.22 
- 
514-58- [ 
... 
] 
On 3 August at 9.32 
- 
111-13-30 
On 10 September at 14.51 
- 
03-12 
On 7 October at 11.01 
- 
01-25 
20 October 
- 
the day of Novoselov's murder 
On 21 October at 17.40 and at 17.55 
- 
15-117 
On 27 October from 13.59 to 15.39 
- 
15-117-510 (5 times) 
The journalists discovered the meaning of these messages by decoding them with 
the common pager code. For example, 117 means "call me", 5 10 
- 
"urgent", III- "not 
available at the moment", and so on. The message 15-117-5 10 
- 
could mean "number 
fifteen is asking to call him urgently" and 111-13-30 
- 
could mean "I am busy until 
13.30. "
536 In fact, the history of the murder seemed to prove that the contract killers did not earn much in Russia. 
Malish and Gudkov were rather common people who could not go to expensive restaurants. According to 
the information of the Agency, the killers of Novoselov earned no more than $500 each. 
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However, this code did not allow the j ournalists to understand some messages 
because they apparently needed a different code. The journalists understood that 01 
referred to Gudkov, and 03 
- 
to the third man, who could have been involved in the 
murder. The journalists forwarded the message 320-66-88-117-510-604 to Malish's 
pager. It meant "call me urgently because you need help. " However, Malish did not reply 
to the message. 
537 
What to do next? The journalists knew that Malish changed his car, the SIM card 
of his mobile phone and house. They knew that Malish's new car was officially registered 
under Viktor Kalashnikov, a fiiend of Malish. However, it was not enough to find him. 
The investigative reporters started to analyse possible variants. They assumed that if 
Malish belonged to a criminal syndicate, the criminal lords would either help him to 
change his ID and address, or kill him. However, it was evident that Malish did not earn 
much money. This allowed the journalists to assume that Malish did not belong to any 
organised crime group (they usually support their members when they are in trouble). So 
Malish apparently tried to avoid even his possible accomplices or the people who ordered 
him to kill Novoselov. 
The journalists were aware of rumours which circulated in Sosnovy Bor. There 
were some talks that Kumarin (the leader of Tambovskaia organiscd crime group) found 
out that Malish belonged to the criminal syndicate of Kostia Mogila and had a hard talk 
with Mogila about this. Mogila is said to have promised to find Malish and to give him 
over to Kumarin. In other words, Malish became the target of many forces 
- 
the FSB, 
GUVD, the Tambovskaia organised crime group, and Kostia Mogila, the alleged lord of 
Malish's criminal syndicate. 
The investigative reporters assumed that Malish had a few options in this terrible 
situation. He could talk to the people who ordered him to kill Novoselov, or he could 
reveal himself to law enforcement agencies. However, the journalists thought that he was 
afraid of these options. That is why the journalists recommended him to meet them. They 
published such a request in the magazine Your Secret Advisor. However, Malish did not 
respond to it. 
537 Konstantinov, Zhurnalistkoe Rassledovanie: Istorlya Methoda i Sovremennaya Prak-tik-a, p. 408. 
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The journalists decided to speak to Malish's friends who were not linked to 
organised crime groups at all. They talked to people from the parachute club in Sosnovy 
Bor and found out that Malish not only had a wife but also a girlfriend in St. Petersburg. 
The investigators found the man (Viktor Kalashnikov) who registered the new car 
bought by Malish 
- 
VAZ 2109, and went to him in the dormitory where he lived. 
Kalashnikov confirmed that Malish had visited him two weeks ago and asked to use 
Kalashnikov's shower because his accommodation had no shower. After the talk with 
Kalashnikov, the journalists asked the receptionist about the identity of the man who had 
visited Kalashnikov two weeks ago. The receptionist checked his record and remembered 
that this man had shown him the passport of Dmitry Sokolov. The journalists checked 
data regarding Dmitry Sokolov and discovered that Sokolov lived in the village Nizino, 
and that he had lost his passport a long time ago. The investigative reporters realised that 
Malish was using Sokolov's passport. 
Then the journalists checked St. Petersburg train stations and one of their 
acquaintances who worked there agreed to research whether a Sokolov had bought a train 
ticket. They found that one Sokolov had bought a ticket to Tambov (a regional city far 
away from St. Petersburg). The journalists asked the names of the people who bought 
tickets next to Sokolov in the train and checked their history. They found that one of 
them, Galina Yagodkina, was born in Tambov and worked some time together with 
Malish. Moreover, she had been registered to live in the same dormitory where Malish 
hid during first two weeks after Novoselov's murder. 
The investigative reporters assumed that Malish lived at her place and decided to 
follow Yagodkina. She worked for a shop 24 Hours and the journalists arrived at this 
shop when she finished her job. Yagodkina went out and asked for a taxi. The journalists 
offered their help, but she declined and took a taxi. The two cars of the Agency of 
Investigative Reporters followed her, but the first car was stopped by the traffic police 
and the second car missed the taxi. 
The journalists repeated their hunt the next night, but they were told that 
Yagodkina had taken a holiday to visit her relatives. Fortunately, the journalists had 
written down the number-plate of the taxi that drove Yagodkina the previous night and 
they found the driver. He told them the place where she had left his taxi; it was next to 
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the tube station Ladozhskaia, a district of St. Petersburg which is situated a fair distance 
from the city centre. 
The journalists arrived at Ladozhskaia and found out that there were only seven 
houses at this place which did not have water facilities (they remembered that Malish had 
asked Kalashnikov to allow him to use the shower in Kalashnikov's room). The 
journalists decided to walk around the houses and to talk to their residents. They told 
them that they are sociologists carrying out a public opinion survey regarding the coming 
election to the Legislative Assembly. However, only few people agreed to talk and did 
not know anything about their neighbours. The journalists decided to wait in their car in 
the middle of the yard, where they could see everyone who came in and out. 
On 16 December 2000 at 6 pm, they saw a man wearing glasses. At first they did 
not pay much attention to him because he did not look like Malish at all. However, 
Yagodkina went out from the same exit a few minutes later and came to the man. They 
moved towards the market place and the journalists followed them. The investigative 
reporters cautiously approached the couple and recognised that the man was Malish. 
Yagodkina and Malish bought some food with a bottle of vodka and returned home. The 
journalists observed where the light was turned on in the building thereby locating 
Malish's hiding place. 
The investigative reporters decided to check whether somebody else contacted 
Malish at this place and continued their observation for three days until 19 December. 
They saw that Malish left the house several times in order to buy bottles of vodka. In total 
he had bought five bottles of vodka over that period. Apparently, nobody visited him. In 
the evening of 19 December, Malish and Yagodkina left the house and went to the tube 
station. Then Yagodkina took the train while Malish bought another bottle of vodka and 
went back home. 
The journalists decided to talk to him. They knew that it was very unlikely that 
Malish had a gun at the moment but approached him quite closely so as to be able to 
prevent any possible resistance. They stopped him at his door and told him that they were 
neither bandits nor law enforcement officers, but they were journalists who wanted to 
help him. 
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"How can be I sure who you are? " Malish asked. 
"If it was not the case, do you think that we would stay patiently and talk to you? 
"What do you want? " He replied. 
"We want to talk to you. We can go to your flat, but it would be better to go to our office... " 
"And if I decline? "
The journalists did not reply. He repeated the question. 
"Listen, Alexander, you have nothing to do. You will be caught sooner or later. You know 
yourself that Tambovskie are looking for you. But we can offer you help" 
"OK. All the same, I cannot continue to live as I do. I do not know who you really are, but I 
waited for YOU.,, 538 
Malish got into the journalist's car and they drove to the office of the Agency of 
Investigative Reporters. He looked very tired and did not ask any questions on the way. 
At 8 prn the journalists arrived at the office. They interviewed Malish and videotaped this 
interview with Malish's permission. This interview was about Malish's contacts with 
Gudkov and the people who ordered Novoselov's murder. It was also about the reasons 
why Malish was involved in the contract killings. Three hours later, on 20 December 
2000, the investigative reporters invited law enforcement officers and they arrested 
Malish. 539 
7.3. Investigative Journalism on Television 
Most of the investigative stories are covered by the press. However, sometimes crime 
coverage was broadcast on television. This section introduces major investigative 
reporters who work for TV channels: Alexander Nevzorov, Andrey Karaulov and Artem 
Borovik. The section presents their biographies and outlines their views on investigative 
journalism and the political situation in Russia. 
538 (2002) "Mi iskali Malisha dva mesiatsa i nashli" [We hunted Malish for two months and found him], 
Vash Tayniy Sovelnik, No. 4. 
539 Ibid., No. 2,3,4. 
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73.1. A le-xan der Nevzorov 
Nevzorov was the first St. Petersburg reporter who created the television news show 
about crime and corruption in St. Petersburg. This show 600 Seconds was very popular in 
St. Petersburg and even in Moscow at the beginning of the 1990s. It is not entirely clear 
how and where Nevzorov found data and sources for his daily show. Certainly the budget 
of 600 Seconds was not enough to pay the sources. However, it is evident that he 
managed to find necessary money or resources. 
Nevzorov's comments on the show were simple and even rude. Perhaps, 
sometimes he used data without sufficient verification; the daily fonnat of the show and 
the personnel of a few men simply did not allow him to check everything. As a result, 
some people found themselves offended by some of his stories. Nevzorov was involved 
in a number of conflicts and was injured in one of them. Nevertheless, he quickly 
recovered and continued his show. 
The content of Nevzorov's show was increasingly concerned with politics. He 
was clearly very critical of Sobchak, the mayor of St. Petersburg at the time and 
supported Yury Shutov in his campaign against Sobchak at the beginning of 1990s. As 
Nevzorov's show had a huge audience, it was easy for him to mobilise his supporters. 
However, even this support eventually failed and the news programme 600 Seconds was 
finally shut down. 
In his attempt to save his programme, Nevzorov asked his supporters to gather 
and form the civil movement Nashi [Ours People] 
. 
540 The first meeting of this civil 
movement took place in a St. Petersburg yard. This gathering was illegal, or at least, it 
was not officially permitted by St. Petersburg authorities. Despite the late hours and 
almost total darkness due to lack of lighting in the yard, many people waited for 
Nevzorov. Nevzorov, along with his crew, drove into the centre of the yard. To illuminate 
the place of the meeting, a torch was lit. Nevzorov pledged that the next meeting would 
take place in the one of the best palaces. Nevzorov held his promise. The next meeting 
540 In 2004, the same name was used for the organisation of young people who support the Kremlin policy. 
However, it was a completely different organisation. 
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took place next to the Mikhailovsky's castle, which used to be the home of the Russia's 
tsar Pavel. 541 
The civil movement Nashi became a part of the political block that eventually led 
the Russian politics, when Zhirinovsky's Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) gained the 
ma ority in the State Duma. Nevzorov was also elected to the Duma. He moved to 
Moscow and started a number of new TV shows. However, they were not successful and 
ORT finally rejected airing Nevzorov's shows. 542 At present, Nevzorov continues to 
make comments on Russian politics. Although he is not an anchorman of any television 
programme and seems not to work for any of the Russian media organisations, his words 
continue to attract the attention of the mass media in St. Petersburg. 
It is an interesting to note Nevzorov's views on Russian politicians. Although 
Nevzorov was against Yeltsin ten years ago, he started to realise that Yeltsin had been a 
very talented politician. This happened after Yeltsin's resignation. It does not mean that 
Nevzorov thinks that Yeltsin did much good for Russia. "Yeltsin's only benefit to Russia 
was freedom, but anybody else could have given it to us as well. 99543 He believes that 
Yeltsin was just in the right place at the right time. 
Nevzorov thinks that a genius cannot be defined in terms such as goodness or 
badness. He illustrated this by the example of well-known Russian writer Nikolay Gogol. 
Nevzorov argues that despite Gogol's enormous impact on the Russian culture, he 
advertised fraud making. 544 Nevzorov estimates his own achievements using the same 
scale. He admitted that his impact could not be considered entirely positive. He said, "I 
did a terrible thing by editing the show 600 Seconds. I depicted the criminal life as 
541 Observation. 
542 (2000) "Berezovskogo ne vozmut v svetloe budushee", Mosk-ovsky Komsomolets, 13.04.2000. 
543 (2002) "Trekhsotletie 
- 
merzkaya data" [The 300-year Jubilee is a naughty date], Mosk-ovsky 
Komsomolets-SPB, 28.08.2002. 
544 It needs to be explained in depth. Gogol wrote Yhe Died Souls, the book which is well known in Russia. 
The major personage of this book, Chichikov, was going to commit a fraud. The scheme of his fraud was 
very simple. The Bank of Russia was ready to give bank credits to the people who intended to use them for 
revival of agriculture in Russian regions. The person who applied for the credits needed to prove that he 
had sufficient number of agricultural workers (krestians) in his disposal. Chichikov did not have them at 
all. However, he understood that the krestiane who died recently but had been alive at the time of the 
previous census could be documented as alive and if he had them he would be granted the bank credit. 
Chichikov went around Russia and bought those died people (in fact, their documents) in discount prices 
from their real owners. 
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normal, natural. By the way, this programme increased crime. Believe me, please, that the 
horror which was shown in my news show was copied by many. " 
Nevzorov does not consider Putin to be a talented man. A talented man would be 
a disaster for politics, at least at the present moment in Russia. Nevzorov hopes that "we 
will manage to avoid another such a terrible thing as a ruling of Russia by a talented 
man. " He argues: 
Everywhere where we have a poor but systematic approach we have wonderful politics, or a 
representation of politics, which resembles the current situation in Russia. The country is not being 
governed. However, some events are always happening and we like this because Putin has 
explicitly pointed out to everybody the piece of freedom which he is entitled to. That is why 
any discussion about politics is boring to me and any other intellectual man. 545 
Nevzorov is convinced that Putin has taken the whole power in Russia, and any speech 
about possible reforms or changes by other politicians is a waste of time and he does not 
want to participate in them. 
Nevzorov did not graduate from a school ofjournalism. and was not a member of 
the Union of Journalists. He thinks he was a pioneer of the information space and he used 
his television advantages to fight against incumbents. He said that he never thought about 
ethical issues. 
St. Petersburg celebrated its 300-year Jubilee in 2003. As Nevzorov's television 
news show 600 Seconds had been a symbol of St. Petersburg in the 1990s, there was an 
assumption that 600 Seconds might be restored on St. Petersburg television. Nevzorov 
was asked whether he had been approached with such an offer. He replied that nobody in 
the St. Petersburg administration was stupid (or sick) enough to make such a proposal. 
He thinks that the entire St. Petersburg administration was controlled by 
Yakovlev 546 and nobody was ready to challenge him. Yakovlev was a dictator, an 
administrative dictator. Nevzorov compares Yakovlev with a spider, which is able to 
manage the flies in his net according to his preferences. Nevzorov insists that he knew the 
situation in the administration well because he was a former advisor to Yakovlev. 
545 (2002) "Trekhsotletie 
- 
merzkaya daW' [The 300-year Jubilee is a naughty date], Mosk-ovsky 
Komsomolets-SPB, 28.08.2002. 
546 The mayor of St. Petersburg from 1996 to 2003 (Yakovlev resigned in July, 2003). 
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Although Nevzorov said that he is fond of Yakovlev, he assesses him on the basis 
of his achievements as the mayor, and not on the basis as to whether he is a good or bad 
man. In addition, Yakovlev helped Nevzorov twice and he thinks that to some extent he is 
indebted to Yakovlev. 
Nevzorov does not agree that St. Petersburg is a beautiful city. On the contrary, he 
thinks that St. Petersburg is a decoration: "The facades are good, but the rest is a mix of 
poor people, iron dust, leaking water pipes, falling ceiling 
... 
the units of special forces run 
somewhere among these things and order everybody to lie down on the floor. " That is 
why he does not consider St. Petersburg 300-year Jubilee to be a remarkable event. He 
thinks that due to the preparation to the jubilee, St. Petersburg was forced to change its 
speed of thefts, corruption and demolishing. Although St. Petersburg gained the money 
from the state budget, Nevzorov doubted that common people would notice any 
improvement. 
Nevzorov argues that there are no bright people in either the Administration nor in 
the Office of the Representative of President in St. Petersburg. As a result of this, even 
the alleged conflict between them has not produced any interesting stories. It does not 
surprise Nevzorov, because he believes that no bright man can be an official while Putin 
is the president of the country. He claims, 
We had a bright official Yakubovsky, we can see him as a thief, who stole the books, 547 he is too 
fat, but he is apersonage! We had Boris Abramovich Berezovsky, who looked wild among 
Russian officials-bureaucrats. Now we have average officials and politicians, Yakovlev and 
CherkeSOV548 are some of them. To say it better, all of them became average after Putin become 
president. 549 
Nevzorov has a better opinion about Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, than about 
Yakovlev. He thinks that despite his arrogance, Luzhkov is talented. It is widely known 
that investigations have been launched for nearly everybody in the government of 
Moscow. However, Luzhkov is able to protect his people, in contrast to Yakovlev who 
547 Yakubovsky was sentenced for stealing several very valuable books from the St. Petersburg Public 
Library. 
54' The Representative of President in St. Petersburg. 549 (2002) --rrekhsotlctie 
- 
merzkaya data" [The 300-year Jubilee is a naughty date], Mosk-ovsky 
Komsomolets-SPB, 28.08.2002. 
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simply did not know how to do so: "He left them on the battleground and ran away. It 
does not mean that he betrays them because everybody in Yakovlev's place would have 
done the same for the mayor. " In other words, Yakovlev's action is correct. "I am 
approving of his behaviour, because I decided to approve everything he is doing. After 
all, I feel myself in debt to him 
.,, 
550 However, Nevzorov realises that although he was 
seen as part of the governor's team, he has not been accepted by many of them as an 
equal partner. He suspects that they consider him to be an idiot because he is different 
ftorn them. 
Nevertheless, Nevzorov thinks that Irina Yakovleva, the mayor's wife, is a good 
and bright woman. She was not quite correct to involve herself in cases with TRK 
Peterburg and with Ivan Korneev, the director of the St. Petersburg zoo. Yakovleva 
forced Komeev, who likes his animals and has done a lot for the zoo, to leave. Nevzorov 
does not believe that Komeev tried to fight to the death to remain in the zoo because he 
had allegedly been indebted to some of the St. Petersburg bandits. Instead, Nevzorov 
argues, 
It is not true, the point is not whether somebody is indebted to the bandits, the point is who the 
bandits are. There are no bandits who have demands that are unrealistic, unsuitable or non 
adoptable for the reality of St. Petersburg. The heroes of the 1990s have gone and have been 
replaced by pragmatic, well-educated and good-looking people who are linked to the St. 
Petersburg administration. 551 
Nevzorov thinks that Komeev was not indebted to anybody and the fact that some people 
allegedly linked to Tambovskaia organised. crime group tried to protect him just shows 
that Komeev is sincerely liked by many, including Nevzorov himself552 
7.3-Z Andrey Karaulov 
Andrcy Karaulov is well known in Russia because of his television show Moment Istini 
[The moment of Truth]. Moment Istini is one of the best Russian talk-shows. This 
550 Ibid. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid. 
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programme is similar to Hard Talk on BBC. Karaulov talks to politicians, political 
observers, and governors of Russia's regions. Karaulov's show addresses very difficult 
themes for discussion: corruption, political scandals, and frauds by prominent Russian 
businessmen are highlighted by this show as well as some issues related to organised 
crime and drugs. Karaulov also talks to the cultural elite of Russia and tries to touch on 
the issues that are important for all Russian people such as declining birth rate, and the 
authorities' disregard to the fate of the Russian soldiers involved in military conflicts. 553 
Karaulov describes the current situation in Russia's politics as questions without 
answers and answers without questions. The focus of Moment Istin! on problematic issues 
is exemplified by the music at the beginning of the show 
- 
Tariverdiev's Requiem. 
Karaulov thinks that this tragic music best suits anything he could possibly report in this 
show about the Russian government and Russia. 
The government and authorities are the main subjects of Karaulov's show. 
Karaulov is certain that Russian authorities do want to be critically assessed by the media. 
The governmental officials want the press to forget about them. "However, our 
government makes too many mistakes. Some time ago our Church was separated from 
the state, today 
- 
our government is separated from it. It is very uncomfortable to ask 
Kasyanov, 554 who has done rather well for himself, about the problems of the Russian 
economy. " 
Karaulov thinks that the Russian government is not capable of enacting reforms: 
I think that Gref does not understand that he discredits Putin. Let us take fish auctions 
- 
150,000 
fishermen in the Far East, whole villages will be demolished. According to the new state budget, 
Moscow will lose 40 billions rubles, St. Petersburg 
-6 billions, Leningrad oblast - 500 millions. 
There are no regular pension payments, which were promised together with children's donations 
It was possible to expect that the personnel of state enterprises and organisations could be paid 
regularly due to the colossal income from the increased oil sales. However, the average delay of 
salary payments is one and a half month. Regions transfer tax money to the Kremlin and the 
money disappears there. 555 
553 Programme ofthe television company TV Centre, (URL http: //www. tvc. nL/programs/moment. html, 
consulted in July, 2003). 
554 The former Prime Minister of Russia. 555 Karaulov's interview to the newspaper Tribuna, Kuzina, N. (2002) "Poisk istini u nas v krovi" [The 
truth is essential for us], Tribuna, 16.05.2002. 
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Karaulov estimates that the real standard of life has decreased 15-20 per cent. 
However, the media does not tell about this. Instead the Russian mass media is always 
reporting that Putin's rating is high. Karaulov claims, "The rating of the president is the 
price of the petrol in petrol stations and in shops. The real rating of the president is the 
,, 
556 prices in these shops. 
Karaulov has written the book The Russian Sun. This book refers to the agreement 
to split the Soviet Union, signed by Yeltsin, Ukraine's and Belarus's presidents. Also, it 
is about Yeltsin and Gorbachev, the politicians who made Russian politics ten years ago. 
They are not popular in Russia nowadays. However, Karaulov thinks that the story was 
worthy of writing. Another his book is Yeltsin's Era. Karaulov and some other authors of 
this book tried to prove that the real value of Yeltsin's presidency was higher than his 
political and economic mistakes. 
Karaulov thinks that many people who worked together with Yeltsin such as 
Yumashev, Krasnov, Livshits, Baturin, Shakray, Savostyanov, Chubais, Voloshin, 
Sisuev, Shabdurasulov and Dyachenko still do not tell the whole truth about the events. 
They wrote some memoirs about Yeltsin's presidency and their jobs in the Presidential 
administration. Karaulov noted the Livshits's reply to his question as to how honestly 
Livshits described the past was: "Twenty per cent. " This answer did not surprised 
Karaulov because some aspects of Yeltsin's policies can hardly be reported: 
For example, once Yeltsin, after drinking too much vodka, ordered his press secretary to be 
thrown into the river Enisey from the presidential ship. And the press secretary was thrown into 
the water with a temperature of 6 C. Fortunately, Borodin, who then was the mayor of Yakutsk, 
jumped into the river and rescued Kostikov. These people saw or participated in many other 
unpleasant events but decided not to talk about them. Or maybe they were ordered not to talk 
about them. 557 
Fortunately, Karaulov does not think that he promised something to someone in 
the Kremlin. "Yes, I went to the Kremlin's banquets some years ago, " he admitted. 
However, he stopped doing that after the tanks faired into the White House (Russian 
556 Ibid. 
557 Ibid. 
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Parliament) and after law enforcement agencies arrested Yakubovsky. Karaulov thinks 
that nothing will get him to go there again. 
Karaulov pointed out that there were very different people in the Yeltsin's team. 
Along with honest intellectuals there were people who were bribed in order to gain 
Yeltsin's signature on some documents. These people knew how to handle this 
assignment. They were aware that Yeltsin drank a lot and brought him the paid 
documents at moments when he understood little of what he was signing but still was 
able to hold the pen. 
Karaulov believes that many of the Russian enterprises were not properly 
privatised because the privatisation of big enterprises was regulated by Yeltsin's orders 
instead of the decrees of the State Duma. He claims, 
They sold out the best Russian enterprises almost for free. Who took them? We can now see. We 
are seeing how they are hiding the money in offshore zones and fighting one another in 
newspapers and television. This is the result of Yeltsin's orders. Yeltsin signed some of these 
orders when he was drunk. However, there is nothing that can be done to change the situation. Our 
present history has been written in this style. 558 
An interesting episode happened while Karaulov was interviewing Mikhail 
Cherny, who is allegedly linked to organised crime. Karaulov decided to play a joke and 
asked him: "Mikhail, are you a thief? " Chemy thought for a minute, then he untied his tie 
and said: "That's all, let's go to the restaurant. " Although the same question can be 
referred to many of the participators in the Karaulov's show, he does not think that it 
would be a good idea to repeat it because he fears that these people will not forgive him 
for asking it so easily as Cherny did. 
Karaulov thinks that the Russian officialdom does not want and is not able to 
change itself He assumed that Putin would replace the people he was not interested in 
indirectly, through other authorities, his allies. For example, Karaulov argues that the 
budget money for the development of Goskino (the main Russian state film production 
company) was allocated in the budget of the Ministry of Culture deliberately so that the 
Ministry of Culture could decide which company should use the money for film 
558 Ibid. 
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production. Karaulov says that he would not be surprised to learn that the Ministry was 
going to choose Video International Ltd, which was allegedly linked to Lesin, the 
Minister of the Press. 
Karaulov was the anchorman of the show The Russian Age. He interviewed many 
people who contributed a lot to maintaining and developing the Russian culture, such as 
Pokrovsky, Dudinsky and Bekhtereva. However, he has not seen people of the new 
generation who can replace them. In fact, he does not understand the young people. They 
focus only on money making. Karaulov points out: 
There are surprisingly many mentally ill people among youngsters. They do not care who the 
Russian president is, and what kind of life we are constructing. They are not entirely indifferent to 
popular music. However, they do not care who sings in the Big Theatre, who dances Odetta, and 
whether Russian films are produced or not. The most important point is that they do not care in 
which country to live and to work, if their salary is good. Emigration has already increased during 
Putin's presidency. Yet, a bigger emigration is still to come. People in the Soviet Union were 
above the money. I have just started to understand how important it is. 559 
Karaulov fears that only less educated people are to remain in Russia, if the government 
does not start to listen to the words of many of the Russian governors, such as Rossel 
(Ekaterinburg), Evdokimov (Murmansk) and Shaimiev (Tatarstan). 
Karaulov claims that although some representatives of the Russian government 
reported many figures about their achievements, Russia is transforming into a country 
where everything is getting worse. In order to illustrate this point, Karaulov has given a 
number of examples. For example, he refers to his interview with Daniel Granin, a well- 
known Russian writer. When Karaulov asked him, whether he might decide to leave 
Russia, Granin thought a great deal and said that he could but would not do so. And 
Karaulov understands the reasons why Granin contemplated for such a long time the 
answer, because he travelled around Russia a lot and visited some villages where life has 
already perished. 
Another Karaulov's example concerns with his story about the shooting of the 
soldiers of a unit of Russian special forces (Sergiev Posad ONION) by the soldiers of 
5S9 Ibid. 
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another unit (Podolsky OMON). Ustinov, then the Minister of Defence, admittcd that it 
was true only 12 months after this incident had happened. Finally, Karaulov reminds a 
story about Sergey Dorenko's false reports about the alleged involvement of Luzhkov, 
the mayor of Moscow, into the killing of P. Teytum. He emphasises, "Did anybody doubt 
that Dorenko had lied? However, all of us allowed him to lie and he did. " Because of this, 
,, 
561 Karaulov ought to conclude: "There is no public opinion in Russia. 
7.3.3. Artem Borovik and the Media Syndicate Sovershenno Sekretno 
The major source of investigative stories in post-Soviet Russia is big organisations of 
investigative journalists. These investigative organizations distribute their stories by 
several ways, including the press, television and the Internet. One of such organisations 
has been examined in section 7.2.3. There is another very big investigative media empire, 
which is called Sovershenno Sekretno [Absolutely in Secret]. This section reviews its 
investigative practices and the biography of its former President Artem Borovik. 
A. Borovik was a remarkable person in Russian investigative j ournalism. 
His father, Genrikh Borovik, was a prominent Soviet journalist in the 1960s. G. Borovik 
was a special correspondent of the magazine Ogonyok. He, along with his family, lived 
for some time in New York. Artem Borovik spent his childhood among the American 
children and some representatives of the Soviet cultural elite who were allowed to visit 
the United States during this time. 
A few years later G. Borovik retumed to Moscow. However, he was the part of 
the Soviet cultural elite and this status allowed him to live a much better life than the 
majority of the Soviet people did. Artem attended a special school for elite people and 
later was able to continue his education in MGIMO, Moscow State Institute for 
International Relation, one of the elite Russian universities. During his study he was 
placed in the consulates of the Soviet Union in some countries. After graduation A. 
560 This journalistic investigation was conducted by Vyacheslav lzmailov. 
561 Ibid. 
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Borovik was offered the job in the Ministry of International Affairs. However, he rejected 
the offer by saying that he wanted to be a journalist like his farther. 
A. Borovik started his journalistic career in the magazine Ogonyok, a very popular 
Russian magazine. It is interesting to note that he worked together with Vladimir 
Yakovlev, who later became one of the founders of the media holding Kommersant, and 
Dmitry Birukov, who was later appointed to the post of the president of the publishing 
562 house 7 Days (Media-Most). 
A. Borovik focused on investigative stories. The most covert theme of that time 
was the war in Afghanistan. He used his ties with the generals of the Red Army in order 
to gain permission to move to the front line. This allowed him to see the events of this 
war first hand, and he wrote very sharp reports that were remarkably different from the 
official coverage of this unfortunate event in the history of Russia. These stories made A. 
Borovik very famous in Russia. On the basis of his reports he later published the book 
Vstretimsia u Trekh Zhuravley [We shall meet next to Three Cranes]. 
A. Borovik's next endeavour was a Soviet-American media project. According to 
this project, one American man was enlisted in the Red Army for a couple of months, and 
one man from the Soviet Union was allowed to become a soldier of the American army. 
Artem Borovik, who suggested the project, was the Soviet participator. He served several 
months in the American army and wrote stories about his life there. 
After that A. Borovik started to work for the newspaper Sovershenno Sekretno 
[Absolutely in Secret]. In 1989, Julian Semenov, the founder and editor-in-chief of the 
major investigative newspaper, appointed A. Borovik his first deputy. Semenov was very 
famous in Russia. He was a screenwriter and wrote several books about the Soviet 
Intelligence Service. His book and screen script for the film Semnadisat Mgnoveniy Vesni 
[Seventeen fractions of an autumn] made him known to almost everyone in Russia. This 
film was about Shtirlits, the agent of one of the German special units, who in fact was the 
agent of Soviet Intelligence Maksim Isaiev, and used his position to end up the 
negotiations between some German generals and the commanders of the American army. 
Links to the CheKa and the KGB helped Semenov create the newspaper 
Sovershenno Sekretno. However, it was difficult for him to continue his publishing 
562 Borovik, G. (2000) Artem. Moskva: Sovershenno Sekretno. 
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business because he did not have enough business skills. In addition, his health was not 
good enough. The newspaper accumulated a great deal of debt and seemed to have no 
means of overpaying them. Semenov died soon after, but before this he transferred his 
publishing rights and the management of the newspaper to Artern Borovik. 
Borovik did a great deal for Sovershenno Sekretno. He solved many financial 
problems and reorganised its structure. Borovik created the weekly Versia (A Version], 
the television programme, and magazine Litsa [Faces]. Also, Borovik changed its policy 
and published many risky stories which were severely criticised by the members of 
Gorbachev's team. The popularity of the magazine Sovershenno Sekretno increased 
tremendously and made it one of the leading investigative media organizations in Russia. 
An interesting point is Borovik's managerial style. One of the members of the 
editorial committee remembered that Borovik was always late for editorial meetings. He 
walked in the room, immediately started to talk about the most important matters, whilst 
563 looking at his watch. All times there were many phone calls from all over the world. 
Although people of different backgrounds came to investigative journalism such as 
mathematicians, historians, former law enforcement officers, Borovik continued to rely 
on field investigations. The reporters of Sovershenno Sekretno worked in many regions of 
Russia to gain data first hand. 564 
Special attention was paid to the trustworthiness of the stories published by 
Sovershenno Sekretno. The data of the stories was verified repeatedly and preferably 
from different sources. Finding sources was one of the most important dimensions in the 
work of Sovershenno Sekretno. A. Borovik had a huge number of friends in Russian 
social, business, and political elites, and he spent a lot of time establishing new contacts. 
He had one meeting after another with generals, bankers, writers, editors, ministers, 
565 politicians and readers. 
The concern about the safety of the sources and encouraging them for future 
cooperation was an important aspect too. For example, after Sovershenno Sckretno had 
563 Lubimov's interview, (200 1) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad [Already beyond of any obstacles]. Moskva, 
Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", p. 176. 564 Rustarn Arifdzhanov's interview, (200 1) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad [Already beyond of any obstacles]. 
Moskva, Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", p. 126. 565 Lubimov's interview, (200 1) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad (Already beyond of any obstacles]. Moskva, 
Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", p. 176. 
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published audio records of some talks in the Russian officialdom regarding the coup 
which took place in 1991, Borovik was asked to explain how he had managed to find 
them, and he declined to comment. He said that he had promised not to talk about this 
and if he would betray the trust of one of his sources, nobody would give him materials 
for other investigative stories. 
However, A. Borovik confirmed that Sovershenno Sekretno paid its sources. For 
example, in the case with the above-mentioned records, the source received a lot of 
money. Borovik admitted that they paid less than they could in this case because the 
source was confident that Sovershenno Sekretno would protect him. When the records 
were transferred to Spigel in 1991, according to some reports, their seller earned US$ 
500,000. Borovik said that they paid less for these records less, although not much less. 566 
Borovik revealed that Sovershenno Sekretno needed a lot of money in order to 
operate properly. "We are increasing our personnel who work with archives, documents 
and information. It requires a lot of money. For example, a report in the American show 
60 Minutes may cost up to US$ 100,000.9,567 Who financially supports Sovershenno 
Sekretno is not entirely clear. It is known that one of its branches, the newspaper Versia, 
was partly owned by an American partner. Another source is advertising revenue. 
However, this source of income decreased when the advertising on RTV was centralised. 
Sovershenno Sekretno had to sell its shows and programmes to RTV although it was less 
profitable than direct advertising revenues. 
Journalistic investigations in Russia are very expensive and risky. A. Borovik 
himself underlined this by saying: 
If you touched an organisation a few years ago, you could have been dismissed. Nowadays, you 
are very likely to be killed. And the police will never find who has done this because they fear 
themselves ( 
... 
] When was it less risky to conduct journalistic investigations 
- 
during dictatorship 
or democracy? It has become evident that it was less risky during the dictatorship. To some extent 
all investigations are concerned with money transactions and financial groups, which cannot avoid 
being linked to criminal syndicates. In the United States, a journalistic trip to a war is significantly 
566 Borovik's inteview to Petrovskaya, "Rassledovanie 
- 
delo dorogoe i opasnoe" [Investigation is 
expensive and risky business] in (2001) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad (Already beyond of any obstacles]. 
Moskva, Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", pp. 176,415. 567 Ibid., p. 418. 
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better paid than a trip to Miami. Nowadays, a journalistic investigation is a trip to a war. In the 
American show 60 Minutes, a reporter earns US$ 5,000,000 per annum, and if he decided to take 
risks, he does it intentionally. Our reporters are not paid well although they work in a significantly 
,, 
569 
more dangerous social environment than the American reporters. 
Some members of the editorial office of Sovershenno Sekretno confirmed that 
there were cases of intervention of armed people who felt themselves offended by some 
of their published stories. Sovershenno Sekretno had to strengthen its security in order to 
protect the safety of its personnel. 569 
Borovik had his own political views, which were neither capitalistic nor 
communistic. He though that capitalism without any ethical rules was unacceptable. And 
"Russian capital has again discredited itself by its inability to hold the power in Russia. If 
it is still keeping it, this is being done by absolutely criminal methods. " Borovik thought 
that there was corruption in the Kremlin and the oligarchs would keep trying to hide 
many facts of their life. Nevertheless, he was sure that "everything will be disclosed on 
court hearings like the tribunal after the World War IL It will happen after the current 
,, 570 political regime changes. 
Borovik was aware that his views might cause him trouble. He realised that the 
current elite "will fight to the death because everything depends on it, not only their 
capitals but their lives. And God save journalists to have their own opinions! They will 
immediately conclude that we fight against the state. On the contrary, we do not fight 
against the state, we tackle corruption, the corruption in the government. I was told that 
they would not forgive me thiS.,, 571 
A. Borovik was asked repeatedly to modify his approach. However, he seemed to 
choose to follow his way. Although security around Sovershenno Sekretno and its editor- 
in-chief was continuously being improved, it failed to save his life. On 9 March 2000, 
Borovik, along with a businessman and crew, boarded a private aircraft in a Moscow 
airport. For some unclear reasons, the aircraft crashed after a few seconds after taking off 
All its passengers, including Borovik, died instantly. According to official reports, the 
568 Ibid., p. 418. 
569 Lubimov's interview, (200 1) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad [Already beyond of any obstacles]. Moskva, 
Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", p. 176. 570 Borovik's interview to Tamara Matrtinova, Vesti, 11.03.2000. 
571 Ibid. 
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crash was caused by the freezing of the plane. However, this conclusion did not satisfy 
many, who continue to believe that it was a contract murder and that Borovik was killcd 
because of his job. 
7.4. Investigative Journalism in the Internet 
The Internet can attenuate some problems of investigative journalism. This fact has 
encouraged the rapid development of news websites that publish stories on organised 
crime and corruption. These websites are called investigative websites in this thesis. 
Investigative websites are officially registered and have emails of the sites' owners. 
However, it is extremely complicated to trace the owners of these websites, especially for 
people who are not professionally involved into criminal investigations. Therefore, 
although less people use the Web in Russia than in developed countries, much more 
reports on organised crime can be published openly and in a greater volume on the 
Internet than on television or in the press. 
The investigative websites emerged not a long time ago. Perhaps, the first 
investigative website was the site Hearing Window. 572 It was launched on II December 
1998 and published stories about controversial ties of Yury Luzhkov (the mayor of 
Moscow), Lebed (General and politician), Bikov (allegedly the godfather of the 
Krasnoyarsk Mafia), and the Cherny brothers (who also were under suspicion of being 
linked to organised crime). The access to the website was very irregular. It was 
repeatedly blocked and finally disappeared. 
The next investigative websites were Cogot-1 and Cogot-2. They published a lot 
of data about corruption in the Russian officialdom and the links of well-known Russian 
politicians to the criminal underworld. It is interesting to note that apparently none of the 
owners of the above-mentioned sites were traced and arrested despite publishing stories 
on people with links to high-ranking officials of Russian law enforcement agencies. 
There is a special Internet resource which aims to summarise information 
regarding Russian intelligence and special forces 
- 
Agentura. ru. It was founded by 
572 URL www. rumours. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 
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Relpress-Info on 5 September 2000 and involved journalists from many known dailies, 
such as Izvestia, Kommersant, Ukraina Kriminalinaia [Criminal Ukraine] among others. 
The editor-in-chief is Alexander Soldatov. 
The aim of the website is twofold. On the one hand, it intends to provide verified 
information about the Russian intelligence and special forces and thus eliminate 
unchecked rumors. For this purpose, the website summarises data on the structure and 
activity of the FSB in Moscow and Russian regions. It provides an insight into their 
history, introduces interesting people, and describes remarkable cases. On the other hand, 
its authors hope that it helps them establish a sort of civic control over the activity of the 
most powerful law enforcement units in Russia. 
There are two look-alike investigative websites Kompromat. ru 573 and 
Compromat. ru. 574 Kompromat. ru is professionally designed and called "The Database of 
Russian Politics and Business. " Its deficiency is that it does not publish sufficient 
evidence to verify its stories. The similar website Compromat. ru has a good collection of 
investigative stories published in the Russian mass media. These stories are about 
Russian prominent businessmen, gangsters and politicians. Even experts consider this 
website to be a valuable resource. 575 However, this website focuses on publishing 
scandalous stories rather than serious studies on Russian powerful actors. 
It is possible to find investigative sites that provide a serous socio-economic and 
political analysis, though. For example, the Oligarchs'Page576 publishes analytical 
materials regarding Russian major parties and business groups. Another similar 
investigative website is the website of the Analytical Centre Eurasia. 577 Although it is a 
news website, it publishes investigative stories about misdoings of prominent officials 
and politicians from Asian countries of the former Soviet Union. These stories are written 
by the journalists of the website or taken from the mass media. 
Another remarkable investigative resource is located on 
http: //www. vokruginfo. ru. It is the website Vokrug Novostey [Around the News]. It 
differs from the others by focusing on the publication of the news. However, the choice 
573 URL www. kompromat. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 574 URL www. compromat. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 575 Interview with Litvinenko, London, 2003. 576 URL www. cityline. ru/politika/raznoe/oligarhi. html, consulted on 12 July, 2003. 577 URL www. eurasia. org. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 
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of the news is to a great extent influenced by the worthiness of the stories for political 
scandals. These stories reveal relatively little-known scandalous facts from the lives of 
Russian politicians, businessmen and oligarchs, including Berezovsky, Abramovich and 
Putin. 
It should be noted that the editorial team of the website is highly involved in 
political campaigns and the editors know the Russian media market first hand. They were 
first among those people who admitted that the new Putin's initiative to appoint regional 
governors would make a great negative impact on budgets of regional mass media. The 
website published an editorial that claimed that regional mass media companies were 
likely to lose enormous sums of money which used to be spent on election campaigns and 
were associated with the dissemination of compromising stories. 578 
Another investigative website is the website of the FreeLance Bureau. 579 It was 
created by the former employees of the media syndicate Sovershenno Sekretno. The 
stories of the website are backed by evidence. However, some observers believe that 
many of the stories published on the website have been paid by people interested in 
discrediting their opponents. 580 
The Agency Stringer (SA)581 is very similar to the FreeLance Bureau. The only 
difference is that it more focuses on business than on politics. Stringer SA was founded 
by 000 Bakkard-M. Vladimir Stoletov and Elena Tokareva were its editors-in-chief 
The agency monthly publishes and distributes the magazine, which copies the content of 
the website. 582 
583 The investigative resource Investigate. ru was created in 2003. Although little is 
known about its founders, stories published there indicate that several investigative 
agencies from Moscow and St. Petersburg might have been involved. The website 
578 "Politteknologi v panike: Putin uvodit s rinka kolossalnie budgeti" [Political experts are in shock: Putin 
sweeps away huge sums of money from the market], (URL 
http: //www. vokruginfo. nL/news/news7877. html, consulted on 14.09.2004). 579 URL www. flb. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 580 Konstantinov, Zhurnalistkoe Rrassledovanie: Istoriya Methoda i Sovremennaya Prak-tik-a [Investigative 
journalism: the history of the method and current practice], p. 362. 581 URL www. stringer-agency. ru, consulted on II July, 2003. 582 To find more detail about Stringer, see notes of its cditor-in-chief in Tokareva, E. (2005) Zapiski 
Riadovogo Informatsionnoy Voyni [Notes of a Soldier of an Information War], Moskow: Yauza. 
583 URL http: //www. investigate. nL/, consulted in March 2005. 
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focuses on contract murders and summarised data on almost all killings of Russian 
politicians, businessmen, crime lords and journalists. 
The website monitors the crimes committed not only in Russia but also across the 
world. For example, it reported about the murder of one of the richest businessmen of the 
Netherlands in May 2004. Also it published a translated version of an article by an 
investigative reporter for Financial Times, presenting details of his journalistic 
investigation on the mysterious death of Stephen Curtis, newly appointed head of Yukos, 
the leading Russian oil company, in a helicopter crash in March 2004. 
Cry. ru is one of the most interesting Russian investigative websites. This 
remarkable resource was established in 2000. It summarises data for all serious crimes 
committed in Russia, including criminal offences related to organised crime. For unclear 
reasons it did not work from August 2003 until July 2004. However, it resumes its work 
in August 2004 and is being updated regularly since than. 
Russian law enforcement agencies seem to technically and financially support the 
website. This conclusion can be drawn from the fact that it represents a great variety of 
high quality data, 584 which are grouped in several categories. They encompass tatistics 
and news regarding all sorts of crime committed in the Russian Federation, including 
serial killings, corruption, prostitution, slave trade, drug offences, terrorism, kidnapping 
and contract killings. Serious crime committed abroad is also reported and updated with 
the speed of leading news agencies. 
In addition to the investigative websites that publish stories on various politicians 
and officials, there are some investigative websites which focus on particular political or 
business groups. For example, the website All Truth about the Russian Nation Union 
)585 (RNE publishes only stories about misdoings of the leaders of the RNE. 
There were some cases when an investigative story published on the investigative 
website caused the death of its editors. For example, the murder of Georgy Gongadze 
might have been caused by his editorial work for the investigative website Uk-raine's 
Pravda. 586 This investigative site was very critical of Ukraine's President Kuchma and 
oligarch Volkov. The story of Gongadze's killings has already been reviewed in this 
584 The editorial office of the MVD (Russian Home Office) is a business partner of this website. 585 URL www. az. ru/karamazov, consulted on II July, 2003. 586 LTRL www. pravda. com. ua, consulted on II July, 2003. 
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thesis. After Gongadze was killed, many employees of the website changed their 
addresses or hired bodyguards. 
To sum up, this section has shown that Russian investigative journalism is well 
presented on the Internet. There are several Russian professional investigative wcbsitcs 
that publish stories about politicians, businessmen and lords of organised crime. 
7.5. Ties between Investigative Journalists and Organised Crime 
This section shows that that investigative journalists have tics with power elitcs and 
organiscd crime. Investigative journalists themselves, despite underlining their own 
independence, agree that many other journalists wrote and published articles which were 
ordered and paid by powerful actors. For ex=plc, Khinshtein has admitted that 
investigative journalism in Russia is embedded in powerful networks. 
He has pointed out that stories about Norilsky nickel and Sviazinvest (reviewed in 
section 6.2.2. ) were published because some powerful actors used the mass media in their 
symbolic confrontation with their rivals. Khinshtein has suspected the media companies 
and journalists of being paid for publishing these reports. 587 
It is known that Konstantinov's Agency also has ties with lords of organised 
crime. For example, Konstantinov revealed that he had participated in the meeting 
between Konstantin Yakovlev and Barsukov (Kumarin), the lords of the Tambovskaia 
gang (one of the most powerful crime groups in St. Petersburg), when they agreed to stop 
their conflict. 588 
Also, according to Barsukov (Kumarin), Nevzorov, another investigative reporter, 
is a good friend of his. Barsukov even agreed to play Ludovik XIV in the film that was 
directed by NevzoroV. 589 In fact, some of early Nevzorov's reports (when he was the 
anchorman of 600 Seconds at the end of the 1980s) seemed to have helped the 
Tambovskaia crime group to become one of the most powerful criminal syndicates in St. 
Petersburg. Barsukov himself admitted this by saying that "Nevzorov began producing 
587 Khinshtein, Politicheskie rassledovania 
- 
eto vsegda strashniy risk. 
588 Konstantinov's interview, St. Petersburg, August, 2002. 
589 Barsukov, V. (2003) "Perestante assotsfirovat Tambov s volkami" [Do not assosiate Tambov with 
volves], Vash Tayniy Sovetnik, No. 21,3.11.2003, p. 11. 
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one TV report after another about horrible Tambowsy 
- 
this was like advertising for us. 
After that many people came to us. "590 
There is no data that Khinshtein is connected with the criminal underworld. 
However, according to several sources, he has ties with some departments within the 
FSB. 591 
7.6. Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the investigative jornalism in Russia since the 1980s. It has 
described the major Russian investigative mass media organisations and journalists. It has 
shown that first investigative stories were published in the Soviet newspapers and they 
were for the most part written in the genre of satire. The range of stories published and 
broadcast by investigative journalists has significantly changed since that time. 
The first publications primarily critisised small misdoings of rather low-ranking 
managers and buroucrats. Step by step, the zone of critisism has considerably expanded. 
Investigative journalists tried to draw public attention to serious social phenomena such 
as corruption and prostitution. Finally, the involvement of the Communist Party in dirty 
businees transactions and the corruption in the Russian government also have become 
the object ofjournalistic investigations. 
Investigative journalism is becoming more multidimensional. This chapter has 
shown that people of different backgrounds have became prominent Russian investigative 
journalists. Khinshtein, Nevzorov and Konstantinov did not have a degree in journalism 
and belonged to the Russian middle class. Artem Borovik belonged to the Soviet and 
Russian elite. 
It has been shown that investigative journalism is very risky. In order to overcome 
existing problems, investigative journalists have formed teams of investigators. Providing 
safety for the personnel remains one of the main concerns of the investigative mass 
590 Volkov, V. (2002) Violent Enterprenerus: The Use ofForce in the Making ofRussian Capitalism. 
Ithaca, N. Y.: Cornell University Press, p. 109; Konstantinov, Corrumpirovanniy Peterburg, p. 35 1. 591 Interview with Litvincnko and several reports published by Flb. ru. 
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media in Russia. The staff of the most sucessful teams of investigative journalists consists 
of security officers, lawers, investigators and journalists. 
Nowadays, there are a few big investigative media organisations in Russia, such 
as the Agency of Investigative Reporters and the media holding Sovershenno Sekrctno. 
These organisations tend to diversify their activities by printing newspapers, producing 
television shows, and launching websites. However, the press remains to be the dominant 
channel of distribution. Although Russian television is actively trying to be involved into 
the process, the necessity of in-depth research undermins the eligibility of investigative 
stories for television formats. 
Connections with and the reliance on law enforcement agencies is one of the 
features of the investigative journalism in Russia. It does not mean that law enforcement 
agencies use the mass media for their purpose. This relationship is significantly more 
complex. However, people, knowledge and information of law enforcement agencies are 
main resources essential for cfficient investigative journalism. 
Methods of investigations are very much similar to practices of law enforcement 
agencies. In fact, many former or current officers of law enforcement agencies cooperate 
or work for investigative media organisations. Nevertheless, sometimes investigative 
journalists have managed to find what has not been found by law enforcement agencies. 
This can be explained by a stronger motivation: whilst law enforcement agencies are state 
organisations, the income of investigative media organisations depends on their 
performance. 
One of the major trends of investigative journalism in Russia is its increasing 
involvement in political communication. Although managers of Russian investigative 
media organisations insist that their organisations are not politically motivated or 
financed, the reality of Russia does not allow them to stay away from power elites. This 
undermines the ability of Russian investigative journalism to provide unbiased coverage 
of important events and to serve as a watchdog of the public sphere. 592 
592 To illustrate this, I would like to quote the editor-in-chief of the investigative newspaper Stringer. She 
claims, "It is very difficult nowadays to publish something worthy. There are 'blocks' everywhere, editors- 
in-chief are bound by money-supported promises not to touch one or another corporation" (Tokareva, 
Zapiski Riadovogo Infonnatsionnoy Voyni, p. 47). 
272 
8. Conclusion 
In the 1990s political changes in the Russian Federation triggered two processes: the rise 
of organised crime and the emergence of an independent media. These two forces started 
to play an enormous role in post-Soviet Russia, making an impact on its economic, 
political and social institutions. Although important developments of Russian organiscd 
crime and the mass media have been examined in academic literature, the relationship 
between them has not been explored in detail. This research is a pioneering study in this 
respect. 
I believe that an analysis of the relationship between organised crime and the 
media is likely to be superficial if it does not rest on the socio-political context of this 
relationship. Therefore, I have drawn a larger picture of Russian society in the 1990s and 
shown the deep embeddedness of the Russian news media in socio-economic and 
political networks, including organised crime. It has been pointed out that after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian influential networks penetrated the entire society 
and started a battle for the economic resources and for political power. All available 
methods and numerous allies were used in this struggle for prosperity and influence. My 
thesis is that Russian organised crime and the media have been involved in this clash of 
Titans and this is greatly reflected in the features of their relationship. 
This research gives many examples of connection between Russian organised 
crime and economic and political elites, and it presents a wealth of evidence that the 
Russian media have not avoided the grasp of the Mafia. I have suggested that this 
happened because the news media were relatively defenceless against the numerous 
methods of influence wielded by the power elites and that they were not able to 
effectively resist the pressure of the powerful players. At the same time, the Russian 
power elites became interested in the media due to the growing importance of the 
"symbolic method" in the confrontation between them. 
I define the symbolic method as a means of exercising symbolic power that aims 
to downgrade the symbolic capital of the opponents. Symbolic capital and symbolic 
power are important notions for politicians in democratic societies, and they were of 
enormous significance during the numerous elections which became a part of the Russian 
political landscape. This research has demonstrated that organised crime reporting 
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comprises significant part of the symbolic method and is an effective instrument of 
political confrontation. This makes the media attractive to organised crime groups, which 
are deeply embedded in Russian power networks, and the result is the establishment of 
numerous ties between the mass media and the Mafia. 
The use of the symbolic method and the dominance of covert techniques in pubic 
relations eroded the public sphere in Russia. The public sphere is an arena in which the 
democratic communication of information takes place. One of its watchdogs is 
investigative journalism since the main task of investigative journalists is to alert the 
public when the boundaries between legal and illegal action are overstepped by 
businessmen or politicians. Consequently, this research addresses the history of 
investigative journalism in post-Soviet Russia and assesses its impact. 
This study outlines the major trends of Russian investigative journalism and 
introduces its major actors. It describes some of the main investigative media 
organisations and looks at biographies and achievements of leading journalists. It 
demonstrates that they have not avoided being involved in political communication. It 
also shows that they have connections with criminal lords and rely heavily on law 
enforcement agencies. Although managers of the investigative media companies insist 
that their organisations are not politically motivated or financed, the reality of Russia 
does not allow them to remain separate from political forces and power networks. This 
undermines the role of investigative journalism as an unbiased pubic informer and 
contributes to the erosion of the Russian public sphere. 
In conclusion, I would like to make some suggestions and recommendations to 
improve the situation. First, there is no doubt that Russian media policy should be 
changed so that media organisations become more independent and protected from the 
pressures of power elites. A number of methods could be employed, including the further 
development of media legislation, the establishment of clearly defined limits for the 
intervention of controlling authorities and the provision of secure personal protection for 
leading journalists. 
However, these activities alone are unlikely to radically improve news content. 
The media system itself should be reformed. It is not a secret that the Russian mass media 
have many of the drawbacks of the global media industry. For example, several recent 
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studies have questioned the ability of Western media to provide an adequate 
representation of views of various political and social groups, the main media 
responsibility according to the First Amendment. 593 In particular, these studies have 
pointed that an increasing concentration of media under the control of a few multinational 
syndicates undermines the diversity of the media content. 594 Researchers have also noted 
that the commercialised news media are increasingly tied up to the entertainment 
business, leading to simplification and reduction of news coverage due to cost-cutting 
measures. 595 
I would like to add a few comments to these important observations. First, I shall 
argue that although the news media is a key component of democratic society, the media 
can hardly be regarded as an entirely democratic institution since journalists and reporters 
are not elected by the public, but are employed by personnel managers or executives of 
media companies. If politicians have to worry about the possible impact of their words or 
policies on voters, the media staff should be anxious only about their bosses, opinions. 
Thus, they have no particular incentive for serving public interests. 
Furthermore, let us suppose that this not entirely democratic institution becomes 
completely independent and protected from all external influences. A favorite media 
saying is that every government is corrupt. But how corrupt should be a power that is not 
under any control from the public or other institutions? The media is the establishment 
that is frequently regarded as the fourth estate. How can this influential power which is 
under no public control be entirely honest, let alone be the main avenue of 
communication of democratic societies? 596 As Lord Acton has said: "Power corrupts; 
absolute power corrupts absolutel Y.,, 597 
593 Leanza, C. and Feld, H. (2005) "How Can Government Consitutionally Compel Mass Media to Provide 
News, and How Can Citizens Make It Happen", in E. Cohen (ed. ) News Incorporated: Corporate Media 
Ownership and its Threat to Democracy. New York: Prometheus Books, p. 188 
594 Bagdikian, B. (2004) The New Media Monopoly. Boston: Beacon Press, p. 260 
595 McChesney, R. (1999) Rich Media, Poor Democracy, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, and Phillips, 
P. (2005) "Beyond the New American Censorship", in E. Cohen (ed. ) News Incorporated. Corporate 
Media Ownership and its Threat to Democracy. New York: Prometheus Books, p. 36 
596 Of course, journalists have professional codes of ethics (see, for example, Belsey, A. and Chadwick, R. (eds. ) (1992) Ethical Issues in Journalism and the Media, London: Routledge. ), but politicians also have 
their codes of ethics and it is difficult to prove that media ethics is superiour to the ethics of politicians. 
597 Cited from Bagdikian, The New Media Monopoly, p. I 
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In addition, the fact that journalists are skilled writers does not necessarily mean 
that they want or are able to contextualise all their material from the broadest perspective 
and accurately present all events and facts. In other words, when the mass media are 
completely independent (that is to say, free from any form of public control), there is a 
high risk that this non-democratic institution would seek personal gain through the extort 
of considerable sums of money from other power elites for its silence or for a required 
presentation in the media agenda. 
Consequently, I shall argue that a solution of current media problems can be 
sought in transferring the media to the larger control of the public. Ben Bagdikian and 
598 
many others have expressed similar ideas. Following this, I would like to propose a 
diagram which illustrates the position of the media among major social institutions and 
supports the necessity of such a transformation. This diagram (Figure 8.1) represents 
main powers of contemporary societies and also suggests a recommended pattern of their 
relations with each other. 
Figure 8.1 Public Sphere and Major Powers of Contemporary Societies. 
598 Bagdikian, 71e New Media Monopoly, p. 263 
276 
In this diagram, the Media is located at the point that is equally distant from the 
other three powers. This position allows the media to be an efficient co-ordinator of the 
public sphere and to provide essential unbiased information exchange between the main 
components of society. It should be noted that the Media in this diagram is located at the 
point that is closer to the Public than points S and B. These two points represent the 
current position of the media in some authoritarian and democratic societies, reflecting 
that media organisations in these countries are partially controlled by state departments or 
business corporations. 
This scheme challenges the role of the media as the fourth estate. In my view, 
the modem media organisations are not as interested in providing a critical dialog 
between the parties as they are interested in a diminishment of contradictions and 
conflicts between the major players. However, I argue that the main goal of the media is 
to inform the public on the matters of public concern and to provide a platform for the 
exchange of diverse views and opinions. This approach could fuel a renaissance of the 
public sphere. 
The media should reflect the public will rather than form public opinion through a 
system of specifically developed techniques. There is no doubt that the media should be 
able to criticise the government. However, it does not mean that it should criticise all 
governmental. activities, regardless of their merit. Such an approach would be more likely 
to discredit the media rather than the government, especially when some state policies 
have popular support. 
It should be noted that the position of Russian mass media differs from the "ideal" 
model, which is shown in Figure 8.1. The Russian media was close to it at the very 
beginning of the 1990s, but it progressively moved under the control of large business 
groups (point B in Figure 8.1). Putin's policy towards the media initiated a slide of the 
ma ority of the media companies towards point S. Although Putin's approach has found 
many supporters among Russian people, the media are still more distanced from the 
public than is necessary in order to secure a healthy flow of communication and in order 
to encourage a critical dialog among all the parties involved. Consequently, more efforts 
from the government, the media and the public are needed in order to restore the public 
sphere in Russia. 
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Russian investigative journalism should play a very important role in this proccss. 
Obviously, political and business elites would prefer to minimise public knowledge about 
their activities, but it is the mission of investigative journalism to ensure public access to 
issues of public concern or to those that transgress the boundaries of legality. Rather than 
seek personal gain, this should be the main goal of investigative journalists. Certainly, 
this goal cannot be achieved without additional public funding and solid protection for 
investigative journalists. 
This is the suggested direction of the media reform in Russia. When the media 
companies are sufficiently protected from external pressures of powerful networks but 
still open to public control, and when the role of the media is not to teach people what 
they should think and how to vote, but rather to inform them about matters of public 
concern, the media is likely to become the centre of the public sphere. By this means it 
could provide the truly valuable dialog needed among major powers for the sustainable 
development of society. Otherwise, the media is at serious risk of becoming a corrupt 
power itself. One which dominates the political landscape, extracts rent in exchange for 
previously agreed media content, and trades its status of the fourth estate for the doubtful 
advantages of being the fifth network of Russian organised crime. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 
Main Actors of this Thesis 
Alexander Cheluskin 
-a friend of V. Yakovlev, he is suspected of links to the organised 
crime group controlled by the brothers Vasilevi 
Alexander Khinshtein 
- 
an investigative journalist (MoskovsAy Komsomolets) 
Alexander Kniazev 
- 
the director of TV company Samara 
Alexander Korzhakov 
- 
the head of presidential bodyguards 
Alexander Litvinenko 
- 
lieutenant-colonel of the FSB 
Alexander Malishev 
- 
the lord of one of the most powerful crime syndicates in St. 
Petersburg 
Alexander Nevzorov 
- 
an investigative journalist (the anchorman 600 Seconds) 
Alexander Solonik 
-a gangster, regarded as the killer N2 1 in Russia 
Anatoly Bikov 
-a lord of organised crime in Krasnoyarsk 
Anatoly Sobchak 
- 
the Mayor of St. Petersburg until 1996 
Andrey Karaulov 
- 
an investigative journalist (the anchorman of the show Moment Istini) 
Andrey Konstantinov 
- 
an investigative journalist, the director of the Agency of 
Investigative Reporters 
Badri Patarkatsishvili 
-a former manager of ORT and TV-6, a friend of Berezovsky 
Bella Kurkova 
-a head of the St. Petersburg television Channel 5 at the beginning of the 
1990S 
Boris Berezovsky 
-a media mogul 
Evgeny Kiselyov 
- 
the Director General of NTV, and than TV-6 
Irina Prudnikova 
- 
the former Director General of TRK Peterburg 
Irina Yakovleva 
- 
the wife of Hadimir Yakovlev 
Konstantin YakovIev (Kostia Mogila) 
-a lord of organised crime in St. Petersburg (killed 
in May 2003) 
Paul Klebnikov 
- 
an author of a book about Berezovsky, the editor-in-chief of Forbes in 
Russia, killed on 10 July 2004 
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Ludmila Narusova 
- 
the wife of Anatoly Sobchak 
Sergey Shevchenko 
- 
member of St. Petersburg Assembly (accused of extortion and links 
to organised crime) 
Sergey Dorenko 
-a popular reporter, Berezovsky's supporter 
Sergey Lisovsky 
-a media mogul, the President of a big Russian advertising company 
Sergey Mikhailov (Mikhas) 
-a lord of organised crime in Moscow 
Sergey Trolimov (Selvester) 
-a lord of organised crime in Moscow 
Vadim Tareev 
- 
the husband of Bella Kurkova 
Hadimir Barsukov (Kumarin) 
-a lord of the Tambovskaia organised crime group in St. 
Petersburg 
Wadimir GusinsAy 
-a media mogul 
Wadimir Kirpichev (Kirpich) 
- 
an influential thief in law 
Hadimir YakovIev 
- 
the mayor of St. Petersburg from 1996 until July 2003 
Vyacheslav Shevchenko 
- 
member of St. Petersburg Assembly, (accused of extortion and 
links to organised crime) 
Yan Gurevsky 
-a gangster of one of the most powerful crime groups in St. Petersburg 
Yulian Dubov 
- 
Director General of Logovaz, Berezovsky's supporter 
Yury Luzhkov 
- 
the Mayor of Moscow 
Yury Shutov 
-a Sobchak's adversary, who is accused of ties with organised crime and 
sentenced 
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Appendix 2 
Chronology: Selected Events Mentioned in this Thesis 
November 1982 Death of Brezhnev; Yury Andropov becomes leader 
February 1984 Death of Andropov, Konstantin Chemenko becomes leader 
March 1985 Death of Chemenko, Michael Gorbachev becomes leader 
December 1985 Boris Yeltsin becomes I" secretary of Moscow Office of the 
CPSU 
March 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev is elected by new legislature to new 
presidency of USSR 
July 1990 Law on the Mass Information Media (Law on the press) is 
adopted 
June 1991 Yeltsin wins Russian presidential election 
19-21 August 1991 GKChP, Putsch in Moscow 
December 1991 Dissolution of the Soviet Union 
27 December 1991 The Law on Mass Media is adopted 
21 December 1991 First issue of Nezavisimaia Gazeta appears 
October 1992 Russia's privatisation programme begins 
21 September 1993 Yeltsin suspends the Congress of People's Deputies 
24 July 1993 The Law on State Secrets is adopted 
October 1993 Tanks fire on the White House in Moscow 
October 1993 Censorship decreed temporarily for media 
17 October 1994 Dmitry Kholodov, a journalist for MoskovsAy Konuomolets is 
assassinated 
August 1994 Last Russian troops withdrawn from the Baltic states 
1 March 1995 Vlad Listev, Director General of ORT, is killed 
14 June 1995 The Federal Law on Advertising is adopted 
June 1995 Bella Kurkova, accused of corruption, is sacked from the post of 
the head of St. Petersburg television 
12 September 1995 Berezovsky helps Tretyakov to hold control over Nezavisimaia 
Gazeta 
18 October 1995 The Federal Law on The State Support of the Mass Media and 
Book Publishing is adopted by the Duma 
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25 January 1996 Oleg Slabynko, who used to be the Director of television at 
Ostankino, is assassinated 
May 1996 Andrey Konstantinov creates the Agency of Investigative 
Reporters 
June 1996 Gazprom purchases a 30 percent stake in NTV 
June 1996 Anatoly Sobchak defeated in re-election bid for mayor of St. 
Petersburg 
June 1996 Yeltsin appoints General Alexander Lebed to top security post 
3 July 1996 Yeltsin is re-elected as Russian President 
17 October 1996 Yeltsin fires Alexander Lebed 
17 November 1997 Litvinenko's press conference regarding criminal methods of the 
FS13 
10 September 1998 Dmitry Rozhdestvensky, a founder of Russian Video, is accused 
of the involvement in illegal business activities and arrested 
December 1998 Y. Shutov is elected to the St. Petersburg Legislative Assembly 
February 1999 Y. Shutov is arrested 
25 March 1999 A. Litvinenko is arrested 
October 1999 Oleg Chervonuk, a chairman of the firm the Baltic Press, along 
with his brother, is assassinated 
7 August 1999 The incursion into Dagestan by Chechen fighters 
9 August 1999 V. Putin is appointed Prime Minister 
8 September 1999 A building on Guryanova Street in Moscow is bombed 
31 December 1999 Yeltsin resigns 
9 March 2000 Borovik's aircraft crashes after taking off 
May 2000 Russian tax police, officers from the prosecutor's office and the 
FSB storm the Moscow headquarters of NTV and Media-Most 
and search the premises for 12 hours 
13 June 2000 Gusinsky is arrested 
16 June 2000 Gusinsky is released on bail 
II August 2000 Incident with the submarine Kursk 
16 September 2000 Gongadze, publisher of the Internet journal Uk-rainska Pravda, 
disappears. His corpse is found headless in a suburb of Kiev 
3 October 2000, Sergey Ivanov, the Director General of the channel Lada-TV, is 
assassinated 
November 2000 Litvinenko applies for asylum in the UK 
December 2000 Gusinsky is arrested by Spanish police 
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January 2001 M. Mirilashvili is arrested 
January 2001 Gazprom has taken a controlling stake of 46 percent in NTV 
March 2001 Berezovsky becomes the major shareholder of TV-6 
29 March 2001 Badri Patarkatsishvili s appointed general director of TV-6 
April 2001 Gazprom replaces the management of NTV 
14 April 2001 Badri Patarkatsishvili appoints E. Kiselyov interim general 
director of TV-6. Some reporters left NTV and start to work for 
TV-6 
14 December 2001 Sergey Kalinovsky, the editor-in-chief of the daily Moskovsky 
Komsornolets and the radio MK- Smolensk, disappears in 
Smolensk 
January 2002 TV-6, in which Berezovsky has 75 per cent stake, is shut down 
28 April 2002 General Lebed, the Governor of the Krasnoyarsky Kray is killed 
in a helicopter crash 
30 April 2002 Valery Ivanov, the chief editor of Toliatinskoe Obozreniye, is 
murdered 
7 May 2002 Valeriy Malishev, vice-governor of St. Petersburg, accused of 
corruption, dies 
25 June 2002 Oleg Sedinko, an owner of the TV company Novaia VoIna (A 
New Wave), is assassinated in Vladivostok 
May 2003 Konstantin Yakovlev (Kostia Mogila) is assassinated in Moscow 
July 2003 Vladimir Yakovlev, the Mayor of St. Petersburg, resigns 
September 2003 Berezovsky is granted asylum in the UK 
October 2003 Mikhail Khodorovsky is charged with tax evasion and arrested 
August 2003 Ruslan Kolian, a lord of organised crime, is assassinated 
October 2003 Yury Shutov is transferred from "Kresti", a St. Petersburg prison, 
to the Moscow special prison "Matrosskaya Tishina" 
24 February 2004 Putin sacked Ministers 
2 March 2004 Mariasov, vice-mayor of Novosibirsk is assassinated 
5 March 2004 Mikhail Fradkov is appointed the Prime Minister 
14 March 2004 Putin is re-elected as President of Russia 
25 March 2004 Corpses of Vyacheslav Shevchenko and Zorin are found in 
Cyprus 
12 April 2004 Boris Goldman, who won nomination Media Manager-2003 and 
was Head of the advertising agency New Found Quality (NFQ) 
is assassinated 
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9 May 2004 Kadirov, President of Chechnya, is assassinated in Grozny, 
Adam Khasanov, a Reuters cameraman, was among 14 people 
killed in the accident 
20 May 2004 European Court rules out that Russia abused Gusinsky's rights 
during conflict between Gazprom and Media-Most 
9 July 2004 Paul Klebnikov, the editor-in-chief of Forbes, is assassinated in 
Moscow 
17 September 2004 Vladimir Pritchin, the editor-in-chief of Severobaikalsk 
Television Company, is murdered on the course of a raid on 
poachers 
17 December 2004 Badri Patarkatsishvili s elected President of the National 
Olympic Committee of Georgia 
January 2005 Badri Patarkatsishvili s appointed President of the World Jewish 
Television 
February 2005 Berezovsky says he intends to leave London and move to 
Ukraine 
March 2005 A conflict between the editor-in-chief and a group of leading journalists for Moscow News 
9 June 2005 Three police officers allegedly involved in the murder of Maxim 
Maximov are arrested in St. Petersburg 
28 June 2005 Following the conflict, the Audit Committee of Moscow News 
resigns. Nevzolin, the owner of the newspaper, terminates 
funding and claims that he is ready to sale Moscow News for a 
dollar to everybody who will defend the freedom of speech in 
Russia 
4 July 2005 Moscow News is bought by Vadim Rabinovich, the Head of 
Media International Group in Ukraine, for less than F. 600,000. 
Kiselyov, editor-in-chief of Moscow News, resigns 
4 July 2005 RAO UES (70%) and Irena. and Dmitry Lcsnevskiy (30%) have 
sold Ren TV, the fifth largest Russian TV channel, to Severstal, a 
major industrial group controlled by Mordashev, for E60 million. 
17 July 2005 Khinshtein reveals some documents indicating that Kasianov, the 
former Russian Prime Minister, privatised and became the owner 
of a very well located property by paying considerably less its 
real cost. The Russian Prosecutor Office launches an inquest into 
the acquisition of the property 
18 July 2005 Prosecutors fail to prove V. Ivankov's (Yaponchik) guilt in the 
court and he is freed. Ivankov reveals his intention to write a 
book and accuses the news media of fictitious reports about him 
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Appendix 3 
List of Interviews 
Respondent Prq14*nlPosition city 
Vasiliy Entrepreneur St. Petersburg 
Stanislav Expert on organised crime St. Petersburg 
Alexander Former FSB officer London 
Nikolay Former Representative of the Russian 
Human Rights Committee 
Moscow 
Sergey Public relation assistant St. Petersburg 
Shishkina Administrator of the School of Journalism 
at St. Petersburg State University 
St. Petersburg 
V. Radaev Rector of Higher School of Economics Moscow 
Petr Investigative journalist St. Petersburg 
Evgeniy Senior manager of an agency of 
investigative reporters 
St. Petersburg 
Igor A TV reporter for a Russian news agency London 
Svetlana Journalist for St. Petersburg Vedomosti St. Petersburg 
Nikolay Executive of an agency of investigative 
reporters 
St. Petersburg 
Elena Russian journalist London 
Ivan Head of a summer school on Russian 
investigative journalism 
St. Petersburg 
H. Tumber Head of the School of Social Science at 
the City University 
London 
G. Karponosenko Professor of the School of Journalism at 
St. Petersburg State University 
St. Petersburg 
Otetc Sergey Russian priest London 
Vladimir Expert on the Russian mass media at a 
School of Journalism 
St. Petersburg 
Natalia Expert on the Russian mass 
media/Journalist 
St. Petersburg 
Nick British investigative journalist London 
Anatoliy Entrepreneur St. Petersburg 
D. Gavra, Professor on Mass Communications at a 
School of Journalism 
St. Petersburg 
Pavel Latvian Entrepreneur London 
Andrey Investigative journalist St. Petersburg 
Denis 
I 
Entrepreneur with close ties with 
organised crime groups 
St. Petersburg 
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Also, I have used: 
Borovik's interview to Tamara Matrtinova, Vesti, 11.03.2000. 
Borovik's interview to Petrovskaya, "Rassledovanie 
- 
delo dorogoe i opasnoe" 
Pvestigation is an expensive and risky business] in (200 1) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad [Already beyond of obstacles]. Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno", Moskva. 
Karaulov's interview to the newspaper Tribuna, Kuzina, N. (2002) "Poisk istini u nas v 
krovi" [The search for truth is essential for us), Tribuna, 16.05.2002. 
Lubimov's interview in (2001) Uzhe ne Veddia Pregrad [Already beyond obstacles]. 
Moskva: Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno". 
Rustam Arifdzhanov's interview in (2001) Uzhe ne Vedaia Pregrad [Already beyond of 
obstacles]. Moskva: Kollektcia "Sovershenno Sekretno". 
Nevzorov's interview to the newspaper Moskovsky Komsomolets-SPb, (2002) 
"Trekhsotletie 
- 
merzkaya data" [The 300-year Jubilee is a naughty date], Moskovsky 
Komsomolets-SPB, 28.08.2002. 
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